ML20100B455
| ML20100B455 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1985 |
| From: | Wilson R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 5211-85-2059, GL-84-24, IEB-82-04, IEB-82-4, RFW-0442, RFW-442, NUDOCS 8503280341 | |
| Download: ML20100B455 (19) | |
Text
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e GPU Nuclear Corporation NUOIM7 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany.New Jersey 07054-1149 (201)263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
March 25, 1985 5211-85-2059 RFW-0442 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
D. G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating Licensing No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-259 Response to Generic Letter 84-24 In accordance with your letter of December 27, 1984, GPUN has in place and is implementing an Environmental Qualification program which to our knowledge satisfies the requirements of 10CFR50.49. In response to your previous letter of March 25, 1984, GPUN outlined the Environmental Qualification Program and provided qualification status for each of the components on the Master List by letter dated December 11, 1984 (5211-84-2292). The Master List identified components which are needed in order to provide a qualified path to safe shutdown as well as equipment required to be qualified for post accident monitoring (RG 1.97) and other plant specific requirements. Attached to GPUN's letter of December ll, 1984 were nine Justifications for Interim Operation (JIO) for equipment which was not currently qualiiied but which was to be tested and qualified or replaced. Seven of these JI0's (TI-1-5, 7 & 8) are no longer applicable because of testing and replacement. On February 15, 1985 (5211-65-2032) GPUN provided a request for schedular extension for the remaining two components to November 30, 1985:
a) Incore Thermocouple Continental /
JIO-T1-84-6 Extension Cable and Connector Bendix Rev 2 (Encl. 3) b) Hi Range Rad Monitor Anaconda /
JIO-T1-84-9 Cable and Assembly Victoreen Rev 2 (Encl. 4) 8503280341 850325 PDR ADOCK 05000289 I
G PDR
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GPU Nuc! car Corporat:cn is a subs:d:ary of Genera! Pub!!c Ut:!:t:cs Corporation g
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- GPUN also indicated some open items which will be resolved by March 31, 1985-
~,
.(Enclosure 1). All other safety related electrical equipment required to be-ehvironmentally qualified is considered fully qualified.
Further, GP!!N has revien d the I&E Bulletin and Notices listed in your letter of December 27, 1984. Summary information on relevance is provided in.
Additional information concerning the relevant Bulletin / Notices is' contained in the respective EQ file.
- cerdly, f'
S-R. F. Wlison Director Technical Functions m
Sworn and subscribed to before me this ),f/,' day of [7pg/
1985
'lr/1422f 4AfCL k A/w[O cc:
R. Conte f,nnensulenco u,,,7ge a nw ac :n J.'t. Stolz My c:r.misem CW3 4 031337 J. Van V1iet 5
0
Open Items List The following open items are described in our submittal of November 9, 1984'and December 11, 1984 (Attachment 5) and are planned for completion by March 31, 1985. Currently the modifications of Section A are installed and are awaiting turnover to the plant except A.2 which is in testing.
A.
Modifications 1.
Replacement of the differential pressure transmitters for MU23-DPT 1,2,3&4 and MU-42DPT with qualified Rosemount transmitters (JIO-TI-84-4).
2.
Replacement of the level transmitters for MU-14-LT with a qualified transmitter (JIO-TI-84-4).
- 3. ' Replacement of the differential pressure transmitters for BS-1-DPT 1 & 2 with a qualified transmitter (JIO-TI-84-2).
'4.
Replacement of the Decay Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature (DH-2-TE 1& 2) with qualified RTD's (JIO-TI-84-5).
5.
Replacement of the low pressure injection (LPI) flow indication (DH-lDPT-1&2) with a qualified Rosemount transmitter (JIO-TI-84-1).
6.
Replacement of the cold juncticn RTD's (TE 952A-955A) with qualified RTD's (JIO-TI-84-7).
B.
File Status (See Revised Attachment 5 attached)
P to Enclosure 1 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION ATTACHMENT 5*
TMI-l EQ FILES STATUS REV. 1 MANUFACTURER /
MODEL N0./
FILE N0.
COMPONENT QUALIFICATION STATUS EQ-TI-103 Limitorque Qualified.
