ML20097A164

Forwards Responses to Draft SER Outstanding Issues 55,63, 119 & 115.Westinghouse Owners Group Generic Mod to Provide Automatic Reactor Trip Sys Actuation of Reactor Trip Breaker Shunt Trip Attachments Will Be Implemented

ML20097A164
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	09/07/1984
From:	Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2NRC-4-139, NUDOCS 8409130196
Download: ML20097A164 (11)

Text

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$VL 2NRC 139 (412)787 - 5141 Telecopy Nuetear Construction DMslon September 7, 1984 Robinson Plaza, Building 2, Suite 210 Pittsburgh, PA 15205 United States Nucle sr Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:

Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Do ket No. 50-412 c

Open Item Response Gentlemen:

This ' letter forwards responses to the issues listed below.

The following items are attached: :

Additional Information on Outstanding Issue 55 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draf t Safety Evaluation Report : Response to Outstanding Issue 63 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report : Response to Outstanding Issue 119 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report : Res ponse to Outstanding Issue 155 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY h

By i

E.p.'Woolever Vice President KAT/wjs Attachment Y0 77 f LLELJW 84091301968409{

Notary Public

/

PDR ADOCK 05000 E

PDR ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUBLIC g/)[

ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986

{l

Unit 2d Stctso Nuc1ccr Reguletory Commission

. Mr. G2crg2 W. Knight:n, Chisf Page 2 L-

~ COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )

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SS:

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY

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I' On this day of _ b C

///

, befora. me, a b

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)

Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared E.

J. Woolever, dio being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President --' of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file

-the foregoing Submittal on b^alf of said Company, and (3) the statements set 'forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge.

AL KU Notary Public ANITA ELAINE REITER. N

, wiC ROBINSON TOWNSH!P, ALLEGnCNY COUNTY MY COMMISSION EXPIRES OCTOBER 20,1986

ATTACHMENT 1 Additional Information on Outstanding Issue 55 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report l

During the June 29, 1984, meeting with the NRC, the NRC reviewer stated that-the 3/30/84 Duquesne Light Company (DLC) response to this open item was unacceptable.

DLC has re-evaluated this issue and will be instal-ling the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) generic design nodification to provide automatic reactor trip system actuation of the reactor trip breaker shunt trip attachments.

1 1

ATTACHMENT 2 Response to Outstanding Issue 63 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluatio. Report Draft SER Section 7.3.3.8:

Control Room Isolation (excerpt)

The applicant has indicated that the design of the control room and pressurization system is incomplete at this time.

Based on its review of preliminary information, the staf f has expressed a concern that the design, which is integrated into the current control room isolation and pressurization system, may not meet the requirements of GDC 5.

Response

• The Beaver Valley Power Station control room is provided with ventila-tion systems and a control room emergency bottled air pressurization system (C.R.E. B. A.P.S. ).

The control room is currently functioning to support the operation of Unit 1. A temporary wall isolates the construc-tion on the Unit 2 side.

Each side (Units 1 and 2) of the control room has an emergency ventilation system powered from the emergency busses of the associated unit.

The design relationships among these systems have teen reviewed and the interrelationship between Units 1 and 2 accounted for in the following manner:

The ventilation isolation dampers fo r each ventilation system are powered from the emergency busses on the corresponding unit. Control signals are provided from both units to isolate ventilation in the event of a control room isolation signal on either unit.

The attached Figure 1 shows the control signal interrelationships and isolation methodolody. In order to assure that the isolation dampers are shut when isolation is required, they will be shut when the associated unit enters mode 5 or 6 (cold shutdown or refueling).

Thus, the dampers will be pre positioned in their safety position in the event that redundant electric power is not available.

Figures 2 and 3 (attached) show the functional control relationships of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 control room ventilation system.

The CREBAPS volume is being enlarged as shown on Figure 4 to provide sufficient capacity to pressurize the combined control room.

The isolation valves on the CREBAPS are powered by Unit 1.

As in the case of the isolation dampers, control signals are provided from both units so that if initiation is required by either unit, pres-surization air will be provided to the control room.

In order to assure that redundant electrical power is available to these valves, transfer switches will be used to transfer the isolation valve power supply to Unit 2 if Unit 1 enters mode 5 or 6.

By using " break-before-make" trans fer switches, redundant power sources will be available to the valves at all times and yet the Unit 1 and 2 emergency power sources will remain independent.

