ML20096G165

Forwards Info Only Copy of Revised Pages to Updated FSAR Re Uhs.Updates Result of Design Basis Reconstitution for UHS & in Support of Amend to TS

ML20096G165
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	05/18/1992
From:	Chrzanowski D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 9205220211
Download: ML20096G165 (85)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:) 1400 Opus Place Ccmm:nwealth Edison t Z Downers Grove. Illinois 6051$ May 18,1992 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject:

Byron Ultimate Heat Sink Byron Units 1 and 2, NRC Docket Numbers 50-454 and 50-455

References:

(1) T.K. Schuster to T.E. Murley letter dated January 9,1992. (2) T.K. Schuster to T.E. Murley letter dated March 31,1992.

Dear Dr. Murley:

The purpose of this letter is to transit an "Information Only" copy of th3 revised aages of tio Byron /Braldwood UFSAR related to the Byron Units 1 and 2 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UFSAR revisions are provided as an attachment to this letter and are belng submitted per a Commonwealth Edison commitment in Reference (1). These updates are the result of the Design Basis Reconstitution for the Byron UHS and are in support of the amendment to Byron Station Technical Specifications as requested in Reference (2). Also included in the attachmert is the previously provided UFSAR Change Log, DPR 4-009. If there are any questions or comments, please contact me at (708) 515-7292. Sincerely, '\\ \\ David J. Chrzanowski j Nuclear Licensing Administrator Attachment - UFSAR Change Log DPR 4-009 with affected UFSAR pages. cc: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator - Rlli, w/ Attachment R. Pulsifer, Project Manager - NRR/PDlll-2, w/o / Oh e, 9 (q. (', g A. Hsia, Project Manager - NRR/PDill 2, w/ Attachment / S. DuPont, Senior Resident inspector (P.aidwood), w/o C '~ W. Kropp, Senior Resident inspector (E',yron), w/o 'h ZNLD/1788/1 ,$0 ko$$k $$$$o!s4 P PDR

ATTACHMENT Byron /Braidwood UFSAR Change Log a,id Affected UFSAR Pages ZNLD/1788/2

i Byron /Braidwood 8893-74 UFSAR Change Log 1 of 8 DRP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Description of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks 2.3.1.2.48Y 2.3-10BY Delete paragraph describing Replace with new Clarify proper wet-bulb the maximum water makeup description on page temperature. UHS finai report, required by the UHS 2.3-118Y page 12 f 2.3 1.2.48Y 2.3-llBY Insert "(Revision 2, January Editorial UFSAR Section Al.27 1976)" 2.3.1.2.48Y 2.3-IIBY Change "98*F" to "100*F" Document system " Byron Ultimate Heat Sink i design basis Cooling Tower Basin Temperature Calculation: Part VII," Calculation NED-M-MSD-19. Revision 0, dated March 2, 1992 2.3.1.2.48Y 2.3-llBY Revise paragraphs discussing Clarify design basis UHS final report, page 12 UHS design temperature and of UHS cooling towers meteorological data l. 2.3.1.2.4BY 2.3-IlBY Revise three paragraphs Document calculation " Byron Ultimate Heat Sink discussing the cooling tower results Cooling Tower Basin Makeup makeup water supply Calculation," Calculation NED-M-MSD-14, Revision 0, dated January 9,1992 and Calculation Ntu-n-;iSD-19. Revision 0, dated March 2, 1992 2.3.6BY 2.3-528Y ~ 'd reference 32 Citation of ASHRAE Reference 16 of UHS final exceedance value in report subsection 2.3.1.2.4 2.4.11.58Y 2.4-20BY Revision of paragroph Document calculation Calculation NED-M-MSD-14, discussing cooling tower results Revision 0, dated January 9, makeup 1992 i 2.4.11.68Y 2.4-23BY Revise paragraph discussing Document calculation Calculation NED-M-MSD-14, compliance with Regulatory results Revision 0, dated January 9, j Guide 1.27 1992 l l C-mF51\\CAWSSAG. CL J ? 1

Byron /Braidwood 8893-74 UFSAR Chan9e log 2 of 8 DRP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Descr~ *irn of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks 2.4.ll.68Y 2.4-23BY and Chance " normal" to " minimum" Document system Calculation NED-M-MSD-19, 2.4-23aBY (two places) design basis Revision 0, dated March 2, 1992 2.4.ll.6BR 2.4-22BR Replrce "The design. Document review of Memo from B. J. Adams to D. E. I l poc r" with "The ESCP has Braidwood UHS with St. Clair dated November 4, seismic event." respect to Byron UHS 1991 (RA-91-004) design basis reconstitutier 2.5.6.9BR 2.5-ll23R Change "in situ" to "in-Editorial Editorial situ" 2.5.6.98R 2.5-ll2BR Insert "The ESCP. Document review of Memo from B. J Adams to D. E. event." Braidwood UHS with St. Clair dated November 4, respect to Byron VHS 1991 (RA-91-004) design basis reconstitution 6.2.1.1.3 6.2-3 Add new paragraph describing Document differences UHS Final Report, Section the containment analyses in the Chapter 6 and 1.'I.C, page 18 contained in subsection Cnapter 9 analyses 9.2.5 6.2.2 6.2-38 Add new paragraph describing Document differences UHS iinal Report, Section ~ l the containment analysos in !Se Chapter 6 and III.C mge 18 l contained in subsection Chapter 9 analyses l 9.2.5 9.0 9.0-iii Insert new subsections Editorial New sectior.s are being added 9.0 9.0-xii Show Tables 9.2-6, 9.2-12, Editorial Changes are par this DRF and 9.2-13 as " Deleted," revise the title of Table 9.2-11, and add Table 9.2-16 L: V 51\\CAN\\UF5'S.LL ~ g

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8893-74 l Byron /Braidwood 3 of 8 JFSAR Change Log DRP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Description of Change Reason / Basi < References / Remarks i 9.0 9.0-xv Show Figure 9.2-5 as E6itorial Figure is being deleted " Deleted" f 9.0 9.0-xv Show figure 9.2-0 as Editorial Changes are per this DRP l (coat'd) " Deleted" and denote Figure 9.2-8 as applying to Braidwood only 9.0 9.0-xvi Denote Figures 9.?-9 through Editorial Changes are per this DRP 9.2-14 as applying to Braidwood only, add figures 9.2-30 and 9.2-31 I f 9.2.i.2.1 9.2-2 Revise section Re act design basis UHS Final Report 9.2.1.2.2 9.2-2 Insert " Actual System... Speci fy that the bHS Final Report, Section II.E, i fl ow s. " stated flow rate is page 13 " typical" 9.2.1.2.2 9.2-2a Insort refere. ice to Taole Editorial New table is being added 5./ 26 9.2.1.2.2 9.2-3 Insert "and are ncrmaily Locument normal Normal operation open" syster. operation 9.2.1.2.2 9.?-3 Insert reference to Table Editorial New tible is being added 9.2-16 9.2.1.2.2 9.2-3 Replace "Each" with At Editorial System design baris Byron, the", replace " tower is" with " towers are" and delete "Both towers .. in operation" 9.2.1.2.3 9.2-4 Delete "From a Editorial Tables 9.2-1? and 9.2-13 are division" ueing deleted L WP51\\CAN\\UF SAR.(i. =.