Various (Containment)
Valve Motor Operators
.EQ-TI-105 Limitorque Qualified SMB-0, -000, -1,-2,-3 Valve Actuators (Auxiliary Building)
EQ-TI-113-ASCO Qualified DHV-4B will have a 206-381-5RVF qualified terminal block
'206-381-7RVF installed to correct a motor NP 8316 66E leads problem by March 31,_1985.
Solenoid Valves EQ-TI-114 ASCO Qualified 8316, 8321 Series Solenoid Valves EQ-TI-ll5 Square D Qualified 9013-AMG-5 Pressure Switch EQ-TI-il7 Static-0-Ring
. Qualified 9TA, 4N6 and 12N6 Series-Pressure Switches EQ-TI-ll8 Rosemount Qualified 1153 Series D Pressure Transmitters
- GPUN. letter dated 12/11/84 (5211-84-2292)
~
l
. EQ-TI-119 Westinghouse Qualified Class lE Large A.C.
Pump Motors EQ-TI-121 General Electric Qualified 5K37JG403 Pump Motor EQ-TI-123 General Electric Qualified 5K810037Al Pump Motors EQ-TI-124 Transamerica Delaval (GEMS) Qualified XM54852 Level Transmitter EQ-TI-127 Namco Qualified M8, D2400X'and SL Series Limit Switches EQ-TI-128 Bailey Meter Qualified BY 8841X-A BY 3840X-A Level Transmitter EQ-TI-129 Rosemount Qualified 1152 Pressure Transmitter EQ-TI-130 Rosemount Qualified 177HW-2 EQ-TI-131' Conax Qualified Modified PL Series /
7590-10000-01 through 23 Conduit Connector EQ-TI-132 Micro Switch Qualified BZE6-2RN DTE6-2RN Limit Switches
,o uc e EQ-TI-133,
General Semiconductor Radiation test completed. Qualified JTXIN6071A subject to replacement of the Voltage Suppression suppression diodes associated with Diode solenoid valves SV/ ICV-3, SV/MUV-3, and SV/MUV-18 with selected units having low' measured values of leakagecurrent-(I)R (JIO-TI-84-8). Replacement will be completed by March 31, 1985.
- EQ-TI-13'4 Ray hem Qualified WCSF-200-N Low Voltage Splice (IKV)
EQ-TI-135 Target Rock Qualified 80Z-14-003, 80Z-14-005, 80Z-14-008 Solenoid Valves
.EQ-TI-137 General Electric Qualification documentation has F01. Series been prepared by the vendor in
-Containment Electrical which they conclude that
' Penetration the penetrations are qualified with no outstanding items.
Documentation will be received and reviewed by March 31, 1985.
EQ-TI-138 Ross Qualified 2676A4011 (Pilot and Solenoid Assembly, Part No. 233C93) Solenoid Assembly EQ-TI-139 Babcock and Wilcox As described in our request for Incore Thermocouple schedular extension dated Feb. 12 Monitoring System 1985 the cable and connector will be tested in April-with a report due in May. In the event that the cable fails to pass it will be replaced ~1n Nov. 1985 with qualified cable..See JIO-TI-84-6 *
-Rev. 2 (Enclosuret3).
EQ-TI-141 Valcor Qualified.
V526-5296 Solenoid Valves EQ-TI-142 Rockwell International Qualified 190MM23001 Thermal Hydrogen Recombiner
.~
l 4-EQ-TI-143
[Compsip Qualified
. KIII/KIV Hydrogen Analyzer System EQ-TI-144-Victoreen Detector qualified.
877-1 Documentation is not available to Radiation Detector support qualification for the existing cable assembly. See JIO-TI-84-9 Rev. 2 (Enclosure 4)'
'EQ-TI-147 ASCO Qualified subject to confirmation
.SA21AR-of installation documentation for
-Pressure Switches s
PS-479A/B/C to~be completed by March 31, 1985.
