ML20098H080
| ML20098H080 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1984 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8410090347 | |
| Download: ML20098H080 (27) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Put*C Sorwn j Decineand Gas (_,/ Company 80 Park Plaia, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430 8217 MAllING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 f _ Aobert L Mitti General Manager Nudoar Awarance an<l Regulation October 3, 1984 Director of Nuclaar Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen: HOPE CREEK GENEMATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FSAR QUESTION 421.10 3 Pursuant to discussions with the Power Systems Branch, attached is a copy of revised FSAR Ouestion 421.10 previ-ously transmitted on September 7, 1984. Should you have any questions or require any additional information on these items, please contact us. Very truly yours, O ' N' '//'j (/ f ? Attachment C D. H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager (w/ attach.) W. H. Mateman a USNRC Henior Resident Innpactor (w/ attach.) Vi i i The Enorgy Peoplo h 0 p L t I
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( t (N ~bh &A-NCGS FSAR 4/34 OUESTION 421.10 (SECTION 7.1 & 7.2) The staff believes that the physical separation provided in the design of-the-RPS cabinets may not satisfy the requirements of Regulatory Guid 1.75 or the plant separation criteria and is, therefore, unacceptable. As an example, it has been noted on similar plants that the cabinet lighting and power circuits (which are not treated as associated circuits).becomes associated with Class IE circuits inside the RPS' cabinets. Section 8.1.4.14
' includes a.brief discussion on the physical separation provided within panels,' instrument racks and control boards for the instrumentation and control circuits of different divisions.
Review the. design of all Class 1E cabinwts for separation between
- non-Class 1E and Class 1E circuits. Provide the staff with a listing of the cabinets which were reviewed and describe in detail how physical separation is maintained within the panels, racks and boards for those cases where a 6 inch air space cannot be maintained. Provide a summary of the analysis and testing performed to support thir lesser separation. Include in the 1 discussion the separation provided for associated circuits, internal wiring identification and the use of common terminations.
RESPONSE
The HCGS RPS cabinets (10C609, 10C611, 10C622 and 10C623) meet the requirements of IEEE Standard 384 as modified and endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.75, as stated in Section 1.8.1.75. Cabinet lighting and receptacle power circuits are physically separated from RPS circuits by being routed in metallic conduit or by structural steel barriers. Physical separation between non-Class IE and Class IE instrumentation and control circuits is provided in panels, instrument racks and control boards in accordance with IEEE
-Standard 384, as modified and endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.75 as stated in Section 1.8.1.75. The following is a listing of
' Class 1E panels, instrument racks and control boards reviewed for the separation requirements of IEEE Standard 384:
Panels 1AC200 H,/O, Analyzer A Panel 1BC200 H,/0, Analyzer B Panel . ICC200 H,/O, Analyzer Heat Trace Panel 1DC200 H,/O, Analyzer Heat Trace Panel 1AC201 SACS Control Panel A 1BC201 SACS Control Panel B ICC201 SACS Control Panel C 1DC201 SACS Control Panel D 10C202 RACS Heat Exchanger and Pumps Control Panel 421.10-1 Amendment 5 4 m.\_m_,_>4,n_ere-m,.m.,.s_,wg.g, N
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HCGS FSAR 4/84 1AC213 Instrument Gas' Compressor A Control Panel 180313 Instrument Gas Compressor B Control Panel 1AC215 H, Recombiner A Power Distribution Panel IBC215 H, Recombiner B Power Distribution Panel 1AC281 Reactor Building Unit Cooler Control Panel 1BC281 Reactor Building Unit Cooler Control Panel ICC281 Reactor Building Unit Cooler Control Panel ! IDC281 . Reactor Building Unit Cooler Control Panel
'1AC285 Reactor Building FRVS Control Panel 1BC285 Reactor Building FRYS Control Panel ICC285 Reactor Building FRVS Control Panel 1DC285 Reactor Building FRVS Control Panel 10C286 Reactor Building Equipment Lock Ventilation 10C399 Remote Shutdown Panel 10C401 Diesel Generator Area Battery Room Panel 10C402 Diesel Generator Area Battery Room Panel 1AC420 Diesel Generator A Exciter Panel IBC420 Diesel Generator B Exciter Panel ICC420 Diesel Generator C Exciter Panel IDC420 Diesel Generator D Exciter Panel .
