ML20097F960

Submits Response to NRC GL 95-07 Re Performing Screening Evaluations to Identify Valves Potentially Susceptible to Pressure Locking/Thermal Binding

ML20097F960
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	02/12/1996
From:	Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
GL-95-07, GL-95-7, NUDOCS 9602200283
Download: ML20097F960 (36)

Text

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l' Southcrn Nuct2tr Operating Company

.,*^i-t, Post Offica Box 1295 5

Ibrminghafn. M1bima 35201 T:1: phons (205) 868 5131 1

Southern Nudear Operating Company

o. e morey Vice President Farley Project the Southern electnC System 4

February 12, 1996 4

Docket Nos.: 50-348 i

50-364 6

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4

ATTN : Document Control Desk i

Washington, D.C. 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Resoonse to Generic Letter 95-07 Ladies and Gentlemen:

The NRC Generic Letter 95-07, requests addressees (1) evaluate all operational configurations of safety-related, power-operated (including air-operated, motor-operated, or hydraulically-operated) gate valves for susceptibility to pressure locking and thermal binding (PLTB) and (2)

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perform further analyses, and any corrective actions, to ensure that safety-related power-i operated gate valves that are susceptible to these phenomena are capable of performing safety functions within the current licensing bases. This is applicable primarily to valves that have an active safety function to open.

The NRC requested the following actions be completed within 90 days of the issuance of the generic letter:

(1) Perform screening evaluations to identify those valves that are potentially susceptible to e

pressure locking or thermal binding; (2) Document a basis for the operability or, if operability cannot be supported, take action e

in accordance with individual plant technical specifications.

These 90-day actions have been completed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company as requested.

In addition, within 180 days each addressee was requested to implement and complete the guidance provided in Attachment 1 of the generic letter by performing the following:

(1) Evaluate the different operating configurations to identify all valves that are susceptible e

to pressure locking or thermal binding.

}{0ES 9602200283 960212 PDR ADOCK 05000348

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 (2) Perform further analyses as appropriate and take corrective actions to ensure susceptible valves identified in 1 above are capable ofperforming their intended safety function (s) under all modes of operation.

The above actions have been completed for Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP). Provided i:: the Attachment is Southern Nuclear Operating Company's 180 Day response concerning.he results of our evaluation. As is detailed in the attachment, a screening / evaluation proress was used on all applicable valves. Based on this screening and analytical analysis using two different models (one of which is a WOG methodology commonly known as the Com Ed methodology) all valves at FNP have sufficient actuator capability to perform their safety function. No physical modifications to FNP actuators are required.

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Respectfully submitted, SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY ff'lW Dave Morey Y ay of 1996 Sworn to andsubscribed before me this /c3 d N M cb OW ~ Notary Public U Seal My Commission Erpires: YI IQ49 REM / cit:gl9507t_. doc Attachment cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Region II Administrator Mr. B. L. Siegel, NRR Senior Project Manager Mr. T. M. Ross, FNP Sr. Resident Inspector J

.,t Attachment GL 95-07180 Day Actions .I dis *Q l

-l FNP Response SNC-Farley has identified all safety-related power operated gate valves at FNP. The identification process identified 198 power-operated gate valves. A listing of the 198 valves screened for potential susceptibility is provided in Section I of this attachment. In addition, SNC developed screening criteria to assist in the identifying and evaluating valves that may be potentially susceptible to pressure locking and/or thermal binding (PLTB) under potential o.oerational configurations. A screening flow path was developed along with a basis for each of the associated criterion. This information is contained in Section il of this attachment. Subsequently, the Westinghouse Owner Group (WOG) issued generic guidance related to temperature and pressure screening criteria for PLTB evaluations. The Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) PLTB criteria envelop the SNC values for quantitative generic screening criteria. The screening / evaluation process consists of three levels. These levels are described below:

• Level (1)- Screened all power-operated gate valves within the generic letter scope using the screening flowchart and design-related parameters,
• Level (2)- Screened the valves which remained after tr.e level 1 screening using the flowchart and plant-specific conditions more representative of normal and/or accident conditions, and
• Level (3)- Evaluated the valves which remain after the level 2 screening using plant specific parameters and the Entergy and Commonwealth Edison (Comed) prediction models for " pressure locking" unseating thrust requirements.

The screening results were documented using formal evaluations. The format of the evaluations was developed to address a specific valve group (in lieu of individual valves) because of the similarities in the valves and in the associated system operation during normal and/or accident conditions. Copies of certain of these evaluations are provided in Section IV of this attachment. The evaluations selected for inclusion with this submittal represent a cross-section of the screening levels. i The Level 1 screening eliminated 118 of the 198 gate valves identified to be within the scope of the generic letter. Of the 80 valves remaining after the Level 1 screening,23 valves were subsequently screened as part of Level 2 for potential susceptibility to both pressure locking and thermal binding. These 23 gate valves have flexible wedge disc designs. The remaining 57 solid wedge gate valves underwent Level 2 screening for j the potential of thermal binding only. For these 80 valves requiring a Level 2 screening and/or evaluation, all valves were eliminated from susceptibility consideration for thermal binding while 65 were eliminated for pressure locking. The remaining 15 valves were screened and/or evaluated for pressure locking susceptibility as part of Level 3. For these valves the above referenced analytical models were utilized to predict the required unseating thrust values. The following valves are included in this group: 1(2)-8801 A/B,1(2)-8803A/B,2-8811 A,1(2)-8884,1(2) 8885, and 1(2)-8886. All of the preceding valves except 2-8811 A are 3-inch,1500 lb, Velan flexible wedge gate valves. Valve 2-8811 A is a 14-inch, 300 lb, Westinghouse EMD flexible wedge gate valve. /

. ~. _ t,*. I i L 1 l As mentioned above, two different analytical models were initially utilized during the Level 3 evaluation phase for the remaining 15 valves. Section lli of this report contains a summary spreadsheet reflecting the results of the Level 3 screening / evaluations for these 15 gate valves. In addition, included in Section 111 are representative copies of the input data forms for the Comed and Entergy models. The results of a comparison between the more conservative prediction for unseating thrust (Comed model) and the calculated design capability of these motor-operated valves indicates a minimum operating margin.in excess of 50% The design capability is determined using methods consistent with the FNP MOV Program approach. Given this large available margin, SNC-Farley concluded these valves are not susceptible to pressure locking. SNC-Farley has reviewed the predictive models and the associated validation test data (the Comed information was provided to SNC-Farley by the WOG) and has concluded the models are based on sound engineering principles reflecting the current level of knowledge regarding the determination of stem load resulting from the application of forces on the valve wedge and stem. Since these models are supported by test data and are based on analytically sound engineering principles, SNC-Farley, applying I engineering judgment, concludes these methods /models are reasonably accurate. For the 15 valves requiring Level 3 screening at SNC-Farley, the mathematical model 1 developed by Commonwealth Edison (Comed) was determined to produce the more conservative results. Therefore, this model was used as the basis for evaluation of these valves. 9 As additional assurance for the acceptability of applying the above models to the valves at SNC-Farley, the following additional information is provided: 1-These valves have successfully operated at Farley Nuclear Plant for over 18 years (14 years for 2-8811 A) without a single identified occurrence of pressure locking. 2-Eight of the 14 Velan valves were subjected to design basis differential pressure testing. During the conduct of this test all stem loads (assumed in the pressure locking Level 3 screening) except the "second disk drag" effect would have been present and, therefore, accounted for in establishing the minimum thrust requirements for setting the associated open torque switches. 3-Surveillance testing of the above 15 valves has established the same operating 3 conditions, with respected to stem loads, as would be present during the assumed i pressure locking scenarios. If, in fact, the analytical predictions were non-conservative by an amount in excess of the available margins, prior " pressure locking" problem should have been identified. 4-The assumed scenario conditions associated with the Level 3 screening included the use of pump shut-off heads and did not credit any bonnet pressure decay due to minor seat or packing leakage. 5-The practice of sizing thermal overloads at Farley Nuclear Plant ensures the overloads will not trip for at least 10% of the valve stroke time with a minimum of 2 seconds and a maximum of 4 seconds at rated lock rotor current.

f l 4 SECTION I Listing of 198 Power-Operated Gate Valves GL 95-07 Jju?Q

l The attached listing identifies the 198 power-operated gate valves identified for