. EQ-TI-1481
. Bailey Meter Replaced by qualified Weed RTD's B3032685F (EQ-TI-136). See Item A.4 (JIO-TI-84-5)
RTD-EQ-TI-149 Rosemount Qualified' 1153 Series B-Pressure-Transmitters a
5 1
l
EQ Bulletin / Notices Summary IEB/N Subject Relevant Comment 82-04 Cont. Elect.
No GPUN ltr 5/20/83
'.:P Penetration Assemb.
(5211-83-164) 82-11 Inaccuracies in Wide No TMI-l is not a Range Press. Inst.
Westinghouse plant.
s 82-52 Test Summary No ASCO NP 1 not Reports 1-11 exposed to greater than 20 Mrads 83-45 GE CR-2940 No Not used on Class Position Selector lE Equipment in Switch radiation areas approaching 10 MRads.
83-72 Test Summary Yes 13,17,18,22&24 Reports 12-24 Apply 84-23 ASCO solenoid Yes Only SV 3&4 Valves No. 8344 &
FWV-17B 8316 84-44 Rockbestos Cable Yes Qualified to D0R Guidelines 84-47 Terminal Blocks Yes Inside containment TMI-l use Raychem Splice. Outside containment TB's are used L_
2-84-57 Moisture Intrusion Yes Moisture intrusion effects on specific components have been addressed in the relevant EQ files. EQ related maintenance /
surveillance requirements are identified to the plant on the SCEWs. The
-preventive actions in IEN-84-57 are under review.
84-68 Field wiring of Yes Valcor e,d Target Solenoid valves Rock.
84-78 Underated Terminal Yes Generally. Speci-Blocks (Sean Products) fically TMI-l has no Beau Terminal Blocks in the EQ.
Program o
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4 f-4 9
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e, Enclosure'3 JIO-T1-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1,1985 Page 1 of 7
_ COMPONENT Tag No:
None
==
Description:==
TMI-l Incore Thermocouple Cable Assembly
_0BJECTIVE The objective of this JIO is:
a.
to demonstrate that the safety function can be accomplished within the time frame for which the cable assembly is qualified.
b.
to demonstrate that the safety function can be accomplished by designated alternative instrumentation.
c.
to demonstrate the applicability of TMI-2 accident test data in support of the cable assembly qualification.
EQUIPMENT-DESCRIPTION Equipment Description l
Manufacturer l
Model No.
l l
Incore Monitoring System l Babcock & Wilc.ox l
DA7L-18-lT-lC-128 I
I Incore assembly to cable l
Benoix l
JT07A-14-19P (302) connector l
l JT06A-14-195 (101) i I
Cable l Continental Wire & Cable Co. l GAI B/M EK-15L The incore thermocouple cable, wnich extends from the incore assembly connector to the reactor building penetration has not been demonstrated to be environmentally qualified in accordance with 10CFR50.49 for the combined steam and pressure / temperature environment associated with a large break LOCA or steam line break accident.
EQUIPMENT LOCATION The incore thermocouple junctions are located in the outlet plenum of the fuel assemblies, inside the reactor vessel.
The thermocouple wires for each assembly pass through a pressure boundary (seal plate) located on the south side of elevation 346' inside containment. This elevation is the operating deck and is outside the reactor cavity and D-ring. The cable assembly is, therefore, protected against the jet impingement effects of LOCAs and HELBs.
It is exposed to the bulk containment environment. The Bendix connector, which is located outside of the seal plate pressure boundary, enables the incore detector assembly to be connected to an external cable that extends to the containment penetration.
s
JIO-T1-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1, 1985 Page 2 of 7 EQUIPMENT FUNCTION The incore thermocouples provide a direct measurement of the core outlet temperature from 52 locations in the outlet plenum of the fuel assemblies.
Data from all of the 52 incore T/C data are available in the control room via the plant computer. Sixteen of these T/Cs (4 per quadrant) may be read out digitally in the control room. These 16 T/Cs are designated as the Backup Incore Readout System (BIR0).
EVALUATION a.
Large Break LOCA Steam / Pressure / Temperature The incore thermocouples are used to indicate that the core is being cooled by verifying the effects of LPI cooling. The minimum qualification period is the time necessary to achieve and verify stable cooling by the low pressure injection (LPI) system. For the smallest large break LOCA 2
of 0.5 Ft, the RCS depressurizes to pressures at which LPI achieves full flow in under five minutes (refer to Figure C-10 of Reference 1).