Byron /Braidwood 8893-74 UFSAR Change Log 4 of 8 DRP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Description of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks 9.2.5.1 9.2-29 Insert "Since the... Document system UHS Final Report, Section II.A, active failure" design basis page 9 9.2.5.1 9.2-29 Delete " redundant" and Editorial Editorial delete "Only essential... towers." 9.2.5.1 9.2-29 Insert " Components... Reference the Editorial Table 9.2-1" and delete "The appropriate table for normal... Btu /hr." unit heat loads 9.2.5.1 9.2-29 Delete references to Table Editorial Table and Figures are being 9.2-6 and Figures 9.2-5 and deleted or revised. 9.226. Expand the discussion of Figure 9.2 '. 9.2.5 2.1 9.2-29 Delete "above normal water Editorial System configuration level" and " trough" 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-29a Change " sinks" to " sink" Editorial Editorial 9.2.5.2,1 9.2-29a Delete " redundant" Editorial Proper terminology 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-29a Insert description of the Reflect system Letter Byron 92-0114, Proposed essential service water configuration Technical Specification cooling towers Amendment, page 2 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-29a Delete "Each of... hot Document system UHS Final Report, Section II.A, 4 shutdown." and insert "The design basis page 9 ultimate... an occurrence" 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-29a Insert "The ultimate heat Docum;nt systea UHS Final Report, Section II.A, ... active failure." design basis. page 9 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-30 Replace " supply header" with Editorial Proper terminology " pump discharge" C : WP 51 \\CAN\\UF S AR. CL

Byron /Braidwood 8893-74 UFSAR Change Log 5 of 8 ORP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Description.of Change Reasoc/ Basis References / Remarks 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-30 Delete stated setpeint Editorial Information is not part of the i values. Refer to "a system design basis predetermined value" 9.2.5.2.1 9.2-30 losert " service water Editorial Proper terminology cooling" 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-30 Delete " emergency" Editorial Proper terminology 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-30 Replace "a volume.. to" locument calculation Calculation tdD-M-MSD-14, with " sufficient... and results Revision 0, dated January 9, for" 1992 i 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-31 Change " post" to " design Docu: rent system UHS Final Report, Section IV.B, t i basis" and insert " low river design basis page 25 event." 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-31 Delete " trough" Editorial Proper terminology 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-30 Change "5" to "6" Document syste.n Figure 9.2-28 design basis 9.2.5.2.2 9.2-31 Delete " automatically" Reflect system Normal operating procedure j operation 9.2.5.2.2 9.2 31-Change " post" to " design Document calculation Calculation NED-M-MSD-14, 1 f basis" results Revision 0, dated January 9 1992 9.2.5.3.1 9.2-32 Insert " active", replace Document system Memo from T. K. Schuster to "either... its" with design basis G. Contrady dated August 2, ? "while... safety", delete 1991, UHS Final' Report section I " Additionally...failur." II.A, page 10 9.2.5.3.1.1 9.2-32a insert new subsection Document system UHS Final Report, Sections III-design basis and IV i 9.2.5.3.1.2 9 2-33 Insert new subsection title Editorial Divide large subsection C; \\ WPM \\C AN\\UF S AR. CL i ~

Byron /Braidwood '8893-74' UFSAR Change Log 6 of 8 DRP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Description of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks 9.2.5.3.1.2 9.2-33 Replace "above" with "in Editorial Editorial Subsection 9.2.5.3.1.1" 9.2.5.3.1.3 9.2-34 Insert new subsection title Editorial . Divide l'arge subsection 9.2.5.3.1.4 9.2-35 Insert new subsection title Editorial Divide large subsection 9.2.5.3.1.4 9.2-35 Replace "a slight super-Editorial Proper terminology cooling of" with " freezing at" 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-36 Replace stated setpoint Editorial Information is not part of the values with "a predetermined system decign basis value" (two locations), delete setpoint values (one location) 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-37 Replace "is locked" with Reflect system Normal operating procedure " remains" operation 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-37 Delete discussion of post-Document calculation Calculation NED-M-MSD-14, accident evaporation, blow-results Revision 0, dated Jannary 9, down, and makeup rates 1992 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-38' Delete "therefore" Editorial Editorial 9.2.5.3.2 9.2-38 Replace "in one... down" Document system UriS Final Report, Section II.A. -[ with " coincident... design basis page 9 activc failure" 9.2.5.1 9.2-43 Delete references to Table Editorial Table and Figures were deleted 9.2-6 and Figures 9.2-5 and 9.2-6 j 9.2.5.1 9.2-43 Insert "The LOCA... Document system UHS Final Report f calculations" design j i t C:\\WP51\\CAN\\UfEAR CL W

I Byron /Braidwood 8893' 1 .-UFSAR Change log 7 of 8 DRP 4-009 5/92 Section Page Description of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks 9.2.9 9.2-61 Insert references 7 through Editorial References used in preparing 14 new subsection 9.2.S.3.1.1 9.2 9.2-62 Revise Table 9.2-1 Reflect system fiormal operating procedure I operation i j 9.2 9.2-71 Delete Table 9.2-6 Editorial Information contained 'in Figure i 9.2-7 9.2 9.2-97 Revise Table 9.2-11 Reflect system design Heat Exchanger Data Sheets, 'etter from S. C. Mehta to +

r. Lentina' dated January 17, 1990 i

9.2 9.2-98 Delete Table 9.2-12 Editorial Information containcd in revised Table 9.2-11. 9.2 9.2-99 Delete Table 9.2-13 Editorial Information contained in l revised Table 9.2.-11 5 9.2 9.2-102 Add Table 9.2-16 Document calculation " Ultimate Heat Sink Design l results Basis LOCA Single Failure Scenarios," S&L Calculation UHS-01, Revision 1, August 5. 1991 i 9.2 F9.2-2, Replace with new figure Reflect sy. stem Normal operating procedure Sheet 1 operation 9.2 F9.2-5 Delete figure 9.2-5 Obsolete " Heat Load to the Ultimate Heat Sink during a loss of Coolant Accident," S&L Calculation- ) ATD-0063, Revision 1, April I,,. 1.992-I 9.2 F9.2-6 Delete Figure 9.2-6 Obsolete Calculation ATD-0063. Revision 1, dated April 1,1992 capsncmursu ct

Byron /Braidwood 8893-74 UFSAR Change tog 8 of 8 DRP 4-009 '5/92'

Sectio, r* age _ _

Description of Change Reason / Basis References / Remarks ) 9.2 ~9.E-7' Revise Figure 9.2-7 Document calculation Calculation AID-0063, results Revision 1, dated April.1, 1992 9.2 F9.2-8-to Change Figures 9.2-8 through Editorial Byron does not have a cooling i 1 F9.2-14 9.2-14 to 'Braidwood Only' pond 9.2 F9.2-9 to Replace Figures 9.2-9 Document calculation " Thermal Performance of.the - 'I F9.2-14 through 9.2-14 results Ultimate Heat Sink During a Loss of Coolant Accident," Sal Calculation ATD-0109, Revision 1, April 27, 1992 9.2 F9.2-30 Add figure 9.2-30 Document calculation Calculation RSA-B-91 -03, resul ts Figure 14 i 9.2 F9.2-31 Add Figure 9.2-31 Document calculation Calculation RSA-B-91-03, results Figure 15 l 't 9 t 7 4 C:\\WP51\\CA%bFSAR.Cl 1 r

- ~ BYRON-UFSAR water, or about 146 inches of fresh snow), which was tak2n as.the 48-hour PMP during the winter toonths -(December through Mire'a) (Reference 17). The design-basis snow and ice load is +bcn 104 psf (see Subsection 2.4.2). 2.3.1.2.4 Ultimate Heat Sink Desian The ultimate heat sink at Byron consists of two wet mechanical draf t cooling towers and their associated tr'keup system. In i order to evaluate the ultimate heat sink, 30 years of meteorological data is required. Long-term data most representative of the conditions at Byron Station were recorded at Rockford. However, the Rockford NWS station has only a 28-year period of record (1950-1977). Other than Rockford, data most representative of the meteorological conditions-of the Byron j site and not affected by large water bodies yet still providing a I conservative evaluation of the ultimate heat sink were recorded at.Peoria for a 30-year period (1948-1977). Peoria data extracted from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 3-hourly observations on magnetic tape per Reference 18 were used in evaluating the heat dissipation characteristics of the proposed wet mechanical draft cooling towers under adverse atmospheric conditions. Peoria weather data was not available for January 1952 through December 1956. The decision was made to fill this data gap with meteorological data which best reflected the conditions at Peoria. Therefore, data from Springfield, the closest NWS station to Peoria, were used to complete the 30-year meteorological data record. Average monthly temperature and humidity are summarized in Tables 2.3-43 and 2.3-44 for the representative meteorological data from Springfield and Peoria. Included for comparison are meteorological data from the Byron site and from Rockford. The maximum water-makeup-rate required-by--the ulti-mete--heat-sink was-determined-using-the maximum-1-day-evaporat-ion-petied (average-dey-bulb temperatwee---90. 5 P and average-wet-bulb temperatureM3rF-F}-end the maximum-3-hour-evaporet-ive-peetod fdey-bu4b-temperature - 110re'F nd-wet-bulb-hemperatuee-- M,-C ^ T ), whieh-wca recorded-on-Jul-y-10, 1054 and,7el'f 14, 1054 at -3+GO-p. m. . aspee t-i-ve4 y. The ma*tmu -evaporet-i-ve-pcriods-were l - def i n ed as-per-iods-having-the-man imum-dif-f-erenee-between-d ry-buab temperature-e nd-dew-point-temperatur e. The-enclysis of-marieum plent--wate r-intake-temparatu re-whieh-oeeurs-during-the-peeled-of-minimum-water-cooling---was made with-the-highest _3 heue-vet-bu+b tenpereture-of 0 2. 0"F wh-ieh-waa-reeerded on July 3 0, 10 01-at--h00 p.m. The-mawi-mum-dew-poitt-tempereture-eeeerded-et-the Dyron [ sitc ia 77.O"r. The-ceeresponding-d ey-bulb-tempeee t-ure-i-s B0. 0 ^ r,.;hi4e-the-wet-bulb-is-4hl a r,-- This-onaitc wct-bulb temperaturc la lower-than-the-GihrOLF-wet-bulb-temperature-used-ie i bhe--des 49n-of-t-he-ul-binate-heat-s+nk-l The UHS tower is designed to fulfill its purpose under the extreme environmental conditions set forth in Regulatory Guide 2.3-10 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 i

