ML20098E693
| ML20098E693 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1984 |
| From: | Mittl R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8410010290 | |
| Download: ML20098E693 (327) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, O PS SectncandGas ^ G.PutWicServ.cc Cornpany 80 Park Plaza, Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430 8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570. Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nuclear Assurance and Regulation September 26, 1984 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814 Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing l Gentlemen: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
. DOCKET NO. 50-354 DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OPEN ITEM STATUS Attachment 1 .'s a current list which provides a status of the open items identified in Section 1.7 of the Draft Safety Evaluation Report (SER). Items identified as " complete" are those for which PSE&G has provided responses and no confir-mation of status has been received from the staff. We will consider these items closed unless notified otherwise. In order to permit timely resolution of items identified as
" complete" which may not be resolved to the staff's satis-faction, please provide a specific description of the issue which remains to be resolved.
Attachment 2 is a current list which identifies Draft SER Sections not-yet provided. Enclosed for your review and approval (see Attachment 4) are
'the resolutions to the Draft SER open items and FSAR Question listed in Attachment 3.
In addition, enclosed (see Attachment 5) is a copy of PSAR Section 13.4 revised to reflect the proposed HCGS Technical Specifications transmitted on September 21, 1984. 8410010290 840926 l - PDR ADOCK 05000354 Of A E PDR lp p i l The Energy People 95 #)l2 f 4W 7 el k- _- _ _.-- _____ ____-___ _ .___-_- -_________ _
Director of-Nuclear Reactor. Regulation 2- 9/26/84~ Also, enclosed.(see. Attachment 6) is a copy of the resolu-
.tions;to the Draft SER open items and modifications to FSAR Section 17.2 and SRAI (1) previously-transmitted on September 24, 1984,.and-(see Attachment 7) a copy of the D
resolutionfto Power System Branch Cuestions previously Ltransmitted~.on September 25, 1984.
'Also, enclosed.(see Attachment 8) for your information is one copy of'the A.D. Little report entitled, "An Update on the Analysis of Potential Effects of Water Borne Traffic on the_ Control Room and Water Intakes _at the Hope Creek Gen-
-erating Station," March ~1983.
-Pursuant to-the DSER License Condition contained in Section 4.4.4, PSE&G will evaluate the analytical results for thermal hydraulic' stability;for operations beyond Cycle:1 coro and will' submit the results for NRC. review and approval if.the calculated core _ stability margin is less
~t han-that-for the--existing core.
A signed. original of the required affidavit is provided to document the submittal of these items.
-Should'you have any' questions or require any_ additional information-on these items, please contact us.
Very_truly yours,
/
Attachments / Enclosure C- D. H. Wagner USNRC Licensing-Project Manager _(w/ attach.) W.~'H. Bateman USNRC Senior Resident Inspector (w/ attach.)
.J. Spraul.
"SNRC Ouality Assurance Branch
-f
m
'q UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DOCKET NO. 50-354 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
'Public_ Service Electric and Gas Company-hereby submits the enclosed responses to DSER open items and FSAR Questions, Lar,d: revised FSAR Section 13.4, 17.2, and SRAI(l) for the Hope. Creek Generating Station.
The-matters set forth in this submittal are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief. Respectfully submitted, Public Service Electric and Gas Company By: Thomas J.jflartin Vice Pr461 dent - Engineering and Construction Sworn to ar3 subscribed before me, a Notary PublJc of New Jersey, this N M day
.of September 1984.
k 0d . /]A DAVID K. BURD \ NOTARYPUBUC 0F NEW JERSEY
, My Comm. Opires 10 23-85
- -MC 28 02
- [ ,
DPEE: 9/26/84 ATDOBENT 1 DSER R. L. MITIL TO I' ces SacrION A. S0m WCER rrm NUMER SUETECT SrKtUS IErrER IWrED 1 2.3.1 DesigrH) asis temperatures for safety- Ccaplete 8/15/84 , related auxiliaq systems l 2a 2.3.3 Ac aracies cf meteorological Couplete 8/15/84 maamirements (Rey, 1) 2b 2.3.3 Accuracies d noteorological Couplete 8/15/84 naasurements (Rev. 1) 2c' 2.3.3 Amuracies c2 noteorological Ccmplete 8/15/84 measurements (Rev. 2) 2d 2.3.3 Accuracies d noteorological Ccapleta 8/15/84 measurements (Rev. 2)
~3a 2.3.3 Upgrading d onsite notearological Complete 8/15/84
=*amirements program (III.A.2) (Rev. 2) 3b 2.3.3 Upgrading cf onsite noteorological Couplete 8/15/84 measurements program (III.A.2) (Rev. 2) 3c 2.3.3 Upgrading of onsite noteorological tatC Action neasurements progran (III.A.2) 4 2.4.2.2 Ponding, levels Couplete 8/03/84 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Ccaplete 9/13/84 Sa Water Intake Structure (Rev. 3) 2.4.5 Wave impact and runup on service Canplete' 9/13/84 Sb water intake structure (Rev. 3)
Sc 2.4.5 Wave inpact and rurup on service Ccuplete 7/27/84 water intake structure 2.4.5 Wave inpact and runup on service Canplete 9/13/84 5d water intake structure (Rev. 3) 6a 2.4.10 Stability cf erosion protection Ccmplete 8/20/84 structures 6b 2.4.10 Stability of erosion protection Canplete 8/20/84 structures 6c 2.4.10 Stability cf erosion protection Ccmplete 8/03/84 structures M P84 80/121-gs _ .__ _ _ _ _ ._.~ _ _. . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . . . _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . , _ _ . - _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . , . _
c ATDGMENT 1 (Cont'd) DSER R. L. MITIL *10
- 1 -OPEN SECIICN A. SCHWENCER
- '; ITEM NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS LEITER DATED 7a 2.4.11.2 Thermal aspects of ultimate heat sink Ctmplete 8/3/84 7b' 2.4.11.2 Thermal aspects of ultimate heat sink Ocuplete 8/3/84 l l
Choice of maximma earthquake for New complete 8/15/84 !h 8 2.5.2.2 England - Piedmont Tectonic Province 1 9 2.5.4 Soil damping values Complete 6/1/84 l 10 2.5.4 Foundation level response spectra Complete 6/1/84 ~! 11 2.5.4 Soil shear moduli variation Ccamplete 6/1/94 12 2.5.4 Canbination of soil layer properties Ccaplets 6/1/84 13 2.5.4 Lab test shear nrrisili values Ccaplete 6/1/84 14 2.5.4 Liquefaction analysis of river bottan Ccaplete 6/1/84 sands Ccmplete 6/1/84 t 15 2.5.4 Tabulations of shear modeli 16 2.5.4 Drying and wetting effect on Ccaplete 6/1/84 i vincentown 17 2.5.4 Pcher block settlement monitoring Ccuplete 6/1/84 18 2.5.4 Maximum earth at rest pressure Ccmplete 6/1/84 coefficient 19 2.5.4 Liquefaction analysis for service Ccmplete 6/1/84 water piping 20 2.5.4 Explanaticn of cbserved power block Conglete 6/1/84
- settlement 21 2.5.4 Service water pipe settlement records Ccmplete 6/1/84 22 2.5.4 Cofferdam stability Ccmplete 6/1/84 j
M P84 80/12 2 - gs
m- , ._
.~ ... -
v. I-i t MrIROteNr 1 (Cont'd)
-DSER R. L. MITIL 10 CPEtt SECTIQi A. SQWENCER
'f' i- SMUS LETIER DED ITDI NLDSER SUE 7BCT 23 2.5.4 ' Clarification cf PSAR Tables 2.5.13 Ccaplete 6/1/84 l and 2.5.14 Ccaplete 6/1/84 [
, 24 2.5.4 Soil depth models for intche structure i 25. 2.5.4 Intake structure soil modeling Caplete 8/10/84 I -
26 2.5.4.4 Intake structure sliding stability Ccaplete 8/20/84
- 27 2.5.5 Slope stability ,
Ccaplete 6/1/84 28a 3.4.1 Flood protection Caplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) l 28b 3.4.1 Flood protection Ccuplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) I 28c 3.4.1 Flood protection Ccaplete 8/30/84
' (Rev. 1) 28d 3.4.1 Flood protection Ccuplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) 28e 3.4.1 Floof. prct m ion Cmplete S/30/84
<- (Rev. 1) 28f 3.4.1 Flood protection Canplete 7/27/84
! 28g 3.4.1 Flood protection Conplete 7/27/84 29 3.5.1.1 Internally generated missiles (cutside Canplete 8/3/84 contairunent) (Rev. 1) 30 3.5.1.2 Internally generated missiles (inside Closed 6/1/84 cortairnent) (5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
31 3.5.1.3 Turoine missiles Conglete 7/18/84 32 3.5.1.4 Missiles generated by natural phencuena Ccaplete 7/27/84 33 3.5.2 Structures, systems, and cuuprsnts to Ccmplete 7/27/84 be protected fran externally gererated missiles M P84 80/12 3 - gs
,b...... I ATIAODENT 1 (Lant'd) D6ER R. L. MITH."10 NEN - SBCTIGi A. SOGENCER ITDI NEDEER SUBJECT STATUS IEITER IRTED 34 3.6.2 Uhrestrained whipping pipe inside Cm plete 7/18 /84 contairunent
- 35 3.6.2 ISI program for pipe welds in Complets 6/29/84 break exclusion zone 36 3.6.2 Postulated pipe ruptures Ccmplets 6/29/84 37 3.6.2 Feedwater isolaticm check valve Ccaplete 8/20/84 cgerability 38 3.6.2 Design cf pipe rupture restraints Ccmplete 8/20/84 39 3.7.2.3 SSI analysis results using finite Canplete 8/3/84 element method and elastic half-space approach for containnent structur' 40 3.7.2.3 SSI analysis results using finite Ccaplete 8/3/84 element method and elastic half-space aggreach for intake structure ,
41 3.8.2 Steel containnent buckling analysis Ccmplete 6/1/84 42 3.8.2 Steel cxmtainnent ultimate mpacity Ccaplete 8/20/84 analysis (Rev. 1) 43 3.8.2 SRV/[IXh pool dynamic loads Complete 6/1/84 44 3.8.3 ACI 349 deviations for internal Ccaplete 6/1/84 structures 45 3.8.4 ACI 349 deviations for Category I Canplete 8/20/84 structures (Rev. 1) 46 3.8.5 ACI 349 deviations for fczandations Ccmplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 47 3.8.6 Base mat response spectra Ccmplete 8/10/84 (Rev. 1) 48 3.8.6 Rocking tine histories Ccmplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 1 M P84 80/12 4 - gn , t
1 ATDOMNr 1 (Cont'd) DSER R. L. MITIL '10 WEN SECTICN . A. SOMNCER ITEM NUieER SUBJECT STA'IUS IETTER DMED 49 3.8.6 Gross concrete section Ccmplete 8/20/64 (Rev. 1) 50 3.8.6 Vertical f1cce flexibility response Ccaplete 8/20/84 sp Gra (Rev. 1) 51 3.8.6 Ccaparison of Bechtel independent Cmplete 8/20/84 verification, results with the design- (Rev. 2) basis results 52 3.8.6 Ductility ratics due to pipe break Ccmplete 8/3/84 53 3.8.6 Design cf seismic Category I tanks Ccuplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 0 54 3.8.6 Cambination cf vertical responses Ccuplete 8/10/84 (Rev. 1) 55 3.8.6 Torsional stiffness calculation Ccaplete- 6/1/84 56 3.8.6 Drywell stick model develquent Ccuplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 57 3.8.6 Rotational time history irputs Cmplete 6/1/84 58 3.8.6 "O" reference point for auxiliary Complete 6/1/84 building model 59 3.8.6 Overturning mcment cf reactor C m plete 8/20/84 building foundation mat (Rev. 1) 60 3.8.6 EAP element cize limitations Ccmplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 61 3.8.6 Seismic modeling cf drywell shield Ccmplete 6/1/84 wall 62 3.8.6 Drywell shield wall boundary Ccmplete 6/1/84 conditions 63 3.8.6 Reactor building dcme boundary Ccuplete 6/1/84 conditions I M P84 80/12 5 - gs
-- -e- ;. .
s 1 ATDOBENF 1 (Cont'd) ._ DSER R. T . MITIL 'IO GWI SECTIGl. , A. EOIMNCER ITEM NLDEER SUB7ECT S1XmS 12TTER '.ETED 64 3.8.6 SSI analysis 12 Hz cutoff frequency Ccqlete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 65 3.8.6 Intake structure crane heavy load Ccuplets 6/1/84
- N .
66 3.8.6 %nos' analysis for the intake ccuplete 8/10/84 structure (Rev. 1) 67 3.8.6 Critical Inada calculation for Ccaplete 6/1/84 reactor building cbme 68 3.8.6 Reactor building foundation met Couplete 6/1/84 contact preemirms 69 3.8.6 Factors of safety against sliding and Ccuplete 6/1/84 overturning of drywell shield wall 70 3.8.6 Sei-i< shear force distribution in Ccaplete 6/1/84 l cylinder wall 71 3.8.6 overturning cf cylinder wall Ccaplete 6/1/84 l 72 3.8.6 Deep beam desip d fuel pool walls Ccuplete 6/1/84 73 3.8.6 ASHSD dcme podel load inputs Ccaplete 6/1/84 74 3.8.6 Tornado depressurization Complete 6/1/84 75 3.8.6 Auxiliary building abnormal pressure Canplete 6/1/84 76 3.8.6 Tangential shear stressos in drywell Ccuplete 6/1/84 shield wall and the cylinder wall 77 3.8.6 Factor cf safety against overturning Ccmplete 8/20/84 cf intake structure (Rev. 1) 78 3.8.6 Dead load calculations canplete 6/1/84 79 3.8.6 Post-modification seismic loads for Canplete 8/20/84 the torus (Rev. 1) M P84 80/12 6 - gs
l AT D OBEINT 1 (Cont'd) DSER R. L. MITIL TO CEGI SECTIGI A. 50MNCER ITEM NtBEER SUIMECT STMUS IEITER DMED 80 3.8.6 Tbrus fluid-structure interactions Ccuplete 6/1/84 81' 3.8.6 Seismic displacement of torus Complete- 8/20/84 . (Rev. 1)
~
. 82 3.8.6 Review of seismic Category I tark Ccaplete 8/20/84 4 design (Rev. 1) 83 3.8.6 Factors d safety for &ywell Cauplete 6/1/84 buckling evaluation 84 3.8.6 Ultimate capacity d contairunent Ccaplete 8/20/84 (materials) (Rev.1)
, . 85 J.8.6 Iced cambination consiste m Complete 6/1/84
; 86 3.9.1 Camputer code validation. Ccaplete - 8/20/84 87 3.9.1 Information on transients Camplete 8/20/84 4
88 3.9.1 Stress analysis and elastic plastic Ccaplete 6/29/84 . analysis 89' 3.9.2.1 Vibration levels for NSSS piping Ccaplete 6/29/84 systems-90 3.9.2.1 Vibration nonitoring progran charing Canplete 7/18/84 testing ,' 91 3.9.2.2 Piping supports and anchors Ccaplete 6/ 29/84 92 3.9.2.2 Triple flued-head containment Ccaplete 6/15/84 penetrations 93 3.9.3.1 toad ccm61 nations and allowable Ccuplete 6/29/84 stress limits i 94 3.9.3.2 Desi@ of SRVs and SRV discharge Ccmplete 6/29/84 I piping i e i M P84 80/12 7 - gs 4
- _ . , . . . . . ,.,..__,_---._-...,_-e., .,.,__-,.v- ._m_,-__m_,m,- .-,,____r.m..,,m-r-...-.. e,
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DATE: 9/26/84 { ATD O MINF 1 (Cont'd) DSER R. L. MITIL TO OPEN SBCIICH A. SOM!NCER IMER St9!lJBCf STATUS IEITER DPGED l IT1!M 95 3.9.3.2 Fatigue evaluation at SRV piping Couplete 6/15/84 and IOCA downcaners 96 3.9.3.3 IE Information Notice 8 F 80 Ccaplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 97 3.9.3.3 Buckling criteria used for ocuponent Ocuplete 6/29/84 supports 98 3.9.3.3 Design of bolts Ccuplete 6/15/84 99a 3.9.5 Stress categories and limits for ccuplete 6/15/84 core support structures 99b 3.9.5 Stress ategories and limits for Canplete 6/15/84 core support structures 100a 3.9.6 10CFR50.55a paragraph (g) Ccuplete 6/29/84 10CFR50.55a paragraph (g) Ccuplete 9/12/84 100b 3.9.6 (Rev. 1) 101 3.9.6 PSI and ISI program for pungs and Carplete 9/12/84 valves (Rev. 1) 102 3.9.6 taak testing cf pressure isolation Ccuplete 9/12/84 valves (Rev. 1) 103al 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Carplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipmerit 'l 103a2 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification cf Canplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103a3 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Ccuplete 8/20/84 medianical and electrical equipnent 103a4 3.10 Seismic ard dynamic qualification cf Ccmplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment l l M P84 80/12 R - gs
c:: . l l' MDCItert 1 (cont'd) DSER R. L. MITTL 10 CFBI SBCTIGI A. SGBENCER IT5t IOSER SUB7ECT STATUS IJfr!ER DR2ED 103a5 3.10 Sefmaic and dynamic qualification of couplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103a6 3.10 Seimsic and dynamic qualificatica of complete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103a7 3.10 Seisatic and dynamic qualification of Conglete 8/20/84 anchanical and electrical equipment 103bl 3.10 Seimaic and dynamic qualification of complete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment , 103b2 3.10 Seisatic and dynamic qualification of Ocuplete V20/84 unchanical and electrical equipment 103b3 3.10 Seimic and dynamic qualificatics of Ocuplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103b4 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Ccaplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103b5 3.10 Seisatic and dynamic qualification of Caplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103b6 3.10 Seisutic and dynmaic qualification of Complete 8/20/84 nochmilcal and electrical equipment 103cl 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Cmplete 8/20/84 unchanical and electrical equipment 3.10 Seismic and dynmaic qualification of Complete 8/2u,o4 103c2 mechanical and electrical equipnent 103c3 3.10 Seisatic and dynamic qualification of Ccuplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 103c4 3.10 Seismic and dynamic qualification of Caplete 8/20/84 mechanical and electrical equipment 104 3.11 Environmental qualification of NRC Action
^
mechanical and electrical equipment I 4
.M P84 80/12 9 - gs ,
l
, _ _ , - . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . _ _ . ~ . . . _ _ , . _
__ _ ,. _ i - _ . _
ATIRCIDENT 1 (Cont'd) - DSER R. L. MITIL 'IO OPEN SECIIQi A. SOMINCER I'IDI NGeER SUBJECT STNItJS IETIER QPGED 105 4.2 Plant-specific nochanical fracturing Couplete 8/20/84 analyuis (Rev. 1) 106 4.2 Applicability d seismic andd LOCA Ccaplete 8/20/84 loadirn evaluation (Rev. 1) 107 4.2 Minimal post-irradiation fuel Cceplete 6/29/84 surveillance program 108 4.2 Gado.1 inn thermal conductivity Ccapleto 6/29/84 equacion 109a 4.4.7 'DtI-2 Iten II.F.2 Ccaplete 8/20/84 109b 4.4.7 - IMI-2 Item II.F.2
' Complete 8/20/84 110a 4.6 Functional design d reactivity Ccaplete 8/30/84 control systems (Rev. 1) 110b 4.6 Functional desip cf reactivity Ccaplete 8/30/84 control systems (Rev. 1) lila 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Cmplete 6/29/84 (ccuponents within reactor pressure bcundary) 111b 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Ccaplete 6/29/84 (wysents within reactor pressure boundary) 111c 5.2.4.3 Preservice inspection program Ccmplete 6/29/84 '
(wvaents within reactor pressure boundary) 112a 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Ccmplete 8/30/84
, leakage detection (Rev. 1) 112b 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Ccmplete 8/30/84 leakage detection (Rev. 1)
M P84 80/1210 - gs
I DATE: 9/26/84 I f ATDOMENT 1 (Cont'd)
;- DSER R. L. MITII.10 j CPEN SECTIGE A. SONENCER
- rim NueER suBmx smus urrrun omo 112c 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Ccuplete 8/30/84 leakage detection (Rev. 1) l 112d 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pr===re boundary Couplets 8/30/84 Imakage detection (Rev. 1) 112e 5.2.5 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Caglete 8/30/84
- leakage detection (Rev. 1) 113 5.3.4 GE procedure applicability Complate 7/18/84 f -
l i 114 5.3.4 ccupliance with NB 2360 d the Sussume Couplate 7/18/84 j 1972 Addenda to the 1971 ASME Code 1 15 5.3.4 Drop weight and Charpy v-notch tests Ccuplete 9/5/84 fx closure flange meterials (Rev. 1) 116 5.3.4 Charpy v-notch test data for base Complets 7/18/84 meterials as used in shell ocurse No. I 1 17 5.3.4 Cczpliance with NB 2332 of Winter 1972 Canplete 8/20/84 Addenda d the ASMC Code 2 , 118 5.3.4 f. mad factors and neutron fluence for Ccaplete 8/20/84 surveillance capsules 119 6.2 1MI itsen II.E.4.1 Ccaplete 6/29 / 84 ii 120a 6.2 1MI Itan II.E.4.2 Ccmplete 8/20/ 84 i 120b 6.2 1MI Itaa II.E.4.2 Canplete 8/20/84 121 6.2.1.3.3 Uso d NURfrA588 Ccaplete 7/27/84 3 122 6.2.1.3.3 Tangeuture profile Ccapleto 7/27 / 84 123 6.2.1.4 Butterfly valve operation (post Canplete 6/29/84 accident) M P64 80/1211 - gs r-- - -- e .,.-m . _ . - .