- screening and/or evaluation as part of the actions associated with Generic Letter 95-07. The valves are identified by the Farley Nuclear plant Total Numbering System (TPNS) in additions to a corresponding noun description. The other columns associated with the listing: 1-Denotes whether or not a particular valves has an " Active" opening safety function, 2-Identifies the wedge design [ solid (SWG) or flexible (FWG)] for each valve, 3-Identifies the screening criteria [ pressure locking (PL) and/or thermal binding (TB)]- applied to each individual valve, 4-Identifies the valve grouping associated with each valve (this number can be cross referenced to the formal evaluations), and 5-Identifies a code (reference screening evaluation flow chart) for the associated PL or TB screening criteria by which the particular valves was eliminated from susceptibility i consideration. All valves identified with a code of PL-7 or TB-6 required at least a Level 2 screening evaluation. Those identified by a PL-7 screening code required an analytical evaluation using the Entergy and/or the Comed models. f P

) l . LISTIN9 OF VALVES EVALUATED FOR SUSCEPTlalLITY TO PRESSURE LOCKIN3 & THERMAL BINDIN3 i ) TPNS ACTIVE DISK EVAL GROUP DESMPM CODE CO E NUMBER i 1 Q2E11FCV0802A Y FWG PL & TB 01 PL-7 TB4 RHR A RECIRC VALVE i Q2E11FCV06028 Y FWG PL & TB 01 PL-7 TB-6 RHR B RECIRC VALVE Q1E21MOV8801A Y FWG PL & TB 02 PL 7 TB-6 BIT OUTLET ISO Q1E21MOV8801B Y FWG PL & TB 02 PL 7 TB-6 BIT OUTLET ISO Q2E21MOV8801 A Y FWG PL & TB 02 PL-7 TB-6 BIT OUTLET ISO Q2E21MOV8801B Y FWG PL & TB 02 PL-7 TB-6 BIT OUTLET ISO Q1E21MOV8803A Y FWG PL & TB 03 PL 7 TB-6 BIT INLET ISO Q1E21MOV8803B Y FWG PL & TB 03 PL-7 TB-6 BIT INLET ISO Q2E21MOV8803A Y FWG PL & TB 03 PL-7 TB-6 BIT INLET ISO Q2E21MOV88038 Y FWG PL & TB 03 PL-7 TB-6 BIT INLET ISO Q1E21MOV8884 Y FWG PL & TB 04 PL-7 TB-6 CHG PMP TO RCS HOT LEG ISO l Q1E21MOV8886 Y FWG PL & TB 04 PL-7 TB-6 CHG PMP RCS COLD LEG ISO Q2E21MOV8884 Y FWG' PL & TB 04 PL-7 TB-6 CHG PMP TO RCS HOT LEG ISO l Q2E21MOV8886 Y FWG PL & TB 04 PL-7 TB-6 CHG PMP RCS COLD LEG ISO Q2E11MOV8811 A Y FWG PL & TB 05 PL-7 TB-6 A RHR PUMP SUCT FROM CTMT SUMP i Q1E21MOV8885 Y FWG PL & TB 06 PL-7 TB-6 CHG PMP TO RCS COLD LEG ISO Q2E21MOV8885 Y FWG PL & TB 06 PL-7 TB-6 CHG PMP TO RCS COLD LEG ISO 1 Q1E11MOV8888A Y FWG PL & TB 07 PL-7 TB-6 A RHR/LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG Q1E11MOV88888 Y FWG PL & TB 07 PL-7 TB-6 B RHR/LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG Q2E11MOV8888A Y FWG PL & TB 07 PL-7 TB-6 A RHR/LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG Q2E11MOV88888 Y FWG PL & TB 07 PL-7 TB-6 B RHR/LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG Q1E11MOV8889 Y FWG PL & TB 08 PL-7 TB-6 RHR TO HOT LEG Q2E11MOV8889 Y FWG PL & TB 08 PL-7 TB-6 RHR TO HOT LEG 1 Q1E21LCV01158 Y SWG TB 09 PL-1 TB-6 RWST TO CHG PMP SUCTION ISO Q1E21LCV01150 Y SWG TB 09 PL-1 TB-6 RWST TO CHG PMP SUCTION ISO Q2E21LCV01158 Y SWG TB 09 PL-1 TB-6 RWST TO CHG PMP SUCTION ISO Q2E21LCV0115D Y SWG TB 09 PL-1 TB-6 RWST TO CHG PUMP SUCTION ISO Q1E11MOV8706A Y SWG TB 10 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR TO CHG SUCTION . Q1E11MOV87068 Y SWG TB 10 PL-1 TB-6 B RHR TO CHG SUCTION Q2E11MOV8706A Y SWG TB 10 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR TO CHG SUCTION Q2E11MOV87068 Y SWG TB 10 PL-1 TB-6 B RHR TO CHG SUCTION Q1E11MOV8887A Y SWG TB 11 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR/LHSI TO RCS HOT LEG Q1E11MOV88878 Y SWG TB 11 PL-1 TB-6 B RHR/LHSI TO RCS HOT LEG Q2E11MOV8887A Y SWG TB 11 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR/LHSI TO RCS HOT LEG Q2E11MOV88878 Y SWG TB 11 PL-1 TB-6 B RHR/LHSI TO RCS HOT LEG Q1E11MOV8811 A Y SWG TB 12 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR PMP SUCTION FROM CTMT SUMP Q1E11MOV8811B Y SWG TB 12 PL 1 TB-6 B RHR PMP SUCTION FROM CTMT SUMP Q1E11MOV8812A Y SWG TB 12 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR PMP SUCTION FROM CTMT SUMP Q1E11MOV8812B Y SWG TB 12 PL 1 TB-6 B RHR PMP SUCTION FROM CTMT SUMP Q2E11MOV8811B Y SWG TB 12 PL-1 TB-6 B RHR PUMP SUCT FROM CTMT SUMP Q2E11MOV8812A Y SWG TB 12 PL-1 TB-6 A RHR PUMP SUCT FROM CTMT SUMP Q2E11MOV88128 Y SWG TB 12 PL-1 TB-6 B RHR PUMP SUCT FROM CTMT SUMP Q1E13MOV8826A Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 A CTMT SPRAY PMP SUCTION Q1E13MOV88268 Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 B CTMT SPRAY PMP SUCTION Q1E13MOV8827A Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 A CTMT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION Q1E13MOV8827B Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 B CTMT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION Q2E13MOV8826A Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 A CTMT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION Q2E13MOV88268 Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 B CTMT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION Q2E13MOV8827A Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 A CTMT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION Q2E13MOV8827B Y SWG TB 13 PL-1 TB-6 B CTMT SPRAY PUMP SUCTION Q1E13MOV8836A Y SWG TB 14 PL-1 TB-6 SPRAY ADD TO EDUCTOR Q1E13MOV88368 Y SWG TB 14 PL-1 TB-6 SPRAY ADD TO EDUCTOR Q2E13MOV8836A Y SWG TB 14 PL-1 TB-6 SPRAY ADD TO EDUCTOR Q2E13MOV8836B Y SWG TB 14 PL-1 TB-6 SPRAY ADD TO EDUCTOR Q1E13MOV8820A Y SWG TB 15 PL-1 TB-6 A CTMT SPRAY PMP DISCHARGE ISC. Q1E13MOV88208 Y SWG TB 15 PL-1 TB-6 B CTMT SPRAY PMP DISCHARGE ISO. FrMay, January 26,1996 Page1

