ML20098E977

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Suppls Re Operability of RHR Svc Water Sys Pumps. Effort to Replace Questionable Bolts on Schedule.Bolt Matl Verified Acceptable by Johnston Pump Co
ML20098E977
Person / Time
Site: Hatch 
Issue date: 09/27/1984
From: Beckham J
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: Stolz J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NED-84-512, NUDOCS 8410020206
Download: ML20098E977 (5)


Text

r Ceorgia Power Company g

333 Piecmont Avenue Atlanta, Georg:a 30308 Telephone 404 526-7020 l

I

- MaMng Add: css.

Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta. Gen 7a 30302 h

Georgia Power J. T. Beckham, Jr.

the southert1 electnc system Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Generation NED-84-512 Septenber 27, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.

20555 NRC DOCKET 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 EDWIN I. HA'IGI NUCLEAR PIANT UNIT 2 SUPPIDETIAL INICBMATION REGARDING RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM PLMPS Gentlenen:

Georgia Power Cmpany (GPC), pursuant to the raluest of Mr.

J.

A.

Olshinski, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcenent, U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Camission, herein subnits the following information to supplanent our letter NED-84-510 dated Septenber 26, 1984 regarding the operability of the Residual Heat Renoval Service Water (RHRSW) pmps:

1.

The effort to replace questionable bolts as of 8:00 a.m., Septenber 27, 1984, is on a schedule ahead of the ccanitments made in our Septenber 26, 1984 letter. RHRSW pump 2 Ell-C001B has had the bolts in question replaced and is reinstalled. 2 Ell-C001A is expected to be returned to service after bolt replacanent by noon today. RHRSW pmp 2 Ell-C001D has been renoved from service and is in the process i

of bolt replacer.ent.

The last of the four RHRSW pmps, 2E11-C001C will undergo bolt replacenent when pmp A has been restored to service.

'Ihere are no known obstacles which will prevent

?

replacanent of the renaining questionable bolts by the dates ccanitted to in our earlier correspondence.

If any situation arises which will preclude our meeting our stated comnitment, appropriate NRC Region II personnel will be notified at the first cpportunity.

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Georgia Power A Director _of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Septaber 27, 1984 Page h o

'2.

Subsequent to the subnittal of letter NED-84-510, GK' management learned that sufficient bolts to modify all four RHRSW peps were not, in fact, on the plant site as was stated in that letter. The misunderstanding on. this point originated in the invoicing and transmittal of the packaged bolts. However, an adequate supply of suitable bolts has been located and has been procured on an expedited basis by use of dedicated aircraft. Delivery is expected to support the ccanitted - schedule.

Additionally, a clarification is required regarding the material of the replacment bolts currently being installed.

SA-354 Grade BD bolts were not available in a time frame to support the early effort on 2 Ell-C001 A and B.

Johnston Pmp Cmpany supplied a substitute material, A490 Grade BD, for the SA.354 Grade BD material.

This substitute material is acceptable under the provisions of ASME Section II, Part A, "Requirments for SA 354 Bolting Material", 1983 edition for use in this application.

We use of this bolt material has been analyzed by the pmp vendor, Johnston Pmp Cmpany, and verified to be fully acceptable. RHRSW pm ps 2 Ell-C001C and D will be rebolted with acceptable bolts manufactured fra either A490 Grade BD or SA 354 Grade BD.

3.

A review has been conducted of the Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications to determine if any secondary impacts on plant operations would result from the inoperability of the RHRSW peps.

Wo such Limiting Conditions for Ope ations (ILDc) were found--3.6.2.2(b), Suppression Pool Cooling and 3.9.12(a), Reactor 2

Coolant Circulation During Refueling Operations.

100 3.6.2.2(b) calls for action which is similar to and bounded by 100 3.7.1.l(4) discussed in our Septaber 26, 1984 letter.

IfD 3.9.12(a) only applies-when the plant is in the refueling mode and therefore is not a concern for continued plant operations.

Dese ICOs and the Applicability Statment 3.0.3 are the only known plant Technical Specifications to be of applicability, to our knowledge and belief.. In each case the action required is bounded by the discussion contained in our Septaber 26, 1984 letter.

4.

In order to minimize the possibility of any abnormal plant

. transient which would require the use of the RHRSW pmps, the Plant Hatch Deputy General Manager (acting for the General Manager) issued a m morands on Septaber 25, 1984 to the Manager of Operations and the Superintendent of Operations which, in part, called for the following:

' Georgia Powerd Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Septaber 27, 1984 Page %ree o

%e. reactor reained in operation (the reactor will continue in operation as long as plant conditions permit);

o

. All load increases were suspended imediately; o

All startup testing was suspended; and All work which would significantly increase the risk of a o

plant

trip, with the exception of the required surveillance tests, was suspended.