..,_,r_--.,c-.,.,, --,_rm.-.~.,.~...-m.--.... .
o DATE: 9/26/84 ATTROBE!NT 1 (Cont'd) l DSER R. L. MITTL 1D l Get SECTIGE A. SGNENCER ITHE NtBSER SUBJECT S1XIUS LETTER DREED 124a 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Ca plete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 124b 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Ocuplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 124c 6.2.1.5.1 RPV shield annulus analysis Ccsplete 8/20/ 84 (Rev. 1) 125 6.2.1.5.2 cesign drywell head differential couplete 6/15/84 pressure 126a 6.2.1.6 Redundant position indicators for Cm plete 8/20/84 vacumt breakers (and control roomt alarms) 126b 6.2.1.6 Redundant position indicators for Cmplete 8/20/84
- vacuum breakers (and control roou alams) 127 6.2.1.6 Operability testing of vacutan breakers Cmplete 8/20/84 (Rev. 1) 128 6.2.2 Air ingestion Cong,Lete 7/27/84 129 6.2.2 Insulation ingestion Ca plete 6/1/84 1
Couplete b 130 6.2.3 Potential bypass leakage paths 131 6.2.3 Administratics of secondary contain- Couplete 7/18/84 ment cpenings 132 6.2.4 Containment isolation review Ccaplete 6/15/84 133a 6.2.4.1 Containment purge system Complete 8/20/84 133b 6.2.4.1 Containment purge system Cenplete 8/20/84 l l 133c 6.2.4.1 Containment purge system Ccmplete 8/20/84 e J
. M P64 80/12 12- gs
DATE: 9/26/84 M DCISEINF 1 (C at'd) DSER R. L. METH. *10 '
@BI SECTIGi A. SODENCER r111M tueER SUMECT S1XmS IEFIER EWIED 134 6.2.6. Contalment leakage testing C a plete 6/15/84 135 6.3.3 IPCS and LPCI injection valve Caplete 8/20/84 interlocks 136 6.3.5 Plant-specific IOCA (see Section Ccaplete 8/20/84 15.9.13) (Rev. 1) 137a 6.4 Control rocat habitability Ccuplete 8/20/84 137b 6.4 Contxol roan habitability Caplete 8/20/84 137c 6.4s Control rom habitability .Completa 8/20/ 84 138 6.6 Preservice irspection progrant for Complete 6/29/84 Class 2 and 3 ccuponents 139 6.7 MSIV leakage control systest Ccuplete 6/29/84 i 140a 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Ccaplete 9/7/84 (Rev. 2) 140b 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Cauplete 9/7/84 (Rev. 2) 140c 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Ccmplete 9/7/84 (Rev. 2) 140d 9.1.2 Spent fuel pool storage Cmplete 9/7/84 (Rev. 2)
- . 141a 9.1.3 Spent fuel cooling and cleamp Conglete 8/30/84 systen (Rev. 1) 1 141b 9.1.3 Spent fuel cooling and cleamp Ccaplete 8/30/84 system (Rev. 1)
, 141c 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup Ccmplete 8/30/84 systen (Rev. 1) M P84 80/12 13 - gs
. . - _ _ ~ _ _ _ . _ . _ - _ . . - . _ . _ _!
1
.t l
DATE: 9/26/84 l ATD OpqENT 1 (Cont'd) t
.DSER R. L. MITE *10 OPEN SECTIGi A. SONENCER ITDI NIDEER StBJECT S1XIUS IJiTHR QATED l
I
,i 141d 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleamp Complete 8/30/84 systant (Rev. 1) j 141e 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling aM cleamp Caplete 8/30/84 systant (Rev. 1) )
141f 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling and cleamp Complete 8/30/84 i systant (Rev. 1)
?
141g 9.1.3 Spent fuel pool cooling ard cleamp Couplete 8/30/84 systemt (Rev. 1) { 142a 9.1.4 Light Iced handling systemi (related Ccmplete 8/15/84 j (Rev. 1)
- to refueling)
I
! 142b 9.1.4 Light load handling systen (related Ccaplete 8/15/84
! to refueling) (Rev. 1) 143a 9.1.5 overhead heavy load handling Ccmplete 9/7/84 143b 9.1.5 overhead heavy load handling Ca plete 9/13 /J4 144a 9.2.1 Station service water systems Canplete 8/15 / 84
- (Rev. 1) 144b 9.2.1 Station service water systen Ccaplete 8/15/84 (Rev. 1) i 144c 9.2.1 Station service, water systen Complete 8/15/84 (Rev. 1) 145 9.2.2 ISI progrant and functional testing Closed 6/15/84 l of safety and turbine auxiliaries (5/30/84-cooling srstems Aux.Sys.Ptg.)
146 9.2.6 Switches eid wiring associated with closed 6/15/84 HPCI/RCIC in ud action (5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg. ) ; l M P84 80/1214 - gs
' - - - - - . - - .--4-,-v-, -.--,---------ww-.,,--,.--,,-,-a,--+erw---.----~,---wm.--w..--.--,,..www----,--,..--+-,,.-.----e,r-- ,,ww
== .. .. _ . DATE: 9/26/84 ATDO9ENT 1 (Cont'd) --- DSER R. L. MITII 10 CPRE SBCTIGi A. SQDENCER IT1!M NIDGER SUILTECT S11TUS IATIER DATED 147a 9.3.1 Cagressed air systems Complete 9/21/84 (Rev. 2) 147b 9.3.1 Compressed air systems Ccuplete g8 147c 9.3.1 Ccapressed air systems Ccaplete 9/21/84 (Rev. 2) 147d 9.3.1 Ccagressed air systens Cmplete 9/21/84 (Rev. 2) 148 9.3.2 Post-accident sangling systemt Ccuplete 9/12/84 (II.B.3) (Rev. 1) 149a 9.3.3 Equipment and floor drainage systemt Couplete 7/27/84
.149b 9.3.3 Equipannt and floor &ainage systal Ccuplete 7/27/84
-150 9.3.6 Primary catairunent instrument gas Canplete 8/3/84 system (Rev. 1) 151a 9.4.1 Control structure ventilation systent Ccuplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) 151b 9.4.1 Control' structure ventilation systent Canplete 8/30/84 (Rev. 1) 152 9.4.4 Radioactivity monitoring elements Closed 6/1/84 (5/30/84-Aux.Sys.Mtg.)
153 9.4.5 Engineered safety features ventila- Ccuplete 8/30/84 tion systen (Rev 2) 154 9.5.1.4.a Metal red deck construction Canplete 6/1/ 84 classificiation 155 9.5.1.4.b Gogoing review d safe shutdown NRC Action capability 156 9.5.1.4.c Ongoing review d alternate stutdown NRC Action capability M P84 80/12 15 - gs
DATE: 9/26/84 l
. \
ATDOBENf 1 (Cont'd) DSER R. L. MITTL 10 ! OPIBI SECTIGE A. SGNPNCER ITBE NLBSER SUE 7BCf STATUS IEFNR DATED 157 9.5.1.4.e Cable tray potection Ccuplete 8/20/84 158 9.5.1.5.a riman B fire detection system Caplete 6/15/84 159 9.5.1.5.a Primary cui secondary power supplies Ccuplete 6/1/84 for fire detectica systen 160 9.5.1.5.b Fire water pump capacity Complete 8/13/84 161 9.5.1.5.b Fire water valve supervision Conglete 6/1/84 162 9.5.1.5.c Deluge valves Caplete 6/1/84 163 9.5.1.5.c Manual hoes station pipe sizing Ccaplete 6/1/84 164 9.5.1.6.e ammote staatdown panel ventilation C g lets 6/1/84 165 9.5.1.6.g Emergency diesel generator day tank Caplete 6/1/84 protection 166 12.3.4.2 Airborne radioactivity monitor Cenplete 9/13/84 positioning (Rev. 2) 167 12.3.4.2 Portable continuous air monitors Complete 7/18/84 168 12.5.2 Equipment, training, and procedures Cmplete 6/29/84 for inplant iodine instrunentation 169 12.5.3 Guidance of Division B Regulatory Conglete 7/18/84 Guides 170 13.5.2 Procedures generation package Caplete 6/29/84 submittal 171 13.5.2 TMI Item I.C.1 Caplete 6/29/84 172 13.5.2 PGP Cmunitznent couplete 6/29/84
'73
, 13.5.2 Precc.dures covering abnormal releases Conglete 6/29/.84 of radioactivity M P84 80/12 16- gs
1
! DME: 9/26/84
, JEDC19ENT 1 (Cont'd)
DSER R. L. MITIL *10 0P56 SECTICal A. SODENCER l ITUI NLBGER SUILTECT STAItJS IZITER QMED i' 174 13.5.2 ammolution explanation in FSAR of Canplete 6/15/84 TMI Items I.C.7 and I.C.8 175 13.6 Physical security Open 176a 14.2 Initial plant test programa Ccaplete 8/13/84 l I 176b 14.2 Initini plant test program Carplete 8/13/84 176c 14.2 Initial plant test progran Ccaplete 7/27/84 , 176d 14.2 Initial plant test program Ccaplete 8/24/84 (Rw . 2) l 176e 14.2 Initial plant test pogras Complete 7/27/84 l f 176f 14.2 Initial plant t<mt progras Couplete 8/13/84 17Cg 14.2 Initial plant test program Canplete 8/20 / 84 176h 14.2 Initial plant test gegram Canplete 8/13/84 1761 14.2 Initial plant test program Couplete 7/27 / 84 l 177 15 .1 .1 Partial' feedwater heating Canplete 8/29/84 l (Rev. 1) .l l 15.6.5 IDCA resulting from spectrum of NRC Action l. (! 178 postulated piping breaks within RCP l. 173 15 .7 .4 Radiological consequences cf fuel NRC Action jl j handling accidents 180 15.7.5 Spent fuel cask decp accidents NRC Action 181 15.9.5 TMI-2 Item II.K.3.3 Ccmplete 6/29/84 I 182 15.9.10 TMI-2 Item II.K.3.18 Ccmplets 6/1/84 183 18 Hope Creek DCR0R Complete 8/15/84 M Po4 80/1217 - gs
I I
. l I erd OBENF 1 (Cont'd) l I ,
l EBER R. L. MITIL 10 ! (PSI SECTIQi A. SODENGR ITBI N SLBJECT SDER IATNR D M D 184 7.2.2.1.e Failures in reactor vessel level Ccuplete 8/1/84 sensing lines . (Rev 1)
- 185 7.2.2.2 Trip systen sensors and cabling in Ccuplete 6/1/84
! turt4ne building .