BYRON-UFSAR 1.27 (Revision 2,- January'1976). The meteorological data from Peoria were-employed to identify the period of meteorological record resulting in the minimum heat transfer to the atmosphere and maxiuum plant intake temperature. The Peoria weather tape was also used for a water consumption analysis to verify the availability of a 30-day cooling water supply. The design UHS tower outlet temperature is 9 PF100*F. .A 3-hourly transient computer analysis of the Peoria weather tape using the maximum heat rejection to the UHS was used to determine maximum plant intake temperaturerduring'the period ~ofl minimum tower performance. This analysis was made with the' highest three-hour wet-bulb temperature, 82*F, which was recorded on July:30j 1 9 6 1,- at 3:001pm. Per_RegulatoryrGuide~1.27 (Revision 2,l January j 1976), -the ultimate heat sink maist be capable of performing its coollng function during-the-design basis event for-this worst case _three-5our. wet-bulb temperature.'.However, the denign operating wet-bulb temperature of the ultimate: heat sink.is'78'I (ASHRAE 1% exceedance'value). The maximum heat rejection to the UHS is from the safe shutdown of two 3411-MWet (guaranteed core thermal-power) PWR reactors, as a renlt of one-uni-t-undergo-ing-a-loss-of-coolant accident (LuCA) and one uni +-undergoing-eomplete concurrent'with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) on_one. unit and the_ concurrent. orderly shutdown and cooldown from-maximum power to cold: shutdown of the-other unit using normal; shutdown operat-ing-procedures. The accident scenario also includes a' single active f ailure external-power ~ (LOEI'). The" maximum predicted UHS ower outlet temperature from the tower performance curves for this 3-hourly analysis is less'than 100*T9 A 6'Fr This -13 3.4AF lana t-han-design. 4 l >To-s u ppo rt-the,wa-ide b i4-i-t-y--of-a-3 G-d a y --coeHng-wate r-su pplyr-a 3-hou r+y-bransient-compu te r-e n a+ys-lewa s-also-mad e. Dae-to-the fee t-that-the-UHS-wa ter-su pply--4+-a-cont-inuous-cou r c c from-two diesel-engine-delven7-Gategory-I-makeup-syst+ms --{eech-havite-a r - design-eapabi4-i-t-y--ef-600-gpmh the-marinum-s-hour-water eensumpt-ion-rate-wa s-used-t o - che ck-the-makeup-pump-e-iee. The marieum--3-hourly askeup-rate-requi-red-to-replenkh-the-watcr loss due-to-evapeention, delft-and-blowdcwn -- 1 s less-than-the-design e=t pab4-Mty-o f-the-pumper By ron -has-vere-tha n-a-30-d ay-s u pp+y-o f-wa ter-beca u s e it hae-e ee n t-inu o us-ma k eu p-s u ppFy-f-rom-th e noek-*iver-us ing-the.-se4saie Crtegory-I-makeup-systeu. I h e-Peor-le-wea ther-te pe-was--used n-e t-ransient-a naly sis-to-d etermin e -the-woes t 3 hourly-evaporttien ra te-u si ng-the-maximum-hea t-re-j eet-lon-te-the-UHS-fee-the-safe sh utdown+f-two-Rh l-MWe-PWR-reae ters, one-unit-undergoing-a-LOGis and-the-ether--unst-undergoing-a-LOEP. The-makeup-rete--eequ4 red to-replenis h-t he--wa t+t-lose-d ue-te-eva porat-i-on7-d eMt-e nd blowdow n-i-s-dess-tha n-the--des ign-eapabi-Rty-of-}OOO-9pm-for-the two-makeupapuPp&r A4se -the-postulet4en--of-a-single-fei49re-to-one--of-the-two r l makeup-pueps-wes-ineluded-in-eur-ana4ysie-of-a-30-day. tater supply. "4th-the-s-ingle-fe44ure-of-one-of-the-two-makeup pumper the-makeup-rate-for-the-worst 3 hour-weather-condhien-fi r7-39 gpmF-exceeded-the-des gn--eapab44-ity-of-ene-makeup--pump.- Bu t-the ma keup-re te-for-the--worst-e-houe-wea ther-eendh4owwas-d eter mined l (- 2.3-11 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 i

BYRON-UFSAR to-eweeed-the-enpae4 ty-of-one--makeup-pump-oni-y-dueing-the-Mrst MO-eeeonds-of-the-trans ent. Thie-condit4 rc-resulte-4nst requirement-for 1,04 5 gaHone-of-watee-beyond-t-he-eapab4-1-ity-of-the-one-makeup-pump. Each mechandea4-draft-oooling-t-ower-beein conta4na-a-minimum tal-ume--(4eventoryt -of--29&y400-gal-Pns-of This-290 0&&--ga44ene-prov1-des-more-than-amp 4e-maegin weterr-7 during-the 750-accend-period-in-which-the-makeup-rate-exceeds-t-he d es i-gn-eapabRity--e f--orw-makeu p-pumpr The maximum water makeup rate required by the ultimate' heat." sink wasLdetermined using the maximum one-day evaporationtperiod (average dry; bulb temperature =.90.5'Faand: average wet bulb temperature = 73.0'P) which-was recorded on' July; 1 8,-? 1 9 5 4.1 The maximum evaporative; period was_' defined as the period havingfthe maximum, difference between dry bulb temperature and dew-point? temperature._ ~ Byron'has_more than a 30_-day supply 1of:: water:because it0has'a continu'ous makeup supply:from.the Rock River using the SeismiU Category I. makeup system.: In:the event that makeup from:the:Rbck River ' is. not :available, anoalternative makeup source lis ; from-;the onsite deepLwells. There are two. deep: wells which have been demonstrated to bejable to supply water-at aKrate of'800Jgpm"per well for more-than.30 days. To supportithe availability of.a{30-dayEccolingl water supply Etwo analyces were: performed:;-to determine the makeup; requirements under the worat:-1-day' weather; condition,.with. heat-rejection rate-based onLa LOCA'ani LOOP on ono unit in conjunction'with--safe shutdown of'the other unit,. and a single active failure. :The analysis for the; makeup rate also assumed a safe shutdown 1 seismic event. Both the makeup system and'the deepBwel1 system'were demonstrated to be able-_to provide-sufficient' water to replenish watersloss due to evaporation,= blowdown, drift and auxiliary feedwater supply,-'and to provide continuous cooling for at:-least:30_ days. L i I 2.3-11a REVISION 4 - DECEMBER'1992

. ~.. - -.. = - -. -. - _. -. BYRON-UFSAR

- TMe-per-iod--o f-MG-seeends la very conservat-ively calculat-ed usiing-a--eenstant--max 4 mum--heet-reieetheate-to-the U"6r For details 1of the ultimate heat sink design and makeup water availability, see Subsections 9.2.5 and 2.4.11.6.