LISTINp OF VALVES EVALUATED FOR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PRESSURE LOCKING 8 THERMAL BINDIN3 TPNS ' ACTIVE DISK EVAL GROUP DESCRP M NUMBER CODE C E Q2E13MOV8820A Y SWG TB 15 PL-1 TB-6 A CTMT. SPRAY PMP DISCHARGE ISO Q2E13MOV88208 Y SWG TB 15 PL-1 TB-6 B CTMT. SPRAY PMP DISCHARGE ISO Q1P16MOV3024A Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV30248 Y SWG TB 16 PL 1 TB-6 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3024C Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3024D Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3024A Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM 2A CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV30248 Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM 2B CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3024C Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM 2C CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3024D Y SWG TB 16 PL-1 TB-6 SW FROM 2D CTMT COOLER Q1N23MOV3209A Y. SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO AFW ISO 3 Q1N23MOV32098 Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO AFW ISO j Q1N23MOV3210A Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO MDAFW PUMP SUCTION Q1N23MOV3210B Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 MDAFW PUMP SUCTION Q2N23MOV3209A Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO AFW ISO Q2N23MOV32098 Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO AFW ISO Q2N23MOV3210A Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO MDAFW PUMP SUCTION Q2N23MOV32108 Y SWG TB 17 PL-1 TB-6 MDAFW PUMP SUCTION Q1N23MOV3216 Y SWG TB 18 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO AFW ISO Q2N23MOV3216 Y SWG TB 18 PL-1 TB-6 SW TO AFW ISO Q1E22MOV3872A Y SWG TB 19 PL-1 TB-6 RX CAVITY H2 DILLUTION FAN AIR DAMPER Q1E22MOV3872B Y SWG TB 19 PL-1 TB-6 RX CAVITY H2 DILLUTION FAN AIR DAMPER 1 Q2E22MOV3872A Y SWG TB 19 PL-1 TB-6 RX CAVITY H2 DILLUTION FAN AIR DAMPER Q2E22MOV38728 Y SWG TB 19 PL-1 TB-6 RX CAVITY H2 DILLUTION FAN AIR DAMPER Q1813MOV8000A N FWG PL & TB 20 B-2 B-2 PRZR PORV BLOCK VALVE Q1813MOV80008 N FWG PL & TB 20 B-2 B-2 PRZR PORV BLOCK VALVE Q2813MOV8000A N FWG PL & TB 20 B-2 B-2 PRZR PORV BLOCK VALVE Q2813MOV80008 N FWG PL & TB 20 B-2 B-2 PRZR PORV BLOCK VALVE Q1E11MOV8701 A N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 RCS LOOP C TO A RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV8701B N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 A RHR PUMP SUCT ISO Q1E11MOV8702A N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 RCS LOOP A TO B RHR PUMP Q1E11MOV87028 N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 8 RHR PUMP SUCT ISO Q2E11MOV8701 A N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 RCS LOOP C TO A RHR PUMP Q2E11MOV8701B N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 A RHR PUMP SUCT ISO Q2E11MOV8702A N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 RCS LOOP A TO B RHR PUMP Q2E11MOV8702B N FWG PL & TB 21 B-2 B-2 B RHR PUMP SUCT ISO Q1E11MOV8809A N SWG TB 22 B-2 B-2 RWST TO A RHR PUMP SUCTION Q1E11MOV88098 N SWG TB 22 B-2 B-2 RWST TO B RHR PUMP SUCTION Q2E11MOV8809A N SWG TB 22 B-2 B-2 RWST TO A RHR PUMP SUCTION Q2E11MOV88098 N SWG TB 22 B2 B-2 RWST TO B RHR PUMP SUCTION Q1E13MOV8817A N SWG TB 23 B-2 B-2 RWST TO A CTMT SPRAY PUMP Q1E13MOV8817B N SWG TB 23 B-2 B-2 RWST TO B CTMT SPRAY PUMP Q2E13MOV8817A N SWG TB 23 B-2 B-2 RWST TO A CTMT SPRAY PUMP Q2E13MOV8817B N SWG TB 23 B-2 B-2 RWST TO B CTMT SPRAY PUMP Q1E21MOV8100 N SWG TB 24 B-2 B-2 RCP SEAL LEAKOFF ISOLATION VLV Q1E21MOV8112 N SWG TB 24 B-2 B-2 RCP SEAL LEAKOFF lSO VALVE Q2E21MOV8100 N SWG TB 24 B-2 B-2 RCP SEAL LEAKOFF ISO VLV Q2E21MOV8112 N SWG TB 24 B-2 B-2 RCP SEAL LEAKOFF ISO VALVE Q1E21MOV8107 N FWG PL & TB 25 B-2 B-2 NORMAL CHG ISO Q1E21MOV8108 N FWG PL & TB 25 B-2 B-2 NORMAL CHG ISO Q2E21MOV8107 N FWG PL & TB 25 B-2 B-2 NORMAL CHG ISO Q2E21MOV8108 N FWG PL & TB 25 B2 B-2 NORMAL CHG ISO Q1E21MOV8106 N FWG PL & TB 26 B-2 B-2 CHG PUMP MINIFLOW ISO Q2E21MOV8106 N FWG PL & TB 26 B-2 B-2 CHG PUMP MINIFLOW ISO Q1E21MOV8130A N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Q1E21MOV81308 N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Frtesy, January 26, t906 Page 2

!. LISTINJ OF VALVES EVALUATED FOR SUSCEPTiglLITY TO PRESSURE LOCKING & THERMAL tilNDINJ TPNS ACTIVE DISK EVAL GROUP CODE CODE NUMBER Q1E21MOV8131A N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Q1E21MOV8131B N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Q2E21MOV8130A N SWG TB 27 ' B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Q2E21MOV81308 N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Q2E21MOV8131 A N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION Q2E21MOV81318 N SWG TB 27 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP SUCTION HEADER X-CONNECTION } Q1E21MOV8132A N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. Q1E21MOV81328 N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN Q1E21MOV8133A N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. Q1E21MOV81338 N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. i Q2E21MOV8132A N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. Q2E21MOV81328 N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. . - Q2E21MOV8133A N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. 1 Q2E21MOV81338 N FWG PL & TB 28 B-2 B-2 CHG PMP DISCHARGE HEADER X-CONN. j Q1E21MOV8808A N FWG PL & TB 29 B-2 B-2 ACCUM 1 A DISCHARGE j Q1E21MOV88088 N FWG PL & TB 29 B-2 B2 ACCUM 1B DISCHARGE Q1E21MOV8808C N FWG PL & TB 29 B-2 B-2 ACCUM 1C DISCHARGE j Q2E21MOV8808A N FWG PL & TB 29 B-2 B-2 ACCUM 2A DISCHARGE Q2E21MOV88088 N FWG PL & TB 29 B-2 B2 ACCUM 2B DISCHARGE 4 Q2E21MOV8808C N FWG PL & TB 29 B-2 B-2 ACCUM 2C DISCHARGE l Q1N11HV3368A N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 A LOOP UPSTREAM MSIV BYPASS i Q1N11HV33688 N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 B LOOP UPSTREAM MSIV BYPASS i Q1N11HV3368C N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B2 C LOOP UPSTREAM MSIV BYPASS Q1N11HV3976A N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 A LOOP DOWN STREAM MSIV BYPASS Q1N11HV39768 N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B2 B LOOP DOWN STREAM MSIV BYPASS Q1N11HV3976C N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 C LOOP DOWN STREAM MSIV BYPASS Q2N11HV3368A N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 A LOOP UPSTREAM MSIV BYPASS Q2N11HV33688 N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 B LOOP UPSTREAM MSIV BYPASS Q2N11HV3368C N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 C LOOP UPSTREAM MSIV BYPASS Q2N11HV3976A N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 A LOOP DOWN STREAM MSIV BYPASS Q2N11HV39768 N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 B LOOP DOWN STREAM MSIV BYPASS Q2N11HV3976C N FWG PL & TB 30 B-2 B-2 C LOOP DOWN STREAM MSIV BYPASS Q1N23MOV3764A N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B2 MDAFW ISO TO 1 A S/G Q1N23MOV37648 N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 1B S/G Q1N23MOV3764C N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B2 MDAFW ISO TO 1C S/G Q1N23MOV3764D N FWG PL & TB 31 B2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 1B S/G Q1N23MOV3764E N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 1 A S/G Q1N23MOV3764F N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 1C S/G Q2N23MOV3764A N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 2A S/G Q2N23MOV3764B N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 2B S/G Q2N23MOV3764C N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 2C S/G Q2N23MOV3764D N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B2 MDAFW ISO TO 2B S/G Q2N23MOV3764E N FWG PL & TB 31 B-2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 2A S/G Q2N23MOV3764F N FWG PL & TB 31 B2 B-2 MDAFW ISO TO 2C S/G Q1P16MOV3441A N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW FROM 1 A CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3441B N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW FROM 1B CTMT COOLER Q1P16M0V3441C N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW FROM 1C CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3441D N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW FROM 1D CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3G13A N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3019B N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3019C N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3019D N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3441A N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW FROM 2B CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3441B N SWG TB 32 E-2 B-2 SW FROM 2B CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3441C N SWG TB 32 E-2 B-2 SW FROM 2C CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3441D N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW FROM 2D CTMT COOLER Friday. January 26.1996 Page 3