IAC421 Diesel Generr. tor A Local Engine Control Panel IBC421 Diesel Generator B Local Engine Control Panel ICC421 Diesel Generator C Local Engine Control Panel 1DC421 Diesel Generator D Local Engine Control Panel IAC422 Diesel Generator A Remote Control Generator Panel 1BC422 Diesel Generator B Remote Control Generator Panel ICC422 Diesel Generator C Remote Control Generator Panel IDC422 Diesel Generator D Remote Control Generator Panel 1AC423 , Diesel Generator A Remote Engine Control Panel 1BC423 Diesel Generator B Remote Engine Control Panel ICC423 Diesel Generator C Remote Engine Control Panel ILC423 Diesel Generator D Remote Engine Control Panel IAC428 Diesel Generator A Load Sequencer Panel IBC428 Diesel Generator B Load Sequencer Panel ICC428 Diesel Generator C Load Sequencer Panel IDC428 Diesel Generator D Load Sequencer Panel 1AC482 Electric Heater Control Panel 1AVH403 IBC482 Electric Hester Control Panel IBVH403 1AC483 Diesel Area HVAC Control Panel 1BC483 Diesel Area HVAC Control Panel 1CC483 Diesel Area HVAC Control Panel IDC483 Diesel Area HVAC Control Panel 1AC485 Control Area HVAC Control Panel 1BC485 Control Area HVAC Control Panel 1AC486 Diesel Area Panel Room Supply System 1BC486 Diesel Area Panel Room Supply System 1AC487 Water Chiller Panel IBC487 Water Chiller Panel 1AC488 Chiller AK403 Power Panel IBC488 Chiller BK403 Power Panel IAC489 Electric Heater Control Panel 1AVH407 .._ IBC489 Electric Heater Control Panel 1BVH407 421.10-2 Amendment 5
HCGS FSAR 4/84
.6 1AC490 Water Chiller A Control Panel IBC490 Water Chiller B Control Panel 1AC491 -Water Chiller A Power Panel 1BC491
- Water Chiller B Power Panel IAC492 Electric Heater Control Panel IBC492 Electric Heater Control Panel 1AC,493 Control Panel - Auxiliary Building Diesel 1AC494 Control Panel - Auxiliary Building Diesel 1AC495 Control Panel - Auxiliary Building Diesel 1BC495 Control Panel - Auxiliary Building Diesel 1CC495 Control Panel - Auxiliary Building Diesel 1DC495 Control Panel - Auxiliary Building Diesel 1AC515 . Traveling Screen Control Panel IBC515 Traveling Screen Control Panel ICC515 Traveling Screen Control Panel 1DC515 Traveling Screen Control Panel 1AC516 Service Water Pump Panel i 1BC516 Service Water Pump Panel ICC516 Service Water Pump Panel
. 1DC516 Service Water Pump Panel l- 1AC581 Intake Structure HVAC Control Panel
! IBC581 Intake Structure HVAC Control Panel ICC581 Intake Structure HVAC Control Panel
. 1DC581 Intake Structure HVAC Control Panel
! 10C601 RRCS Division 1 Panel 10C602 RRCS Division 2 Panel 10C604 Class IE Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Cabinet 10C617 Division 1 RHR and Core Spray Relay Vertical Board - 10C618 Division 2 RHR and Core Spray Relay Vertical Board 10C620 HPCI Relay Vertical Board 10C621 RCIC Relay Vertical Board 10C622 Inboard Isolation Valve Relay Vertical Board 10C623 Outboard Isolation Valve Relay Vertical Board 10C628 ADS Divisioa 2 Relay Vertical Board 10C631 ADS Division 4 Relay Vertical Board 1AC633 Post LOCA H, Recombiner A Control Cabinet IBC633 Post LOCA H, Recombiner B Control Cabinet-10C640 Division 4 RHR and Core Spray Relay Vertical Board i 10C641 Division 3 RHR and Core Spray Relay Vertical Board l 10C650 Hain Control Room Vertical Board 10C651 Unit Operators Console 1AC652 IE Solid State Logic Cabinet Channel A IBC652 1E Solid State Logic Cabinet Channel B t ICC652 IE Solid State Logic Cabinet Channel C 1DC652 IE Solid State Logic Cabinet Channel D 1AC655 IE Analog Logic Cabinet Channel A 1BC655 IE Analog Logic Cabinet Channel B ICC655 IE Analog Logic Cabinet Channel C 1DC655 IE Analog Logic Cabinet Channel D 1AC657 IE Digital Termination Cabinet Channel A IBC657 IE Digital Termination Cabinet Channel B 1CC657 IE Digital Termination Cabinet Channel C 1 421.10-3 Amendment 5 z, -w,e -
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HCGS FSAR 4/34 1DC657 IE Digital Termination Cabinet Channel D 1AC680 1E Electrical Auxiliary Cabinet Channel A IBC680 IE Electrical Auxiliary Cabinet Channel B ICC680 IE Electrical Auxiliary Cabinet Channel C-1DC680 1E Electrical Auxiliary Cabinet Channel D Instrument Racks 10C002 Reactor Water Clean-up Rack 10C004 Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure A Rack 10C005 Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure C Rack-10C009 Jet Pump Rack A 10C014 HPCI A/HECI Leak Detection A Rack : Main Steam C/D and Recire A Flow Rack 10C015