2.3.1.2.5 Inversions and Hich Air' Pollution Potential Thirteen years of data (1952-1964) on vertical temperature gradient from Argonne (Reference 4) provide a measure of thermodynamic stability (mixing potential). Weather records from many U.S. stations have also been analyzed with the objective of characterizing atmospheric dispersion potential (References 19 and 20). The seasonal frequeneles of inversions based below 500 feet for the Byron Station are shown by Hosler (Reference 19) as: % of 24-Hour Periods With at Least 1 Hour i Seagan % of Tota.1 Hours of Inversign Spring 30 71 Summer 31 81 Fn.ll 37 68 Winter' 31 53 Since northern Illinois has a primarily continental climate, inversion frequencies are closely related to the diurnal cycle. .The'less. frequent occurrence of storms in summer produces a larger frequency of nightc with short-duration inversion I conditions. i Holzworth's data (Reference 20) give estimates of-the average ~ depth of vigorous vertical mixing, which give an indication of the vertical-depth of atmosphere available for mixing and dispersion of effluents. For the Byron Station region, the i seasonal values of the mean daily mixing depths (in meters) are: 1 Mean Daily Mixina Depths Season Morning AfterD99D Spring 480 1400' Summer 300 1600 Fall 390 1200 Vinter 470 580 When daytime (maximum) mixing depths are shallow, pollution potential is highest. i Argonne data ere presented below in terms of the frequency of inversion conditions in the 5.5.to 144-foot layer above the ground as percent of total observations and in terms of the average duration of inversion conditions. 2.3-12 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 .u...

. ~. - BYRON-UPSAR. 26. C. L..Mulchi and J. A.-Armbruster, " Effects of Salt Sprays an and Nutrient Balance of. Corn and-Soybeans," fooldrtg_ Tower @vironmen.t 1 1974_,-AEC Symposium Series, Technical Information Canter, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, pp.-379-392, 1975. 27. E. Aynsley, Environmental Aspects of Cooling Tower Plumes," TP 78A, Cooling Tower Institute, Houston, Texas, 1970. 28. P. T. Brennan et al., " Behavior of-Visible Plumes from Hyperbolic Cooling Towers," American Power Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 22, 1976. 29. A. Martin, "The Influence of a Power Station-On Climate - A Study of Local Weather Records," tmospheric EnviroIur@nt, Vol. 8, pp. 419-424, 1974. 30. D. J. Moore, "Recent CEGB Research on Environmental Effects of Cooling Towers," Coolina Tower Environment,- 1974, AEC Symposium Series, Technical Information Center, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, pp. 205-220, 1975. 31. S. R. H4nna and F. G. Gifford, " Meteorological effects of energy dissipation at large power parks, " Btillet_in Amer. Mete _o.n Soc, 56, pp. 1069-1076, 1975. 32. AmericanESociety of Heating and Refrigeration Engineers (ASHRAEl~ Handbook:fundamentcls, 1989, IP edition, pg. 24'.7. I r i I i l' I ..e 6._ REVISION 4 DECEy2ER 1992

~ ~.. -.. ~- BYRON-UPSAR .2.4.11. Low' Water Coysiderations 2.=4. ) 1.1 : ' Low Flow in the Bock River Low flow frequency analyses for the Rock River at Rockton and at Como were made-using the. Log-Pearson Type III d'stribution (Reference 14). Flows-'at the-intake were interpolated using Equation 2.4-1 in Subsection 2.4.2. Table 2.4-15 gives flows in the Rock River at the intake for various combinations of duration and recurrence interval. Considerations of downstream dam failures are included in Subsection 2.4.11.5. 2.4'.11.2 Low Water Resultina froll Suroes, Selches, or Tsunami Low water conditions resulting-from curges, seiches, or tsunami -are'not design considerations because there are no large bodies of water nnar the site, nor is the site near a coastal area. 2,4.11.3 Historical Low Water A minimum daily flow of 440 cfs was recorded at Como on August 20, 1934. The historical 1-day low flow at the intake is encimated to be 400 cfs and has a recurrence interval of more than 100 years. The corresponding river elevation at the intake is 670.4 feet. 2.4.11.4 future Controls Future upstream uses of Rock River water are not expected to lower minimum-flows. Since most communities derive their water supply from groundwater, the trend will be toward higher future minimum i-flows due to increased sewage effluent discharges. l 2.4.11.5 Plant Reauirements The circulating water makeup is withdrawn from the Rock River. The maximum water requirement for plant use is 107 cfs. Actual I l-use might be less depending on plant operating loads and seasonal l. Variability of evaporation and blowdown losses. Since only 61 cfr E are used up due to evaporation and drift, 46 cfs are returned to l the Rock River. Thus, the net withdrawal rate is 61 These a. requirements include makeup water for the essential service cooling towers, of which 2 cfs are for evaporation and drift losses and 2 cfs are for blowdown. The maximue - ikcup-rate-tette-essent-ial service-water cooling towers-unde..-the-weret 1 - day weather-cond4-t-ions--is - 3 54 5 gpm.- Ginee-the-teba4- -des-igr--eapabl4ity-of-t-he-essent-la-1-wev-iec water ~ makeup-putaps-is-sOO&-gpr., a uf-f-iesent+1ter-is-aMleble--faytwa-f-e p-lent- -shutdown-0-rom--the--Rock-River r In-the-uni-ikc1y event-that emergeney-requ+rementemn~not-be-sat-isf-ied-by-surfef.wlter - withdrewa4s4 rem-the-Rock-River, groundwater 2.4-20 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 ~

BYRON-UFSAR Makeup to the. essential. service water cooling towers isirequired 1 to. compensate'for losses due to-evaporation,1 blowdown and drift, Under the' design. basis accident,-which consists of_aEloss of coolant accident coincident with a' loss ofscffsitafpower-on'one unit-and the concurrent orderly shutdown and cooldown-from maximum power to cold shutdown (do not show deletion) of the_other unit using normal; shutdown operating procedurosiand:a: single: active f ailure, the. maximum 1 makeup demand under theLworst: 1-day-weather conditionssis 2000"gpm. The. makeup rate 1 decreases ~toLapproxi-mately 1500 gpm twelve minutesrafter the accidentrand. continues to decrease - Since the-total. design-capability-of the' essential ~ service water; makeup pumps is 3000 gpm, sufficient water!is availab'e for safe shutdown-from the Rock River. In theLunlikely event ~that emergency cooling water-requirements cannot boJsatis-fled by makeup:-from the Rock River, deep wells will provide-makeup to the essential service water cooling tower. l i l l 2.4-20a REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

BYRON-UPSAR weHs-wi-ll ser-ve-fee-makeup-to-the-essent-iol-servicewatee-ecoHeg towers. T he-w e He-a te-ea pa bie-e fg r ed u cing-in-exces se f-14500-g p m and-sa t-is ft-the-makeup-eequhement r A summary of the cooling water capabilities of various pumps and wells is provided in Table 2.4-16. Table 2.4-17 illustrates the required minimum safety-related cooling water flow, the sump invert elevation and configuration, the minimum design operating level, and the required minimum pump submergence. The essential service water makeup pumps are capable of supplying sufficient water during periods of low water resulting from the 1-day 100-year drought. From Table 2.4-15, the 1-day 100-year low flow at the intake is 454 cfs. The corresponding water surface elevation is 670.4 feet. Backwater analyses for low-flow conditions in the Rock River e indicate that a reduction of 10% in the river discharge would result in only negligible changes of water-surface levels at the T pumping site and downstream. Backwater profiles were computed (Reference 13) for discharge conditions shown in Table 2.4-18 for the river reach from Sterling to the pumping site, a distance of 41 miles. Above the dam at Oregon, changes in wuter-surface levels due to withdrawal of 10% of the low-flow discharge would be 0.03 foot or less. Between the dams at Sterling and Oregon, the average differences in water levels would range from 0.05 to 0.09 foot, as shown in Table 2.4-18. Water levels at Como, with and without cooling water s thdrawals, were estimated from the USGS rating table for the Como gauge 3 miles downstream from the dam at Sterling. With lot withdrawal, the change in stage would be approximately 0.08 foot at Como for the low-flow conditions listed in the table. This change confirmed water levels derived by backwater analyses since the water surface elevation at Como it not controlled by a small dam as it is above Sterling, Dixon, and or jon. An extremely low water level could possibly occur through b combination of low river discharge and breaching of the Orcgon dam 5 miles downstream. Since the lowest point on the river bottom at the intake is about 10 feet below the dam's crest, removal of the impounding effect of the dam during low flow would lower the water surface at the intake. Consequently, studies were made to determine that level. The same computer model was used as described in Subsection 2.4.3 with a channel "n" value of 0.032 and a river flow of 400 cfs, the 1-day lowest flow at the site area. The resulting water-surface 2.4-21 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