%ese actions were reviewed and concurred with by the Plant Review Board.

A malfunction of a recirculation pmp controller resulted in a load decrease fr a approximately 700 mwe to 342 mwe during the evening of the 26th. Ioad level has been maintained at the reduced level in accordance with our comnitment to limit transients whenever possible.

Bec operating restrictions will be rescinded upon restoration of one RHRSW pmp per subsyste loop to a known acceptable operability condition through replacment of questionable bolts.

5.

A standing order was issued on Septaber 26, 1984, which gave guidance to plant personnel regarding preferred plant operations in the event of a reactor trip.

Briefly, the Standing Order called for the plant to be maintained in a hot standby condition following a reactor scrm, if plant ciremstances would allow.

Further, the operation of the RHRSW pumps was prohibited unless absolutely necessary to maintain the reactor in a safe condition or to protect plant equipnent and the general public. It noted that the decision to operate the pumps should eme fra the Operations Supervisor on shift.

21s order should minimize the possibility, to the extent possible, of the operation of the RHRSW pmps.

These operam.g restrictions will be rescinded upon restoration of one RHRSW pump per subsyste loop to a known acceptable operability condition through replacment of questionable bolts.

6.

As noted in our Septaber 26, 1984 letter, in the event of an Operating Basis Earttquake (OBE) the stresses on the pep colmn will be greater. for an operating pmp than for a non-operating pmp. Since the subnittal of that letter, we have received a more detailed quantification of the stresses seen in the CBE and Design

Georgia PowerA -

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. John F. Stolz, Q11ef

. Operating Reactors Branch No.14 September 27, 1984 Page Four Basis Eartlquake (DBE) for operating and non-operating peps.

A sLmanary of these stresses is provided in the enclosed Table 1.

It '

can be.seen that the allowable stresses for the material which is in question (SA-193) are greater than the seisnic loads for non-operating ' peps in the event of an CBE, as noted in our Septenber 26, 1984' letter. -Further, the table shows that the material used in. the replacenent bolts (SA-354/A490) has an allowable stress well in excess of the seisnic loadings on the peps in ~.the operating 'or non-operating mode in the event of an

~

If one. capares the Relocation Analysis OBE loading fra line

-OBE.

1 of' the table _to the listed allowable for the SA-354/A490 material, the multiplier of 1.5 should be applied for-the flat face flange assmption and the allowable becmes 45,000 psi.

Should you re:Juire any further clarification or amplification regarding

.the Plant Hatch RHRSW pmps, please contact my office.

Yours very truly,

' J. T. Beckhan, Jr.

NEB /nb'

~ Enclosure -

xc:

H. C. Nix, Jr.

J. P. O'Reilly '(NRC-Region II)

Senior Resident' Inspector-i.

i.

e L

Georgia Power 1

~

7m 1 PLANT HATCH-UNIT 2 RHR SERVICE WATER RMPS COIIKI STRESSES Inadings on Bolts (in psi)

DBE OBE Relocation Analysis for flat faced flange 45,361 39,181 7btal Inads RHRSW Pmps Operating - Note 1 Total Code Allowables (SA-193) Per 27,000 22,500 Original Analysis - Note 2 Seismic Inads - Note 3 19,334 17,69]

RHRSW Pmps Not Operating 1984 Analysis for raised face flange 25,206 19,239 Revision Cmpleted 9/26/84 - Note 4 Tbtal Code Allowables (SA-193) Per 27,000 15,000 Revised Analysis - Note 5 7btal Code Allowables (SA-354/A490) New 112,500 30,000 Bolt Material - Note 6 Notes:

1.

Analysis revised to reflect relocation of seimic support assming flat face flanges.

2.

Assuming SA-193 Grade B8 bolts 15,000 psi allowable loads, 30,000 psi yield per AEME Section III 1971, with 1.5 x allowable stresses for OBE and 0.9 x yield strength for DBE. (multiplier of 1.5 corresponds to use of flat face flanges) 3.

Seismic loads are total bolt loadings with RHRSW pmp in a non-operating p m p only, not at rated pressure.

4.

Analysis revised to reflect raised face flange connection (which Plant Hatch has) in lieu of previously assmed flat faced flange connection.

Flat faced flanges were oricjinally assmed for a more conservative

. analysis.

5.

Assuming SA-193 Grade B8 Mlts,15,000 psi allowable loads, 30,000 psi yield per AEEE Section III 1971, with 1.0 x allowable stress for OBE and 0.9 x yield for DBE. (multiplier of 1.0 corresponds to use of raised face flange) 6.

Assuming SA-354 grade BD or A490 grade BD, per ASME Section II Part A, with 30,000 psi allowable and 125,000 psi yield, with 1.0 x allowable stress for CBE and 0.9 x yield for DBE. (multiplier of 1.0 corresponds to use of raised face flange)

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