By these means, the safety function of the control room ventilation and pressurization systems are maintained in all situations.

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ATTACHMENT 3 Response to Outstanding Issue 119 of the 3

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report Draft SER Section 6.5.1.3:

Deviations from the Standard Review Plan (excerpt)

These items are deviations from Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, and are considered as "open items" requiring further evaluation by the applicant:

Section 1 Several paragraphs of IEEE-STD 279-1971 relating to testing of manual initiation and system status of protective systems have been deleted.

The staf f does not agree with the applicant that these design requirements can be deleted for ESF filter systems.

Section 2 i

The applicant has taken exception to the requirement that dampers used in contaminated air streams be designed to ANSI B31.1 (con-struction Class A dampers).

Instead, these dampers will be designed only to meet the strength and leak tightness necessary for use in contaminated air streams. The staf f considers this position accept-able except that dampers used for isolation and shutof f of contami-nated air streams (either toxic chemical or airborne radioactive materials) should be construction Class A.

The applicant should verify to the staff that all isolation and shutof f dampers in poten-tially contaminated airstreams are, in fact, construction Class A.

Section 3 The applicant has taken exception to the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per month filter purge, with heaters operational, to maintain the charcoal in an

" accident re ad y" condition.

In s t e ad, the applicant considers 15 minutes all that is necessary to demonstrate operability and keep

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the charcoal free of moisture.

The staf f disagrees with the appli-cant.

With regard to the conrol room pressurization system, the charcoal filters will normally be idle.

Thus, during periods of high humidity and with dampers that do not seal 100%, water vapo-by dif fusion will enter the charcoal and possibly degrade its pe rf o r-5 mance.

Therefore, it is essential to periodically purge the ch ar-coal filters with low humidity air for a duration (considered to be 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />) to maintain the charcoal dry and in an " accident read y" condition.

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.- Re sponse :

Section 1 L

As indicated by the revised Regulatory Guide 1.52 position presented in FSAR Section 1.8, heendment 4, the Beaver Valley Power Station

.(BVPS) Unit 2 design is in accordance with the paragraphs of IEEE-STD 279-1971 relating to testing of manual initiation and system sta.:us of protective systems.

Section 2 Isolation dampers for control room and containment isolation are ASME-III valves (which exceed the ' requirements of ANSI B31.1).

Dampers in other potentially contesinated air streams are construc-tion Class B.

The system is designed to ensure that any leakage through the dampers is from the noncontesinated to the contaminated portion of the system and the flow is exhausted through the filters before being released to the atmosphere.

Therefore, construction Class A dampers would not improve the safety of the plant.

Section 3 Duquesne Light Company (DLC) experience on BVPS-1 has indicated that no significant moisture buildup occurs with only 15 minutes per month operation on BVPS-1. Dif believes that running the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per month produces no significant benefit. Thus, no safety gain exists to counter the additional costs of down-time for filter replacement.

Therefore, DLC believes that 15 minutes per month operation is sufficient to ensure filter operability.

l I

l 4

ATTACHMENT 4 Response to Outstanding Issue 155 of the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 Draft Safety Evaluation Report Draft SER Section 4.2.4.2:

On-Line Fuel System Monitoring The applicant shall provide information regarding the plant's on-line fuel rod failure detection methods to satisfy the guidelines de scribed in Paragraph II.D.2 of SRP Section 4.2.

The reactor coolant radiation monitors, which include high-and low-range of f-line liquid monitors in the reactor coolant letdown line that can detect conditions that indi-cate fuel rod failure, are briefly mentioned in Sections 4.2.3.3 and 4.2.4.7 of the FSAR and are discussed in Sections 11.5.2.2 and 11.5.2.5.10 of the FSAR.

The ability of the reactor coolant letdown radiation monitors to detect fuel rod failures needs to be confirmed along with the applicant's commitment to use these techniques to monitor f ailures as per SRP Section 4.2.

Response

The reactor coolant letdown monitors are designed with a wide sensitiv-ity range ([10-4 _ 194 uCi/g][see FSAR Table 11.5-2]) in order to have the capability to detect any significant va riation in the reactor coolant letdown activity level.

Should the fuel cladding fall, the rise in coolant activity will be rapidly detected by these nonitors.

The control room operators will be alerted to this rise by alarm and will be able to take the appropriate action.

These monitors, along with the regular reactor coolant chemistry samples will provide adequate surveil-lance of reactor coolant activity to detect any fuel failures.

_