Within two hours, the LPI suction would be established from the building sump and long term core cooling established. Flow of at least 1000 gpm per LPI train is specified in plant procedures.
In the case of a core flood line break accident, this assures at least 1000 gpm to the vessel.
This is sufficient flow to ass 9ee adequate core cooling for any large break LOCA. Long term indication that core cooling it, maintained may also be obtained from LPI heat removal path components.
The principal method of assuring stable long term cooling is by monitoring low pressure injection flow. This instrumentation will be qualified for operation in a post-LOCA environment before restart of TMI-1. Additional qualified instrumentation will also be available to determine that the DH heat exchangers are functioning (DH outlet temperature and certain secondary services cooling water temperature will be available to the operator as per R.G.1.97).
Verification of proper heat exchanger performance and LPI flow assures long term core cooling l
following any large break LOCA.
l b.
_Use of Incore Thermocouples During Accident / Transients (SB LOCA and HELB Inside Containment) 1.
Alternate Instrumentation The symptom oriented emergency procedures at TMI-l cover both design j
basis and beyond design basis accidents and transients. ATPs refer to l
the incore thermocouples for use in the following situations:
l
~
JIO-T1-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1, 1985 Page 3 of 7 INDICATION ACTION ALTERNATE 1.
Subcooling margin (SCM)
calculate SCM once flow is verified in the RC loops in accordance with plant procedure ATP 1210-10. (see Item 5) 2.
Subcooling margin
- Allowed to throttle use RCS pressure greater than 25FI HPI if pressurizer and temperature and level is on scale calculate SCM once
- Restart RCPs flow is verified in the RC loops in accordance with plant procedure ATP 1210-10. (see Item 5) 3.
Subcooling margin
- Throttle HPI to Use RCS pressure approaching 100F prevent exceeding and temperature and subcoolingl PTS limits calculate SCM once flow is verified in the RC loops in accordance with plant precedure ATP 1210-10. (see Item 5) 4.
Incore T/Cs do not
- Maintain a minimum Plant procedure re-l indicate a decreasing EFW flow of at quires 0TSG 1evel temperature trend least 225 gpm until to be raised to 90-t OTSG level reaches 95% upon loss of l
90 - 95% (Ref 8)
SCM (see Item 1) although minimum flow would not be l
specified. OTSG level would still be raised to 90-95%
in time to prevent prevent core un-covery I
With reactor coolant pumps running, the subcooling margin is calculated from the hot leg RTDs.
If RCPs are off, the subcooling margin is calculated from the incore thermocouples.
l
JIO-T1-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1, 1985 Page 4 of 7 INDICATION ACTION ALTERNATE 5.
Incore T/Cs and hot leg RTDs not
- This is one indi-Use RCS temperature trending together cation of a loss TH0T + TCOLD of natural circula-0TSG level and tion. Attempt to re-establish natural pressure steam &
feed flow circulation flow None of the above actions are taken during a large break LOCA HELBs and SB LOCAs and prevent core damage.are intend Rather, they 2.
_T/C Required Operating Time and Environment heat in 2 - 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during an SB LOCA.The RCS would be quickly depressurize the RCS to LPI operating conditionsFor an SB LOCA cooling system heat removal capacity will exceed the ener,gy release the containment the reactor building while the OTSG heat removal system removes th decay heat and cools the RCS.
Thus, the containment pressure and re temperature will be returned to nearly pre-event conditions within a relatively short period.
LPI mode core cooling can be confirmed from L by the.LPI flow.
and DH heat removal system performance monitoring.
Therefore, the incore thermocouples would have to be available for a 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> in order to procedure functions. perform the above actions specified in the emergency At the end of that time, the RCS would be cooled down and depressurized with LPI removing decay heat.
can be described into categories based on their effect on RCS pressure Small break LOCAs The following discussion describes these three categories and discus the time required for incore T/Cs during each type break and the effect of such a break on the containment environmant.