BYRON-UFSAR holes and the well casings were grouted with concrete grout from j the bottom upward in order to seat the casings intc the bedrock and to provide seals prevnnting the movement of soli or surface contaminants into the wells. The production por'. ion of the wells consists of uncased, open boreholes which were over pumped after completion to remove any loose rock or drill cuttings. The type of well construction, ith the length of casing welded together i w and seated into the bedrock, provides the maximum strength for any groundwater well. Municipal or large-volume industrial w?lis in i northern Illinois are generally of similar or lower quali+v construction. During pump testing of these wells, some caving of sandstone was observed which might interfere with the pump performance and reduce the productivity of the well. The actual zone of caving was determined by caliper-logging of the borehole and the wells were deepened to allow for any debris to collect at the bottom and still assure adequate yield. A smaller diameter casing was I extended dceper into the well placing the pump setting within the cased portion of the well. This prevents any caved material from damaging the pump. With these modifications, the wells assure adequate supply to the UHS when needed. l The design elevation of the pump invert which supplies makeup to the essential service cooling tower basins from the Rock River has been based on the postulated low water elevation resulting from the breaching of the Oregon Dam during the historic low flow period. This occurrence would result with a river flow of 400 cfs, a water elevation of 664 feet 4 inches. The historic low flow of the Rock River recorded in 1939 at Como, Illinois was 440 .fs. In addition, under these conditions, an alternate source of makeup water is available from the seismically qualified deep wells. An-a na4-ys4s-has-d eeons t-ra ted-tha t-ea k e Sp-wate r-is-ev a+1e Me-f o e-34 days,m d-beyond-e t-a-cat e-wh4eh-ea t4ef-ies-the-nos t-severe-desig n basis at -set-feett-in-NRC-Regu4atory-Guide-1M M isden J, Jenuary 19 7 6 }-pos4-t4 ens-Grl-4,md-Grl,-b. 4he t.t-sink-desig n bases-resu+t-s-f rom,v--postuleted-loss-of--coo +ent--eeefdent-for-ene u nit-x d-less-e f-e x t-e rne4-pow e r-for-the-et heer The Byron Ultimate Heat Sink design basis accident consists of a loss of coolant accident coincident with a loss of offsite power on one unit and the concurrent orderly shutdown and cooldown from maximum power to cold shuedown of the other unit using normal shutdown operating procedures and a single active failure. l Analyses were performed to demonstrate that makeup water is l available for 30 days and beyond at a rate which satisfies the most severe design basis as set forth in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.27 (Revision 2, January 1976) positions C.1.a and C.1.b. The analyses were based on the above described scenario in conjunction with the worst one day weather conditions. Each Seismic Category I cooling tower basin at norea4 minimum water level contains 290,000 gallons, of which 200,000 gallons are dVailable for auxiliary feedwater. 2 4-23 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

BYRON-UFSAR. The connections between the essential service water cooling towers and the' auxiliary feedwater train are provided with normally closed motor-operated valves. . Protection against single active or passive failures is provided by the redundancy of the essential service water system. An analysis of the impact of supplying water to the auxiliary feedwater train from the ultimate heat sink-indicates that the

heat-sink dependability is in no way impaired since the neema4 minimum i

l t l i l l l 2.4-23a- . REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 l. i 't ~ - - - - - - -. ~,.. _.. 7-4 .y

BRAIDWOOD-UFSAR 2.4.11.6 heat Sink Denemd_a1;Lility Requ_ir_ements The normal source of cooling water for the plant is the 2537-acre cooling pond. Cooling water is taken from the pond at the Pond Screen House by six circulating water pumps. Two 192-inch circulating water pipes carry water to the plant and back again to the pond. A buried pipeline from the plant takes alowdown to the Kankakee River. Makeup water is pumped f rom the river screen house on the Kankakee River through a buried pipeline to the northeast section of the cooling pond. Should makeup water be eliminated by system failure or extreme low flows, the pond can operate under a closed cycle system. Emergency shutdown water is available from the ultimate heat sink, namely the ESCP, The ESCP is an excavated area located within the cooling pod s designed to provide suf ficient volume to permit plant operativ fu a minimum 30-day period without requiring makeup watt it accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.27 (Revision 2, January l' The-des 4 n-bus 1s---of-the-ESGP-postu-lates--one-unEt-under$r - 5 a l os s-o f-e oo lan t--a ec id e nt-a nd-t he second-suffer-ing-a4 >

• exter-nerl-power,--The ESCP has been reviewed to determine _ts ability to handle the-total heat dissipation requirecents of the station assuming a LOCA coincident with a loss of offsite power on one unit and-the concurrent orderly shutdown and cooldown from maximum power to. cold shutdown of the other unit using normal shutdown operating procedures, a sLngle active failure, and-a coincident design basis seismic event.

It is estimated that water loss due to seepage and evaporation would amount to a 1.5 foot (1 foot due to evaporation and 0.5 foot due to seepage) decrease in C depth of water in ESCP for such a 30-day period (see Subsection 9.2.5). The ESCP has an area of 99 acres and a depth of 6.0 fr ?t at elevation 590.0 feet. Its area-capacity curve iF given in Figure 2.4-46. Figures 2,4-47 and 2.4-48 show the E.JP and its sections and pipelines. The intake pipes for the essential service water are in the pond screen house at a centerline elevation of 572.67 feet, over 11 feet below the bottom of the pond. The sump invert elevation of the pond screen house is 570.17 feet. At a minimum ESCP elevation of 573.92 f eet at which the 30-inch intake pipes are fully submerged, the essential service water pump net positive suction head requirements are more than satisfied. This is based upon two pumps being supplied with water at their rated pumping capacity from a single 48-inch supply line and three 30-inch intake lines. Plan and elevation drawings of the pond screen house are provided in Figure 1.2-15. The intakes are protected from ice blockage by traveling screens, bar grills, and trash rakes, located at the front of the Pond Screen House. The minimum operating level is 590 feet, at which point the ESCP loses communication with the cooling pond. The essential service water pumps are located in the auxiliary building. Two essential service water discharge pipelines run from the auxiliary building to the south end of the ESCP. The description of the essential service water system can be found in Subsection 9.2.1.2. 2.4-22 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

of depth measurements at specific time intervals along trcck lines, spaced equally over the pond. Also, included in this report are the results of the surveys in terms of the surface area and volume capacity. Monitoring of the ESCP is covered by Surveillance Requirement 4.7.5. 2.5.6.9 Construction Notes The ESCP is an excavated pond within the cooling lake. Design and in-situ soil conditions were presented in subsections above. The ESCP does not depend upon man-made structural features for water retentl6n and is constructed to remain intact during a design' basis seismic event. 2.5.6.10 Operational Notes Field observations and results of instrumentation for the ESCP are discussed in Subsection 2.5.6.8. 2.5 7 Feferences 1. N. M. Fenneman, Physioataphy of Eastern Upited States pp. t 499-518, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, 1938. 2. M. Faul, Ages of Rocks, Planets, and Stars, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1966. 3. J. C. Bradbury and E. Atherton, The Precambrian Basement of

Illinois, p.