. LISTING OF VALVES EVALUATED FOR SUSCEPTiulLITY TO PRESSURE LOCKING & THERMAL BINDIN3 a P T TPNS ACTIVE DZK EVAL GROUP DESCRIPTION NUMBER OE Q2P16MOV3019A N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV30198 N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3019C N SWG TB 31 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3019D N SWG TB 32 B-2 B-2 SW TO CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3023A N SWG TB 33 B-2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV30238 r'a SWG TB 33 B-2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3023C id SWG TB 33 B-2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3023D N SWG TB 33 B-2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3023A N SWG TB 33 B-2 B2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3023B N SWG TB 33 B-2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3023C N SWG TB 33 B2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q2P16MOV3023D N SWG TB 33 B-2 B-2 SW FROM CTMT COOLER Q1P16MOV3131 N FWG TB 34 B-2 B-2 SW FROM RCP MOTOR COOLERS Q1P16MOV3134 N SvVG TB 34 B-2 B-2 SW FROM RCP MOTOR COOLERS Q1P16MOV3135 N SWG TB 34 B-2 B-2 SW TO RCP MOTOR COOLERS O2P16MOV3131 N SWG TB 34 B-2 B-2 SW FROM RCP MOTOR COOLERS Q2P16MOV3134 N SWG TB 34 B-2 B-2 SW FROM RCP MOTOR COOLERS Q2P16MOV3135 N SWG TB 34 B-2 B-2 SW TO RCP MOTOR COOLERS Q1P17MOV3046 N SWG TB 35 B-2 B-2 CCW FROM RCP ISO Q1P17MOV3052 N SWG TB 35 B-2 B-2 CCW TO RCP ISO Q1P17MOV3182 N SWG TB 35 B-2 B-2 CCW RETURN FROM RCP BEARINGS Q2P17MOV3046 N SWG TB 35 B-2 B-2 CCW FROM RCP ISO Q2P17MOV3052 N SWG TB 35 B-2 B-2 CCW TO RCP ISO Q2P17MOV3182 N SWG TB 35 B-2 B-2 CCW RETURN FROM RCP BEARINGS Q1E21LCV0115C N SWG TB 36 B-2 B-2 VCT TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Q1E21LCV0115E N SWG TB 36 B-2 B-2 VCT TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Q2E21LCV0115C N SWG TB 36 B-2 B-2 VCT TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Q2E21LCV0115E N SWG TB 36 B-2 B-2 VCT TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Q1E21MOV8105 N FWG PL & TB 37 B-2 B-2 SEAL WATER INJ. ISO VALVE Q2E21MOV8105 N FWG PL & TB 37 B-2 B-2 SEAL WATER INJ. ISO VALVE Friday, January 26,1998 Page 4

c i' j l 7 I d l SECTION ll Screening Flow Chart with Criteria Descriptions j Jk"Q

t, ! s,, i l GL 95-47 SCREENING EVALUATION i 1 1 54 l Al Poww Opwated seree, mesei.4 oete vown r y B-1 No is steem or Waler the -> ouit Process Medium? Thermal Binding Susceptibility y Pressure Locking Susceptibility Yes l l Yes 32 Yes Does the Velve Have y on ASF to Open? No TB-1 PL 1 > QuN Quit 4 le the Fluid No Does the vobe have e Temperesure above Flexible disc wedge? 9 150 deg. F? l Yee Qua l y, T T TB-2 No is the Process Does the Velve have s medium steem? Flex or Solid Wedge? Qut l Yes Yes Y T l PL-2 ) g TB-3 No le the volve insteBod where p Wie the valve be CLOSED steem may condense & enter oud __p whee above room ombient Oud the bonnett? temp? ,fes I Y-T7 Yes 9 Wit the vehe be CLOSED No pg.3 j No TB-4 for any reason wah Wit the veNe be CLOSED M ogg l Wit the vefve cool pressure in the vk for any reason when the more then 50 dog. F

• bonnet?

veNe bonnet temperature ener ciocing? may increase? l Yes k Yu T 9 y, No T54 No pt.4 is the vobe required to -> 4 Wie any normel or accident g OPEN eAer cooling? Que condaion resus in system pressure decreasing sRor the volve le closed? Yes Y" T y T g K4 T54 PL-5 4__. is the volve required to --->g The veeve mer be =P Qug la th* V8k' OPEN efter the temp to thermal binding. Needs required Io OPEN increases? l Deted h I i y,, Y m, con the veave bonnet preneure increase 7 The veno may be subject to pressure locking. Needs Detail Evoluta I

,4 GL 95-07 Scraaning Crit::ria Besis i B-0 All Power Operated Safety Related Gate Valves This is the scope as defined by Generic Letter 95-07 for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding (PLTB) evaluation. It includes motor, air, and hydraulically-operated gate valves. Because of plant specific licensing commitments, there may be non-safety valves that should be included in the scope of this review. The NRC cites the PORV block valve as an example because it is not safety related at some plants, but it is included in the GL 89-10 reviews. B-1 is Steam Or Water The Process Medium? Pressure locking is not a concern in air or gas service valves because the heat capacities and heat transfer coefficients of the process are not significant when compared to water or steam, and the " boiler effect" is not possible without liquid in the bonnet. Thermal binding is also of lesser concem because high temperature gasses are not used. Thus, there is no mechanism to heat a valve body to a significant degree. B2 Does The Valve Have An Active Safety Function (ASF) To Open? The Generic Letter states in multiple places that licenses are to ensure that valves susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding are capable of performing their required safety functions. Pressure locking and thermal binding only prevents closed valves from being opened. Thus to meet the requirements of the GL, only those valves that are required to open from a closed position to perform a safety related function are in the scope of this review. Valves that are not in the GL scope of review because of this criteria, but may be susceptible to PLTB should still be evaluated for commercial considerations. There may be valves that could become pressure locked or thermally bound as part of a test, surveillance, or normal operational sequence. Even though these events would have no safety significance, (because the valve would not be performing a safety function) they could be on critical path, or reFJlt in equipment damage. / n OXample of a valve that would fall into this category is the Vogtle RHR heat exchanger outlet valve, HV-88098. This valve is normally open and has no safety function that requires the valve to open from a closed position. Howeverit has been thermally bound as part of the RHR system cool down sequence performed during unit start-up. i l l I

.{ , A GL 90-07 Scracning Criteria Saola TB-1 is The Fluid Temperature Above 150'F? The 150 F cut off was chosen as a lower limit for the proces<. temperature, below which thermal binding would not be expected. For thermal binding tc occur, the valve body and disc must expand or contract at different rates, or by different amounts. The coefficient of thermal expansion for all steels is lower at lower temperatures, and the amount of valve heat-up and cool down that can occur for a process temperature at 1 150 F or belov/ is limited to relatively insignificant amounts. TB 2 Does The Valve Have A Flex Or Solid Wedge? Only solid wedge and flex wedge gate valves are identified as being susceptible to thermal binding in GL 95-07. Solid wedge gets va!ves are most susceptible, but flexible wedge gate valves with significant temperature changes are also potentially susceptible. TB-3 Will The Valve Be Closed While Above Room Ambient Temperature? In order for thermal binding to occur, the valve and disc must change dimensions by different amounts. If the valve is not closed above room temperature, it would not be l expected to cool as the room ambient temperature would tend to heat the valve. Even if the fluid in the valve is cooler than room temperature, the differential temperature would be less than that discussed in TB-4. TB-4 Will The Valve Cool More Than 50*F After Closing, Or The Disc Warm More Than 50'F More Than the Valve After Closing? A relatively small temperature decrease would not be expected to cause thermal binding or pressure locking. A 50 F differential change in temperature between the valve and the disc would result in much less than 1 thousandth of an inch in interference. Check for dissimilar wedge and body materials that have different coefficients of expansion as these would be more susceptible to thermal binding. 1 Some have postulated that the valve body would heat faster than the disc with the valve open since it would have flow through it and the disc would be out of the flow stream. Others have postulated that the stem expands (lengthens) when the valve is closed and creates a higher wedging force. Thermal binding events are possibly more severe when valves are only momentarily opened, the valve body is warmed but the disc and stem are still cool, rather than if the disc and body are uniformly hot, and then the valve is closed and allowed to uniformly cool. Closing a cool disc into a warm body allows the disc to be closed farther into the body, then when it warms to expand and bind the valve. i 2

