ML20098F403

Comments on Commission Order CLI-84-18 Re Evidentiary Hearings Required to Be Completed Before Effectiveness of 1979 Shutdown Orders Lifted

ML20098F403
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	10/01/1984
From:	Au T, Woelfling M PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
CON-#484-205 CLI-84-18, SP, NUDOCS 8410020711
Download: ML20098F403 (6)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY C2tGSS101 BEFORE 'DE 00tHSSI_Qi

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Docket No. 50-289 (Three Mlle Island NJclear (Restart) gR C Station, thiit No.1)

COMNWEAlmi T PDNSYINANIA CQtefIS 04 02tCSS1Q4 CRDER CL1-84-18 on. September 11, 1984, the camissim issued an order requesting ccmnents to facilitate its review of AIAB-772, A1AB-738, and NUREC-0680, Supplement No. 5.

In particular, the Candssion solicited ccanents on what evidentiary befngs are required to be empleted before the C=f acion may lift the innediate effectiveness of the 1979 shutdown orders.

On August 15, 1984, the PWth of Pennsylvania stated its position that the Ccmdssicn should not vote on restart "mless and mtil fundb1g has been assured to ecmplcce the radiation cleanup of the danaged Unit 2 facility on 'DR, and inless and until this ccanission has provided adequate assurances that thit l'can be operated without threat to the health or safety of the people of central Pennsylvada en the integrity of our envimmerd.". Statementt of Governor Thornburgh, August 15, 1984. The Counission should resolve all issues regarding the cmpetence and integrity of thit 1 tr.anagers, the level of operator training, inanagement respcusibility for 7MI-2 leak rate falsification, and 'DR-2 clamep fmding, prior to any vote on restart 3he Carmissien's order of Septaber 11, 1984 identified certain itws for ceumerx, and the Ocmnemealth will address t1mse item in sequence.

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In AIAB-772, the Appeal Board found three areas cf deficienc4a= in.

the record with respect to the Licensing Board'c der 4 mica m M-1 restart. 'Ibe first of these areas involves the adequacy of operator training at 'Dit.

In light of the lessons of the March 28, 1979 ancident, operator training may be crucial to the preventien of future problems.

'Ibe Appeal Board determinad that "the deficiencies in operator testing as manifested by the cheating eposides, inay be sy_v-in of nere extensive failmes in licensee's cuerall training progran." AIAB-772, at 63. The Appeal Board could not find, based on the evidence before the Licensing Board, that Licensee's training program was "cwyresensive and acceptable." AIAB-772, at 64. 'Ihere has been considerable discussicn of the scope of the Appeal Board's remand, doe to the arbiguity of the Appeal Board's directive. Both the Staff and limueo have proposed to the scope of the remanded hearing to only obtaining the views of the licensee's consultants on the adequacy of the licensee's training prety.=, without assessing the trainNg progran as a whole.

In the Om=mealth's view, the basic issue before the Licensing Board, and the C:nmission, is whether the operacers of 'DfI-1 are trained to safely operate the plant, based on _all currently available infonnation.

In order to answer that question, the Board and the Catanission cust assess all the infonnation available since the close of the Licensing Board hearing in 1981, not sinply the selected views of certain of the licensee's consultants.

inc1whi in the infonnation available since 1981 are the 1

revisions to 'IME training pr-An es issued by the licassee, the Report of the Imsscns ta-d Workshop (NAD-83-01), the Special Report of the Resonstituted OARP [Cperator Accelerated Betraining Program] Peview Ccumittee, the Staff's SAIP (Systamtic Assessmmt of Ltcensee Per-fonnance] reports and other training assessment reports, the BETA /MR

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l[ Basic Bnerb Tecimology Associates, Inc. and Rohrer, Hibler and Replegla, Inc.] yd.m and the Rickover Report. All these documents have bem relemed since 1981, and all these h==nts contain important infrmnation i

conc-udng the adequacy of the operator training program. 'these docmants have not been stbject to the scrutiny of an evidet.iary bearing. Thus,

t in order to assess idiather the M-1 operators have been trained to unet the hidest standards possible, it is necessary for the Ccandssion to direct the 1Acent ng Board to receive all evidence available since 1981 i

en operator training.

'Jhe ra-mumm 1t*t will ncc' msnmt extansively on the legal aJthority to 4=naam a arnd4Hm cm==;-;..t by excity'.ng He. Charles Husted fran M-1 managment responsibilities. It should be sufficient to note that the Ocamissicn has sple legal =+harity to 4w ccnditicns on man;ge-ment conduct in relaHm t.o spr. tion of M-1.