The largest small break LOCAs result in continuous depressurization t the LPI setpoint. Examples of such RCS pressure responses are illust in B&W ECCS analyses (Reference 3) and TMI-l AT0G, Part II, Volume rated (Reference 4).
feet) depressurize to below the core flood tank actuation about 15 minutes.
to remove decay heat, continued cooldown and depressuri pressures at which LPI flow is established is on the order of several hours.
LPI flow and DH heat exchanger performance.Once LPI flow is e large enough to remove decay heat, the containment temperature andSinc pressure peaks at about 30 psig and 240-250F.
s.
JIO-T1-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1, 1985 Page 5 of 7 t
The.next' size category of breaks (about 0.1 to.02 square feet) stabi'.;zes at pressures near the OTSG pressure. This occurs because the break is too small to remove decay heat. The OTSGs remove the remaining decay heat and cool the cold leg temperature to the OTSG saturation temperature. As RCS pressure decreases, the break flow decreases, and HPI flow increases.
With two HPI pumps available, the sensible heat of the HPI in combination with the break flow exceeds decay heat almost immediately and depressur-izas the RCS to the LPI setpoint.in;several hours. With one HPI pump available, the break is large enough to initially exceed the flow from one HPI pump. The RCS either does not refill until several hours into the transient or until the LPI system is initiated. Nevertheless, break flow in combination with the sensible heat removal from HPI flow depressurizes 4
and cools the RCS..
Reference:
3 shows the response for break sizes as small as.055 square feet result in depressurization to the core flood tank pressures in less than 45 minutes. Based on mass and energy balance calculations, the RCS depressurizes to the LPI initiation setpoint in less than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (Reference 4). HPI flow to the vessel is assumed to be a maximum of 330 gpm (i.e. 64% to the core and 36% out the break).
The containment response to such a break (.085 ft2 LOCA) with one HPI l
pump available has been analyzed in Reference 6.
The building active and passive heat sinks remove the energy relieved to the building for this class of breaks.
Pressure never exceeds 15 psig and temperature, which e
peaks at 200F is reduced below 175F within 10 minutes.
f I.
The third class of small breaks belongs to those which are too small to
' remove decay heat or pass full HPI flow. The initial result is a voiding of the RCS and loss of heat transfor to the secondary side. Eventually, the RCS voids sufficiently to initjate boiler condenser heat transfer to the OTSGs and RCS pressure decreads. Reduction of RCS pressure to the
(
CFT actuation setpoint will cause the RCS to continue cooldown even without OTSG heat transfer. The system begins to fill as a result of this depressurization (break flow decreases and HPI flow increases).
In 2-3 hours, the decay heat drops off sufficiently to cause the RCS to begin cooling down even without OTSG heat transfer. HPI flow exceeds the break
' flow at this time.
Considering only mass and energy balances, the RCS could be refilled in several hours for this break. However, steam voids in the hot leg U-bend could delay refill and re-establishment of-single phase natural circulation. Procedural guidance for bumping RC pumps would cause the system to refill.
If the RCS repressurized to 2300 psig, the PORV would be opened as per procedures. This action will reduce RCS pressure until i
the CFTs activate. CFT flow in conjunction with HPI flow is sufficient to if cause the RCS to cooldown and depressurize. Alternatively, opening the hot leg vents would allow refill of the system if the hot legs contained steam in the U-bend but subcooled water in the remainder of the hot leg piping.
The containment conditions for this class break are comparable (but less severe) than results shown for the.085 ft2 LOCA.
JIO-Tl-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1,1985 Page 6 of 7 3.
TMI-2 Experience Experience from the TMI-2 accident gives indication that the cable assembly can survive high humidity temperatures between 140 and 180F (Reference 9, " Equipment and Actuation Matrix") and chemical spray.
Inspections performed on the TMI-2 cables indicate that fifty (50) thermocouples are known to have electrical continuity through the seal table to the internal area of the reactor vessel (References 2 and 7).