.10C018 RHR A and ADS Rack 10CO21 RHR B and ADS Rack 10C025 Main Steam C/D and Recire A Flow Rack 10CO26 Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure D Rack 10C027- Reactor Vessel Level and Pressure B Rack ;
10C037 RCIC D/RCIC Leak Detection D Rack 10C041 Main Steam A/B and Recirc B Flow Rack 10C042 Main Steam A/B and Recirc B Flow Rack 10C069 RHR D and ADS Rack 10C208A RCIC/ Reactor Cooling 10C211 RCIC Pump 10C212 RCIC Pump Instrument racks are separated into channels. No two redundant piped or tubed safety-related instruments are located on the same i rack.
.Where a 6-inch air space cannot be maintained between j instrumentation and control circuits of different channels (both barriers are l
Class IE to Class'IE and Class IE to non-Class IE), These barriers provided in accordance with IEEE Standard 384. I ) are metallic conduit, structural steel barriers, or non-metallic wrap (Havey Industries Siltemp Sleeving type S or Siltemp Woven Tape Type WT65). The metallic conduit and structural steel The nonmetallic wrap barriers are noncombustible materials. (Siltemp) was successfully tested for use as an isolation barrier - (reference Wyle Laboratories Test Report Number 56669). ain types of isolati devices, barriers f the type For ce or these cases, e quirements of noted a ve are not feasible. 384 are met, as llows: Section 7 .2.1 of IEEE Standar l input and >utput "The se ration of the wiring tethe may be less t n l terminal of the isolation dev .6.2 provided at it 6 inches ( 15 m) as required in han the distance bet en input and o tput is not less terminals. At:W n sert A 421.10-4 Amendment 5
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Minimum separa ion requirements do ot apply for ring and components ithin the isolation device; howeve , eparation shall be provided'whereve practicable. Testin in accordance ith IEEE Standard 72 (Surge With tand E Capabil ty) will be per ormed to ensure tha the Class 1E nputs to the i olation devices are not affected by short-circuit failures, ground faults voltage surges on he output side of ( the isola ion devices. s Smsle Th: r 'y analysis it:" Ta.W we v e.
l br performed to support air spaces
' less than 6 inches, e+ nee-the revirr r_7tr ef IEE" Standard 384 ' e e tisfi:d,.irtfor the Neutron Monitoring System Panel (10C608) and the Process Radiation Monitoring System Panels (10C635 and 10C636). 76.s r-e joo r 4 w o s s o e.,... # u/ u ocee e e.,e p m /e c.cJe r l / L M .* H I To A be hwe,sce e cioAed S epi e an un 7, If SV.) No associated circuits have been identified in the non-NSSS panels, instrument racks, or control boards. Internal wiring identification is done using color coded insulation or insulation
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marked with color coded tape. For panel sections of one channel only, internal wiring identification may,not be done. Where common terminations are used, the requirements of IEEE Standard 384 are satisfied as stated above. - Electrical equipment and wiring for the reactor protection system (RPS), the nuclear steam supply shutoff systems (NSSSS) and the engineered safeguards subsystems (ESS) are segregated into separate divisions designated I and II, etc., such that no single credible event is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to
-prevent reactor shutdown, removal of decay has from the core, or l
closure of the NSSSS valves in the event of a Jesign basis L accident. l l No single control panel section (or local panel section or instrument rack) includes wiring essential to the protective function of two systems that are backups for each other l (Division I and Division II) except as allowed below:
- a. If two panels containing circuits of different separation divisions are less than 3 feet apart, there shall be a steel barrier between the two panels. Panel ends closed by steel j end plates are considered to be acceptable barriers provided l
that terminal boards and wireways are spaced a minimum of I one inch from the end plate. l
- b. Floor-to-panel fire proof barriers must be provided between adjacent panels having closed ends.