4, Circular 382, Illinois State Geological Survey, 1965. 4. A. J. Fardley, Structural Geology of North America, Harper and Row, New York, 1962. 5. H. B. Willman, et al., Handbook of Illinois Stratigraphy, Bulletin 95, Illinois State Geological Survey 1975. 6. H. B. Willman and J. C. Frye, Pleistocene Stratigraphy of Illinois, pp. 67 and 74, Bulletin 94, Illinois State Geological Survey 1970. 7. H. M. Bristol and T. C. Buschbach, Stratigraphic Setting of the Eastern Internal Region of the United States, in Dackaround Mat e_r ia.lli - Reference 5, 2971. 8. D. H. Swann and A. H. Bell, Habitat of Oil in the Illinois Basin, Reprint 1958-W, Illinois State Geological Survey 1958. 9. K. E. Clegg, The LaSalle Anticlinal Belt in Illinois, pp. 106-110, Illinois Geological Society Guidebook Series 8 (Prepared for the Geological Society of America Field Trip on November 10, 1970), 1970. 2.5-122 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

B/B-UFSAR containment fan cooler housing is drained to the containment base mat. e. The containment and subcompartment atmospheres are maintained during normal operation within prescribed pressure, temperature, and humidity limits by means of the containment chilled water systems which deliver 40*F water to the dehumidifying coils within each reactor containment fan cooler. Containment penetrations cooling is accomplished by means of supplying component cooling water to the penetrations that have cooling coils. Containment ventilation systems such as the CRDM booster fans and the CRDM cooling fans are used during normal operation and require no periodic testing to ensure functional capability. 6.2.1.1.3 Desig.n Evaluation The short-term pressure subcompartment analysis considers a loss of offsite power. Consideration of single active failures is of no consequence, since none of the safety equipment functions during the initial seconds of the postaccident transient. The maximum calculated differential pressure in the loop compartment is 20.27 psi resulting from a double-ended hot leg (DEHL) break in solume 3 (see Table 6.2-10 for listing of volumes). The maximum calculated differential pressure in the upper pressurizer cubicle is 10.24 psi resultina from a spray line double-ended break. The maximum calculated differential pressure in the steamline pipe chase is 13.43 psi resulting from a main steamline break in volume 26. The containment subcompartment differential pressure analysis is described in detail in Subsection 6.2.1.2. The results of the pressure transient analysis of the containment for the loss-of-coolant accidents are shown in Figures 6.2-1 through 6.2-6. Containment temperature curves are presented in Figures 6.2-7 through 6.2-12. The cases examined in this analysis determine the effects of the full range of large reactor coolant break sizes up to and including a double-ended break. Cases illustrating the sensitivity to break location are also shown. All of these cases show that the containment pressure will remain below design pressure with margin. After the peak pressure is attained, the performance of the safeguards system reduces the containment pressure. At the end of the first day following the accident, the containment pressure has been reduced to a low value. The peak pressures and margins are shown in Table 6.2-1. Additional containment analyses were performed for the purpose of evaluating ultimate heat sink capability (see subsection 9.2.5). The containment analyses performed for the ultimate heat sink reconstitution differ from the containment integrity analyses described here in that the heat removal rates from the reactor containment fan coolers and the residual heat removal system were maximized to determine the limiting heat load on the ultimate heat sink. l 6.2-3 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 l

B/B-UPSAR f i .The smaller-pump-suction breaks,'the hot-leg break and.the cold. leg break-mass and energy releases assumed that the sump water -(which isLpumped back through tho' core when-the RWST empties) is .j at a. con _stant temperature of saturation at the design pressure of the-containment. As-required by-the NRC, the full .6 ) i 6.2-3a ~ REVISION.4 -? DECEMBER-1992 ~ l l I j

l B/B-UFSAR 6. The main control room dicplay/ recording requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, are met for containment sump level. Reactor support concrete temperatures are indicated inside containment. Reactor support liquid coolant, utilizing ccmponent cooling water, may be provided if the need is indicated by the concrete temperature indicators. Refer to Section 7.3 for design details. 6.2.2 Containment Heat Removal System The containment heat removal system consists of the reactor containment fan cooler system and the containment spray system. The reactor containment fan cooler system has no emergency function other than containment heat removal, while the primary function of the containment spray system is the removal of iodine and other radionuclides from the containment atmos-phere. The containment pray system is designed to operate following a LOCA to reduce the elemental iodine concentration of the containment atmosphere and to raise the pH of the containment sump by adding NaOH, to ensure that the iodine removed from containment atmosphere will be retained in the sump solution. The objectives are comp.ieted in approximately 30 minutes, at which time the spray in3ection phase is terminated. The system is then isolated from the RWST and plant valves are aligned for recirculation operation. (It should be noted that after 30 minutes most of the heat removal from containment is provided by the reactor containment fan coolers, which are safety grade for Byron /Braidwood.) Sprays are not required for long-term heat removal. Nevertheless, the containment sprays will be operated for at least 2 hours following a LOCA before they are terminated. The RHR, CV, and SI systems are designed to operate following a LOCA to cool the reactor core. These systems are switched from injection to recirculation at approximately 30 to 40 minutes and remain in operation for the remainder of the accident. Additional fuel clad failure is not postulated while these systems are operating. The containment spray system is discussed in Subsection 6.5.2, and the performance of both the reactor containment fan cooler system and the containment spray system under the design-basis loss-of-coolant accident condition is evaluated in Subsection 6.2.1.1. The containment. heat removal system rejects heat to the ultimate heat sink. Containment analyses to support the design bases of the ultimate heat sink are described in Subsection 9.2.5. 6.2-38 REVISIOri 4 - DECEMBER 1992

B/B-UFSAR TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) PA9I 9.2.4 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems 9.2-28 9.2.4.3 Design Basis 9.2-28 9.2.4.2

System Description

9.2-28 9.2.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-28 9.2.4.4 Testing and Inspection 9.2-28 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink (Byron) 9.2-29 9.2.5.1 Design Basis (Byron) 9.2-29 9.2.5.2 System Description (Byron) 9.2-29 9.2.5.2.1 Essential Service Water Cooling Towers (Byron) 9.2-29 9.2.5.2.2 Category I Essential Service Water Makeup System (Byron) 9.2-30 9.2.5.2.3 Category II Deep We.'l Pumps (Byron) 9.2.31 9.2.5.3 Safety-Evaluations (Byron) 9.2-32 9.2.5.3.1 Ultimate Heat Sink Design Basis (Byron). 9.2-32 9.2.5.3.1.1L Design ~ Basis' Reconstitution (Byron) -9.2-32a ~ 9.2.5'.3.1.1.1.: Containment HeatzLoad Calculations (Byron) 19.2-32a 9.2'5.3.1.1.2 -Steady State Tower; Performance

Analysis _(Byron)L 9.2p32c 9.2.5.3.1.1.3L Time.Dependenti Basin Temperature

Calculationsi(Byron)

- 9 ~. 2 -3 2 c 9.2.5;3.1.2: ' Combination of' Seismic' Event and, 9.-2-32d 9.2.5.3'1.1.4 Conclusioni(Byron) Drought - (Byron) 9.2-33 9.2.5.3'.1.3 Ice Buildup (Byron) 9.2-34 l 9.2.5.3.1.4. Frazzle:Icel(Byron)~ _9.2-35 ~ l 9.2.5.3.2 Essential Service Water Cooling Towers (Byron) 9.2-35 9.2.5.3.3 Category I Essential Service Water Makeup System (Byron) 9.2-38 9.2.5.3.4 Category II Deep Well Pumps (Byron) 9.2-39 9.2.5.4 -Tests and Inspections-(Byron) 9.2-42 9.2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements (Byron) 9.2-42 9.2.5 Ultimate Heat Sink (Braidwood) 9.2-43 9.2.5.1 Design Basis (Braidwood) 9.2-43 9.2.5.2 System Description (Braidwood) 9.2-43 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation (Braidwood) 9.2-44 9.2.5.4 Tests and Inspections (Braidwood) 9.2-46 9.2.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements (Braidwood) 9.2-46 9.2.6 Condensate Storage Facilities 9.2-47 9.2.6.1 Desian Bases 9.2-47 9.2.6.'2

System Description

9.2-47 9.2.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-48 9.2.6.4 Testing and Inspections 9.2-48 9.2.6.5 Instrumentation Application 9.2-48 9.2.7 Plant Chilled Water System 9.2-48 9.2.7.1 Containment Chilled Water System 9.2-49 9.2.7.1.1 Design Bases 9.2-49 9.2.7.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-49 9.0-iii REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

D/B-UFSAR I TABLE OF CONTfNTS (Cont'd) 9.2.7.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-49 9.2.7.1.2