The remaining two (2) thermocouple cabler are in an unknown condition at this time with an open connection either at the seal table or internal to the vessel. This condition is being investigated. The cable and connection at the seal table are being removed for examination and test.ing (see " Qualification Plan" below). EG&G has concluded that the only evidence that the problem could be at the seal table (i.e. external to the vessel) is that the anomalies seen on these two cables are different from the other cables. All other thermocouples are known to be damaged inside the reactor vessel as a result of. core damage. However, they also believe that the condition of these two cables could be an
-actual physical condition inside the reactor vessel. The incore thermocouple anomaly is similar to two SPND cables that are known to be in a damaged area having indications of being open and dry (while they are expected to be open and wet) (References 2 and 7). This further supports the suggestion that the two anomalous thermocouples may be damaged internal to the reactor vessel.
'UALIFICATION PLAN Q
GPUN is pursuing parallel paths concerning the incore thermocouple extension cable qualification.
The first path includes testing of the extension cable between the seal plate connector and the containment penetration to verify qualification. Results of this test will be available by May 1985. This testing will include the same type of cable that was exposed to the TMI-2 accident environment. The second path involves the replacement of the extension wires with qualified cable should the cables fail and the connectors pass the test. The resolution of this item will be based on the results of the testing. The test plan is currently under review. The schedule for completion of testing of the extension cable and connector is 30 weeks for-procurement and fabrication, and 28 weeks for engineering and installation.
Eighteen of those 28 weeks overlap with the procurement and fabrication schedule.
RESULTS For large break LOCAs:
The safety function is accomplished by procedural guidance and qualified instrumentation without reliance on the incore thermocouple assemblies.
For SB LOCAs and HEL8 inside containtment:
The safety function can be accomplished by alternate qualified instrumentation with existing procedural guidance.
JIO-T1-84-6, Rev. 2 March 1, 1985 Page 7 of 7 The safety function can be accomplished within the relatively short time (2-10 hours) and in a relatively benign containment environment using the incore thermocouple assemblies.
The safety function can be accomplished based on inspections of the TMI-2 incore thermoccuple assemblies which are similar to those at TMI-l.
CONCLUSIONS The information provided in this discussion demonstrates safe plant operation with important to safety electrical equipment that has not yet been qualified in accordance with 10CFR50.49.
Safe plant operation has been demonstrated by meeting the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.49 which are addressed as objectives of this justification.
REFERENCES 1.
R. C. Jones, J. Biller, 8. M. Dunn, "ECCS Analysis of B&W's 177-FA Lowered-Loop NSS-Rev 3".
July 1977.
BAW 10103A. Babcock & Wilcox, Co.
Lynchburg, VA.
2.
R. Meininger to Distribution, " Examination of TMI-l Incore Extension Cable and Seal Table Cor.nector - RDM-58-84". November 7, 1984. EG&G.
Middletown, PA.
3.
James H. Taylor, Letter to S. A. Varga, US NRC.
July 18, 1978.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., Lynchburg, VA.
4.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., " Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines".
Doc ID 74-1124158-00. April 6, 1983. Lynchburg, VA.
5.
Calculation Number C-1101-220-5450-023, "CSMP Analysis of TMI-l SB LOCA Response".
6.
L. C. Lanese. " Containment Response to Small Break LOCAs". TDR 644. Draft.
7.
TMI-2 Incore Instrumentation Damage - An Update GEND-INF-031, Volume II.
April 1984. EG&G, Idaho Falls, Idaho.
8.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.
Evaluation of SBLOCA Operating Procedures and Effectiveness of Emergency Feedwater Spray for B&W - Designed NSSS.
February 1983. B&W Doc ID 77-1141270-00. Lynchburg, VA.
9.
" Analysis of Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Accident", Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, NSAC-80-1. March 1980.
JIO-TI-84-09 Rev. 2 March 13, 1985 Page 1 of 3 Justification for Interim Operation 1.0' Component Victoreen Monitor Cable and Connector Assembly Tag No.:
RMG 22 & 23 2.0-Objective The objective of this JIO.is to demonstrate that:
The safety function can be accomplished by some designated alternative equipment if the principal equipment has not been demonstrated to be fully qualified.