- 186 7.2.2.3 Testability d plant protection Ccuplete 8/13/84 e systems at power (Rev. 1)
I
! 187 7.2.2.4 Lifting d leads tn perfoun surveil- Ccuplete 8/3/84 1anos testing 188 7.2.2.,5 Setpoint nothodology couplete 8/1/84 189 7.2 '. .! .5 Isolation devices ccuplete S/1/84 (f
l 190 7.2.L1 Regulatory Guide 1.75 Couplete 6/1/84 191 7.2.2.0 Screa discharge volume Complete 6/29/84 l ' Cauplete 8/15/84 192 .7.2.2.9 Reactor node switch l
- (Rev. 1) . 193 7.3.2.1.10 Manual initiation d safety systens Ccuplete 8/1/84 I ' 194 7.3.2.2 Standard review plan deviations Ccuplete 8/1/84
- (Rev 1) 195a 7.3.2.3 Freezgrotection/ water filled Cannlete 8/1/84
- instrument and samplire lines and ; cabinet tangerature control t 195b 7.3.2.3 Freezer protection / water filled ' Canplate 8/1/84
,i instrument and sappling lines and
- cabinet temperature control I
i 196 7.3.2.4 Sharing d cannon instrunent taps Canplete 8/1/84 197 7.3.2.5 Micrtprocessor, nultiplexar and Canplete 9/1/84 couputer systems (Rev 1) I l M P84 80/1218 - gs
A2 TAD M Nr 1 (Cent'd) DSER R. L. MITE 10 CPEN SEXICN . A. SOMNCER I11M NLDSER Sulk 7ECT S1RIts IEPIER DMED 198 7.3.2.6 1MI Itas II.K.3.18-ADS actuation Ca plete 8/20/ 84 199 7.4.2.1 IE Bulletin 79-27-Ioss cf non-class Complete 8/24/84 - IE instrumentatim and control power (Rev. 1)
. systen bus during cperation 200 7.4.2.2 Remote shutdown systen Complete 8/15/84 (Rev 1) 201 7.4.2.3 RCICAfCI interactions Ccaplete 8/3/84 202 7.5.2.1 tavel neasurement errors as a result Ccaplete 8/3/84 of envircrmental temperature offects
- on level instrumentation referena leg 203 7.5.2.2 Regulatory Guide 1.97 Cmplete 8/3/84 204 7.5.2.3 1MI Itas II.F.1 - Accident nonitoring Canplete 8/1/84 205 7.5.2.4 Plant process ccmputer systen Cmplete 6/1/84 206 7.6.2.1 High gressure/ low gressure interlocks Canplete 7/27/84 207 7.7.2.1 HELBs and consequential control systen Canplete 8/24/84 failures (Rev. 1) 208 7.7.2.2 witiple control systen failures Ccuplete 8/24/84 (Rev. 1) 209 7.7.2.3 Credit for non-safety related systens Cmplete 8/1/84 in Chapter 15 of the FSAR (Rev 1) 210 7.7.2.4 Transient analysis recording systen Ccuplete 7/27/84 211a 4.5.1 Centrol rod driw structural materials Ccmplete 7/27/84 211b 4.5.1 Control red driw structural materials Ccmplete 7/27/84 211c 4.5.1 Control red driw structural nuterials ccmplete 7/27/84 M P84 80/1219 - gs ,
. DATE: 9/26/84 i
2 KrDOM!Nr 1 (Cont'd) 1 CSER R. L. MITIL 'IO CPEh 68CTIOl A. SOMNCER r!BI IUSER SUR7ECT SIATUS IATNR QM'ED 211d 4.5.1 Control rod drive structural materials Complete 7/27/84 211e 4.5.1 Control red drive structural noterials Caplete 7/27/84 212 4.5.2 Reactor internals materials Caplete 7/27/84 213 5.2.3 Reactor coolant pressure boundary Ccaplete 7/27/84 material l 214 6 .1.1. Engineered safety featureo materials Complete 7/27/84
}
I Main steast and feedwater systen Otmplete 215 10.3.6 7/27/84 materials 216a 5.3.1 asector vessel materials complete 7/27/84 216b 5.3.1 asactor vessel noterials Complete 7/27/84 217 9.5.1.1 Fire protection organization Ccuplete 8/15/84 218 9.5.1.1 Fire hazards analysis Ccaplete 6/1/84 l 219 9.5.1.2 Fire protection administrative Complete 8/15/84 controls l 220 9.5.1.3 Fire brigade and fire brigade Conglete 8/15/84 training 221 8.2.2.1 Physical separation of offsite Conglete 8/1/84 transmissicn lines i l - 222 8.2.2.2 Design provisions for re-establish- Conglete 9/14/84 ment of an offsite power source (Rev. 1) 223 8.2.2.3 Independence of offsite circuits Caplete 9/26/84 i betwen the switchyartl and class IE (RcV- 3) buses , 224 8.2.2.4 Canon failure node between onsite Conglote 9/26/84
', and offsite power circuits (Bov. 2) l M P64 80/12 20- ga i
L_
~
i DATE: 9/26/84 l \ _ATDODENF 1 (Cont'd) ! DSER R. L. MII"H. 10
- ces SsCrra
- a. SonexxR j JTm NIDGER '" SUBJECT STATUS IEFIER D M D
- 225 8.2.3.1 Testability d automatic transfer of Complete 9/21/84 power from the normal to preferred (Rev. 1) power. sourca
,' 2 26 8.2.2.5 Grid stability Complete 8/13/84 (Rev. 1) 227 8.2.2.6 Capacity and capability d offsite Ccuplets 8/1/84 . circuits ! 2 28 8.3.1.1(1) voltage &cp & ring transient condi- Complete 8/1/84
- tions 229 8.3.1.1(2) Basis 'for using bus voltage versus Ccaplets 8/1/84 actual -ch load voltage in the l
voltage drty analysis 230 8.3.1.1(3) Clarificatico d Table 8.3-11 Ccuplete 8/1/84 1 231 8.3.1.1(4) Undervoltage trip setpoints Ccaplete 8/1/84 232 8.3.1.1(5) Imd configuration used for the ccuplete 8/1/84 voltage &cp analysis { 233 8.3.3.4.1 Periodic systen testing Conglete 9/21/84 g (Rev. 2) 234 8.3.1.3 Capacity and apability d ensite Canplate 8/1/84 N: power supplies and use cf ad-ministrative controls to prevent overloading af the diesel generators 235 8.3.1.5 Diesel generators load acceptance Ccuplete 9/21/84 (Rav. 2) test 2 36 8.3.1.6 Carp 11ance with pMition C.6 of Canplete 8/1/84 IG 1.9 237 8.3.1.7 Decription cf the load sequencer Ccmplete g8g 238 8.2.2.7 Sequencing cf loads en the offsite Ccmplete 9/21/84 , power system (Pav. 1) ' l l i l l M P84 80/12 21 - gs I l
l l
- l
. DATE: 9/26/84 l ATEA099ff 1 (Cont'd) i DSER R. L. Mr11L TO
{ A. SONNCER
; GW SacrION
! TI1N NL3eER SUBJECT SDatB IKrNR ORTED l 239 8.3.1.8 Testing to wrify 804 minissa Ccaplete
+
8/15/84 l citage
, 240 8.3.1.9 Capliance with BIP PSB-2 Ccaplete 8/1/84 ! 241 8.3.1.10 Ioad acceptance test after prolonged C a plete 9/21/84 no Iced cperation of the diesel (Rev. 3) ' generator t
242 8.3.2.1 Compliance with position 1 of Regula- Ccuplete 9/13/84 l tory Guide 1.128 (Rev. 1)
' 9/13/84 243 8.3.3.1.3 Protection or qualification of Class Ccaplete ! lE equipment from the effects of (Rev. 1) fire mappression systems 244 8.3.3.3.1 Analysis and test to demonstrate Caplete 9gV'6/84 I 3) adequacy d less than specified separation 245 8.3.3.3.2 The use cf 18 versus 36 inches cf C mplete 9/26/84 separatica betweer. racesays (Rev. 3) 246 8.3.3.3.3 Specified separation cf raceways by Ccaplete 8/1/84 anal' psi's and test l 2 47 8.3.3.5.1 Capability cf penetrations to with- Cmplete 9/13/84 s stand long duration oh::t circuits (Rev. 1) + at less than maxima or worst cise short circuit 248 8.3.3.5.2 Separatics of penetration primary Cmplete 8/1/84 and tackup protectisns 2 49 8.3.3.5.3 The use cf bypassed trarmal overload Complete 8/1/84 protectiw devices for penotration protections 250 8.3.3.5.4 Testing cd fuses in accordance with C mplete 8/1/84 R.G. 1.63 M P84 80/12 22 - gs
I DATES 9/26/84 I JGTRCiterr 1 (Cbnt'd) DSER R. L. MITTL '10 CNN SBCTICM A. SODENCER ITEM IUSER SUETECT SrJGUS IJl TIER DMED 251 8.3.3.5.5 Fault current analysis for all Complete 9/24/84 representative penetration circuits (Rev. 3) l 9/21/84-252 8.3.3.5.6 The use of a single breaker to provide Ctuplete penetration protection (Rev. 2) 253 8.3.3.1.4 n==ltment to protect all Class 1E Ca plete 9/24/84 equipment from external hazards versus (Rev. 2A) only class 1E equipment in one division 254 8.3.3.1.5 Protection of class 1E power supplies Ca plete 9/14/84 from failure of unqualified class 1E (Rev. 1) , loads 255 8.3.2.2 Battery capacity Complete 8/1/84 256 8.3.2.3 Automatic trip of loads to maintain Complete 9/13/84
- sufficient battery capacity (Rev. 1) i 257 8.3.2.5 Justificatiat for a 0 to 13 second Complete 9/13/83 I load cycle (Rev. 1) 258 8.3.2.6 Design and qualification of DC Caplete 8/1/84 systasa loads to operate between mininasa and maximum voltage levels 259 8.3.3.3.4 use of an inverter as an isolation Ca plete 9/26/84 device (Rev. 2) 260 8.3.3.3.5 Use of a single breaker tripped by Conglete 9/13/84 l a toCA signal used as an isolation (Rev. 1) device 261 8.3.3.3.6 Automatic transfer of loads and Ccaplete 9/13/84 l (Rav. 1) interconnectice between redundant divisions
>; 262 11.4.2.d Solid waste control program Cmplets 8/20/84 i f i M P64 80/12 23- as l 4
, - - - - - - - - ----,c -- .---,.-.a- n,----._-,, - . - - .- - - - , _ ,.- ,-- --,.---n-- - - - . . . , . - . - , . - - ,-,
DATE: 9/26/84 AT!209 err 1 (Cont'd) DSER R. L. MITIL 10 A. SQpelCER 0F58 SECTIGO ITEM NUBSER SUR7BCf STATUS LEITER IRIED _, 243 11.4.2.e Fire protection for solid radweste Complete 8/13/84 l storage area 264 6.2.5 sources of oxygen ocuplete 8/20/84 265 6.8.1.4 Est Filter Testing Complete 8/13/84
- 266 6.8.1.4 Field leak tests Complete 8/13/84 267 6.4.1 Control rom toxic chsodcal Camp 1cte 8/13/84 detectors 268 Air filtration unit drains Caplete g8{
269 5.2.2 code mass N-242 and M-242-1 Caglete 8/20/84
' Complete 270 5.2.2 Code case N-252 8/20/84 TS-1 2.4.14 Closure of wetectight d:ces to safety- Open related structures TS-2 4.4.4 Single recirculation I'mp operation open TS-3 4.4.5 Core flow mccitoring for crud offacts Cooglete 6/1/84 TS-4 4.4.6 Imee parts monitorirq systass Open TS-5 4.4.9 Natural circulation in normal Open operation TS-6 6.2.3 Secondary contat e t negative Open pressure 6.2.3 Inloakage and drawdown time in Open TS-7
<- secondary containment 6.2.4.1 taakage integrity testirq open TS-8 6.3.4.2 BCCS subsystem periodic camponent Open TS-9 testing M P84 80/12 24- gs l
l 1 AFDO9 err 1 (Cont'd) i j DSER R. L. MITIL 10 OFW SECTIGI A. SO9 80CER l STMUS I.ErmR tWIED
, 1798 NLDSER SUBJECT ' i TS-10 6.7 MSIV leakage rate TS-11 15.2.2 Availability, setpoints, and tacting open of turbine bypass systaan . 116-12 15.6.4 Primary coolant activity IC-1 4.2 Fuel rod internal pressure criteria Oceplete 6/1/84 ,
IC-2 4.4.4 Stability analysis subunitted before Open second-cycle operation l t e l i t I i e M P64 80/12 25- gs
l ATTACHMENT 2 DATE: 9/26/84
'! DRAFT SER SECTIONS AND DATES PROVIDED --- 1 ! )
SECTION DATE SECTION DATE l 3.1 3.2.1 11.4.1 See Notes 165 i' 3.2.2 11.4.2 See Notes 165
; 5.1 11.5.1 See Notes 1&5 1 . 5.2.1 11.5.2 See Notes 1&5 i 6.5.1 See Notes 1&5 13.1.1 See Note 4 i 8.1 See Note 2 13.1.2 See Note 4 8.2.1 See Note 2 13.2.1 See Note 4 L' 8.2.2 See Note 2 13.2.2 See Note 4 8.2.3 See Note 2 13.3.1 See Note 4
? 8.2.4 See Note 2 13.3.2 See Note 4 8.3.1 See Note 2 13.3.3 See Note 4 i 8.3.2 See Note 2 13.3.4 See Note 4 i- 8.4.1 _See Note 2 13.4 See Nate 4 i 8.4.2 See Note 2 13.5.1 See Note 4
. 8.4.3 See Note 2 15.2.3 ; 8.4.5 See Note 2 15.2.4 8.4.6 See Note 2 15.2.5 8.4.7 See Note 2 15.2.6 8.4.8 See Note 2 15.2.7 9.5.2 See Note 3 15.2.8 9.5.3 See Note 3 15.7.3 See Notes 1&5 9.5.7 See Note 3 17.1 8/3/84 9.5.8 See Note 3 17.2 8/3/84 ! 10.1 See Note 3 17.3 8/3/84 4
10.2 See Note 3 - 17.4 8/3/84 c 10.2.3 See Note 3 j 10.3.2 See Note 3 * 10.4.1 See Note 3 l 0
-l'.4.2 See Notes 3&5 i 10.4.3 S.ee Notes 3&S 10.4.4 See Note 3 11.1.1 See Notes 1&S Notes:
11,1.2 See Notes 165 , 11.2.1 See Notes 1&S 1. Open items provided in ;
, 11.2.2 See Notes 165 letter dated. July 24, 1984 11.3.1 See Notes 1&S (Schwencer to Mittl) 11.3.2 See Notes 165 . 2. Open items provided in
- June 6, 1984 meeting
- 3. Open items provided in April 17-18, 1984 meeting CT db
- 4. Open items provided in e
May 2. 1984 meting
- 5. Draft SER Section provided in letter dated. August 7,
~
1984 (Schwencer tus Mitti) MP 84 95/03 01 -- . - - . - . . - - . . - .. -_.-- -.,-..-.- -
..Date : 9/26/84' i
Attachment 3 DSER DSER ITEM SEC5 ION SUBJECT 223 8.2.2.3 - Independence of offsite circuits between the switchyard and Class lE buses 224 8.2.2.4 Common failure mode between onsite and offsite power circuits 244 8.3.3.3.1 Analysis and test to demonstrate adequacy of less than specified separation 245 8.3.3.3.2 .The use of 18 versus 36 inches of separation between raceways 259 8. 3. 3. 3. 4 Use of an inverter as an isolation device e e S
,,ggewer g n++v-vgy- -gw-=+,-pmw-w--,.-e-,7r-en-y--+.-m-e y--e, e w w- m ae p r *em me- T --vi--+---
y 9 ) 1 ( 9 s b ? 4 a . ATTJummtT 4' . 3 k ? r h i 1 k' v . - _ _ . . . _ . -- - - - - - - - - -- . , _ . _ . , . _ . .
~
g e.v.3 DSER Open Item No. 223 (DSER Section 8.2.2.3) INDEPENDENCE OF OFFSITE CIRCUITS BETWEEN THE SWITCHYARD AND THE
. CLASS lE BUSSES The Hope Creek design provides two immediate access of fsite circuits between the switchyard and the 4.16 kV Class 1E busses. It is the ,
I staff position that these two circuits be physically separate and independent such that no single event can simultaneously af fect both circuits in such a way that neither can be returned to service in time to prevent fuel design limits or design conditions of the The physical reactor coolant pressure boundary from beng exceeded. separation and independence of these two circuits from and including station service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 to the 4.16 kV Class lE busses has not been described or analyzed in the FSAR. By Amendment 4 to the FSAR, the applicant implied, in response to a request for information, that the offsite circuits are non-Class lE. and thus do not have to be physically separ'ated in accordance with the requirements of Criterion 17 of Appendix A of 10CFR50. The staff _ finds this interpretation to be unacceptable.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.2.2.2 has been added to provide a discussion of the physical separation and independence of the two offsite power circuits from the station service transfocmers to the 4.16 kV Class 1E buses. 1 f REV 2
. ~
6 HCGS FSAR QUESTION 430'.4 (Section 8.2) The Hope ' Creek design provides two immediate access of f site circuits between the switchyard and the 4.16 kV Class lE buses, It is the staff position that these two circuits be physically separate and - independent such that no single event can simultaneously af fect both circuits in such a way that neither can be returned to service in time to prevent fuel design limits or design conditions of the The physical reactor coolant pressure boundary from being exceeded. separation and independence of transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 to the 4.16 kV Class 1E buses has not been described or analyzed in the FSAR. Provide the description and analysis and justify areas of noncompliance ~ with the above staf f position. The analysis should include separation and independence of control and protective relaying circuit.s as well as the power circuits.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.2.2.2 has been added to provide the required information. .. l l l I . l DSER OPEN ITEM 223 430.4-1 Amendment 4 _ _. . _ . _ . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ l_._;__.,._..__.-_____-
8.2.2.2 SEPARATION OF OFFSITE POWER SUPPLIES WITHIN THE PLANT The circuits for the offsite power supply located within the plant are designed to comply with the requirements of GDC 17. Refer to FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 for a detailed description. 4 W e-4 i l r l i
l
. WT HCGS FSAR 1/84 ,
groups remain intact to provide for 1. and 2. above. 7 / A) SEK..7~~ k ; Each 4.16-kV Class 1E bus has access to the two ' physically independent offsite power sources. Upon LOP, the Class IE system is automatically isolated from the offsite power system and the l onsite non-Class IE distribution system. The isolation of the offsite and Class IE onsite power systems is accomplished by tripping of the incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class IE buses. This tripping is accomplished through the undervoltage relays connected on the source side of these breakers. The tripping of these incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class 1E buses also isolates one power supply channel from redundant power supply channels. The combination of these factors considered in the design of the electric power system minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the onsite power supplies as a result of the loss of power from the offsite sources or any disturbances of the non-Class TE ac system. The voltage analysis performed in accordance with Branch Technical Position PSB-1, Item 3, indicates that the onsite distribution system voltages are adequate to support Class IE loads within the equipment ratings during LOCA and' plant shutdown with the offsite system voltages at anticipated minimum or maximum voltage and with only the offsite source being considered available. The analysis also confirmed that the setting of the undervoltage relays on the source side of the incoming offsite source breakers on the Class TE 4.16-kV buses will protect Class 1E loads from degraded voltages resulting from sustained low offsite system voltage condition. The voltage analysis is based on the simplified single line diagram shown on Figure 8.3-15 which represents one half of station distribution buses and one of the two offsite sources. Because tf similarity in the redundant Class 1E buses and similarity of non-Class IE buses, the voltage analysis conducted is applicable to all of the station distribution buses. This single line 8.3-32 Amendment 4
\
_ _ _ _ ._._. _ _ _ _ . _ .m _ . _ ._.. _ _ _ . _ __ _ .
1
; e i e Insert-A Figure 8.3-5 shows that each of the four 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear buses . i:s supplied from two of fsite (preferred) power sources and - one onsite standby diesel genorator (SDG). . The offsite power to these buses.is supplied from station service transformers LAX 501 and IBX501 by non-segregated phase buses that . are enclosed in metallic ducts. The non-segregated phase buses from the station service transformers to the 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are designated as non-Class IE.
Figure 8.3-16 shows the routing of these non-segregated phase bus ducts from station service transformers LAX 501 and IBX501 to 4.16 kV switchgear. Station service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 are provided with \ individual water spray systems and are separated from each other by a 1-hour fire. barrier. Each transformer has a collection dike and drainage outlet for collecting transformer oil spills and fire suppression system water and draining it to the oily waste drainage system. The drainage outlet for each transformer is designed to drain the entire volume of oil from the transformer plus the maximum flow of water from the automatic water spray system. The non-segregated phase buses are run outside the turbine building wall up to the point where they enter the building. An extension of the station service transformers' water. spray sprinkler system provides additional protection in the area of the common bus support and the limited area of crossover of the two non-segregated buses. The non-segregated bus duces are designed and constructed for i adverse outdoor weather conditions (rain, ice, etc). The bus ducts I are designed per ANSI Standard C37.20-1969/C37.20C-1974, Section 8.2.2.4, Watertight Tests, and, therefore, water from the sprinkler l system of one transformer will not endanger the operation of the 4 non-segregated bus of the other transformer. These design features ensure that a station service transformer fire can not damage the bus duct from the other transformer and cause a loss of both offsite sources of power. l Within the turbine building the offsite buses are routed through common areas. Separate supports are provided for the non-segregated l phase buses in non-seismic plant areas. In Seismic Class I plant ( areas Seismic Class I supports.are.provided for the non-segregrated phase buses.. The buses are physically separated from each other l' and their steel duct enclosures minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident environmental conditions.