f ~ GL 95-07 Scrcaning Critaria Bania TB-C is The Valve Required To Open After Cooling? If the valve is not required to open, then there is no concem even if thermal binding exists. For this screening, " required to open" means the valve must open for the system to perform its safety function (s). TB-6 The Valve May Be Subject To Thermal Binding - Needs Detailed Evaluation Since the valve did not screen out prior to this step, a detailed evaluation will be performed. PL-1 Does The Valve Have A Flexible Disc Wedge? Pressure locking is much more significant for valves that can be pressurized between the discs. These valves may see twice the friction force with a pressurized bonnet and no line pressure as they might see if only a differential pressure across the wedge is considered. Heating the water in a water solid bonnet can make the friction forces even more significant as the pressure could be many times the originalline pressure. PL-2 is The Valve Installed Where Steam May Condense & Enter The Bonnet? Steam valves are only affected when there is water in the bonnet. Othenvise, the pressure in the bonnet could be no higher than the steam pressure in the line. The water can collect when the valves is mounted in a vertical line, when the valve is in the system low point, or when the valve bonnet is not mounted vertically above the valve. PL-3 Will The Valve Be Closed For Any Reason When The Valve Bonnet Temperature May increase? Different studies have shown that the pressure increase in a water solid bonnet may be as much as 100 psi per F increase in bonnet temperature. Lower pressure increases per degree temperature increase occur at lower temperatures (on the order of 33 psi i per *F. In fact, NUREG -1275 Vol. 9 states that the lowest pressure locking event occurred at slightly below 200 F. This effect has been referred to as the " Boiler Effect." Bonnet temperature increase may be due to accident room temperatures (high energy line breaks, flow through piping in the same room, or loss of room cooling), cold water i heated up to normal room temperature, conduction a id convection through the l connected piping, or leakage through check valves co.inected to a higher temperature l system. I PL-4 Will Any Normal Or Accident Condition Result in System Pressure l Decreasing After The Valve is Closed? l With pressure in the bonnet, a decrease in the line pressure will cause the bonnet pressure to force the disc against both seats and increase the friction force resisting disc movement. The "Entergy" method or " Con Ed" method has been used to calculate this increased force in some cases. 3

s.: GL 95-07 Scrsoning Crit 3ria Basis PL-5 is The Valve Required To Open After The Valve is Closed? If the valve is not required to open, then there is no concern even if pressure locking exists. Given enough time, it is expected that the high pressure in the bonnet would decrease to the highest line pressure at the disc. For this screening," required to open" means the valve must open for the system to perform its safety function. PL-6 is The Valve Required To Open After The Temperature increases? If the valve is not required to open, then there is no concern even if pressure locking exists. Given enough time, it is expected that the high pressure in the bonnet would decrease to the highest line pressure at the disc. For this screening, " required to open" means the valve must open for the system to perform its safety function. PL-7 The Valve May Be Subject To Pressure Locking-Needs Detailed Evaluation Since the valve did not screen out prior to this step, a detailed evaluation will be performed. 4

c i i SECTION lli 1 4 4 4 Analytical Evaluation Results including Input Data 4 E 4 l J I T

l i,- The information in this section relates to the 15 valves for which the Entergy and Comed predictive models were utilized for the Level 3 screening / evaluation process. Included is a spreadsheet providing the results of the comparison of the predicted unseating thrust requirements to the design capability values for each of these 15 valves. The comparison is performed on a valve-specific basis under all operating conditions where a significant " pressure locking" component is possible. Therefore, certain valves are evaluated for operation under an safety injection (SI) actuation situations and for transferring from the injection phase of emergency core cooling to the hot (HL) and cold (CL) recirculation phases. Below is a summary of the method used to establish the values in the various columns on the spreadsheet. Column 1 - The values in this column were obtained by using the Entergy model at the expected bonnet and line pressures. The static unseating thrusts used in the model represents either the actual measure unseating thrust for the particular valve (when this data was available) or an average based on all other identical valves tested at Farley Nuclear Plant. The plate friction coefficient used in the model 0.5. This value is consistent with the data from the EPRI MOV Performance Prediction Program (PPP) and is conservative when compared to available dynamic test data. Column 5 - This column reflects values obtained through the use of the Comed predictive model using the same input parameters as identified above for Column 1. Column 10 - The values in this column reflect the calculated design capability for the respective valves. The voltage input corresponds to the " worst case" voltage at the time of the require d valve opening. The remaining inputs required to determine the design actuator output torque (AOT) capability are consistent with the methods employed to perform such calculations as part of the MOV program. The stem factor values required to convert the design AOT to thrust are based on test data obtained at Farley Nuclear Plant. For the 3-inch Velan valves, the stem factor used corresponds to a coefficient of friction (COF) greater than the measured value for any of the subject valves. The stem factor used for 2-8811 A is based on the average (COF) for all stem-stem nuts at Farley utilizing Nebula EP-1 as a stem lubricant. This option was chosen for 2-8811 A because the actual measured stem factor for this MOV was extremely low. i The margin column reflects the per cent margin between the more conservative Comed unseating prediction and the calculated design capability for the particular valve. Also included in this section are example data sheets for the application of the Comed model to certain of these valves. The method employed by SNC-Farley for the determination of the mean seat radius differs slightly from the method contained in the User Guide for the Comed model. However, the impact of the difference on the comparative conclusions has been assessed and determined to be less than 5%.

C PRESSURE LOCKING

SUMMARY

TABLE a FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT RESULTS OF COMPARISONS BETWEEN UNSEATING THRUST PREDICTIONS USING THE COMED MODEL AND THE CALCULATED DESIGN CAPABILITY VALUES ENTERGY COM ED COM ED TOTAL REQ'D TOTAL REQ'O LOCA/ % MARGIN THRUST THRUST POST LOCA TOTAL (ACTUAL OR AVG (ACTUAL OR AVG MOV TPNS NO. UNST) UNST) (AVG + 2STD) (AVG + 2STD) (1) (5) (10) (5)(10) 1-8801 A - SI 5,657 10,780 19,971 85.26 1-8801 B - SI 5,509 10,632 16,631 56.42 2-8801 A - SI 6,580 11,703 19,639 67.81 2-8801B - SI 5,166 10,289 16,694 62.25 1-8803A - SI 5,315 10,504 19,934 89.78 1-88038 - SI 5,363 10,552 16,418 55.59 2-8803A - SI 4,101 9,290 19,597 110.95 2-8803B - SI 5,315 10,504 16,394 56.07 1-8803A - HL TO CL 12,891 14,503 26,502 82.73 1-8803B - HL TO CL 12,939 14,551 25,774 77.13 2-8803A - HL TO CL 11,677 13,289 26,319 98.05 2-8803B - HL TO CL 12,891 14,503 25,594 76.47 2-8811 A - CL 20,634 20,280 40,376 (A) 99.09 1-8884 - CL TO HL 13,128 14,747 25,414 72.33 2-8884 - CL TO HL 11,145 12,764 24,820 94.45 1-8885 - HL TO CL 14,095 ~ 15,707 26,624 69.50 2-8885 -HL TO CL 12,057 13,669 25,414 85.92 1-8886 - CL TO HL 13,750 15,353 25,895 68.66 2-8886 - CL TO HL 12,126 13,728 25,235 83.82 A. USED AVERAGE STEM FACTOR FOR A!) VALVES IN MOV PROGRAM AT FNP. SUMTABLE.WK4 1 02/09/96