3.0 Existing Equipment Description The cable assembly consists of the following components:
3.1 Device Type Manufacturer Model No.
Cable Anaconda / Time Wire FR-13AA Cable Connector Victoreen Pt No. 877-1-5 High Temperature Software Victoreen Pt No. MS#A-0015 Potting Resin Victoreen Pt No. MS# J4375 Shrink Sleeving.
Victoreen Pt No. MSfH-6229 Nickel Seal Victoreen Pt No. 877-1-60 Adhesive, Duhesive No. 300 Victoreen Pt No. MS# J4365 Pull Box GPU field None Stainless Steel Hose Swagelok SS-12HU-6-S12 Heat Shrinkable tube / splice Raychem WCSF-N 4.0 Equipment Location The cable assembly is located inside the containment at 362-0" elevation.
This-cable assembly runs from the containment penetration to the Victoreen radiat'on detectors RMG-22 & 23 mounted on top the "D" rings. The normal radiological dose rate in this compartment is 10 to 100 MR/hr which results in a maximum integrated dose of 3.4x104 Rads over 40 years at doseis2.0x10yreof125'F. During a LOCA the postulated total integrated aging temperat
, at a temperature of 275*F.
1 JIO 84-9 Rev. 2.
March 13.-1985 Page 2 of 3 s:
5'.0-Equipment Function
~
L This cable assembly delivers _high voltage to the high range monitor-Lionization' chamber (877-1) inside the containment building and provides return-signals to the'ratemeter mounted in panel PRF in the Main Control Room (MCR). The_ equipment. performs no safety function but is used
~ exclusively for post-accident monitoring.
^However, this monitor does' perform the-following functions:
a '. Provides indication which may restrict personnel access to.the Reactor Building under high radiation conditions, b.
Provides limited gross radiation data following an accident involving
-high radiation release to the Reactor Building.
6.0-Evaluation
~ )1 As.an alternate over the short term, RMG 8 will be used. RM G8 is an 8 a
decade containment-dome monitor equipped with a high range gama sensitive ionization chamber detector located in the Reactor. Building. RMG 8 Monitors airborne activity thru 2 inches of lead which shields the detector and_ desensitizes it.to detect radiation-levels from.0lR/hr. up to lx106 R/hr. This monitor is powered from the 10 vital bu~s.- This ionization chamber detector is housed in a watertight container hermetically sealed to withstand the Reactor Building post accident pressure. This monitor reads out and alarms in the control room.
-Although this monitor has'not-been environmentally qualified; based on the accident at TMI-2, this type monitor provided the necessary functions in-the post accident environment. TMI-l and TMI-2 both have Victoreen Model 847-1 detector and 846-1 ratemeter for containment dome radiation monitoring.
The failure of the Time Wire Cable will not:
a., Degrade any safety function because the system is fused to protect faults from affecting other Class _lE systems or
-b.. Mislead the operator because under very low voltage s'ituations an alarm is indicated in the control-room informing the operator-to use' alternate instrumentation (TMI-l alarm procedures'PRF-1-2-8 and 1-3-8).. In the case of a low voltage signal (not: low enough.to alarm) the operator will check the-redundant channel and the dome monitor
~
.(RMG-8) based on training received in the operation of these monitors.
^
b) As.an alternate over the long term, the Containment Atmospheric Post Accident Sampling System (CAPASS) will.be used.
It is capable of taking a Reactor. Building atmospheric sample from which radioactivity level may be determined. The CAPASS is located outside the reactor building.
JIO-TI-84-9 Rev. 2 March 13, 1985 Page 3 of 3 7.0 Equipment-Qualification Program The modified Time wire will be replaced with qualified triaxial cable.
Delivery of the cable and connector at the detector end is expected in approximately 15 weeks after receipt of the purchase order.
Installation would require a scheduled shutdown of 30 days.
8.0 Results
^
Based on the evaluation in Section 6.0, the equipment is qualified a.
- based on experience (testing) at TMI-2 for its designated function, b.
The objective of the JIO has been satisfied by the evaluation.
9.0 Conclusion
' Safe plant operation with electrical equipment important to safety, as defined in 10CFR50.49, which has not yet been qualified has been demonstrated by the information provided in this JIO. This has been accomplished by meeting the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.49.
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