--~,,--,,,,,--,v,a- ,- . , , . . , - , . - . - _ . , , , , . -,,,n~ ,-,e m,,,we,,,.,,,.,,,,-a,,-n-,,,,- , , - , - , ,.-,,.vn. .,w,---g---,.,,w,--.,-
- Page two The onsite power feeds to the 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are routed in rigid steel conduit from the standby diesel generator rooms. Each train of onsite Class lE power is compartmentalized such that the four trains are separated from each other by two-hour fire rated concrete walls and each diesel is separated from-its associated offsite power bus by a three-hour fire rated wall.
The circuit breakers that connect a 4.16 kV Class 1E switchgear bus to the two offsite power supplies and its associated onsite standby power supply are Class lE'and are qualified to the HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for any design basis event. These breakers are electrically interlocked to prevent the automatic paralleling of-the onsite and offsite power supplies. The only control -interf ace between the .onsite Class lE and of fsite power systems is the station service transformer dif ferential relay current transformer (CT) leads in the Class lE switchgear. The CT leads are classified as non-Class lE and are enclosed in armored cable or conduit to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75. Each of the four SDGs are located in separate rooms of a Seismic Class 1 structure. The SDGs and the associated control panels are qualified for HCGS seismic and. environmental parameters for all design basis events. The control panels, power, and . control cables for all the four SDGs are separated to comply with Regulatory Guide i 1.75 requirements. , 1-Each of the four Class lE 4.16 kV switchgear buses has its own independent protective relaying schemes. The failure of a protective relay in the 13.8 kV and/or 500 kV systems does not impact any of the four onsite power sources. The control power supplies for both the offsite and onsite Class lE infeed breakers are from a 125V de distribution panel of the same Class lE channel. Cables of the same Class lE channel are routed in common raceways but these raceways are separated from their redundant counterpart by two-hour fire rated concrete walls from the switchgear room to the cable spreading room. Within the cable spreading room the redundant Class lE control raceways are provided with Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation as well as automatic fire suppression systems. Figures 9.5-1 to 9.5-5 show these features. Common control room panels, where both onsite and offsite control
' cables terminate, have separation or barriers provided, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, to eliminate common mode failures between onsite and offsite breaker control.
Protection against common mode fire induced failure of the onsite power trains is addressed as part of the Hope Creek fire protection analysis in Section 9.5.1, and Appendix 9A.
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Page three These design features minimize the probability of losing electric-power from any of the required Class lE electrical power systems as a result of, or coincident with, loss of the power generated by the main generator, loss of the _ power from the offsite transmission network, or loss of the power from the onsite electric power supplies,
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-* ' ' ' " FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
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4.16 KV,2 0,60 Hz NON.SEGRAGATED BUS DUCT l
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FIGURE 8.3-16 AMENDMENT 8,10/84] s S Woo / O.290 -ol
F 9 he.@ A DSER Open Item No. 224 (DSER.Section 8.2.2.4) COMMON FAILURE MODE BETWEEN ONSITE AND OFFSITE POWER CIRCUITS Each of the 4.16 kv Class lE busses at Hope Creek is supplied power from preferred offsite and standby onsite circuits. It is the staff position that these circuits should not have common failure modes. Physical separation and independence of these circuits has not been described or analyzed in the FSAR. By Amend. 4 to the FSAR, the applicant, in response to a request for information, indicated that'a single event can not cause common failure of both onsite and of fsite power source circuits because they are separated in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75. The staff _ disagrees.. Separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 by itself is not sufficient for-the staff to conclude that there are no common feilure modes or to conclude that the probability of coincident loss of both onsite and offsite power sources has been minimized in accordance with the requirements of Criterion 17 of App,endix A to.10 CFR 50. , , ,
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 has been revised to include the results of an analysis to show compliance of the onsite and offsite ;ower systems to GDC 17. FSAR Figure 8.3-16 is attached to DSER Open Item 223. l l REV 1 L.
I QUESTION 430.5 (SECTION 8.2)
' Each of.the 4.16 kV-Class lE busses at Hope Creek is supplied power
~
from preferred offsite and standby onsite circuits. It is the staf f- position- that these circuits should not have common f ailure -
-modes. Physical separation and independencePrevide of these circuits has a description not been described or analyzed in the FSAR.
and analysis in accordance with Section 5.2.1(5) of IEEE Standard 308-1974.
RESPONSE
FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 has been revised to provide the requested information. 4 ' DSER OPEN ITEM-224 430.5-1 Amendment 5
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vi HCGS FSAR - - - - - 1/84 - groups remain intact to provide for=1. and 2.
- above. '
7 / AJS&K 7~~ , k Each 4.16-kV Class 1E bus has access.to the.two physically independent offsite power sources. Upon LOP, the Class 1E system.is automatically isolated from the offsite power system and the onsite non-Class IE distribution system. The - isolation of the offsite and Class 1E onsite power
-systems is. accomplished by tripping of the incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class IE buses. This tripping is accomplished through the undervoltage relays connected on the source side of these breakers. The tripping of these incoming offsite source breakers to the 4.16-kV Class IE buses also isolates one power supply channel from redundant power supply channels. The combination of these factors considered in the design of the electric power system minimizes the probability of losing electric power from the onsite power supplies as a result of the loss of power from the offsite sources or any disturbances of the non-Class 1E ac system.
The voltage analysis performed in accordance with Branch Technical Position PSB-1, item 3, indicates that the onsite distribution system voltages are adequate to support Class IE loads within the equipment ratings during LOCA and plant shutdown with the offsite system voltages at anticipated , minimum or maximum voltage and with only the offsite source being considered available. The analysis also confirmed that the setting of the undervoltage relays on the source side of the incoming offsite source breakers on the Class TE 4.16-kV buses will protect Class 1E loads from degraded voltages resulting from sustained low offsite system voltage condition. The voltage analysis is based on the simplified single line diagram shown on Figure 8.3-15 which represents.one half of station distribution buses - and one of the two offsite sources. Because of ~ similarity in the redundant Class 1E buses and similarity of non-Class 1E buses, the voltage analysis conducted is applicable to all of the station distribution buses. This single line (
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0 1 Insert A % Figure 8.3-5 shows that each of the four 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear
. ' buses. is supplied from two offsite (preferred) power sources and one onsite standby diesel generator (SDG). The offsite power t'o these buses is supplied from station service transformers 1AX501 and 1BX501 by non-segregated phase buses that are enclosed in metallic ducts. The non-segregated phase buses from the station service transformers to the 4.16 kV Class 1E switchgear are designated as non-Class 1E.
Figure 8.3-16 shows the ' routing of these non-segregated phase bus ducts from station service transformers LAX 501 and 1BX501 to 4.16 kV switchgear. Station service transformers 1AX501 and 1BX501 are provided with individual water spray systems and are separated from each other by a 1-hour fire barrier. Each transformer has a collection dike and drainage outlet for collecting transformer oil spills and fire Jsuppression system water and draining it to the oily waste drainage system. The drainage outlet for each transformer is designed to drain the entire volume of oil from the transfocmer plus the maximum flow of water from the automatic water spray system. The non-segregated phase buses are run outside the turbine building wall up to the point where they enter the building. An extension of the station service transformers' water spaay sprinkler system providen additional protection in the area of the common bus support and the limited area of crossover of the two non-segregated buses. The non-segregated bus ducts are designed and constructed for !- adverse outdoor weather conditions (rain, ice, etc). The bus ducts ! are designed per ANSI Standard C37.20-1969/C37.20C-1974, Section 8.2.2.4, Watertight Tests, and, therefore, water from the sprinkler system of one transformer will not endanger the operation of the non-segregated bus of the other transformer. These design features ensure that a station service transformer fire can not damage the bus duct from the other transformer and cause a loss of both offsite sources of power. Within the turbine building the offsite buses are routed through common areas. Separate supports are provided for the non-segregated phase buses in non-seismic plant areas. In Seismic Class I plant areas Seismic Class I supports are provided for the non-segregrated phase buses. The buses are physically separated from each other and-their steel duct encicsures minimize, to the extent practical, the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident environmental conditions. 4 a e
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Page .two The onsite power foods to the 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear are routed in rigid steel conduit from the standby diesel generator rooms. Each train of onsite Class lE power is compartmentalized such that-the four trains are separated from each other by two-hour fire rated
- concrete walls and each diesel is separated from its associated offsite power bus by a three-hour fire rated wall.
The circuit breakers that connect a 4.16 kV Class lE switchgear bus to the two offsite power supplies and its associated onsite standby power supply are Class lE and are , qualified to the HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for any design basis event. These breakers are electrically interlocked to prevent the automatic paralleling of the onsite and of fsite power supplies. , 4
- The only control interf ace between the onsite Class lE and of fsite power systems is the station service transformer dif farential relay current transformer (CT) leads in the Class 1E switchgear. The CT leads are classified as non-Class lE and are enclosed in armored cable or conduit to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
Each of the four SDGs are. located in separate rooms of a Seismic Class 1 structure. The SDGs and the associated control panels are qualified for HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for all design basis events. The control panels, power, and control cables for all the four SDGs are separated to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.75 requirements. Each of the four Class lE 4.16 kV switchgear buses has its own
- independent protective relaying schemes. The failure of a protective relay in the 13.8 kV and/or 500-kV systema does not impact any of the four onsite power sources.
The control power supplies for both the offsite and onsite Class lE
'infeed breakers are from a 125V de distribution panel of the same
--Class 1E channel. Cables of the same Class lE channel are routed in common raceways but these raceways are separated from their redundant counterpart by two-hour fire rated concrete walls from the switchgear room to the cable spreading room. Within the cable spreading room the redundant Class lE control raceways are provided with Regulatory Guide 1.75 separation as well as automatic fire suppression systems. . Figures 9.5-1 to 9.5-5 show these features.
Common centrol room panels, where both onsite and offsite control cables terminate, have separation or barriers provided, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75, to eliminate common mode failures between onsite and offsite breaker control. Protection against common mode fire induced failure of the onsite , I power trains is addressed as part of the Hope Creek fire protection analysis in Section 9.5.1, and Appendix 9A. l a
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s Page three These design features minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the required Class lE electrical power systems as a result of, or coincident with, loss of the power generated by the
- main generator, loss. of the power from the offsite transmission network, or loss of the power from the onsite electric power supplies, '
as required by GDC 17. l e 9 O 4 e '1
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-d Ra. 2. A sc DSER Open item No. 244 (DSER Section 8.3.3.3.1)
ANALYSIS AND TSST TO DEMONSTRATE ADEQUACY OF LESS TRAN SPECIFIED SEPARATION hhe applicant, by Amendment 4 to the FSAR, provided a description of physical separation between redundant enclosed raceways (covered trays and open top raceways, and between non-class 1E trays and Class 15 conduit, as follows:
- 1. In .the cable spreading rooms, the main control room, relay room, and control equipment room, the separation is twelve inches (12") horizontal, a.nd eighteen inches (18*) vertical.
- 2. In all other plant areas, the separation is three feet horizontal and five feet vertical.
The applicant further stated that where the separation distances specified above can not be maintained, cable trays shall either be covered with metal tray covers or an analysis, based on test results, will be performed. The staff concludes that the above separation meets the guide-lines of Regulatory Guide 1.75 and is acceptable except for the following: (1) The use of 18 versus 36 inches of separation between race-ways is evaluated in Section 8.3.3.3.2 of this report, and ( 2) The use of an analysis to justify less than specified separation will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
The response to Question 430.52 has been revised to provide the i requested analysis. das copy of es.cA e f' V 4 e fe//ow,'y re,oort.s vasc a.dm.a.4 em/ for y ou.r us e" o rs A q u, sr so. T4 84 1.a.har aSe s, 7*.s+ Re., par 4 No . s s yi 9, b s4< =l : i ,) u)yis ' Mona har s o, 19so , p repa.rsd fee s u s g ue. ha.nn s
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%8 ZW Ru.2A HCGS FSAR [ftm 2I OUESTION 430.52 (SECTION 8.3.1 and 8.'3.2)
Provide a description of separation between redundant enclosed raceways or conduit and open top raceways and between N0n Class lE trays and Class lE conduit.
RESPONSE
Refer to Section 8.1.4.14 and revised Section 1.8.1.75 for a description of HCGS separation provisions and a discussion of HCGS compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.75. s e s 430.52-1
As I HCGS FSAR 1/84 ) i 1.8.1.74 -Conformance to Reculatory Guide 1.74, Revision 0, j February 1974: Ouality Assurance Terms and Definitions ; l HCGS complies with ANSI N45.2.10-1973, as interpreted in ' Regulatory Guide 1.74. See Section 17.2 for further discussion of quality assurance and Section 1.8.2.for the NSSS assessment of this Regulatory Guide.
- 1. 8.= 1. 7 5 Conformance to Reaulatory Guide 1.75. Revision 2, Sectember 1978: Physical Independence of Electric Systems HCGS complies with IEEE 384-1974, as modified and endorsed by Regulatory _ Guide 1.75, with the clarifications and exceptions outlined below.
Position C.1 separation is accomplished in general by supplying t non-Class IE loads connected to a Class IE bus through a single breaker with a shunt trip device tripped by a LOCA signal. All non-Class 1E loads will be tripped automatically by LOCA signal. i Provisions for restoring certain of these loads from the main control room are provided. 4
@ggggkm Position C.12HCGS stateshas thatonlyredundant cable spreading areas should a single cable spreading area.
be provided. Position C.12 endorses IEEE 384-1974, Paragraph 5.1.3, which indicates that in cable spreading areas the minimum separation distance between redundant Class IE cable trays should be 1 foot . between trays separated horizontally and 3 feet between trays separated vertically. The separation criteria used on HCGS for cable spreading areas is a minimum of 1-foot horizontal distance and 18-inch vertical distance between redundant Class IE cable trays. The configurations, for which the redundant cable-trays can not be separated-by distances specified above, will either be analyzed or tested tc demonstrate the compliance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.75. Position C.15 specifies that redundant Class IE batteries be located in separate safety class structures and be served by independent ventilation systems. The 250-V Class 1E batteries for electrical divisions A and B, located on elevation 163 feet of the auxiliary building, are served by a common ventilation 4 1.8-45 Amendment 4 l r
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5
. HCGS FSAR (Question 430.52/ Item 25)
INSERT A-Position C.6 states that all analyses to justify lesser separation a distances shall be identified. The following are the HCGS excep-
. tions to the IEEE 384 separation distances.
There are only three generic cases where analysis is used to justify' lesser' separation distances. These are identified and analyzed as follows:
- Conduit-to-conduit less than one (1) inch. apart.
Because of space limitations in some areas of 'the plant, the minimum separation distance of one inch between rigid steel conduits can not be maintained. The use of the con-duits is limited to instrumentation *.o instrumentation control to. control, and instrumentation to power feeder - with maximum 120 Vac or-125 Vdc cables only. Wyle Test Report No. 56719, prepared for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, showed that rigid steel conduits in contact with each other are acceptable barriers. The testing demon-strated that shorting of' conductors in one conduit until
' failure did not af fect the performance of the conductors in the other conduit or damage the conduit . In addition, Franklin Institute Research Laboratories ( FIRL) pe rformed similar testing for the Toledo Edison Company in 1977 with successful results. The test configuration and cables used conservatively bound the HCGS conditions; therefore,
[ the limited cases where the HCGS separation has not been met in the installation are justified. The two reports , referenced have been submitted under separate cover, by le tter from R. L. Mitti, PSE&G, to A. Schwencer, NRC, dated August 30, 1984. Based on the results of this test and analysis program, separation criteria for Class lE conduit has been estab-lished which assures that (1) any failure or occurrence in a Class lE conduit will not degrade a redundant essential
- Class lE circuit in adjacent Class lE conduits, (2) a failure or occurrence in a non-Class lE conduit will not degrade redundant essential Class lE circuits in adjacent Class lE conduits.
i The criteria established are as follows:
- 1. Circuits carrying control, instrumentation, or power 1 of 3 i
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. Insert A (Cont'd) cable (where the power cable is limited to 480 volt or lower and No. 12 AWG or smaller) are allowed to touch each other.
- 2. Conduit carrying essential Class lE 4.16 kV power cables or 480 volt load , center power cables will have a one inch minimum separation from conduits carrying Class lE circuits of a redundant channel. -
, 3. Conduit carrying non-essential.13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, or 480 volt load center cables that bridge conduits carrying essential Class lE circuits of redundant channels will be separated from conduit carrying cir-cuits of the redundant channel to give a minimum sepa-ration of one inch.
Conduit carrying essential Class lE power cable of' 4. 480 volt or lower. voltage with conductor size larger than number 12 ANG, and not covered by 2. above , will meet the following criteria: -
- a. Will have a minimum of 1/8-inch separation from the surface of any conduit crossing above which contains an essential Class lE circuit of the
- redundant channel.
- b. Are allowed to touch conduits containing an essen-tial Class lE circuit of the redundant channel when installed in a horizontal, side-by-side configuration.
i
- c. Will have a minimum separation of one inch from conduits containing an essential Class lE circuit of the redundant channel mounted directly above and running parallel.
- 5. Conduit carrying non-essential power cable of 480 volt or lower voltage with conductor size larger than num-o ber 12 AWG, and not covered by 3. above, that bridge conduits carrying essential Class lE circuits of redun-I dant channels will be treated as in 4.a, b, and c for proper separation from the redundant channel.
- Non-Class lE conduit separation from Class lE tray.