- c. Penetration of separation barriers within a sub~ divided panel is permitted, provided that such penetrations are sealed or otherwise treated so that an electrical fire could not 421.10-5 Amendment 5 f
kM BCGS FSAR 4/34 reasonably propagate from one section to the other and destroy the protective function.
- d. tihere, for operational reasons, locating manual control switches on separate panels is considered to be prohibitively (or unduly) restrictive to normal functioning' of equipment, then the switches may be located on the same panel penvided no single event in the panel can defeat the automatic operation of the equipment.
With the exception of panels 10C608, 10C635 and 10C636, internal wiring of the NSSS panels and racks has color-coded insulation.
-Associated circuits are treated within a panel or rack in the same manner as the essential circuits. Where common terminations are used,-the requirements of IEEE Standard 384 are satisfied.
E'<deit,J pec h kon o.sseebV,s by,. b., , a I Ohsch beMM6L f o # C ' VY< n. A)A45 34g.ed ( 10 c ho fr) e2.yv/ IY5 tNo / 24 y a.c ()fS fos)pr he-eAers6.s 0] SCREE'S E ( revisecA 3 ccdio w 7, 4 . I. t, 2-- , l l 421.10-6 Amendment 5 __ _ _ _ Y
HCGS FSAR 4/84 CHAPTER 7 v FIGURES (Cont)
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Fioure No. Title 7.6-2 NMS IED , 7.6-3 Detector Drive System 7.6-4 Functional Block Diagram - IRM Channel 7.6-5 AP_RM Circuit Arrangement - Reactor Protection System Input
'7.6-6 Power Range Monitor Detector Assembly Location
-7.6-7 NMS FCD 7.6-8 Redundant Reactivity Control System Initiation Logic ,
7.6-9 HCGS Redundant Reactivity Control System ARI Valves ~ l] 7.6 DeIeted [#
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'f5h 7.7-2 RMCS Block Diagram 7.7-3 Reactor Manual Control System Operation 7.7 Reactor Manual Control Self-Test Provisions 7.7-5 Eleven-Wire Position Probe 7.7-6 Recirculation Flow Control
. 7.7-7 Feedwater Control System 7.7-8 Simplified Diagram Turbine Pressure & Speed Load Control Requirements l
7.7-9 Deleted
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I HCGS FSAR - s-coazial cable._ The amplifier is a linear current amplifier whose
- _ voltage output is proportional to the current input and therefore proportional to the magnitude of the neutron fluz. Low level output signals.are provided that are suitable as an input to the computer, recorders, etc. The output of each LPRM amplifier is isolated to prevent interference of the signal by_ inadvertent
. grounding or application of stray voltage at the signal terminal point.
g ha. Frrua g f.3-H SM.i-3 PowerfortheLPRMissuppliedhtwonon-Class 1E_) ' uninterruptible power sourcesF. approximately half of the LPRMs
'are supplied.from each bus. Each LPRM amplifier has a separate power supply in the main control erna, which furnishes the detector polarizing potential. The LPRM amplifier cards are mounted into pages in the NMS cabinet, and each page is supp],ied operating voltages from a separate low voltage power supply.
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The trip circuits for the LPRM provide signals to actuate lights and annunciators. Table 7.6-3 lists the LPRM trips. Each LPRM may be individually bypassed via a switch on the LPRM amplifier card. Placing an LPRM in " bypass" sends a signal to the assigned APRM, electronically causing it to adjust its . averaging amplifier's gain to allow.for one less LPRM input. In this way, each APRM can continue to produce an accurate signal l- representing average core power even if some of the assigned LPRMs fail during operation. If the number of functional i assigned LPRMs drops to 50% of the normal number, the APRM automatically goes inoperative and a half scram (one trip logic channel deenergized), rod block, and appropriate annunciation are L generated. Administrative controls ensure that a minimum number of LPRMs at each level (A, B, C, and D) in the core are maintained or the APRM is declared inoperative and manually placed in the tripped state.