=.--_ i' Q1E21MOV8801B Safety injection SM 95-0981-001, Rev. O Attachment C - Comed g Originatorb G Date N Date M'[16 Reviewer InpMLQate Page 3 of 54 ODseat(in) SCS2 3.378 OD of valve seat IDseat(in) $C$3 2.278 ID of valve seat g(in) $C$4 1.414 mean seat radius b(in) $C$5 0.871 wedge hub radius E 27600000 Pup (psig) $C$6 2632.000 Pressure upstream t 0.8285 Pdn(psig) $C$7 0.000 Pressure downstream Pbonnet(psig) $C$8 2581.000 Pressure in valve bonnet V $C$9 0.300 Poisson's ratio for C.S. Th:ta $C$10 5.000 Wedge Seat Angle Mu $C$11 0.500 Plate Friction coefficient for Stellite SD SC$12 1.125 Stem Diameter C.alculated_ values _focu sejn. formula a/b $C$15-1.623 D 1437354.8 b/s $C$18 0.616 G 10615385 GLN(A/B) $C$17 0.485 DPavg 1265 (B/A)^2 $C$18 0.379 Mrba 3231.0023 (1V) $C$19 0.700 Mrbb 0.0734805 (1+V) $C$20 1.300 Mrb -237.4157 ) l (B/A)^4 $C$21 0.144 Ybqpr -1.05E-05 Hub Area (in2) $C$22 2.383 Ksapr -0.104552 iub Circ.(in) $C$23 5.473 HUBlength 0.489 Ysqpr -3 01E-05 Op(psi)(dn-up) $C$24 -2632.000 A^4 3.997584 Pforce 4928 4029 V*2 0.09 Aa3 2.827146 Ystretch -1.83E-05 A*2 1.999396 B^2 0.758641 Ypriotal 5.89E-05 CalGMletioAt C2 0.063216 Ybw -4.38E-08 C3 0.007364 Ksaul -0.581443 CD-0.782802 Ysaul -9.35E-08 C9 0.260898 Yeompr -3.30E-08 Yultotal -1.70E-07 L11 0.000751 L3 0 L17 0.057939 L9 0 seat load 3069 8791 stem force 1261.541 Ob(Ib/in) 901.008 Fpiston 2564 2638 Fvert. 1385.0493 Miasured unwedging Load (Ibf) Fprestock 2523.0821 9289 Flotal 10632.868 l PL188018.WK4 1 02/06/96 i

l, (', O2E21MOV8803B Safety injection SM-95-0981-001 Rev. O Attachment C Comed Originatorb 1 Mwi\\ pate Reviewer MIt Date JN86 ff1RuiDela Page 15 of 54 ODseat(in) $C$2 3.378 OD of valve seat IDseat(in) $C$3 2.278 ID of valve seat a,(in) $C$4 1.414 mean seat radius b(in) $C$5' O.871 wedge hub radius E 27600000 Pup (psig) $C$6 2641.000 Pressure upstream t 0.8285 Pdn(psig) $C$7 0.000 Pressure downstream Pbonnet(psig) $C$8 2690.000 Pressure in valve bonnet V $C$9 0.300 Poisson's ratio for C.S. Theta - SC$10 5.000 Wedge Seat Angle Mu $C$11 0.500 Plate Friction coefficient for Stellite SD $C$12 1.125 Stem Diameter Calculated.yalueeJotusejaformula alb $C$15 1.623 0 1437354 8 b/a $C$16 0.616 G 10615385 CLN(A/B) $C$17 0.485 DPavg 1369.5 (B/A)^2 $C$18 0.379 Mrba 3497.9111 (1V) $C$19 0.700 Mrbb 0.0734805 (1+V) SC$20 1.300 Mrb -257.0283 (B/A)^4 $C$21 0.144 Ybqpr 1.13E-05 Hub Area (in2) $C$22 2.383 Ksapr -0.104552 iub Circ.(in) $C$23 5.473 HUBlength 0.489 Ysqpr -3.26E-05 Dp(psi)(dn-up) $C$24 -2641.000 A^4 3.997584 Pforce 5335.5319 V^2 0.09 A^3 2.827146 Ystretch 1.98E-05 A*2 1.999396 Ba2 0.758641 Yprtotal -6.37E-05 CSICulatioat C2 0.063216 Ybw -4 38E-08 C3 0.007364 Ksaul 0.581443 C8 0.782802 Ysaul -9 35E 08 C9 0.260898 Yeompr -3.30E-08 Yultotal -1.70E-07 L11 0.000751 L3 0 L17 0.057939 L9 0 seat load 3323.4778 stem force 1365.7553 Ob(Ib/in) 975.439 Fpiston 2672.557 Fved 1499 4664 Mzasured unwedging Load (Ibf) Fpreslock 2731.5106 8946 avg group Ftotal 10504.42 PL288038.WK4 1 02/06/96

k' (.'. 4 Q1E21MOV8886 Recirculation SM 95-0981-001. Rev. 0 Attachment C - Comed Originato AN 1 Date Reviewer Date N jfigut_ Data Page 39 of 40 j ODseat(in) $C$2 3.378 OD of valve seat 'IDseat(in) $C$3 2.278 ID of valve seat c(in) $C$4 1.414 mean seat radius b(in) $C$5 0.871 wedge hub radius E 27600000 Pup (psig) $C$6 179.000 Pressure upstream t 08285 Pdn(psig) _ SC$7 0.000 Pressure downstream Pbonnet(psig) $C$8 2786.000 Pressure in valve bonnet V $C$9 0.300 Poisson's ratio for C.S. Th:ta $C$10 5.000 Wedge Seat Angle Mu $C$11 0.500 Plate Friction coefficient for Stellite SD $C$12 1,125 Stem Diameter Calculated _valumeJotuseJalonttula alb $C$15 1.623 D 1437354.8 bla $C$16 0.616 G 10615385 CLN(A/B) $C$17 0.485 DPavg 2696.5 (B/A)^2 $C$18 0.379 Mrba 6887.2708 (1V) $C$19 0.700 Mrbb 0.0734805 (1+V) $C$20 1.300 Mrb 506 0802 (B/A)^4 $C$21 0.144 Ybqpr -2.23E-05 Hub Area (in2) $C$22 2.383 Ksapr -0.104552 dub Circ.(in) $C$23 5.473 HUBlength 0.489 Ysqpr -6.41 E-05 Op(psi)(dn-up) $C$24 -179.000 A^4 3.997584 Pforce 10505.485 V^2 0.09 A^3 2.827146 Ystretch -3.91 E-05 A*2 1.999396 B^2 0.758641 Yprtotal -0.000125 Calculallone C2 0.063216 Ybw -4.38E-08 C3 0.007364 Ksaul -0.581443 C8 0.782802 Ysaul -9.35E-08 C9 0.260898 Yeompr -3.30E-08 Yultotal -1.70E-07 L11 0.000751 L3 0 L17 0.057939 L9 0 seat load 6543.8174 stem force -2689.1268 Ob(Ib/in) 1920.606 Fpiston 2767.9345 Fvert. 2952 3995 Mrasured unwedging Load (Ibf) Fpreslock 5378.2537 9790 Flotal 15352.719 i 18886R.WK4 1 02/06/96

,N Q2E11MOV8811 A Recirculation SM-95-0981-001. Rev 0 Attachment C - Comed Originato lio D ate Reviewer /Mt Date JM4d (DDut.D414 Page 25 of 54 ODseat(in) $C$2 13.500 OD ol valve seat IDseat(in) $C$3 11.620 ID of va've seat a(in) $C$4 6.290 mean a sat radius b(in) $C$5 2.560 wedge hub radius E 27600000 Pup (psig) $C$6 39.000 Pressure upstream t 2 59 Pdn(psig) $C$7 49.000 Pressure downstream Pbonnet(psig) $C$8 50.000 Pressure in valve bonnet V $C$9 0.300 Poisson's ratio for C.S. Th:ta $C$10 7.000 Wedge Seat Angle Mu $C$11 0.500 Plate Friction coefficient for Stellite SD $C$12 2.000 Stem Diameter Calculated _valuesfor_ust_Ittf9tmula alb $C$15 2.457 D 43912255 bla $C$16 0.407 G 10615385 CLN(A/B) $C$17 0.899 DPavg 6 (B/A)^2 $C$18 0.166 Mrba 335 30045 (1.V) $C$19 0.700 Mrbb 0.1870338 (1+V) SC$20 1.300 Mrb -62.71252 (B/A)^4 $C$21 0.027 Ybqpr -3 60E-06 Hub Area (in2) $C$22 20.589 Ksapr -0.289066 iub Cire.(in) $C$23 16.085 HUBlength 0.85 Ysqpr -2.50E-06 Op(psi)(dn-up) $C$24 10.000 A^4 1565 318 Pforce 621.91782 V^2 0.09 A^3 248.8582 Ystretch -4.65E-07 A*2 39.5641 B^2 6.5536 Yprtotal -6 56E-06 Calculatiotis C2 0.134135 Ybw -4 82E-07 l C3 0.021724 Ksaul -1.078745 j C8 0.707976 Ysaul -2 47E-07 C9 0.297242 Yeompr -2.96E-08 Yultotal -7.58E-07 L11 0.003679 L3 = 0 L17 0.117644 L9= 0 seat load 342.08171 stem force 128 07667 Ob(iblin) 38.684 Fpiston 157 Fvert. 181.77196 M;asured unwedging Load (ibf) Fpreslock 256.15334 20000 Ftotal 20280.925 28011RA.WK4 1 02/06/96

e.: I i l 4 SECTION IV i Sample Evaluations for Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding JIJHQ