In safety-related areas of the plant there are non-Class 1E rigid steel conduits within one inch of Class lE tray. The non-Class 1E conduit contains only control, instrument-ation or 120 Vac/125 Vdc power cables. The testing performed l l 2 of 3 l _ . . . _ _- _ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . . ~ _ .
Insert A (Cont'd) for the above projects demonstrated that the rigid steel conduit is an effective barrier for protection of any cabling. Therefore, the HCGS cases where the non-Class lE conduit is not installed as required is justified by the previous testing.
- . Metal-clad cable separation from Class lE raceways.
- Metal-clad cables, type MC, are used in non-Class lE,
,' circuits only. The minimum separation between the metal-clad cable and Class lE raceways (open top trays or conduits) is one (1) inch. The type MC cable is a factory assembly of one or more conductors, each individually insulated, covered with an overall insulating jacket and all enclosed in a metallic sheath of interlocking galvanized
. steel. The cable has passed the vertical flame test of IEEE 383-1974.
The above analysis identified the cases on a generic level. The installation and inspection of raceways are ongoing and the specific cases where the analysis appoes are documented on nonconformance reports that are part of the QA/QC program. s b 3 of 3
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Dsta cwn Item No. 245 (DSER Section S.3.3. . . WEEN RACRWAYS 1 . Tus gas or 18 VERSUS 36 INCBBS OF SEFARATION SET i , FSAR it is l
; rays in the
; In stated sections that separation1 8.1.75 and 8.1.4.14.31 between redundant cab l
lof ethe y roes, rticallyt l . cable speeading area, control equipment ration roome, re a i and main control room are separated by 18 inches ve as opposed to the recommended 384-1974. 36 inches of sepa required by Isas standard FSAR, indicated that this
- ' l during the I The applicant, by Amendment 4 toites k plant. th918 The inches staff's of i states l preliminary design review of the Bope Creepreli thats
.l , "The applicant claims t'home separation ling will distancesbe are adequate because a high grade type cab that ,
hn specified and results of estensive testing show i _ nc, cable degradation or flame propagation occu j the lower tray,d to a gas flame for 15 spinutes.' tray, is espose degradation ! tray es-The results of these tests, that demonstrate i h the noapplicant.
' to cables located in the trays 12 inches above the posed to the gas flame, will be pursued w t I RESPONSE to duestion 430.51 Section 8.1.4.14. 3. I' a'nd e .the r e s po ns e justification for have been revised to provi.de additional
- the separation distance.
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,~ - Item 26 i DSER 245 Rev. 24 HCGS FSAR QUESTION 430.51 (SECTION 8.3.1 and 8.3.2)
- In Sections 1.8.1.75.and 8.1.4.14.3.1 of the FSAR you state that separation between redundant cable trays in the cable spreading area, control equipment room, relay room, and main control room are separated by 18 inches of separation required by IEEE Standard 384-1974. Provide analysis substantiated by test that demonstrates the adequacy of 18 inches of separation.
RESPONSE
The HCGS PSAR was approved with 18 inch vertical separation between redundant cable trays. A copy of the test report that substantiated the .use of this vertical separation has been submitted under separate cover (letter from R. L. Mitt, PSE&G, to A. Schwencer, NRC, dated August 15, 1984). Revised section 8.1.4.14.3.1 provides the analysis based on this test to demonstrate the adequacy of 18 inches separation. In addition to the above test, an additional cable tray test will
- be performed that tests electrical shorting of electrical cabling
. utilizing the 18 inch vertical separation. This test plan is beir.g 4 submitted under separate cover.
If the test is unsuccessful, then cable tray covers will be added to the' trays in accordance'with IEEE Std 384-1974. i i t i DSER OPEN ITEM 245 Rev. 2 430.51-1 i
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Cabl preading Area, ntrol Equipment'Roong A=/ 3.1.4.14.3.1 Sr b .t :-a, and Main Control Room ,.
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And e}& M *C The cable spreading area, control equipment roomb i;s'. ;-a, and main control room do not contain high energy equipment such as switchgear, transformer, rotating equipment, or potential sources of missiles or pipe whip, and are not used' for storing flammable materials. Power supply circuits are limited to those serving These 208/120-V power these ~ areas and their instrument systems. Conduits containing redundant cables are installed in conduit's. cables are separated by a minimum of 1 Sch. Conduit couplings, clamps, locknuts, bushings, etc, shall not be considered in determining the required separation distances. For conduits carrying redundant r.eutron monitoring cables, bones also shall not be considered in determining the required separation. Redundant cable trays 'are separated by at least 18 inchesThe configurations, fo vertically and 12 inches horizontally.not
^ :;- can be separated by .
which the redundant distances specifled above wil;l either be analyzed or tested to with the intent of Reaulatory Guide demonstrate the complianc requirements between Class IE and non-1.75. Separation distance i Class IE raceways are the as for the separation among
> redundant channels. , ,
plM% AT A Strict administrat.1re control of operations and maintenance activities is developed to control and limit the introduction of , potential hazards into these areas. i s.1.4.14.3.2 Limited Hazard Areas 2.imited hazard areas are the general plant s'reas from which potential nonelectrical hazardsThe s'uch as missiles, hazards in this pipe areawhip,are and exposure fires are excluded. limited to failures or faults internal 102, to the equipment or cables. ,These areas include elevations 77, i 124, ~130, and 137 feet in the muziliary building Minimum wing areas and separation in elevation 87 feet in the radwaste area. these C .; .,i_. @ reas is as follows: .
- a. Conduits containing redundant cables are separated by a I
minimum of 1 inch, unless consideration of has'ards Conduit I ' indicates greater separation is required. couplings, clamps, locknuts, bushings, etc, shall not i be considered in determining the required separation distances. For conduits carrying redundant neutron p 3.1-21 Amendment 4 -
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DSER 245
' s (Item 26)
ABSTRACT-PHYSICAL SEPARATION TEST PLAN Page 1 l.0 SCOPE This document is a-test plan for the purpose of testing physical' separation between redundant Class lE cables and Class lE and,non - Class 'lE cables with ' respect to electrical f aults in configurations representative of HCGS. 1.1 OBJECTIVE The purpose of this procedure is to present the requirements, procedures, and sequence for testing the design adequacy of the Hope Creek cable tray-to-cable tray separation. Figure 1 identifies
.the tray-to-tray separation test configuration.
1.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS , IEEE Std 384-1981 IPCEA S19-81 HCGS FSAR Section 8.1 1.3 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION This test procedure encompasses tear.ing of control cable and instrumentation cable as described balow: Item No. Description 1.0 Okonite 600VAC, two conductor, size # 14 AWG (HCGS No. CO2) 2.0 Okonite 600VAC, two conductor,, size i 12 AWG (HCGS No. P12) 3.0 Eaton 600VAC, two conductor, ; size i l16 AWG (HCGS No.102) 2.0 TEST REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Acceptance Criteria 2.1.1 Insulation Resistance Test Measured insulation resistance on all " target" cables and any other cable, in the target raceway, that might sustain significant damage to its insulation system sha,ll be greater than 1.6 x 106 ohms with an applied potential of 500 VDC for sixty seconds.
- l l
DSER 245 I . (Item 2', Page 2 2.1.2 High Potential Test There shall be no evidence of insulation. breakdown or flashover with an applied potential of 2200 VAC for sixty seconds on all " target" cables and any other cable, in the target raceway, that might sustain significant damage to its insulation system. 2.1.3 Cable Continuity Test Energized non-f ault specimens in the " target" raceway shall. conduct 100% rated current at 120 VAC throughout the overcurrent test.
- 2.1.4 Cable Temperature The cabling in the upper cable tray shall be monitored for cable jacket temperature and it shall not exceed the
- qualified. parameter in the environmental qualification of the cable.
3.0 TEST PROGRAM 3.1 Test Configuration These tests shall consist of a series of tests with two vertically separated horizontal cable trays (see Figure 1).
-The test setup shall be identical for each test with the exception of the location of the f aulted cable.
3.1.1 Purpose The purpose of the' tests is to demonstrate the adequacy of design where two horizontal cable trays are physically separated by eighteen inches vertically when an electrical i fault occurs in the lower cable tray. 3.1.2- Test Specimen Preparation The test specimens shall be placed in the cable tray assembly as shown in Figure-1. This apparatus shall be assembled to the indicated dimensions. The following guidelines shall ba observed with regard to the materials and construction of the cable tray assembly:
-1. The cable trays shall be ladder rung trays 72" by 24" by 4" (horizontal tray) from PSE&G stock.
- 2. The cable trays shall be supported with unistrut hangers and shall be mounted such that the bottom of the upper horizontal cable tray is eighteen inches above the top of the upper horizontal cable tray.
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- 3. The upper and lower cable trays shall be filled to a 50%
fill level (by area) using an assortment of six ft unpowered control and instrumentation cables from PSE&G stock.
- 4. One energized 2/C Size 16 AWG cable and one energized 3/C Size 14 AWG cable shall be placed inside the cable trays that do not have the f aulted cable. The energized
" target" cables shall be located in the worst case locations (directly above, underneath or next to the faulted cable) as shown in - Figure 1. (NOTE: Figure 1 shows the fault and " target" cable locations for the
-two tests).
3 .1. 3 . Instrumentation Setup 3.1.3.1 Thermocouple Locations For the test, five thermocouples are to be mounted to the upper and lower cable tray on the edge closest to the faulted cable in the horizontal cable tray. These thermocouples shall be monitored by a Fluke Data-logger feeding a high-speed printer. The datalogger shall be. operated at its maximum rate throughout the overcurrent test. 3.1.3.2 Electrical Monitoring -- All voltages and phase currents s of the energized cables and the fault cable current shall be fed to oscillograph recorders. The oscillographs shall be operated at the 0.1 inch per minute rate throughout the ove rcurrent test. The oscillograph channels shall be as specified below: Occillograph #1 Channels Channel No. Test No. Signal Location 1 1 Current 16 AWG Upper Cable Tray 1 2 Current 14 AWG Lower Cable Tray 2 1 Current 12 AWG Upper Cable Tray 2 2 Current 16 AWG Lower Cable Tray 3 1 Current 16 AWG Upper Cable Tray 3 2 Current 14 AWG Lower Cable Tray 4 1 Voltage 16 AWG Upper Cable Tray 4 2 Voltage 12 AWG Lower Cable Tray 5 1 Voltage 12 AWG Upper Cable Tray 5 2 Voltage 16 AWG Lower Cable Tray 6 1 Voltage 16 AWG Upper Cable Tray 6 2 Voltage 14 AWG Lower Cable Tray
9
. Pags 4 Oscillograph 42 Channels Channel'No. Test No. Signal Location
~1 1,2 Current Faulted Cable A digital multimeter shall be utilized to measure all phase-to-phase voltages and all phase currents' prior to, during,
. and after the overcurrent test.. These data shall be recorded
. to provide accurate evidence of the energized specimens' ability to conduct rated current and 120 VAC throughout the overcurrent test. 3.1.4 Baseline-Functional Tests for Cabling in Upper Tray The baseline functional tests shall consist of insulation resistance .and high potential tests on the " target" cables. 3.1.4.1 Insulation Resistance Test
-1. Using a megohmmeter, apply a potential of 500 VDC and record the minimum insulation resistance indicated over a period of 60 seconds on the " target" cables.
- 2. Perform a high potential test on the " target" cable.
, 3.1.5 Overcurrent Test
- 1. Connect the worst case cable (WCC) size to the copper -
bus bars per Figure 3.
- 2. Energize the two 3/C Size 14 AWG cables with 120 VAC and 15 amperes.
- 3. Energize the two 3/C Size 12 AWG cables with 120 VAC and 90 amperes.
- 4. Energize the worst case cable size with rated current (90 amps).
- 5. Record " target" cable voltages and currents and the fault cable current.
- 6. Allow the worst case cable size to conduct rated current ,
for 15 minutes. _ 7. Increase the Multi-Amp Test Set output to 660 amperes. l
- 8. Record " target" cable voltages and currents and the fault cable current and temperatures.
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- 9. Allow the WCC to conduct 660 amperes until cable failure occurs or until thermocouple readings stabilize for a -
period of five minutes. 10 ~. - De-energize the Multi-Amp Test Set output.
- 11. Record Multi-Amp Test Set. time to failure of the faulted cabic.
- 12. Record " target" cable voltages and currents.
- 13. De-energize the " target" cables.
Photograph the post-test damage. l-14.
- 15. . Remove the f aulted cable and any other cables that were significantly damaged.
- 16. Repeat the applicable portions of Paragraphs 3.1.2 (Test Specimen Preparation, 3.1.3 ( Instrumentation Setup) and 3.1.4 (Baseline Functional Tests).
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. Rev. 14 941 DSER Open Item No. 259 (DSER Section 8.3.3.3.4)
USE OF AN INVERTER AS AN ISOLATION DEVICE , By Amendment 4 to the FSAR, the applicant indicated that the non-Class lE public address system distribution panel shown on sheet 2 i:- of Figure 8.3-11 of the FSAR is supplied power from the Class lE dc system through an inverter. The applicant further stated that this inverter is an acceptable isolation device per IEEE-384-1981, Section 7.1.2. 3. The staff does not agree. Test and analysis to demonstrate the adequacy of an inverter as an isolation device will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
The response to Question 430.33 has been revised to' state that the
- inverter 'will be tested as an isolation' device. In the event that
- the tests are not successful, the non Class lE loads will be removed or the cables will be re-routed.
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BCG5 FSAR l OUESTION 430.31 (SECTION 8.3.1 and 8.3.2) Section 8.3.1.1.2 of the FSAR indicates Non-Class that the Class 1E system 1E: loads are provides power to non-Class 1E loads. connected The single breaker to the Cl tripped automatically by a LOCA signal.
- tripped by a LOCA signal provides acceptable isolation between Class 1E and Non-Class 1E circuits for the design basis accident
- LOCA.
However, for other design basis accidents or operating occurrances that do not generate a LOCA signal (su
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it is the staff concern that a single breaker may not provideProvid acceptable isolation. 308-1974, that l the guidelines of Section 4.9 of IEEE Standard demonstrates that f ailure of an'yone or simultanous four channels of Class 1E power from performing its safety function. i (1) capacity and and capability of onsite and of fsite power supplies their associated distribution system to supply power to C1sss 1E loads within their design ratings for all modes of . operation, 384-1981, (2)(3) an analysis of diesel generator loadings for losa i
' of offsite power similiar to that (4) presented in Tables 8.3-2the failure o through 8.3-6 of the FSAR, system that supplies control power,to the subject non Clas loads, and (5) non-Class 1E loads are connected.
l RESPONSE f The following discussion demonstrates the adequacy of employing a single circuit breaker tripped by a LOCA signal as I design bas ) event that do not generate LOCA signals. g shows the two configurations that employ a Figure 430.33-1 I circuit breaker tripped by a LOCA signal as an isolation device. o ' The two configurations are: A Class IE unit substation supplies a non-Class 1E
- a. motor control center (MCC) or a motor load through C
SS Class 1E circuit breaker B. I i
- b. lA Class 1E motor control center supplies 5
# panel. l I The Class 1E circuit breakers B and D are qualified to operate l z$ for HCGS seismic and environmental parameters for a basis events.
Amendment 4 430.33-1
sess rsan respective Class 1E power supply buses from the non-Class This applies IE loads in the whether the event plant isthe suppliednon-ClassfromIEanloads fail. offsite source or an onsite source. Thus, the f ailure of the non-Class IE loads supp1 led from Cla 1E power supply buses will not prevent any of the four
' channels of Class 1E power supplies from performing its safety function. p 't A PA4d M4E. 42.M - 7.4 )
304-1331 l COMPLIANCE WITH GUIDELINES OF SECTION 7.1.2.1 QF IEEE l' Protective device coordination studies for devices shown in Figure 430.33-1 have shown that the tise-overcurrent trip l characteristics of circuit breakers A, B, C, and D are such that: >
- a. Circuit breaker 3 will trip to clear a fault current prior to initiation of a trip of circuit breaker A.
b. Circuit breaker D will trip to clear a fault current prior to initiation of a trip of circuit breaker C. . Both the onsite and offsite powers supply sources are separately capable of supplying the necessary f ault current for 3 suffi loss of function of Class 1E{ loads. STANDBY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADINGS FOR LOSS OF QFFS ' Table 8.3-1 tabulates the loads, their(DSA) KW ratings, and loading and loss of offsite sequences for design basis accidentIt can be verified by ins.pecting scenarios. power (LOP) Table 8.3-1 that DBA loading of the SDGs is the limiting case with respect to the loading capability of the SDGs. FAILURE OF TO THE NON-CLASS 1E DC SYSTEM THAT SUPP THE SUBJECT NON-CLASS 1E LOADS I For configuration (a) (described above) the circuit breaker 5 supplying a Non-Class 1E MCC or a motorFor load is controlled a non-Class 1Eby motor Class load, IE 125 V de control power supply.a non-Class IE circuit brea This non-Class 1E circuit breaker (GI-AKR circuit type) breakger 3.is controlled by a non-Class 1E 125 V de control power. GI-AKR type circuit breakers Therefore,are directets of theacting trip d a the failure dc electrical fault conditions. control power supply does not prevent p the circu in response to the f ailure of non-Class IE motor load. i IIUetT* C FMm Pntres436.nA6 osa onu tun ;?/, O Amendment 4 430.33-2
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. fev.lA HCGS FSAR QUESTION 430.33 Insert "C"
. ANALYSIS FOR SUPPLYING NON-CLASS lE FROM CLASS lE DC SYSTEMS
- Figure 8.3.11 shows non-Class lE public address system distribution j panel 10J496 supplied from a Class lE dc power bus 10D410 through a ,
Class lE inverter in UPS unit 10D496. The inverter is an acceptable l ,. isolation device per IEEE-384-1981, Section 7.1.2.3. Therefore, a b . failure in the non-Class lE distribution panel 10J496 will not degrade Class lE de system bus 10D410. 1 The HCGS UPS system will be tested to demonstrate the adequacy of an inverter being applied as an isolation device. The test will demonstrate that voltage, current, and frequency on the Class lE side of the UPS are not degraded below acceptable levels when maximum: credible voltage or current transient is applied on the non-Class lE side of the UPS system. The tests to be performed will simulate all operating modes for which the HCGS UPS system is designed. The tests will include the following types of faults at the UPS output location:
- a. Phase to ground.