- In addition to the signals supplied to the APRMs, the LPRMs also send flux signals to the rod block monitor (RBM). When a central control rod is selected for movement, the output signals from the amplifiers associated with the nearest 16 LPRM detectors are displayed on the main control room vertical board meters and sent to the RBM. The four LPRM detector signals from each of the four detector assemblies are displayed on 16 separate meters. The operator can readily obtain readings from all the LPRM detectors by selecting the control rods in order. These signals from the 7.6-10
INSERT A hfW Ml) Electrical protection assemblies (EPAs) identical to those used in the reactor protection system (RPS) (described in Section 8.3.1.5.4) are installed between the power range NMS and the two 120V AC feeders from the UPS power. sources (see Figure 7.6-11). The EPAs 4 ensure that the power range NMS never operates under degraded bus voltage or f requency conditions (undervoltage, overvoltage, underfrequency). The power range NMS panel (10C608) was analyzed with this power supply configuration to ensure that no single f ailure of the power range NMS could inhibit the proper operation of the reactor protection :y:::;;. 3 er : y eth :sf;;y cyct- xrequired for the safe operation of the plant. The interfaces between the T power range NHS and the RPS have adequate provisions for separation. ) The RPS cabling external to the NMS panel conforms to the separation idelines of Regulatory Guide 1.75, which the RPS must satisfy. Tithinthepanely (here the cable and wiring runs to the different ' RPS divisions do no)t conform to the Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation criteria, fire-resistant "Sil-Temp" tape is wrapped around the cables and wires. This eliminates the possibility In of fault accordance with paragraph propagation between the RPS divisions. 5.6.2 of IEEE Standard 384, this tape has been demonstrated to be acceptable. $ gm Q g ggg b{ock g fec'rWJ20alievi .fl M h% g,c),n c ,yg Q , g M r W Auc406 cceal sc hs. has, vtd- beau ekva es.a w, e w w a
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1 l BCGS FSAR four.LPRM strings (16 detectors) surrounding the selected rod are used in the RBM to provide protection against local fuel overpower conditions. 7.6.1.4.3 Average Power Range Monitor Subsystem : l 1 The'APRM subsystem monitors neutron flux from approximately 1% to l above 100% power. There are six APRM channels, each receiving l core flux level signals from 21 or 22 LPRM detectors. Each APRM i channel averages the 21 or 22 separate neutron flux signals from the LPRMs assigned to it, and generates a signal representing core average power. This signal is used to drive a local meter and a remote recorder located on the main control room vertical board. It is also applied to a trip unit to provide APRM downscale, inoperative and ' upscale alarms, and upscale reactor trip signals for use in the , RPS or RMCS. - Refer to Section 7.2.1.1 for a description of the APRM inputs to
- i. the RPS, and Figure 7.6-5 for the RPS trip circuit input arrangesent. APRM trips are summarized in Table 7.6-2.
The APRM scram units are set for a reactor scram at 15% core power in " refuel"_ and "startup" modes. When the mode switch is in "run," the APRM trip reference signal is provided by a signal ; that varies with recirculation flow. This provides a power ' following reactor scram setpoint. As power increases, the l reactor scram setpoint also increases up to a fixed setpoint ! above 100%. Reactor power is always bounded with a reactor ' scram, yet the change in power required to generate the reactor scram does not vary greatly with the operating power level. Provision is made for manually bypassing one APRM channel at a time. Calibration or maintenance can be performed without tripping the RPS. Removal of an APRM channel from service unplugging a card, by taking the APRM without functionbypassing switch outit,of b{ operate," or by having too few assigned LPRM signals to the APRM, will result in an APRM " inoperative" condition which causes a half scram, a rod block, and annunciation St $%L [ The APRM channels receive power from non-Clast IE uninterruptible ' power sourcy . Power for each APRM Lrip unit is supplied from O i h fplg n e. 9 M 5 h _yy n 7-la. I. 4 2 ) ,
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i SINGLE-FAILUREANALYSISFORTHENEUTRONPbHITORING ANDPROCESSRADIATIONMONITOR'INGSYSIEMS i 6 , HOPECREEKGENERATIONSIATION . PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS i AUGUST 1984 - i i a ! l 1 I i a e i i : i ! i i D8J:rs/A08311*-1 i . t 8/31/84 ! i i I o , t
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- SINGLE-FAILURE ANALYSIS FOR THE' NEUTRON ' '[
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.Some of the safety-rel'ted a ,
portions of the ne'utron ' a(nitoringsystem(NMS)and the process radiation monitofing system (PRMS) for % Hope Creek
. Station (HCGS) are not designed and built to conform to the literal separation guidelines of Regulatory' Guib 1.75. Thisaflysise stablishes the acceptabil-ity of these portions of the MS and PRMS by'demonst(ating that thhy m single-failure criteria of IkEE Standard 279, which pquire's that the conse-quences of any single, design-basis failure event in a safety-relahed portion of the systems be tolerated without the' loss.of any safety functio'n.
