ML20099L265
| ML20099L265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1995 |
| From: | GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OLA-3-A171O, NUDOCS 9512200261 | |
| Download: ML20099L265 (2) | |
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' ~ u ~~u LlcENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI
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.nm OF ICE (
SECRFTARY E=
Durin REs enfatest run of the DG on 3-30-90, one of the Eg switc es (TS firipWdandwouldnotreset. This appeared to be an intermitt nt a ilure >ecause it subsequently mechanically reset.
This switch and the leaking switch (TS-19112) were replaced with new switches. All subsequent testing was conducted with no additional problems.
A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine the i
actual jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts without air rolling the engine to replicate the starts of 3-20-90. The test showed that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady.
Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures),
special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs /b '8N#N were performed under various conditions. After th: 3--20 90 rient,(the vere ' control systems of both engines + hr/e 6:Or subjected to a comprehensive test program. -Eut::quent t; t'+.h--tett pr;; rem, 001 A :nd 0010 h:= 5::n started :t -lea:t--!! ti :: :::h :nd n: failur : cr pr:51::: S:n
- urred dur "; any ef there st: rte.
!= additten, :n underveltage si;rt-test with;ut-tir rell was conducted n 4-0 00 ;nd 001A -sterted
- nd ?::ded proper?y.'
M4er-cornp/ch of the confo/ foyiG
+cet se.p ence, a n u n de r vo Hag 6 -fe.sf Was pedorm ed,.
fnc.luding 4he undervoMage feds e.ach enyne has been j
.suc. cess-Tully.S}arled eleven hes wNh no skri
-failures.
Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the jacket water high temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on i
3-20-90.
E.
ANAL.YSIS OF EVENT 4
The loss of offsite power to Class lE bus IBA03 and the failure of DG1A to start and operate successfully, coupled with DGlB and RAT IB being out of i
service for maintenance, resulted in Unit I being without AC power to both Class 1E busses. With both Class 1E busses deenergized, the RHR System i
could not perform its required safety function. Based on a noted rate of rise in 'the RCS temperature of 45 degrees F in 36 winutues, the RCS water would not have been expected to begin boiling until approximately I hour and 36 minutes after the beginning of the event.
I Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equipment hatch wed completed well within the estimated I hour and 36 minutes for the projected onset of boiling in the RCS. A review of inforsation obtained from the l
Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) and grab sample analysis indicated all normal values. As a result of this event, no increase in radioactive releases to either the containment or the
,l environment occurred.
l 9512200261 950906 PDR ADOCK 05000424 92 PRCUECT 057495 0
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