If the rawnf =sicn does not have such authority, ra=niasion inquiry into nanagenent integrity would be 'naanf'=less, since the Ccmdssion wo. tid have. no neans to einforce its views of management integrity on the licensee, h Appeal Board rarnand w-wdog leak rate testing at 'DE-1 needs to be aaaaaaad in comection with current M-1 manaf--E. Although the Office of Investigation did not discover systematic falsification of:

leak rate testing at thit 1 it found same irregn1=-f ties in testing practices and maragemme s ucedures. 'Ihe Appeal Board decision to renand this issue for further evidentiary hearing is based on the significance of preliadnav findings contained in Staff investigation reports: poor rewsdkeeping practices; ignorance of the problan of a cp seal" in the instrtunentation systen; and inattention to work l

requests. mether these probisus are properly resolved by current management practice is'significant to M -1 restart. hre may be other i 1

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e problems y:t unidentified Wicit may be discovered as a result of the further investigation of THI-1 leak rate testing. thtil formal discovery is coupleted and an evidentiary hearing is condocted, the ht=sion v

cannot safely conclude that the leak rate testing problem is history.

Although M-2 leak rate allegaticns reculted in the criminal ocnviction of the.licenseen and a.ed=In=1 indictment against one indi. -

vidual, the Walth campc be ocrtain that the dele matter has been disclosed. Jhe Conmission's March 23, 1984 directive to the Office of Investigaticn not to duplicate matters resolved in the criminal pr M ings leaves many questicas tnanswered. The Ca mission does not have access to the caterial available to the Grand Jury in the criminal case. h major questicn of relevance to 'IMI-1 restart is Mm within the GPU. organization,chadeknowledge-of or participated.*in the.falsi- -

ficaticn of TMI-2 leak rate tests? Without further inquiry, the Couman-wtalth camot lightly jmp to the conclusion that no one currently within M-1 nanagenent had such hiculedge er had participated in this wrongdoing. h ifmited information available to the public does not allow the Caumacwealth to reach such a ccnclusicn.

An inquiry can be taade by the Licensing Board, without delaying the restart pror+am g,.to determine Msether.anyone involved intcurrent. '

n M-l'managenent-had knowledge of or Tarticipatedain TMI-2 leak rate falsification. The Coomamealth urges the Conmission to direct' that Licensing Board to resolve this issue prior to IMI-1 rentsrt.

Finally, the hf asien solicited ccument cn the Staff's conclusion in NUREG-0680, Supp. No. S that present GPU Naclear management is acceptable. The Comomcalth does not believe that the Ommissica can J

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i reach such a conclusim at this time, in light of the remanded issues for evidentiary hearhg. 'Ibe Connonwealth believes that GPU management conduct in relation to the preparation of the "Keatcn Report," treated in Section 8 of NUREG-0680, Supp. No. 5, should be examined as part of the renand. As reported by the Office of Investigations and the Staff; the Keaten Task Force was established by GPU taanagenett to provide an

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independent assesement of the, causes of*the4:'t-2 accident. N earous changes were made, to the Wa*m Task Force report after review by senior management. Che set of changes was constructed to avoid 14 ability eich might result from the GPU v. Babcock & Wilcox litigation by shifting responsibility for the M-2 accident fmn GPU to Babcock & W11 car.

Another set of changes was prapted by the issuance of Net.. ice of Violation l

(relating to failure to carry out specified energency procedures daring tha. M-2 arv 4dmt) by the NRC on October.25,1979. h Kc.aten Task Force included in its Report, without review, a respcnse provided by senior management sich was misleading and appeared to be contrary to fact. W CPU Response to the Notice of Violation amoir.ted to a material false statement to the 0:nmission. Although the sequence of events l

e ich lead to the manipulation of the Keaten Report is apparently clear, two questions remain: Have all the persons who may have influenced the Keaten Report been identified? Wculd current management of GPU'and do current manage practices at M-1 preclude a repetition of a similar i

episode, and how? h Coumonwealth does not believe that the issue of management futegrity can be treated lightly and urges the Cn=1ssion to dkex the Licensing Board to review this matter to determine Wether anyone in wmd. M-1 management was involved in the Keaten Report manipulation and eether current managenent practices et M-1 will make the recurrence of this episode tulikely.

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'Ibe Comission's proceedings cn 'IMI-1 rest. art should be emducted in a manner that fosters public ocnfidence and support. thless the questicns dich have arisen concerning 'DG-1 restart during the past several years are resolved by evidentiary hearing, the Camotwealth and the public,could not be expected to support a decision on 'IMI-1 restart when the 0: mission finally vptes on the matter.

Respectfully submitted, POR 'nE CCttDEAlm{ OF PDNSYLVANIA W &/Ak/4 MAX 1NE WOE 1 FLING S/

Assistant Counsel Y

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THOMS Y. AU Assistant Counse[l Depart 2nent of Envircomental Resources Comotwealth of Pennsylvania Rocxn 505 Executive House P. O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 (717) 787-7060

& COUNSEL:

'IMCt93 b. EEES Deputy General Cotmsel Office of General Counsel Ccumatuealth of Pennsylvania P. O. Box 1128 11arrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108 (717) 787-6563 IVaED: Ct2 & r 1, 1984

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