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Portions of MS and PRMS External to the MS'and PRMS Panels
; i See' Figure' 7.1-1.of'the.HCGS[FSAR for the separat,ionaconceptofth '
protection system (RPS) and its relationship.to the 25. '.
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Under the reactor vessel, cables from the individualj local power , range monitor (LPRM)detectorsandfromtheindividualintormediatrrangemonitor(IRM) detectors are grouped to correspond with the ) chann'el designations. These cable groupings are rum the ve inisel conduit pedestal area i from,RPS to the NHS and PRMS panels.' l, . l s 1 The radiation monitors on the main-steam lines are p 1ysically separated. The cablingfromtheindividual'sensorsto'thepanelsis! ! runins conduit. ! ' I l i Cabling from the NMS and PRMS panels to the tPS cabilets is also run in metal-lie conduit, providing electrical isolation jnd physical separati n'of the NHS andPRMScablingassociatedlwiththeRPSsys tem. , l It is concluded that the safety-related portions of the NHS and PRMS external I I totheMSandPRMSpanelskdequatelyconformtotheseparationefiteriao Regulatory Guide,1.75. , , 08J:rs/A083118-2
- 8/31/84 6
--'--ry e---e--*--ev-1-s,-r- -eneseer----rww--ws-----~w-+-w-erg-w--- - weer-eee--e,-+-,--=-e--v, ---ev-e-+--e+.s-*wv-+ ee,--ev-=,-we-,--,-*w--e wwet=m,r+-eeerw----- * * -
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3 .. j j Sinole Failure in the WS and P,R95 Panels , . I Figures 1 and 2 depict schematic' ally the physical arrangement of the equip
' in MS and PRMS panels H11-P608, H11-P635, and Hf1-P636., The designs of these panels are similar to those of WS and PRMS panels used'in several RWR plants accepted by the NRC.
- l The layouts of the panels and thle assignments c RPS trip oflogic specif4 .
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circuitry provides the designs with the required' tolerance to postulated single failures. The worst-case single failure would be the 1 dss of any combination of trip signals within one bay o'f any panel. However, the loss of any bay and l its associated wiring.would not prevent a scram. Aval{dscramsignalwouldbd i transmitted via the other bays because of the redundancy in the panel designs
.andtheinterconnectionstotheRPS(seeFigure7.1-1oftheHCGSFSAR).
I i TheeightIRMchannelsandthesixaveragepowerrangemonitor(APRM) channels are electrically isolated and physically separated. Within the IRM and APRM modules, analog outputs are derived for use with control room meters, record-ers, and the process computer. Electrical isolation at the interfaces would prevent any single failure from influencing the trip unit output.
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i Physical Separation in the NMS and PRMS Panels i Adequate separation in the NHS and PRMS panels is achieved by using the bay L I design depicted in Figures 1 and 2, by using relay coil-to-contact as suffi-
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-cient separation / isolation, and by separation between divisions / channels / wiring.
Where conformation with Regulatory Guide 1.75 separatiob criteria cannot be achieved, the best-effort design is used. the RPS are phsically Circuits that provide inputs to different divisions of separated by airgaps or by the walls between the bays. 'Within the panels f where the cable and wiring runs to the differenti RPS di ri-sions- do-cot conform ... . totheRegulatoryGuide1.75separationcriterid, fire-fesistant "Sil-Temp" tape is wrapped around the cables and wires. This eliminates the possibility of fault propagation between the RPS divisions. ! In accordance with paragraph 5.6.2 ofIEEEStandard384,thistape'hasbeendemonsdratedtabeacceptable. 08J:ra/A083118-3 I 8/31/84 l
I I l l Separated ducts are provided in'the panel for ttie incomlng circuit wires from - the sensors that belong to UPS Bus 1 or Bus 2. As shown in Figure 3, the isolation / separation recluden the propagation from outside the'NMS cabinets failures that could cause the loss of any safety I function. .