System Description

9.2-50 9.2.7.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-51 9.2.7.1.4 Testing and Inspection 9.2-51 9.2.7.2 Service Building Chilled Water System 9.2-51 9.2.7.2.1 Design Bases 9.2-52 9.2.7.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-52 9.2.7.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-52 9.2.7.2.2

System Description

9.2-52 9.2.7.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-53 F 9.0-1li (Cont'd) REVISIOti 4 - DECEMBER 1992

B/B-UFSAR CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS KIST OF TABLES NUMBER TITLE EAGE 9.1-1 Spent Fuel Fool Cooling System Design Parameters 9.1-67 9.1-la List of Cases Analyzed 9.1-68 9.1-2 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Component Design Parameters 9.1-69 9.1-3 Maximum Pool Bulk Temperature, t, Coinci-dent Total Power, Q, and Coincident Specific Power, q, hortheHottestAssembly 9.1-73 -9.1-4 Vaporization Rate fr.im the Instant All Cooling is Lost 9.1-74 9.1-5 Maximum Local Pool Water Temperature and Local Fuel Cladding Temperature at Instant of Maximum Pool Bulk Temperature 9.1-75 9.1-6 Pool and Maximum Cladding Temperature at the Instant Fuel Assembly Transfer Begins 9.1-76 9.2-1 Essential Service Water Heat Loads 9.2-62 9.2-2 Single-Failure Analysis of the Essential Service-Water System 9.2-63 9.2-3 Component-Cooling' System Design Parameters 9.2-65 9.2-4 System Flow Conditions for Main Plant ? Operating Phases (One Unit) 9.2-67 9.2-5 Component Cooling System Malfunction Analysis 9.2-69 9.2-6 LOC-A-Unit-Hea t-nc j ec t-len-6ummacyDele ted 9.2-71 9.2-7 Plant Chilled Water aystem Equip-ment Parameters 9.2-72 9.2-8 Plant Chilled Water System Failure Analysis 9.2-76 9.2-9 Station Heating System Equipment Parameters 9.2-77 9.2-10 Station Heating System Failure Analysis 9.2-96 9.2-11 Essential Service Water Gubiele-Goo-ler Component Nominal Design Flow Rates 9.2-97 9.2-12 Esserrtia1 Servicc Water-Nerme-1-Operat-i+xj. and Cold Shutdown-Design Flow RatesDeleted 9.2-98 9.2-13 Essent-ie -Serv-ice Watee-Pest--LOGA Design Flow Rates-Deleted 9.2-99 9.2-14 Suspended SedimentiConcentrations (Byron) 9.2-100 9.2 Monthly Flows at Intake 9.2-101 9.2-16. Single FailureJAnalysis of the Ultimate Heat < Sink'(Byron). ' '9.2-102 9.3-1 Sampling System Component Design Parameters 9.3-70 L 9.3-2 Chemical and Volume control System l Design Parameters 9.3-72 l l l 9.0-xii REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 l

B/B-UFSAR -CHAPTER 9.0 - AUXI_LJARY S_YSTEMS -LIST OF FIGURES NUMBER U.T_I4 9.1-1 New-Fuel Rack Installation 9.1-2 Spent Fuel Storage Rack Arrangement 9.1-3 Typical Rack Elevation Region 1 9.1-4' Typical. Cell Elevation Region 1 9.1-5 Typical Rock Elevation Region 2 9.1-6 Typical Cell Elevation Region 2 9.1-7 Dynamic Model 9.1-7a Gap Elements to Simulate Interrack Impacts 9.1-7b Impact Springs and Fluid Dampers 9.1-7c Individual Rack Details of Multi-Rack Model 9.1-7d Spent Fuel Rack Multi-Rack Non-Linear Dynamic Analysis Model 9.1-8 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (Byron) 9.1-8. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System (Braidwood) 9.1-9 Acceptable Burnup Domain in Region 2 Racks 9.1-10 Power Discharged in Spent Fuel Pool (Normal Refueling Discharge) (0-44 Days) 9.1-10a Power Discharged in S, a Fuel Pool (Full Core Discharge) (0-115 Days) 9.1-11 Containment Building Pool Liner Section and Detail 9.1-12 Refueling Machine 9.1-13 Suent Fuel Pool Bridge Crane 9.1-14 New Fuel Elevator 9.1-15 Fuel Transfer System 9.1-16 Spent' Fuel Handling Tool 9.1-17 New Fuel Handling Tool 9.1-18; Lifting ig 9.1-19 Stud Tensioner 9.1-20 Spent. Fuel Storage Liner Plan 9.1-21 Spent. Fuel Storage Liner-Detail 9 1-22 Primary Water (Byron)- 9.1-22 Primary Water (Braidwood) 9.2-1

Nonessential Service Water System (Byron) 9.2 Essential Servic,e Water System (Byron) 9.2-3 Component Cooling System (Byron) 9.2-4 Makeup Demineralize" System (Byron) 9.2-1.

Nonessential Service Water System (Braidwood) 9.2-2 Essential Service Water-System (Braidwood) -9.2-3 Component Cooling System (Braidwood) 9.2-4 Makeup Domineralizer System (Braidwood) 9.2-5 Energy-Fnput-t+-sente-i-nment, Double Ended Pump Suet-lea Rupt-ure Del ~eted 9.0-xv REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

~..... -. -.~ . - -. -. -. _ ~ -.. -. -.... -. - ~ l B/B-UFSAR LIST OF FIGU E (Cont'd) NUMBER IITL.E -9.2 Heat-Remova1--f-rom-Eontainment Deleted 9.2 How'. Rejection to the Ultimate lieat Sink for Two 3411 MWt.(Guaranteed Core Thermal Power).PWR Reactors Brought to Cold Shutdown 9.2-8 Ultimate Heat Sink Area Volume (Capacity) Curves .iBraidwo'od) w l l l' L I l l l. l {- DECEMBER 1992 9.0-xv (Cont'd) REVISION 4 v. --,n., w r,,, w ,~-, +, -,m-, --n--

B/B-UFSAR LLST OF FIGQRES (Cont'd) WMBER TJTLE 9.2-9 Heat Sink Temperatures for Maximum Temperature Conditions'(Braidwood) 9.2-10 Drawdown for Maximum Temperature ConditionsJ(Braidwood) 9.2-11 Natural Temperatures for Maximum Temperature Conditionsf(Braidwood) 9.2-12 Heat Temperatures for Maximum Evaporation Conditions ~(Braidwood) 9.2-13 Drawdown for Maximum Evaporation Conditions:(Braidwo6d) 9.2-14 Natural Temperatures for Maximum Evaporation Conditions .(Braidwood) 9.2-15 Condensate Storage System (Byron) 9.2-16 Containment Chilled Water System (Byron) 9.2-17 Service Building Chilled Water System (Byron) 9.2-18 Auxiliary Building Chilled Water System (Byron) 9.2-19 Control Room Chilled Water System (Byron) 9.2-20 Station Heating System (Byron) 9.2-15 Condensate Storage System (Braidwood) 9.2-16 Containment Chilled Water System (Braidwood) 9.2-17 Service Building Chilled Water System (Braldwood) 9.2-18 Auxiliary Building Chilled Water System (Braidwood) 9.2-19 Control Room Chilled Water System (Braidwood) 9.2-20 Station Heating System (Braidwood) 9.2-21 Essential Service Water Piping At Auxiliary Building 9.2-22 Outdoor Essential Service Water Piping (Byron) 9.2-22 Outdoor Essential Service Water Piping (Braidwood) 9.2-23 Essential Service Water Cooling Tower Plan and Sections (Byron) 9.2-24 ESW Cooling Tower Drive Equipment Plan and Elevation (Byron) 9.2-25 Plan of ESW Cooling Tower OB Basin (Byron) 9.2-26 Plan of ESW Cooling Tower OA Basin (Byron) 9.2-27 ESW Cooling Tower-Basin Sections and Details (Byron) 9.2-28 Byron River Screen Houce 9.2-29 B. on RSH Rating Curvo for-Low Flows 9.2-30 . Containment PressureL-~4 RCFC/2 CS' Pulp CasoLPlus'RHR 9.2-311 LContainment-Temperature:-141RCFC/2 CS: Pump; Case Plus' RHR 9.3-1 Instrument Air System (Byron) 9.3-2 Service' Air System (Byron) 9.3-3' Primary Sampling System (Byron) 9.3-4 Chemical and Volume Control System (Byron) .9.3-5 Boron Recycle System (Byron) 9.3-6 - Auxiliary Building Equipment Dral'as (Byron) -9.3-1 Instrument Air System (Braidwood) 9.3-2 Service Air System (Braidwood) 9.3-3 Primary Sampling System (Braidwood) 9.3-4 Chemical and volume Control System (Braidwood) 9.3-5 Boron Recycle Systen (Braidwood) 9.3-6 Auxiliary Building Equipment Drains (Braidwood) 9.3-7 Plumbing Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram 9.3-8 Auxiliary Building Plumbing Flow Diagram Units 1 and 2 i 9.3-9 Auxiliary Building Plumbing Flow Diagram 4 9.0-xvi REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