- b. Neutral to ground _
,. c. Phase to neutral without ground i d. Hot short (460 vac) A test plan is submitted separately for the staf f's review. The test report and any associated analysis of the test results will be submit $ed in December 1984. An analysis has been performed to support the values used for the acceptance criteria for voltages. This analysis shows that the voltages specified will not cause misoperation or loss of any electrical equipment connected to the supply buses. The results of this analysis for the ac systems is stated in FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.1 and the calculated results are shown in Table 8.3-11. The results of the dc analysis are contained in FSAR Section 8.3.2. These results indicate that the 125 volt de system has an acceptable operating capability with battery voltage variations of 35 volts (140 volts de to 105 volts dc). The test acceptance criterion limits the bus voltage variation to 105-135 volts. i
' In addition, the acceptance values for the test currents are well below the level that would cause the infeed breakers to the UPS supply buses to trip. These values are as follows:
Acceptance Infeed breaker Circuit Current Setting Normal 480 VAC 0-55 amperes continuous 600 amperes Supply with a maximum peak not Pick-up to exceed 132 amperes and
- no value above 55 amperes shall persist for longer
! than 10 mS l Page 430.33-2B(1) ye,, e,y y-y*s v wr a-gy aw-e e--+---erw-- ==.=,+t-a.aa ymy-~e y-we+---y-t e v -e ,-twm----=e.ng,-*wwp.*ggvvvgt-*wm--- =-9-"Nw **-----EPe'""------WP-*ww
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. Insert "C" Page two Acceptance Infeed breaker Circuit Current Setting Back-up.480 VAC 0-78 amperes continuous 600 amperes Supply with a-maximum peak not Pick-up j
-to exceed 500 amperes and no value above 78 amperes >
shall persist for ' longer than 10 mS Alternate 125 VDC 0-180 amperes continuous 2000 ampere Suppl'y with a maximum peak of fuse 364 amperes and no value ' above 180 amperes shall persist 1for longer than i 500 mS If the testing can not demonstrate. adequacy of the UPS as an
' isolation device, than an isolation transformer will be added between the inverter and the distribution panel. The test plan fo'r
- the isolation transformer is also submitted separately for the staff's review. In the event of failure of both tests the non-Class lE loads associated with the UPS system will be removed from the Class lE buses or the cables to these loads will be re-routed so as to be f ' separated from Class lE cables associated with other Class lE channels. 4-1 f I 4 8 4 . l~ Page'430.33-2B(2) ! l
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d 6 NON CLASS lE CABLE l V I I BACK UP POWER SUPPLY FOR UPS SUPPLYING. NON CLASS lE Of 5TRIBUTION PANEL. HOPE CREEK f GENERATING STATION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT f i I
' ISOLATION BETWEEN CLASS lE POWER SUPPLIES AND NON CLASS lE LOADS-TRIPPING CIRCUlT BREAKER
' PIGURE 430.331 AMENDMENT 4,1/34
T E'5 7 ' P R O C E D U R E , ISOLATION VERIFICATION L S/M 9743 1E 20KVA UPS (INSTRUMENTATION AC POWER SUPPLY) FOR PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION PO. 10855-E-154 (Q)-AC OBJECTIVE:. TESTING TO ESTABLISH THE UPS SYSTEM AS A CIRCUIT ISOLATION SYSTEM. PASS CRITERIA: . DEFINITION OF ISOLATION DEVICE OR SYSTEM: A DEVICE OR SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE A CIRCUIT ISOLATION DEVICE IF IT IS APPLIED SUCH THAT THE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE VOLTAGE OR CURRENT TRANSIENT APPLIED TO THE MON CLASS 1E SIDE OF THE DEVICE ~ ~ WILL NOT DEGRADE THE CLASS 1E CIRCUIT ON THE OTHER SIDE'0F
-- ^~ -
THAT DEVICE. , CIRCUIT NORMAL VARIATION ALT. DC. SUPPLY 106-116 VDC
- 0-364 ADC NORMAL-AC SUPPLY 480+105 V(L-L) 3 PHASE 0-55A, 0-132AP FOR 10 MSEC
, BACK UP AC SUPPLY 480+10% V 1 PHASE 0-78A, 0-500AP FOR 10 MSEC ANY VARIATIONS OUTSIDE OF NORMAL VARIATIONS SPECIFIED, WILL 8E ANALYZED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. S g. s
FAULT LOCATION AND TYPE
~
FAULTS WILL BE APPLIED TO UPS SYSTEM OUTPUT TERMINALS BY CLOSING A SWITCH AS REQUIRED. ! FAULT TYPES:
- 1. PHASE (HOT) TO GROUND
- 2. NEUTRAL TO GROUND
- 3. PHASE TO NEUTRAL W/0 GROUND
- 4. 480VAC APPLIED ACROSS UPS OUTPUT W/0 GROUND (HOT SHORT)
THECON0!i!0NOFTHETHREECLASS1ESOURCESWILLBEMONITORED THROUGH-SUITABLE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS BY GOULD INC., 2000W SERIES HIGH FREQUENCY RECORDING SYSTEM. i s' i I 0 2 l e .-- - - . - - -- - , w m~ ,, , . . - , ------.~----,------n-, - , - --r-, --.+--e -- we-,-,-n-wn--,----,v,n-,-w,_ew__--,mme-w-m,-ve,y,,-w..,,..,-, - - - - - - - -
- ~. - - - .- - -.. _ - . _
1 IEST PROCEDURES
' 1.0_. GENERAL h0TES 1.1 BEFORE STARTING TEST DETERMIME AND RECORD ALL SIGNAL CONDITIONER TRANSFER RATIO (MULTIPLIER) VALUES.
1.2 NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION DURING EACH TEST A. CONNECTION PER FIG. 1.
- 8. OUTPUT LDAD 10KVA 9 .08PF (66.7 AMP RESISTIVE AND 50 AMP INDUCTIVE) 9 120VAC NOMINAL.-
C. UPS POWERED BY " ALTERNATE" DC SOURCE (BATTERY) AND ONE OR BOTH AC SOURCES. " NORMAL" & "BACK-UP". D. STATIC SWITCH IN " PREFERRED" POSITION. E. ALL 8REAKERS & SWITCHES CLOSED. BOTH BYPASS SWITCHES IN
" NORMAL" POSITION
" TEST" SWITCH - CENTERED
" RETURN MODE" SWITCH - IN "AUT0" POSITION
" ISOLATION" TOGGLE SWITCHES - ON
" SYNC" TOGGLE SWITCH - ON ,
1.3 TEST INSTRUMENTATION A. G0ULD INC.. N0 DEL 2800W HIGH FREQUENCY RECORDING SYSTEM. EIGHT CHANNEL. INDEPENDENT SCALE SELECT A.050 TO 1500 VOLTS FULL SCALE.
- 8. POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER 480V. 60HZ PRIMARY 120V SECONDARY
- (4:1 RATIO).
C. CURRENT TRANSFORMER 1000:1 RATIO WITH 10 0HM BURDEN RESISTOR. (.01V/A). D. WIDEBAKD DC ISOLATION AMPLIFIER. GOULD INC. MODEL 13-4615-10 OR EQUIVALENT. 1 M l 3 T
.,,.s-,,_,,.m..%.,.. _ , - , , , _ . w y r.m --,_r,
1.4 TEST FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT A. DC SUPPLY - C&D 4LCW-15 BATTERY (60 CELLS, 80KW FOR 30 MIN.) AND BATTERY CHARGER. B. AC SUPPLY - 480V, 3 PHASE, 4W, 60 HZ, 1200A GROUNDED NEUTRAL.
'C . AC LOAD BANK 30KW OR 0-30KV A 9 0.8PF.
D. FAULT APPLICATION DEVICE - G.E. CIRCUIT BREAKER TJC 36400G 400A, 3P. MAGNETIC ONLY. E. HOT FAULT SOURCE - TRANSFORMER, 1 PH 480:120V 30KVA OR 4 LARGER. 2.0 TESTPkOCEDURE 2.1 BASE LINE DATA START UP THE UPS WITH ALL SOURCES AVAILABLE. SET UP " NORMAL - OPERATION" PER 1.2 AND ALLOW SYSTEM TO WARM UP FOR AT LEAST 30 MINUTES. A1. METERING AND CONNECTIONS PER FIG. 2 AND " BACKUP SOURCE" 8REAKER OPEN. RECORD IN " STORE" MODE AT 20KHZ TIME BASE. COPY MEMORY TO PAPER. ' A2. REPEAT A1 EXCEPT USE 500HZ TIME BASE.
- 31. WITH METERING AND CONNECTIONS PER FIG. 2 AND " NORMAL SOURCE" 8REAKER OPEN. RECORD IN " STORE" MODE AT 20KHZ TIME BASE.
COPY MEMORY TO PAPER.
- 82. REPEAT B1 EXCEPT STATIC SWITCH TRANSFERRED TO BACKUP.
- 83. REPEAT B1 EXCEPT USE 500HZ TIME BASE.
- 84. REPEAT 82 EXCEPT USE 500HZ TIME BASE.
l I 4
. I . . . l 2.2 FAULT TESTING CO. METERING AND CONNECTIONS PER FIG 2. RECORDER IN MANUAL TRIGGER MODE. APPLY FAULT BY CLOSING " FAULT" C8 AND AT THE SAME TIME (OR 0 TO 10 MILLISECONDS BEFORE) TRIGGER THE RECORDER IN " STORE" MODE. REMOVE THE FAULT AND RECORD THE MEMORY TO PAPER.
AFTER EACH FAULT APPLICATION CHECK THE UPS FOR DAMAGE. REPA1R THE UPS IF REQUIRED BEFORE PROCEEDING. INSTALL JUMPER "A" T0 " FAULT" CB WITH "8 ACKUP SOURCE" C8 i C1. i
,0PEN WITH RECORDER AT 20KHZ TIME BASE APPLY FAULT PER CO.
i C2. REPEAT C1 EXCEPT WITH 500HZ TIME BASE. C3.J"0 PEN " NORMAL SOURCE" CB AND CLOSE " BACKUP" WITH RECORDER 20KHZ TIME BASE APPLY FAULT PER CO. C4. REPEAT C3 EXCEPT WITH 500HZ TIME BASE. C5. REPEAT C1. C2, C3 & C4 WITH JUMPER "B" INSTEAD OF "A" CONNECTED TO " FAULT
- CB.
C6. REPEAT C1, C2. C3, & C4 WITH JUMPER "C" INSTEA) 0F "A" CONNECTED TO " FAULT' C8. C7. REPEAT C1, C2 C3..& C4 WITH CONNECTIONS TO HOT FAULT SOURCE (UPS RUNNING AT NO LOAD). 2.3 COMPLETE TEST
SUMMARY
SHEET FOR EACH TEST OR TEST GROUP. i 1 0 5
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m . i TEST PROCEDURE. ISOLATION VERIFICATION S/N 9743 IE 20KVA UPS (INSTRUMENTATION AC POWER SUPPLY) IN SERIES WITH A POWER CONVERSION PRODUCTS ISOLATING TRANSFORMER MODEL f RTF-120/120-30 FOR PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO. HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION '
,~PO. 10855-E-154 (Q)-AC
. . . ~ ~ OBJECTIVE: TESTING TO ESTABLISH THE ISOLATING TRANSFORMER IN SERIES WITH A UPS SYSTEM AS A CIRCUIT ISOLATION SYSTEM. PASS CRITERIA: DEFINITION 0F ISQLATION DEVICE OR SYSTEM: A DEVICE OR
" ~
SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED TO 8E A CIRCUIT ISOLATION DEVICE IF IT --.-- IS APPLIED SUCH THAT THE MAXIMUM CREDIBLE VOLTAGE OR CURRENT TRANSIENT APPLIED TO THE MON CLASS 1E SIDE OF THE DEVICE WILL NOT DEGAADE THE CLASS 1E CIRCUIT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THAT DEVICE. CIRCUIT NORMAL VARIATION ALT. UC. SUPPLY 105-136 VOC 0-364 AOC NORMAL AC SUPPLY 480+101 V(L-L) 3 PHASE 0-55A, 0-132AP FOR 10 MSEC 8ACX UP AC SUPPLY 480+105 V
! PHASE 0-78A 0-500AP FOR 10 MSEC 4 ANY VARIATIONS QUTSIDE OF NORMAL VARIATIONS SPECIFIED. WILL '
BE ANALYZEU ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. s f 8 1
FAULT LOCATION AND TYPE FAULTS WILL BE APPLIED TO !$0LATING TRANSFORMER QUTPut TERMINALS SY CLOSING A SWITCH AS REQUIRED. FAULT TYPES: I
- 1. PHASE (NOT) TO GROUND
- 2. NEUTRAL TO GROUND
- 3. PHASE TO NEUTRAL W/0 GROUND
- 4. 480VAC APPLIED ACROSS UPS OUTPUT W/0 GROUND (HOT SHORT)
THE CON'd! TION 0F THE THREE CLASS IE SOURCES WILL BE MONITORED THROUGH SULTABLE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS, BY GOULD INC., 2000W SERIES HIGH FREQUENCY RECORDING SYSTEM. e s t i ! 2 ! ______g._, [_1,
TEST PROCEDURES 1.0 GENERAL NOTE 5 1.1 BEFORE STARTING TEST DETERMINE AND RECORD ALL SIGNAL CONDITIONER TRANSFER RATIO (MULTIPLIER) VALUES. 1.2 NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION DURING EACH T'EST A. CONNECTION PER FIG. 1.
- 8. OUT.PUT LOAD 10KVA 9 .08PF (66.7 AMP RE515TIVE AND 50 AMP INDUCTIVE) 9 120VAC NOMINAL.
C. UPS POWERED BY " ALTERNATE" DC SOURCE (BATTERY) AND ONE OR 80TH AC SOURCES, " NORMAL" & "BACK-UP". O. STATIC SWITCH IN " PREFERRED" POSITION. E. ALL BREAKERS & SWITCHES CLOSED, BOTH BYPA55 SWITCHES IN
" NORMAL" P051T10N
" TEST" SWITCH - CENTERED '
" RETURN MODE" SWITCH - IN "AUT0" P051T10N "150LAT10N" TOGGLE SWITCHES - ON "5YNC" TOGGLE SWITCH - ON ,
1.3 TEST INSTRUNENTATION A. GOULO INC., MODEL 2800W HIGH FREQUENCY RECORDING SYSTEM. EIGHT CHANNEL, INDEPENDENT SCALE SELECT A.050 TO 4500 V0LTS FULL SCALE.
- 8. POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER 480V, 60HZ PRIMARY 120V SECONDARY (4:1 RATIO).
C. CURRENT TRANSFORMER 1000:1 RATIO WITH 10 0HM BURDEN RESISTOR. (.01V/A). D. WIDE 8AND OC ISOLATION AMPLIFIER, G0ULO INC. MODEL 13-4615-10 GR EQU! VALENT. 4 9 l 3, -
.., . .r . . , ,, .
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-1.4 TEST FACILITY AND EQUIPMENT A. DC SUPPLY - C&D 4LCW-15 BATTERY (60 CELLS, 80KW FOR 30 MIN.)
AND 8ATTERY CHARGER. 8. AC SUPPLY - 480V, 3 P.HASE, 4W, 60 HZ, 1200A GROUNDED NEUTRAL. C. AC LOAD BANK 30KW OR 0-30KVA 9 0.8PF.
~
- 0. FAULT. APPLICATION DEVICE - G.E. CIRCUIT BREAKER TJC 36400G 400A. 3P. MAGNETIC ONLY.
E. HOT FAULT SOURCE - TRANSFORMER, 1 PH 480:120V 30KVA OR ' LARGER. . 2.0 TEST PROCEDURE
- 2.1 BASE LINE DATA START UP THE UPS WITH ALL SOURCES AVAILABLE. SET UP " NORMAL OPERATION" PER 1.2 AND ALLOW SYSTEM TO WARM UP FOR AT LEAST 30 4
MINUTES. A1. METERING AND CONNECTIONS PER FIG. 2 AND "8ACKUP SOURCE" BREAKER OPEN. RECORD IN " STORE" MODE AT 20KHZ TIME BASE. COPY MEMORY TO PAPER. A2. REPEAT Al EXCEPT USE 500HZ TIME BASE.
- 81. WITH METERING AND CONNECTIONS PER FIG. 2'AND " NORMAL SOURCE" BREAKER OPEN. RECORD IN " STORE" MODE AT 20KHZ TIME BASE.
COPY MEMORY TO PAPER.
- 82. REPEAT 81 EXCEPT STATIC SWITCH TRANSFERRED TO BACKUP.
- 83. REPEAT 81 EXCEPT USE 500HZ TIME BASE.
- 84. , REPEAT 82 EXCEPT USE 500HZ TIME BASE.
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." C0. METERING'AND CONNECTIONS-PER FIG 2. RECORDER IN MANUAL.
TRIGGER MODE. APPLY FAULT BY CLOSING " FAULT" CB AND AT THE SAME TIME (OR 0 TO 10 MILLISECONDS BEFORE) TRIGGER THE RECORDER IN " STORE" MODE. REMOVE THE FAULT AND RECORD THE MEMORY TO PAPER. AFTER EACH FAULT APPLICATION CHECK THE UPS FOR DAMAGE.
'. REPAIR THE UPS IF REQUIRED BEFORE PROCEEDING.
