ML20099K245
| ML20099K245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1992 |
| From: | Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| WM-92-0135, WM-92-135, NUDOCS 9208250299 | |
| Download: ML20099K245 (4) | |
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1 NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION August 21, 1992 Dart D Withers ern,oent and hi! 92-0135 i
cret t m owe omcor i
(f.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTil!
Document Control Desk liail Station P1-137 Wahington, D. C.
20555
Reference:
Letter dated July 20, 1992 from A.
B.
Beach, llRC to B.
D. Withers, WCNOC l
Subject:
Dc.eket No. 50-482:
Response to Weaknesses 402/9211-91, 482/9213-02 and 482/9213-03 Gent 1emen This letter provides Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Co rpo r a t inn' s resporise to Weuknesses 482/9213-01, 482/9213-02 and 482/9213-03 as a result of an inspection of the operational statur, of the emergency preparedncas program and dose calculation and assessment.
Weakness 4b2/9212-01 involved emergen<y clauaification of accident condi t. ions by operating utews.
Weakness 9213 02 consisted of several e.v-upples of errors and umissione i n notification snoon,49es at i in the formulation and issuance of prot ect (ve action r e crenne nda t. J on s.
Weakness 482/9213-03 iden ified the failure of the dose assessment proceduto to provide guidance on c' 'aining accurate integrated dose projections based on prior release conditions, If you have any questions concerning this matter, please cont a ct me or Mr. Kevin J. Moles of my ataff.
Very t ruly youro,
/
4 1
&s Bart D. Wit hers President and Chief Executive officer LDW/jra Attachment ec; A.
T.
howell (NRC), w/a J.
L. Milhoan (NRC), w/a G.
A.
Pick (NRC), w/a U.
D.
Reckley (NRC), w/a D.
B.
Spittberg (NRC), u/a f
9208250299 920821 g C/
PDR ADOCH 05000482 O
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PO Box 411, Burbngton. KS 66833. Phone (316) 364-6431
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At taciune nt to WM PC 0135 Page 1 of 3 Weakness (482/9213-01):
Emf 123r _y ClM2111 sata.2n cf hacMellt Con 14119m The inspector observed and evaluated the abi;.tf ot each crew to det ect,
assess, and classify abnormal and accident cond'tions.
Two out of three etews failed to recogni e that emergency action level iniciating conditions had been met for a scenar.o event.
Consequently, the two shift supervisors did not declare a Site Area Emergency when they becama aware of plant conditions indicating a breach of, or challenge to the integrity of two fission product barriers.
Specifically, fuel cladding was challenged as the result of an anticipated transient without trip, and cont aitunent was breached because of a steam generator atmospheric relief valve that was stuck open and unisolable.
These conditions met the emergency action level for a Site Area Emergency contained in EPP 01-2.1, " Emergency Classification."
Analvsigt buring interviews with operators it was evident that Emergency Plan Procedure, EPP 01-2.1,
" Emergency classification" phraseclogy lead to the weakness.
The wording in Step 3.6.3 of procedure EPP 01-2.1 can lead to confusion in classifying a containment breach when coupled with another fission product barrier breach.
Q_Qngslive Actions:
Procedure EPP 01-2.1 will be revised to clarify Step 3.6.3.
A course titled,
" Emergency Plan Practical" will be retaught during the current operator requalification training cycle.
Classifiertions made during the requalification training by each operating crew will also be reviewed.
Date When Corrective Act ion Will Be Completg.d:
Procedure EPP 01-2.1 will be revised by October 30, 1992 and issued within 30 days of NRC approval.
- The current operator requalification training cycle will be completed September 11, 1992.
P,eview and critique of classifications made by operating crews are conducted after each session on the simulator and will also be completed by September 11, 1992.
Neakness (482/9213-02): - tLotifications a.ni.E.rotective Action Empp10 min.dations Made to Offsite Authorities Errors and omissions in notification messages and in the formulation and issuance of protectiv'e action recommendations were identified during the walkthroughs as evidenced by several observations.
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I Attachment to PN 92-0135 Page 2 of 3 h!1R1Y.212 :
Only the classifivntion section of Part A trom the Irmnediate !Jotification rozm is reviewed during Operator Requalification Examinations Therefore, only this section has been emphasized during training.
This has resulted in inexperience in cornpleting the entire notification form.
Cptrective Actionet Simulator training scenarios will be reviewed to ensure _ they contain sufficient detail for the instructor to evaluate if the immediate flotification form has been. completed correctly. During all future simulator sessions, with the exception of practice examinations and requalif cation examinations, all 1
of Part A of the immediate flotification form will be completed by the Shift Supervisor.
The form will be evaluated.vith the Shift Supervisor as part of
- the critique session.
_ Annually, Emergency Plan personnel or-Training personnel, will monitor each crew for proper form ccmpletto.1.
M R Ehen Corrective.ActiLns Will f.g._Ccmpletedt.
In order to allow several opportunities for each crew be on the simulator, i
corrective actions will be completed by 14 arch 31, 1993.
Weakness (482/9213-03):
Dilure of the Dose Ag.igamment Procedure to Providt Quidance on obtainina Accurate Inteorated Dose hoiectiong.Jased on Priorlglease Conditions one crew was unable to obtain an accurate estimate of the offsite radiological consequences of the release, because the dose assessment procedure did. not provide guidance for initiating a dose projection after initial release conditions had changed significantly.
In this case, the chemistry technician had been dispatched from the control room by the emergency director prior to (Se release to obtain steam generator samples.
When he returned, the release had been in progress for approximately 20 minutes.
The chemistry technician then promptly calculated the initial post-release dose projections in accordance with EPP. 01-7. 2 but used real time flow data from the release source.
At'the time, however, the flow had decreased about 70 percent since the onset of the release because of depressuristtion.
Therefore, this dose projection did not provide an accurate assessment of the consequences of the release from the time it began, i
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J Attachment to 21 92-0135 Page 3 of 3 Ana ly s i.g:
A review of this weakness determined that procedure RPP 01-7.2, " Computer Dose
' Calculations," does not provide guidance to obtain ths highest flow or release rates from the beginning of a release.
Correglive Actional Procedure EPP 01-7.2 will be revised to provide more complete guidance.
Training for personnel pecforming dose calculations will be provided following is s t.a nce of procedure EPP 01-7.2.
All other dos ( assessment-personnel will complete required reading on procedure EPP 01-7.2.
Chemistsy personnel continue to train on the simulator with the operating crews to provide them with control room experience.
Date When Corrective Actions Will Pe C rnpleted:
2 Procedure EPP 01-7.2 will be revised and issued by October 30, 1992.
Required reeding will be completed within 60 days of issuance of the required reading notice.
Training - for personnel performing dose assessment will be completed by March 31, 1993.
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