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- Although the LPRM, sensors are not required to me'et Class 1E requirements, the design bases of the APRMs specify that the LPRM signals used for the APRMs be so selected, powered, and routed that the APRMs do meet' applicable safety criteria. The LPRM signal conditioners and associated power supplies are isolated and separated into groups. , [
The logic circuitry for the MS 'and PRMS n scram trip sig)al single-failure criteria. Thecontactconfigurat'ionsanffailureconsequences associatedwithIRMA(seeFigure4)andAPRMA(seeFigure5)aretypicalof theothertripchannelsandaredescribedinwhatfollops. I .
- With the reactor scram mode! switch in the " Shutdown l,"" Refuel," or "Startup" positions,IRMAupscaleorinoperatingsignals(unlessbypassed)or APRM A upscale or inoperative signals (unless bypajsad) would produce a channel trip of the output relay. ',
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- I With the reactor system mode switch in the 'Run" p sition, IRM A upscale orinoperativesignals(unlessbypassed)andanAPRMAdownscalesignal (unless bypassed) or APRM A upscale neutron trip or upscale themal trip orinoperativesignals(unlessbypassed)wouldproduceachanneltripof the output relay. , i ;
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- A trip of the channel output relay for IRM k ar.d AFRM A or a trip of the channel output relay for IRM E and APRM E would pro' duce an RPS Al channel trip. In PRMS, the log radiation monitor A'would p'roduce an RPS Al channeltrip(seeFigure6),. !
08J:rm/A083118-4
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. .For MS, one tripped (unbypasse ) channel on the RPS trip. system.would.cause a half scram. IfoneAPRMbayweretofailinanuntrippddcondition,the remaining bays would be capable of sending RPS sufficient scram signals to produce a full. scram, even if cne of them were bypassed.'
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As shown in Figures 2 a~nd 7, if one bay of panels H11-P635 or H11-P636 were to fail in an untripped condition, the remaining bays would be capable of sending sufficient RPS signals even if one of the IRM channels were bypassed. The IRM bypass. switches can bypass one IRM channel at a time. I ' Similarly for'PRMS, if one bay were to fail in an untripped condition, the remaining bays would be capable of sending sufficient RPS trip signals to produce a full scram. : CommonPowerSupplyJustificatig t The NMS is supplied with 120-Vac, 60-Hz power from UPS busses 1 & 2. A design change has been authorized for the installation on.each' bus of redundant.._ . _ electrical protection assemblies (EPAs), which will monitor the incoming voltage and frequency. , l Any fault in one MS channel coulld not cause an ~ unsafe ailureLinanother channel sharing the same low vol'tage power supply becau,e 10-se.9 fuses are installed for wire protection, and the power supplies ate designed with over-voltage and over-current protection circuitry at their output. The PRMS is supplied with 120-Va'c, 60-Hz power from RPS busses A and B. EPAs arealreadyinstalledoneachbustoprovidevoltageandfrequencyprotection. i i Any fault in one PRMS channel could not cause an unsafe failure in another channel sharing the same power supply because 5-amp fuse's are installed for wire protection, and the power supplies are designed wit'h over-voltage and over current protection circuitry at their output. ! l ! l l l , 1- i, I
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8/31/84 10 l .
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.- Because of the fail-safe M5/PRNS logic configuration, a loss of one supply would result in a half scram signal to RPS. Lossofbothsupplieswouldresult in a full scras. ;
I CommonAssociatedCircuitInterfaces Non6ssential(associated)circuitstocommoninformatio'nequipmentarecurrent limitedandprotectedsuchthattheirfailurecannotje';opardizeanadjacent circuit. ; Figure 8 provides an example of"an associated c reuit interface on LPRM card Z11. At the zero-to-160-mV computer output, the card i's protected with a 30-MA fuse. The zero-to-10-V output t.o the rod block monitor' has an additional isolator protection for the card. .
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