C1. INSTALL JUMPER "A" TO " FAULT" CB WITH "SACKUP SOURCE" CB OPEN WITH RECORDER AT 20KHZ TIME BASE APPLY FAULT PER CO. C 2.f. REPEAT C1 EXCEPT WITH 500HZ TIME BASE. C 3.- OPEN " NORMAL SOURCE" C8 AND CLOSE "8ACKUP" WITH RECORDER
~'- 20KHZ TIME BASE APPLY FAULT PER CO.
C4. REPEAT C3 EXCEPT WITH 500HZ TIME BASE. C5. REPEAT C1, C2, C3 & C4 WITH JUMPER "8" INSTEAD OF "A" CONNECTED T0 " FAULT" CB. C6. REPEAT C1, C2, C3, & C4 WITH JUMPER "C" INSTEAD OF "A" CONNECTED TO " FAULT" CB. C7. REPEAT C1, C2, C3, & C4 WITH CONNECTIONS TO H0T FAULT SOURCE (UPS RUNNING.AT NO LOAD). 2.3 COMPLETE TEST
SUMMARY
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HCGS FSAR 8/84 . 13.4 REVIEW AND AUDIT The independent review and audit functions of ANSI-N-18.7 will be performed by the Station operations Review . Committee which reports to the General Manager - Hope Creek Operations, and the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review who reports to the Vice President - Nuclear. Reporting to ,
- the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review are two groups,
- l namely the on-Site Safety Review Group (SRG) and the Off-Site Review Group (OSR). Since the Nuclear Department is located on Artificial Island site the terms on-sits and off-site are intended to convey the distinction between inside and outside the Station fence. The Nuclear Safety Review (NSR) Department organization is indicated in Fig.
13.1-6a. The equivalency to review groups identified in , standard Technical Specifications is indic'ated below: l Equivalent Commonly Used Standard Technical Specification PSE&G Terms 1 Station Operations SORC or PORC or PRC Review Committee (SORC) or Unit Review Group (URG) On-Site safety Review Group ISEG (SRG) Off-site Review Group (OSR) Nuclear Review Board (NRS) , or Off-Site Safety Review Committee ' or Safety Review and Audit Board or i Company Nuclear Review and Audit : Group (CNRAG) j The nuclear safety review process will be furtner strengthened in the organization by the establishment of an advisory board called the Nuclear safety Advisory Board reporting to the vice President - Nuclear. l 13.4-1 HCFSAR 2 Amendment l'
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The Nuclear safety Advisory Board (NSAB) fulfills the role of 4M - oversight committee from the > standpoint of nuclear safety with participation byg5Utside members. The NSAB will be an advisory board to the Vice President - Nuclear and will not be governed by- any Technical specification requirements. Its primary responsibility is to consider potentially significant nuclear and radiation safety issues and related management matters from a programmatic and policy level viewpoint and advise the Vice President - Nuclear. g 13.4.1 STATION OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE The station Operations Review Committee (SORC) will be
- established and functional before the initial fuel loading. Its
- purpose, throughout the life of the plant, is to advise the Genetal Manager - Hope Creek Operations on all operational matters related to nuclear safety by reviewing plant operations, procedures, and tests that have nuclear safety significance. ;
l 12.4.1.1 Organization . Membership of the SORC will consist of, but not be limited to, the following , ,
- s. Chairman - Assistant General Manager - Hope Creek Operations
- b. Members:
- 1. Technical Manager - Vice chairman
- 2. Operations Manager - Vice Chairman
- 3. Maintenance Manager - Vice Chairman
- 4. Operating Engineer
- 5. Maintenance Engineer
- 6. Instrument and Control Engineer l
- 7. Chemistry Engineer
- 8. Technical Engineer
- 9. Radiation Protection Engineer i i 10. Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor I
- 11. Manager, On-site safety Review Group l
i 13.4-2 BCFSAR 2 Amendment l l
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13.4.1.1.1 Alternates All alternate members shall be appointed in writin0 by the chairman to serve on a temporary basis. 13.4.1.1.2 Ouorum A quorum of the SORC shall consist of the Chairman or his desig-nated alternate and five members including alternates. However, no more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in SORC activities at any one tima, 13.4.1.2 Meetinus
- The SORC will meet at least once per calendar month and as convened by the Chairman or Vice Chairman. Minutes of all formal meetings shall be maintained. Copies of minutes from SORC meetings are sent to the Manager - Off-site Review, the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review and the Vice President - Nuclear.
13.4.1.3 Responsibility The SORC is responsible fort
- a. Review of (1) Station Administrative Procedures and changes thereto and (2) Newly created procedures or changes to existing procedures that involve a significant safety issue.
- b. Review of all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety.
- c. Review of all proposed changes to Appendix A. Technical Specifications.
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- d. Review of all proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety
- e. Review of the safety evaluations that have been completed under the provisions of 10CFR50.59.
- f. Review of all violations of the Technical Specifications, including the preparation and forwarding of reports covering evaluation and recommendations to prevent recurrence, to the vice President - Nuclear and to the General Manager -
Nuclear Safety Review. l' 13.4-3 HCFSAR 2 Amendment
- g. Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS l ]
- h. Review of facility operations to detect potential nuclear safety hazards.
- i. Performance of special reviews, investigations, or analyses and reporting thereon, as requested, by the
-~ General Manager - Hope Creek Operations or the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review. ,
- j. Review of the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures including revisions
- k. Review of the Security Plan and implementing procedures including revisions.
- 1. Review of the Fire Protection Program and implementing procedures.
- m. Review of all unplanned on-site releases of radioactivity to the. environs including the preparation of reports covering evaluation, recommendations, and disposition of the corrective action to prevent i recurrence and the forwarding of these reports to t'he vice President - Nuclear and to the General Manager -
Nuclear Safety Review.
- n. Review of changes to the PROCECS CONTROL MANDAL cnd the OFF-SITE DOSE CALCULATION ONUAL.
13.4.1.4 SORC Review Process A technical review and control system will be established to perform the reviews generally required by SORC in accordance with standard Technical Specifications. This system will focus the SORC effort on those areas where the collective expertise of the committee members can have the most substantial contribution to l the safety review effort. Important elements of such system would include L
- 1. Routine periodic review of procedures and changes thereto will be performed within the station organization, and only those items that have a safety significance will be referred to SORC for review.
- 2. SORC reviews will concentrate on consideration of safe and reliable operation of the station. Independent reviews for determination or verification of USQ will be performed by NSR and the results of NSR reviews will be provided to SORC.
13.4-4 BCFSAR 2 Amendment
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- 3. A system of qualified reviewers within the station organisation'will be established to assist SORC review effort.
Reviews and approval of temporary changes to procedures is described in section 13.5. The SORC will review all events that require 24-hour notification to the NRC, viclations of Technical Specifications, and any other unplanned events that may have nuclear safety significance. A ' i report-will be submitted to the SORC by a designated staff member. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the SORC l will be recorded in the minutes of the meeting and forwarded to the General Manager - Hope Creek Operations and the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review. Any unreviewed safety questions will be reported to the General Manger - Nuclear Safety Review
. for further action.
13.4.1.5 Authority The SORC shall:
- .a. Recommend to the General Manager - Hope Creek Operations written approval or disapproval of items a.
through e. under Section 13.4.1.3. f
- b. Provide written notification within 24 hours to the General Manager - Nuclear Safety Review of any disagreement between the SORC and the General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations; The General Manager - Hope Creek Operations will have the responsibility for resolutions of such disagreements. 13.4.2 NUCLEAR SAFETY REVIEW The Nuclear Safety Review Department (NSR) will be responsible for the independent safety review program consisting of the ISEG functions and the standard technical specification functions that are generally performed by a company nuclear review board. NSR consists of a General Manager, a Manager of the On-Site safety Review Group (SRG) supported by at least four dedicated, full-time engineers located on-site at tiope Creek, and a Manager of the Off-Site Review Group (OSR) Supported by at least four l dedicated, full-time engineers located off-site. The SRG will be primarily responsible for ISEG functions and the OSR will be primarily responsible for functions that are generally performed by a Nuclear Review Board. However, depending on the need the resources of both SRG and OSR will be utilized, without organizational restrictions, in discharging overall review responsibilitica of NSR. The staff will possess experience and 13.4-5 ! HCFSAR 2 Amendment i
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competence in.the general areas listed in Section 13.4.2.1. NSR shall establish a system of qualified reviewers from other technical organisations to augment its expertise in the disciplines of section 13.4.2.1. Such qualified reviewers will meet the same qualification requirements as the NSR members; and will not have been involved with performance of the original work. , Establishment of the Manager, off-site Review and Staff is quided by the provisions for independent review of Section 4.3 of ANSI N18.7 (ANS-3.2), and the qualification requirements for the review staff will meet or exceed those described in Section 4.7 of ANS-3.1. 13.4.2.1 OFF-SITE REVIEW GROUP The Off-site Review Group (OSR) will become effective upon the initial fuel loading of the unit and will function to provide independent review and audit of designated activities in the areas of: a.- Nuclear power plant operations
- b. Nuclear engineering
- c. Chemistry and radiochemistry
- d. Metallurgy
- e. Instrumentation and control
- f. Radiological safety
- g. Mechanical engineering
- h. Electrical engineering
- i. Quality Assurance
- j. Nondestructive testing
- k. Emergency preparedness It will also function to examine plant operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, Licensee Event Reports, and other sources which may assist in performing its reviews. ,
13.4-6 HCFSAR 2 Amendment
l 13.4.2.1.1 Review
-The OSR will reviews
- a. The safety evaluations fore 1
\
- 1) Changes to procedures, equipment, or systems and :
- 2) tests or experiments completed under the provision of 10CFR50.59, to verify that such actions did not constitute an unreviewed safety question. j
- b. Proposed changes to procedures, equipment, or systems that involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10CFR50.59. ,
- c. Proposed test or experiments that involve an unreviewed ~
safety question as defined in 10C?R50.59.
- d. Proposed changes to Technical Specifications or to the Operating License.
- e. violations of codes, regulations, orders, Technical specifications, license requirements, or internal procedures or instructions having nuclear safety significance.
- f. Significant operating abnormalities or deviations from normal and expected performance of plant equipment that affect nuclear safety.
- g. All REPORTABLE EVENTS.
- h. All recognized indications of an unanticipated deficiency in some aspects of design or operation of safety-related structures, systems, or components.
- i. Reports and meeting minutes of the SORC.
13.4.2.1.2 Audits Audits of facility activities that generally are required to be
- performed under the cognizance of OSR, in accordance with the Standard Technical Specifications are listed belows
- a. The conformance of facility operations to provisions contained within the Technical Specifications and applicable license conditions at least once per 12 ,
months. i I 13.4-7 ; HCFSAR 2 Amendment l
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- b. The performance, training, and qualifications of the entire facility staff at least once per 12 nonths.
- c. The results of actions taken to correct deficiencies occurring in facility equipment, structures, systems, or method of operation that affect nuclear safety at least once per.G months.
d.. The performance of activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Program to meet the l criteria of Appendix B, 10CFR50, at least once per 24 1 months l
- e. The Facility Emergency Plan and implementing procedures at least once per-12 months
- f. The Facility Security Plan and implementing procedures at least once per 12 months
'g. Any other area of facility operation considered ,
appropriate by the General Manager - Nuclev.r Safety ' Review or the Vice President - Nuclear.
- h. The Facility Fire Protection Program and implementing procedures at least once per 24 months.
- i. An independent fire protection and loss prevention program inspection and audit shall be performed at least once per 12 months utilizing either qualified off-site licensee personnel or an outside fire protection firm.
- j. .An inspection and audit of the fire protection and loss prevention program shall be performed by a qualified outside fire consultant at least once per 36 months.
- k. The radiological environmental monitoring program and the results thereof at least once per 12 months.
.The above audits will be conducted by the Quality Assurance ;
Department. Audit results and recommendations will be reviewed by NSR. 13.4.2.1.3 Consultants l l Consultants may be used as determined by the General Manager - , NSR to provide expert advice to the NSR. Other support groups l within the Nuclear Department will also be available to provide l technical expertise. 1 I l 13.4-8 HCFSAR 2 Amendment l
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L 13 4.2.1.4 Authority NSR will report to and advise the Vice President - Nuclear on those aream of responsi.bility specified in sections 13.4.2.1.1 and 13.4.2.1.2 13.4.2.1.5 Records Records of NSR activities will be prepared and maintained. Reports of reviews and audits will be distributed as follows:
- a. Reports of reviews encompassed by section 13.4.2.1.1 above, will be forwarded to the Vice President -
Nuclear within 14 days following completion of the review.
- b. Audit reports encompassed by Section 13.4.2.1.2 above will be forwarded to the vice President - Nuclear and to the management positions responsible for the areas audited within 30 days after completion of the audit.
13.4.2.2 ON-SITE SAFETY REVIEW CROUP The on-site safety Review Group (sac) will be established and functioning prior to initial fuel load. The functions of the sag include the review of plant design and operating experience for potential opportunities for improving plant safety; the evaluation of plant operations and maintenance activities; and advice to management on the overall quality and safety of plant operations. 13.4.2.2.l' Organisation The SRG will consist of the Manager - on-site safety Review Group and dedicated, full-time engineers, located on site. Four such dedicated engineers will be at the Hope Creek site. 13.4.2.2.2 Qualifications SRG members will meet or exceed the qualifications described in section 4.4 of ANS 3.1 with a bachelor's degree in engineering and 2-4 years' experience in their field, including 1-2 years' nuclear experience. ; 13.4.2.2.3 Responsibility l The SRG will be responsible fort
- a. Review of selected plant operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, and other appropriate
, sources of plant design and operating experience information that may indicate areas for improving plant safety. 1 13.4-9 ' HCFSAR 2 Amendment
A -r r ee
- b. Review of selected facility features, equipment, and systems.
- c. Review of selected procedures and plant activities including maintenance, modifications, operational problems, and operational analysis.
- d. surveillance of selected plant operations and maintenance activities to provide independent verification
- that they are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced to as low as reasonably achievable.
13.4.2.2.4 Authority The SRG will make recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, or other means of improving plant safety to appropriate station / corporate management.
*not responsible for sign-off function.
4 i 13.4-10 HCFSAR 2 Amendment
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1 1 l 1 Date: 9/24/84 j 1 DSER DSER ITEM SECTION SUBJECT 245 8.3.3.3.2 The use of 18- versus 36 inches of separation between raceways 251 8.3.3.5.5 Fault current analysis for all representative penetration circuits 253 8.3.3.1.4 Conunitment to protect all Class lE equipment from external hazards versus only Class lE equipment in one division 259 8.3.3.3.4 .Use of an~ inverter as an isolation device
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D83R Open Item No. 245 (DSER 8ection 8.3*3=3*3 . EEN RACEWAYS f h TER OBE Cr 18 YERSUS 36 INCRES OF SEFARAT i of the FSAR traysit in is the l i In stated Sections 1.8.1.75between that separation and 8.1.4.14.3.1redundant cab e rtically oome . e cable spreading area, control equipmentration room,, relay r and main control :oom are separated by 18 inches ve i
.' as opposed to the recommended 384-1974. 36 inches of sepa required by IEEE Standard
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indicated ithatthe this 5 The applicant, by Amendmentk plant. 4 to the ThePSAR,18 staff's i
, ' preliminary design review of the Bope Creefor this item states
! preliminary safety evaluation report j that
. "The applicant claims t'hese separation type cabling distances will beht are adequate because a high grade hn t a specified and results of extensive testing show
, , no cable degradation or fisme propagation occurs w e the upper j s*
i the lower tray, separated by 12degradation i inches fromtra The results of these tests, that demonstrate above no the tray ex-h applicant. to cables located in the trays 12 inchesposed to t RESPONSt ion 430.51 and e. t he re sponse to Que stification for Section 8.1.4.14.3.1' have been revised to provi'de additional just the separation distance. j i (* - e 1 Dg/es *
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l Stew 2is l DSER 2.6 1 R,a. L HCGS FSAR QUESTION 430. 51 (SECTION 8.3.1 and 8.3.2) In Sections 1.8.1.75 and 8.1.4.14.3.1 of the FSAR you scate that separation .between redundant cable trays in the cable spreading
. area, control equipment room, relay room, and main control room are separated by 18 inches of separation required by IEEE Standard 384-1974. Provide anilysis substantiated by test that demonstrates
.the adequacy of 18 inches of separation.
RESPONSE
The HCGS PSAR was approved with 18 inch ver tical separation between redundant cable trays. A copy of the test report that substantiated the use of this vertical separation has been submitted under separate cover (letter f rom R. L. Mitt, PSE&G, to A. Schwencer, NRC, dated August 15, 1984). Revised section 8.1.4.14.3.1 provides the analysis based on this test to demonstrate the adequacy of 18 inches separation. In addition to the above test, an additional cable tray test will be performed that tests shorting of electrical cabling utilizing the 18 inch vettical separation. This test plan is being submitted under separate cover. 2 I i
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i DSER OPEN ITEM 245 Rev. 2 430.51-1
- _- - -- 8ev.2, Spreading Area, ntrol Equipment'Roemz 4=2 5.1.4.14.3.1 Cabl
- j 5" - __z, and Main Control Room -
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.da' ,d sadWM The cable spreading area, control equipment room
- i;s h s-, and main control room do not contain high energy equipment such as swikchgear, transformer, rotating equipment, or potential sources of missiles or pipe ehip, and are not used for storing flammable materials. Power supply circuits are limited to those These 208/120-V serving power these areas and their instrument systems. Conduits-containing redundant I cables are installed in conduits.
cables are separated by a minimum of 1 1,pch. Conduit couplings, clamps, locknuts, bushings, etc, shall not be considered For conduits in determining the required separation distances. carrying redundant neutron monitoring cables, boxes also shall , not i,e considered in determining the required separation. l Redundant cable trays'are separated by at least la inchesThe configurations, for 1 vertically and 12 inches horizontally.not be separated by . which the redundant ':---t._i; will can either be analyzed or tested to : distances specified above with the intent of Regulatory Guide demonstrate the compliance requirements between Class 1E and non-1.75. Separation d'.stan as for the separation among
- Class 1E raceways are the redundant channels. , g 4
pnSt.AT A . Strict administrative control of operations and maintenance activities is developed to control and limit the introduction of potential hazards into these areas. 3.1.4.14.3.2 Limited Hazard Areas Limited hazard areas are the general plant areas from which potential nonelectrical hazards s'uch as missiles, pipe whip, and The hazards in this area are esposure fires are excluded. limited to failures or faults internal to the elec equipment or cables. ,These areas include elevations 77, 102, 124,'130, and 137 feet in the auxiliary building Minimum wing areas and separation in elevation 87 feet in the radwaste area. these ef_.'. W i. 6 sreas is as follows: .