} e -G.' This section includes sample evaluations for representative valves screened as part of the susceptibility determination process. A separate evaluation was completed for each identified valve grouping (see listing in Section 1). The group evaluations utilized operational and physical data representative of the most susceptible valve within the group. Therefore, the use of a single group evaluations, in lieu of individual valve evaluations, is deemed appropdate, i i

e f,[. e GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET GROUP 02 System: E21 (HHSI/CVCS) Valves: Q(1)2E21MOV8801A/B Revision: 1 (V0004A/B) Valve Function: BORON INJECTION TANK OUTLET VALVE Valve Manufacturer: VELAN Valve Type: 3* FLEX WEDGE GATE Normal Position: CLOSED Post Accident Position: OPEN/CLOSE/OPEN Does valve need to open to perform safety function? Yes E No O If Yes, what mode (s): SI SIGNAL: SWITCH OVER FROM HOT LEG TO COLD LEG REClRC. Design Fluid Temp: 650 op Press: N/A PSIG Service Fluid Temp: 280 op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp: 200 op Press: N/A PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp: 110 op Press: N/A PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp: 104 op Press: N/A PSIG Location: AB. EL.121', ROOM 223 (2223) Normal distance from heat source: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION. Post accident distance from heat sources: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION. Valve inservice Testing: FNP-1(2)-M-046 (M071) j Frequency of IST: QUARTERLY System Functional Testing: FNP 1(2)-M-046 (M071) Frequency of Functional Test: QUARTERLY / REFUELING

References:

P&lD D-175038-1 D-175367/D-205367 D-205038-1 Physical / ISO: Valve Drawing: U-169426/ U-217804 Physical / ISO: Other Information: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION AND SECTION VI FOR ADDITIONAL REFERENCES. Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yesa NO O Accept. Criteria SEE EX. EVAL. Valve susceptible to pressure lock: Yesa NO O Accept. Criteria SEE EX. EVAL. Condition under which valve is susceptible: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION. Proposed fixes: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION. b _L 0 ORIONATOR DATE d/ AL th kt 8/ REVIEWER DATE 1

1 j-4 1 GL 95-07 I EXPANDED EVALUATION I FOR PRESSURE LOCKING & THERMAL BINDING j Valve TPNS No. : Q1(2)E21MOV8801 A/B Revision: 1 i An initial review for these MOVs, using the design data obtained from the line list specification (SS-1109 2) and comparing the values to the established screening criteria, identifies a potential susceptibility to the thermal binding / pressure locking phenomena. A further ) evaluation is required using operational data more representative of those occurring during i both normal and accident conditions. The results of this further evaluation are provided below. i Physical information: l l These valves are located in the BIT outlet high head safety injection line to the RCS cold leg. i The valves are aligned in closed position during normal plant operations. The pipin0 (3" CCB-4 21)is insulated from the charging pump discharge header to the valve. The valves are located approximately 50 feet from the charging pump discharge header. The downstream j piping connects to the RCS cold leg piping approximately 92 feet from the valves. There are double isolation check valves (8997A, B, C & 8998A, B, C) located downstream of these valves prior to the RCS. The valves are located in the 121' Piping Penetration room in the Aux. Bldg. The normal expected temperature ranges for this room is 93 F to 124

• F (based on unit 2 room temperatures).

Normal Operating: These valves are aligned in the closed position during normal operations. Since these valves are isolated by check valves from the reactor coolant system (RCS), it is assumed the valve bonnet can be pressurized by the tack leakage from the RCS. Normal oper; tons do not require manipulation of these valves. Surveillance stroke testing for these MOVs are conducted quarterly (FNP 1(2)-STP-10.3). 2 ..y

a i-4..- j 2 EXPANDED EVALUATION (Cont'd) Valve TPNS No. : Q1(2)E21MOV8801 A/B Revision: 1 Accident Conditions: The subject valves are automatically stroked open upon receipt of a safety injection (SI) signal to align the discharge of the HHSI pump to the RCS cold leg. The valves remain open during cold leg recirculation phase (FNP-1(2) ESP-1.3). During switch over to hot leg recirculation (FNP-1(2)-ESP-1.4) the operator will perform manual realignment to close these valves. The associated train charging pump is restarted after the valves are closed. During transfer back to cold leg recirculation (FNP-1(2)-ESP-1.5), these valves are re-opened. Procedurally, prior to re-opening the valves the residual heat removal pump is running and the associated train charging pump ir, stopped. Once the valves are re-opened, the charging pump is started. Pressure Locking: Hydraulic Locking Hydraulic locking of MOV8801 A can potentially occur following a large break LOCA concurrent with LOSP. Under this scenario, the upstream and downstream piping can de-pressurize causing pressure to be trapped in the valve bonnet. Based on a review of SCS calculation (SM-95-981-001, Rev.0), the maximum expected pressure that may be trapped in the bonnet is 2,581 psig with zero upstream and downstream pressures.. As a result of the above assessment, the MOV may be susceptible to a pressure locking event (double disk drag). An evaluation has been performed using both the Commonwealth Edison (Com Ed) and Entergy methods to predict the required opening thrust. Based on a review of the results using the two mathematical methods, the Com Ed equation predicted the higher thrust requirement of 11,703 lbf. A further assessment is provided to determine if sufficient actuator thrust capability is available to overcome this predicted value. Based on a review of SCS calculation (SM 981-001, Rev. 0), the actuator's thrust capability for LOCA voltage condition resulted in a calculated thrust of 16,631 lbf. This reduced voltage thrust value is calculated using the worst case voltages and statistical average stem factors for the group. Based on a comparison of the predicted thrust from the Com Ed equation and the reduced voltage capability, the MOV will open under the assumed worst case pressure locking condition.

• Boiler Effect Bonnet pressure increases due to intemal and/or extemal heating of the trapped fluids is not expected to occur. MOV8801 A/B are cold trapped during normal operation due to the piping separation between the valves and the charging pump header upstream and the RCS piping downstream. Additionally, the normal room temperature variations are expected to occur slowly over a significant period of time and, therefore, is not considered an initiator for pressure locking. Therefore, the valves should not be subjected to pressure locking via the boiler effect.

3

i. EXPANDED EVALUATION (Cont'a) Valve TPNS No. : Q1(2)E21MOV8801 A/B Revision: 1 Thermal Binding: Thermal binding is not considered credible for these MOVs. The valves are routinely cycled during normal operation with the process temperature below 150 "F. As a result of the cold trap during the cycling between the cold and hot leg recirculation any change in process fluid would be moderated. Summary: Based on the above evaluation, a condition may exist where a hydraulic locking event could occur. However, based on surveillance testing conducted during normal operation a pressure locking event is not expected to occur. No further action is required. D\\ 4 m ORIGINATOR oATE d4 Mb 4/u V REVIEWER 'cATE i 4 j i

r*. 1 GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET GROUP 05 + System: RHR/LHSI Valve (s): Q2E11MOV8811 A(V025A) REV.1 j Valve Function: __RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CTMT SUMP Valve Manufacturer: WESTINGHOUSE idLECTRIC Valve Type: 14*. FLEXIBLE WEDGE GATE Normal Position: CLOSED Post Accident Position: OPEN Does valve need to open to perform safety function 7 Yes E No O If Yes, what mode (s): TRANSFER FROM INJECTION TO COLD LEG REClRC Design Fluid Temp: HCB-46/ECB 7 300/400 op Press: N/A PSIG Service Fluid Temp: 350 op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp: 300s op Press: N/A PSIG Press: N/A PSIG Normal Atmosphere Temp: 90-104 op l Operating Atmosphere Tomp: 90-104 op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp: 104 op Press: N/A PSIG Location: AB 77'EL, RM 2131 Normal distance from heat source: N/A Post accident distance from heat sources: APPROXIMATELY 10 FT Valve inservice Testing: FNP 2-M-071 Frequency of IST: QUARTERLY System Functional Testing: FNP-2-M-071 Frequency of Functional Test: QUARTERLY

References:

P&lD D-205038.2/3 Physical / ISO: 0-205366 Valve Drawing: U-278948 Physical / ISO: Other Information: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION AND SECTION VI FOR ADDITIONAL REFERENCES FSAR APPENDlX 3K. FSAR TABLE T-15.4-3; Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes E NO O Accept. Criteria SEE EX. EVAL. Valve susceptible to pressure lock: Yes a NO O Accept. Criteria SEE EX. EVAL. Condition under which valve is susceptible: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION Proposed fixes: SEE EXPANDED EVALUATION J/ 1.t. ( M 2 / (, / 3 (> ORIG ATOR DATE REVIEWER DATE 1 1

v,,- GL 9547 EXPANDED EVALUATION l FOR 4 i PRESSURE LOCKING & THERMAL BINDING Valve No: Q2E11MOV8811A Revision: 1 i An initial evaluation for this power operated valve, using design data obtained from the i FNP line list (Specification SS-1109-02) and comparing these values to the established screening criteria, identifies a potential susceptibility to the thermal binding and pressure locking (PLTB) phenomena. Further evcluation has been performed using operational data more representative of those conditions occurring during normal and accident conditions. The results of this evaluation are provided below. PhysicalInformation: This is a motor operated gate valve (MOV) with a flexible wedge disc. This valve is located in the RHR pump suction from the containment sump piping. It is the first isolation valve from the containment sump to the RHRS. There is a 2 ft. dead leg of fluid in the vertical pipe leaving the sump to this valve. The valve is encapsulated. Tha valve is normally closed during plant operation. The valve is located in room 2131, elevation 77' df the auxiliary building. The normal expected room temperature rangas between 90-104'F. The post accident temperature is expected to be approximately 104*F. Following an accident, the maximum containment sump fluid temperature is approximately 300*F. Normal Operation: This MOV is normally closed. Normal plant operations do not require manipulation of this valve. The valve is cycled during quarterly surve.!!ance testing of the RHR system valves. The valve remains closed during RHR pump quarterly testing. Therefore, the fluid in the pipe and valve bonnet are assumed to be approximately equal to the room ambient air temperature. Accident Conditions: This valve does not receive a signal to open or close upon initial"Sl" initiation. During the safety injection phase, the RHR suction fluid temperature ranges between 35-104'F. Since there is a large dead leg of fluid between the connection for the supply from the containment sump and the supply from the RWST, the valve temperature will remain relatively stable. During an accident, this valve is opened by operator action following a low RWST level alarm or is opened automatically on a low-low RWST level signal. 2 i

I 4,> Vcive N3: Q2E11MOV8811 A Rivisl:n: 1 Pressure Locigng:

• Hydraulic Locking During initial system alignments following refueling or cold shutdown the RHR pump suction piping is pressurized by the RCS through the hot leg connection. The 8811A valve is isolated from this pressure by a solid wedge gate valve. Upon isolation of the RHR system, the pressure decays in the RHR pump suction piping due to alignment to the RWST. The resulting pressure will correspond to the RWST head resulting from the system alignment to the RWST. Administrative procedures require relieving the potential high pressure downstream of isolation valve 8812A prior to stroking the 8811 A valve for surveillance tests. The pressure assumed to be trapped in the bonnet during establishment of the 2 ft dead leg to the containment sump and after quarterly testing is j

the RWST head considering a full tank. I After an "Sl* initiation with the containment at otmospheric pressure, the total required thrust at valve opening for transfer from injection to cold leg recirculation using the Commonwealth Edison (Comed) modelis 20,280 lbf. This thrust requitement is well within the valve actuator capabilities of 40,376 lbf. This actuator thrust capability is calculated using the worst case voltages and an average stem factor.

• Boiler Effect Bonnet pressure increases due to intemal and extemal heating of the trapped fluid in the bonnet is not expected to occur. The temperature of the fluid in the bonnet will remain relatively constant during quarterly testing. During an accident, the valve will not be exposed to nominal room temperatures appreciably above normal operating conditions. Temperatures of the fluid at valve MOV8811 A will remain steady during the injection phase due ta the insulating qualities of the upstream and downstream fluid.

The fluid and sut sequent valve temperature will elevate after the valve has been opened for cold hg recirculation. Thermal Binding: Thermal binding is not considered credible since during surveillance testing the room ambient temperature and the fluid tempemture are below 150*F. This value is the threshold below which thermal consideratius of pipe and piping system components are considered insignificant. Also, after the valve is opened for cold leg recirculation the valve will not be closed and reopened during an accident. 1 i I l l 3 l

4 :i e 'Vciva No: Q2E11MOV8811 A R;visitn: 1 Summary: Based on the above evaluation, a condition does exist where the pressure locking i phenomena could potentially exist. However, the required thrust to overcome the additional bonnet pressure is well within the capability of the oparator. No further action is required. d tCdk d/nc O ' dATE '/ A t..bINAToR4 2/6/ % REVIEWER DATE ] l 4 4 4 J 4

i ? '. GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET GROUP 20 System: B13 (RCS) Valves: 01(2)B13MOV8000A/B(V027A/B) REV.0 Valve Function: PRZR PORV BLOCK VALVE Valve Manufacturer: VELAN Valve Type: 3* FLEXIBLE WEDGE GATE Normal Position: OPEN Post Accident Position: OPEN Does valve need to open to perform safety function 7 Yes O No E If Yes, what mode (s): 680 op Press: PSIG Design Fluid Temp: CCA-20 Service Fluid Temp: 650 op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG ^ Normal Atmosphere Temp: op Press: PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG Location: Normal distance from heat source: Post accident distance from heat sources: Valve Inservice Testing: FNP 1(2)-M-046 (M071) Frequency of IST: QUARTERLY System Functional Testing: Frequency of Functional Test:

References:

P&lD D-175037-2. D205037-2 Physical / ISO: Valve Drawing: U 266490. U-280770 Physical / ISO: Other Information: THE BLOCK VALVE WILL ONLY BE CLOSED TO PROTECT AGAINST RCS DEPRESSURIZATION OR OVER FILLING THE PRT (OR SURVEILLANCE TESTING), SINCE THE UPSTREAM PRESSURE WILL BE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO THE BONNET PRESSURE, THE ACTUATOR WILL PROVIDE THE REQUIRED FORCE TO OPEN THE VALVE. PRESSURE LOCKING IS NOT CREDIBLE. Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes C NO E Accept. Criteria B2 Valve susceptible to pressure lock: Yes C NO e Accept. Criteria B-2 Condition under which valve is susceptible: THERMAL BINDING MAY OCCUR IF THE VALVE IS CLOSED AFTER SYSTEM IS AT OPERATING TEMPERATURE AND THE PRESSURIZER IS COOLED DOWN AT ITS MAXIMUM RATE OF 200'F/HR. Proposed fixes: THERE IS NO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT TO REOPEN THIS VALVE AFTER CLOSING OTHER THAN FOR SURVEllt.ANCE TESTING. THEREFORE, NO ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION OR MODIFICATION IS REQUIRED. W% 4ha ORIGINATOR DATE -1 d REVIEWER DATE S

,;, y-GL 95-07 EVALUATION SHEET GROUP 21 System: E11 (RHR/LHSI) Valves: Q1(2)E11MOV8701A/B,8702A/B REV;0 (V001 A,016A,001B,0168) Valve Function: RCS LOOP TO RHR PUMP SUCTION ISO & RHR PUMP SUCTION ISO Valve Manufacturer: COPES-VULCAN INC. Valve Type: 12' FLEXIBLE WEDGE GATE Normal Position: CLOSED Post Accident Position: CLOSED Does valve need to open to perform safety function? Yes O No E If Yes, what mode (s): "^ 400 op Press: PSIG Design Fluid Temp: ECB-13,14 Sewice Fluid Temp: 350 op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Fluid Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG "#^ Normal Atmosphere Temp: op Press: PSIG Operating Atmosphere Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG Post Accident Atmosphere Temp: N/A op Press: N/A PSIG Location: Normal distance from heat source: Post accident distance from heat sources: Valve insonice Testing: FNP 1(2)-M-046 (M071) Frequency of IST: COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING System Functional Testing: Frequency of Functional Test:

References:

P&lD D-175041 1, D-205041 1 Physical / ISO: Valve Drawing: U 167460. U 214167 Physical / ISO: Comments: THESE VALVES HAVE NO ACTIVE SAFETY FUNCTION. THEY REMAIN CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATION AND REMAIN CLOSED DURING LICENSING BASES EVENTS. Valve susceptible to thermal binding: Yes NO E Accept. Criteria B-2 Valve susceptible to pressure lock: Yes NO E Accept. Criteria B-2 Condition under which valve is susceptible: Proposed fixes: DAW JJu DATE .d.L bGINATORhM t/6 /% REVIEWER DATE .}}