- a. Conduits containing redundant cables are separated by a minimum of 1 inch, unless consideration of haz'ards Conduit indicates greater separation is required.
couplings, clamps, locknuts, bushings, etc, shall not i be considered in determining the required separation j distances. For conduits carrying redundant neutron ;
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. %fR 2.d (I k 20 ABSTRACT-PHYSICAL SEPARATION TEST PLAN 1.0 -SCOPE This document is a test plan for the purpose of testing physical separation between . redundant class lE cables and Class lE and non-Class lE. cables _ with respect to electrical faults in configurations i representative of HCGS.
l.1 OBJECTIVE The purpose of this procedure is to present the requirements, procedures, and sequence for testing the design adequacy of the Hope Creek cable tray-to-cable tray separation. Figure 1 identifies the tray-to-tray separation test configuration. 1.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS IEEE Std 384-1981 IPCEA S19-81 HCGS FSAR Section 8.1 1.3 EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION This test procedure encompasses testing of control cable and instrumentation cable as described below: Item No. Description 1.0 Okonite 600VAC, two conductor, size # 14 AWG (HC No..C02) 2.0 Okonite 600VAC, two conductor, size # 12 AWG (HC No. P12) r 3.0 Eaton 600VAC, two conductor, size # 16 AWG (HC No. IO2)
- 2.0 TEST REQUIREMENTS 2.1 Acceptance Criteria 2.1.1 Insulation Resistance Test Measured insulation resistance on all " target" cables and any othcr cable, in the targe t raceway, that might sustain significant damage to its insulation system shall be
' greater than 1.6 x 106 ohms with an applied potential of 500 VDC for sixty (60) seconds, i'
- DSEE N f (rh20 Page two 2.1.2 High Potential Test There shall be no evidence of insulation breakdown or flashover with an applied potential of 2200 VAC for sixty (60) seconds on all " target" cables and any other cable, in the target raceway, that might sustain significant damage to its insulation system.
2.1.3 Cable Continuity Test Energized non-f ault specimens in the " target" raceway shall conduct 100% rated current at 120 VAC throughout the overcurrent test. D 9 5 1 l l
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N1 OIL Ra.3 DSER e n Item No. 251 (DSER Sesetion 8.3.3.5.5) FADLT CtRRENT ANALYSIS FOR ALL REPR8SENTATIVE. P nated f ault-current versus time curves for representa tration conductors and their protective devices are included inBased o Figures 420.46-1 of the FSAR. the stafI concludes that representative curves for mo 430.46-1.
- were not included in Figure as versus welltime as other curvescircuita such thatofthe is representative all coordinated fault-current penetration circuits will be pursued with the applicant.
RESPONSE
FSAR. Seekn t. I .4. n. has been rev: sed 1 e mem A Qunde 4h% , a.,4, # ah h m. e O 4 i
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. HCGS FSAR ,__ _ _.1/84 i OUESTION 430.46'(SECTION 3.3.1 and 8.3.2) Section 8.1.4.12 of the FSAR simplies, through the use of the term " penetration conductor", that primary and backup circuit protection is provided to protect the circuit conductor versus the penetration. This design for containment electrical
- penetration protection does not meet the guidelines of position 1 i
of Regulatory Guide 1.63. Position 1 requires primary and backup protection where maximum available fault-current exceeds the current-carrying capability.of the penetration versus capability of the conductors. ( a. Provide justification for noncompliance with the l guidelines of position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.63.
- b. Provide r medinated fault-current versus time curves for each representative type cable that penetrates primary containment. For each cable, the curves must show the relationship of the fault carrying capability
{; between the electric penetrations, the primary overcurrent protective device, and the backup
. overcurrent protective device. ,
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- c. Provide the test report with results'that substantiates the capability of the electrical penetration to withstand the total range of time versus fault current without seal failure for worst case environnemental conditions. ,
; RESPONSE FSkR. SecKon 3.84.I2. has h**~ rev;uA 40 9mviAs %s y es h ) i+4ermKo n .
l l' I' i 430.46-1 Amendment %
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- HCGS FSAR 8.1.4.10 Reculatory Gu:,de 1.53, Acolication of . i the Sinole Fa:, lure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant
" Protection Systems.. June 1973 The-electric power system is designed to comply with Regulatory Guide 1.53 as discussed in Section 1.8. All four Class 1E power l i system channels are designed and located in accordance with the separation criteria for the plant. Routing of cables and location of equipment is designed so that a failure of any kind in any channel cannot propagate to any other redundant channel. Consistent with the single f ailure criterion, only orse failure is assumed to occur in the system following a DBA. 8.1.4.11 Reculatorv Guide 1.62, Manual Initiation of Protective Actions, October 1973 BCGS complies with Regulatory Guide 1.62 as discussed in Section 1.8. 8.1.4.12 Reculatory Guide 1.63, Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Licht-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants, July 1978 Design of HCGS penetration assembly systems is in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63, wi% fhe c.xceptions ina'cafed M g3 h,anJ y L below. /1 The types of circuits that~go'through penetration assemblies are l as follows:
.a. Power feeders for medium voltage 3.92-kV motors l
- b. Power feeders for 480-V ac motors
- c. 480-V ac and 208-V ac miscellaneous power feeders
- d. 120-V ac control circuits
- e. 125-V de control circuits 8.1-12 ,
e
v . g
, l
. .. l 1/34 BCGS FSAR '
f. 120-V ac lighting circuits . l
, g. Motor differential relay current transformer circuits
- h. Low voltage instrumentation circuits .
1
- 1. Communication circuits.
The following system features are provided to ensure compliance f with the Regulatory Guide position on single random failures o circuit overload protection dev' ices: The only medium
- a. Medium voltage penetration assemblies: voltage circuits 3.92-kV circuits for the two reactor recirculation pump Each motor is supplied from a variable motors.
frequency motor-generator set. The maximum fault 1 current limited by available for a contribution the generator fault inside andthe thecontainment circuit is resistance. PUM AT.Y A up EA Cw.uP Pft oTECT1C*4 50E THE 1000 Ecmd., PEMEitAitoM 15 PEov10E0 BY TWO - Ct AS S lE CIEculT BRE AKEES 19 SE E.lf S AS SHoVJ# 1M FSAE Ficagg ,3-14. E ACM ctacutT SEEAW ER., 15 l ' PE,ovt0 Eb wn w An ovp,,,g. Cue.g.EwT e.st. Ay . yy g sg 2 hM S AEE. SE.T To Tgtp TiiElE RESPECTIVE C lE & U+T - BEE A%ERS Fiepn. 7.3 -1 l , gnatT g 1, SMCWS THAT Tyr TIM.E.- c.ure m.ENT c. Ap Asi u T y 07 TwL toce r.:.cu,l,, PEbit.TE.ATt04 t5 c. EE AT E.E T%AW ANY M Ac u t.,1M sgog7 cig cy g 7 cugg c,cv t.D o e e,. e e, . h TIMt. Co4DsTtoW TWAT The 480-V ac loads
- P^ b. 480-V ac motor feeder circuits:
4 inside the containment consist of Class 1E and non-Class II motor-operated valves and non-Class 11All these loads a , g continuous-duty motors. e.
from 480-V sotor control centers (MCCs).
. 'g -
't The magnetic-only circuit breaker used in the l -g combination starter for the motor provides primary A thersal-e i
- protection for penetration conductors.
8.1-13 Amendment 4
1 . . MT HCGS FSAR 1/84 ) l 1 magnetic breaker in series with the starter breaker ' provides backup protection for these penetration l conductors. These primary and backup breakers used for the protection of penetration conductors are-both located in the same cubicle of the MCC. The primary 1 breaker is set to provide only short circuit l protection. It does not provice locked-rotor protection, which is provided by overload relays in the MCCs for non-Class 1E motor-operated valvte and continuous-duty motors.
'For Class IE motor-operated valves (MOVs), the overload relay is bypassed for emergency plant operation to increase the availability of these valves in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106. For these Class 1E MOVs, tae backup breakers are selected to allow for sustained locked rotor current and penetration- l conductors are selected to ensure that-the thermal limits of the penetration are not exceeded during this condition.
The thermal-magnetic backup breaker has a nonadjustable n. trip setting, which is rated on the following basis:
- 1. The time-current characteristic curve remains under the thermal damage curve of the penetration conductor over the range of postulated temperatures so that the breaker trips on l overcurrent before the thermal limit of the ,
penetration conductor is reached. l
- 2. The breaker allows locked rotor current of non- '
Class 1E motors for at least 10 seconds and 1000 seconds for Class 1E motors. These breaker , ' settings prevent nuisance tripping of non-Class 1E l motors during starting and allows ample time for the motors to start.
- c. 480-V and 208-V miscellaneous feeders: Non-Class IE 480-V MCCs provide power for hoists, reactor l recirculation pump motor space heaters, and welding l outlets in the drywell. The primary and backup l
! protections for these" feeders are provided by two l thermal magnetic breakers in series. Both the breakers ' L have the same ratings and are located in the same l cubicle of the MCC. The ratings of both the breakers , 1 I 8.1-14 Amendment 4 [ _. _ _ , . . . _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ , _ _ . _ , _ _ _ _ . . _ , - . _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ , _ . . _ - _ .
. bli HCGS FSAR 1/84 are selected so that on overcurrent, the breakers tri'p l before the thermal limit of associated penetration conductor is reached.
208-V ac miscellaneous feeders from a 208/120-V ac power. panel provide power for source range monitoring (SRM) and intermediate range monitoring (IRM) systems. The primary protection for the 208-V ac circuit is provided by fuses in each circuit conductor. These fuses are located in GE control panels. The main 20-ampere thermal-magnetic breaker, located in the power panel, provides the backup protection for these circuits. The time-current characteristics of both the fuses and circuit breakers are selected so that both the devices trip before the thermal limit.of t% associated. penetration conductor is reached.
- d. 120-V ac control circuits: 120-V ac circuits see powered from 480/120-V ac control transformet s located in the MCC cubicles. Two fuses, with the sara rating in series for each circuit, located in the associated cubicles of MCCs, provide both the primary and backup protection. For a fault, the fuses blow before the thermal limit of the associated penetration conductor is reached.
120-V ac control circuits fed from uninterruptible power supply (UPS) distribution panels are provided with two fuses in series for each circuit. Primary protection is provided by the fuses located in GE control panels. Backup protection is provided by the main fuse with a rating higher than the primary fuse located in the UPS panel. For a fault, the fuses blow before the thermal limit of the penetration conductor is reached.
- e. 125-V de control circuits: Each circuit powered from the 125-V de control bus in the switchgear is provided with two fuses of the same rating located in the associated switchgear cubicle. These two fuses wired in series provide both primary and backup protection for the associated penetration conductor.
Each circuit powered from the control bus in the GE control panels is provided with a fuse in that panel to ensure primary protection for the penetration L 8.1-15 Amendment 4
l
. NT HCGS FSAR . 1/84 conductor. Backup protection is provided by the feeder breaker supplying the control bus, i
In both cases above, either the primary or backup protection is capable of clearing the fault before the thermal' limit of the associated penetration conductor is reached.
- f. 120-V ac lighting circuits: All lighting circuits going through the penetrations are 120-V ac. Each circuit is provided with two tuernal-magnetic breakers in series.
The primary protection for the penetration conductor is provided by breakers located in breaker panels. Breakers located in the lighting panels wired in series
- circuit with breaker panels provide the bactup protection for the penetration conductor.
Both the primary and backup protection are capable of clearing the fault before the thermal limit of the penetration conductor is reached.
- g. Motor differential relay current transformer circuits:
The only circuits in this category are the current transformer circuits for differential protection of the reactor recirculation pump motors. 40 protection is necessary for the penetration conductors assorf.ated with these current transformer leads because the maximum possible relay: current for a sustained fault in the medium voltage cable is only 37 amperes. The ampacity of'the penetration conductor is 41 amperes. Furthermore, the relay current decays to 1.7 amperes after 80-seconds because of the fault current decrement. 'These current transformer circuit cables are designated control cables and are routed in ' - ' ' separate raceways from power cables. This eliminates the possibility of a short circuit between power and
- [(4)fgjgy"/4kcontrol ' cables.
- h. Instrumentation circuits: Instrument circuits are all low-energy circuits carrying only a few milliamperes. .
Also, these circuits are touted in separate raceways from power cables to eliminate the possibility of a short between gg syp ment circuits. c'4A./
'fh r ent n he instrument circuits exceed the ampacity of penetration not conductors under any faulted condition. In additisn, ,
[ i 8.1-16 Amendment 4 sr *wy -- -= p - * --r' r *---ti'-ye---r-*--g-s et==sa+<tw-y 4.-~-4
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- NT Insert A The differential relay fails safe for shorts or opens in the current transformer circuits. If the differential leads were to short while carrying their normal load of 3.17 amperes, the differential ,
relay would operate and trip the generator drive motor in 144 ' milliseconds and the 3.17 amperes load would drop down to 1.7 amperes in 80 seconds. The penetration is rated.for 41 amperes continuously. 6 a l i
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g ' NT I l HCGS FSAR 1/84 the instrumentation circuits are protected from overloads by primary'overcurrent protective devices which are integral with their power supply and by ] backup overcurrent protective devices located upstream i jf f ofthepowersuppliey i g
- 1. Communication circuits - Communication circuits consist of 120-V ac power and signal circuits. Each power circuit has two fuses in series. One located in the distribution panel provides the primary protection, and another located in a terminal box near the penetration provides backup protection for the associated penetration conductors. Both of these are capable of
- clearing the fault before.the penetration conductor reaches its thermal limit y
( 8.1.4.13 Reculatory Guide 1.73, Qualification Tests of Electric Valve Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants, January 1974 HCGS complies with Regulatory Guide.1.73 as discussed in Section 1.8. 8.1.4.14 Reculatory Guide 1.75, Physical Independence of Electric Systems, Sectember 1978 i HCGS complies with Regulatory Guide 1.75. Clarifications and exceptions are noted in Section 1.8. i 8.1.4.14.1 General Separation Criteria Electrical equipment and wiring for the engineered safety feature systems (ESF), reactor protection system (RPS), and neutron
- . monitoring system (NMS) are segregated into separated channels /divic, ions as shown in Table 8.1-1, so that under DBAs no single credible event is capable of disabling sufficient equipment to prevent reactor shutdown, decay heat removal from the core, or mitigation of accidents. The ESF systems, RPS, and-NMS are separated electrically and physically from one another, and each is further separated into four channels. ' The degree of separation provided is commensurate with the potential hazards in a given area.
l 8.1-17 Amendment 4
. w.. ,. .
Insert B The only penetrations with instrument class circuits that are protected by a single circuit breaker or fuse are as follows: 1
- 1. Vibration Monitoring 1
.(a) Circuit breaker is 7 amperes.
(b) Maximum short circuit current is 0.8 amperes. (c) Penetration is $16 AWG wire with a continuous rating of 15' amperes. _. _ _ _ . . ._ _ _ _ . . . (d) These penetrations have a continuous rating in excess of 18 times the maximum short circuit current they may be expected to experience.
- 2. Neutron Monitoring System (a) Circuit protected by a 1/4 ampere fuse.
(b) Maximum short circuit current is 0.2 amperes. (c) Penetration is $16 NNG wire with a continuous rating i of 15 amperes. . (d) These penetrations have a continuous rating -in-excess - ; of 75 times the maximum short circuit current they may be expected to experience. -
- 3. Acoustical Monitoring System (a) Circuit protected by a 2.5 ampere fuss.
(b) Maximum short circuit current <0.1 amp.i:n. (The 330KJLresistor would limit the short circuit to 0.1 ampere even if the rest'of the circuit impedance was zero.) (c) Penetration is #16 AMG wire with a continuous rating of 15 amperes. (d) These penetrations have a continuous rating in excess of 150 times the maximum short circuit current they may be expected to experience. i 1
- 4. Thermocouple Circuits (a) Thermocouples cannot generate any conceivable short circuit challenge to a penetration. l l
I i i l _ . . , . , _ - . . _ _ - _ . _ , . , , ~ . _ , _ . , _ _ . . . . . . . . . , _ . . . . , . _ , , . . . . , _ _ . . _ , . . . - . . _ _ _ _ . , . _ , . . . . _ _ _ _ , . . . . - _ _ . _ , _ _ . . , _ . - , . . . . _ . _ ,
Insert C
. The P.A. voice circuits carry millivolt signals only when they are actually transmitting a voice communication.
The system cannot generate any conceivable short circuit challenge to a penetration. In addition, the penetration assemblies are designed to withstand, l without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum short-circuit current vs. time conditions that could occur, given single random failures of. circuit overload protection devices. Time current characteristic curves, based on tests, of .the penetration conductors have been established by the penetration supplier; these curves show the maximum duration of symmetrical short circuit current. Based on these curves the primary and backup protective devices are selected to ensure that the mechanical integrity of the penetrations is maintained. Coordinated fault-current versus time curves for representative penetration conductors and the protective devices are shown in Figures 8.3-17, Sheets 1 to 22. The test report that substantiates the capability of the electrical penetration to withstand fault current without seal failure for worst case environmen'tal conditions has been submitted under a separate cov.or. , The testing of all penetration over-current protective devices will be incorporated in the HCGS Technical Specifications. 4 3 l l 1 t I
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