n.--.__- -. - - ~ - -. D/D-UFS% 9.2.1.? EsngntinDrrylge_Witruyntpen 9.2.2.2.1 11elLiHD_lMsC.E The ensential service water system is illustrated in Figure 9.2-2, 9.2-21, and 3.2-22. The-ba s i o-d es ig n-ph idosoph y-i-a-to pr ov i d e-t wo-red u nd a n t-s y s tems-i n-ea&u ni t-to-se rv i4 e-the eenen t4 ol-h ea t-load s-i n-each-u n i t. The-essentio l--loods-sup-i pl4ed-during-normal-plent-operat4cnr-lhCA -ond-bOOP-or-norma 4-7 shutdown-operat-lonThe essential service water system is dessigned to ensure that-sufficient cooling capacity is available to provido adequate cooling during normal and accident conditions. The components served by essential service water for normal, LOCA, and shutdown conditions are shown in Table 9.2-1. g The essential service water system is divided into two redundant loops for each unit. The system may be operated with the #, ops cross-tied or as two separate loops. Table 9.2-11 lists nominal l design flowe fort =o each-oubiele-cooler-served-by the essential service water system. Actual component flows vary depending on system alignments, mode of operation, and ambient conditions. These nominal design flow rater are the-samesufficient for all operating conditions, includinn 1.ormal operation, post-LOCA operation, and during a LOT t.1 9ormal shutdown. Typically, the flew rate specified is a nominal value based on maintaining a desired oil temperature or equipment temperature for long-term operation and design-margin exists between the specified flow rate and the flow rate required to remove the design heat-load. To ble-9 r?-1-2-14 s ts-d e.a i g n-f4 ew-ro tes-f o r-each-es s e n t4 a l-se rv i-ce wa ter-t ra in-d u ri ng -no rma4-ope ra t4o n-a nd -noema-1-cold-s h u td own v-i W hl e-9r2-H-14 s te-dee ly n-f4 ow-re tes-fo r-ea ch-es se n t-i o l-se r vi ce wa ter-tw in-<l u r i ng-pos tHK+C A-opera t4cnr In addition, either train can supply 990 gpm to the suction of the auxiliary feed-e wa'cer pump ot the same train. Refer to Sulsoction 10.4.9 for a discussion of the auxiliary feedwater system and tais cross-tie. All safety-related heat transfer equipment is designed for a 200aF essential service wdter inlet temperature. Heat rejection capacity of the essential service water cooling towers is discussed more f ully in Subs.ectioD 9.2.S. 9.2.1.2.2 -Sygterd gneriDtiPD Each full-capacity essentia] service water loop in each unit is supplied by a single pump rated at 24,000 gpm at 180 feet 1 Tot total developed head. Actual system flow varies with system lineup and conditions. Soo Table 9.2-1 and Table 9.2-11 for the components served and the nouinal rated component flows. The pumps are located on the lowest level of the auxiliary building t to ensure the availability of_ sufficient NPSH. Emergency power is available to'each pump from its respective ESF bus as shown in Table 8.3-1 and described in Subsection 8.3.1. At Byron, the ). suction supply is_by one supply-line running from each of the two redundant essential service mechanical draft cooling towers to l l 9.2-2 PEtISION 4 - DECEMDER 1992 I l

B/B-UFSAR the auxiliary building. Each nupply line supplien one ennent.ial r,orvice water pump in each unit; each of the two punpa in a given unit takes its suctior. " rom a separate supply Jjne. At Braidwood, tne suction supply is by two intake lines running from the Safety Categorv I portion of the lake screen house essential pond to the auxiliary building. Each intake line.2upplies one essential service water tuup in each unit; each of the two pumps in a given unit takes its suction from a separate intake line. The system, therefore, veets t'/.e single-failure criterion as shown in the analysis in Table 9.2-2 for Braidwood, and Tables 9.2-2 and 9.2-16 for Syron. On each.init, the et'oss-tic header valves on the disc..arge of each pair of essential service water pumps are powered from sep-F d l 9.2-2a REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

D/D-UPSAR arate ESF buses and are normally open. The suction line valves are each assigned to the same ESP bus as the pump with which it is associated. A cross-tic between the Unit I and Unit 2 essential service water systems can be established through the 1SX005 and 2SX005 valves. I At Dyron, heat rejection from the essential service water system is to the essential service water ccoling towers, both on a normal and on an emergency basis. The discharges from each i loop in each unit are separate and fed to two separate and re-dundant return lines for return to the towers. The two dis-charges from each unit and the two return lines to the towers are arranged similar to the intakes, i.e., the two discharges from each unit run into separate return lines, and each return line is fed from one discharge from each unit. The single fail-ure criterion is met as shown in Tables 9.2-2 and 9.2-16. t At-Braidwood, heat rejection from the essential servi,a water system is to the essential cooling pond, both on a normal and on an emergency basis. The discharges from each loop in each unit are separate cnd fed to two separate and redundant return lines for return to the pond. The two discharges from each unit'and the two return lines to the pond are arranged similar to-the intakes, i.e., the two discharges from each unit run into separate ret':rn lines, and each return line is fed from one of the-two discharges from each unit. The uingle-failure criterion is met as shown in Table 9.2-2. The.escential cooling pond is more fully discussed in Subsec-tion 9.2.5. EochAt Byron the essential service water cooling towardes are designed to accommodate the heat load from both units simultaneously under both normal and accident conditions. Both 2 towe rs-a re-no rmo l-l y -u t-lMe edr-o ne,msig ned -to-ench-u nit,-whe n both-unfets-ore-in-opero t-ion r The essential service water cooling towers and their' auxiliary systems are more fully discussed in Subsection 9.2.5. 9.2.1.2.3 Sa fety _Eva ha_t;19D The' entire essential service water system is designated Safety category I, Quality Group C, including supply lines, pumps, and return lines. The essential service water supply and discharge lines join the auxiliary building and the essent-lal service water. cooling ' towers or cooling pond. These lines are either below or incor-porated in the turbine building base mat. They are not inside the turbine building and, the lines are adequately protected- 'from any occurrence within the turbine building. The routing of this piping is shown in Figures 9.2-21 and 9.2-22. These fi-gures show plan and elevation views between the ultimate heat sink and the pumps, 9.2-3 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 l

D/B-UTSAR This has becn accomplished by utilizing applicable ACI and AISC codes and imponing the SSE and the design basis tornado loads on the turbine building and the base mat design. Because these additienal loads were used in the design of the turbine build-i ing base mat, the requirements of General Design Criteria 2 and 44 of Appendix A to 10 CTR 50 are satisfied. Therefore, the turbine building han the same margin of safety as the Category I structures. This complies with the Regulatory Staff position regarding interaction of non-Category I structures with Catego-ry I structures, as given in SRP Section 3.7.2.11.8. Although j the specific requirements of Appendix D to 10 CFR 50 cannot be demonstrated, comparable practice was used in the construction of the turbine building base mat. The material suppliers and contractors for the construction of the turbine building were { the same as for the construction of the Category I structures. The Applicant's-construction personnel monitored the construc-i tion work and have ensured quality control. The quality of the construction is reflected in the average actual concrete strengths. The design requirement for the concrete compressive strength is 3500 psi. The Byron site was constructed with an average concrete strength of 5265 psi (5369 psi for Draidwood). The "in-place" strength of concrete and reinforc-ing steel used in the construction of the turbine building base mat excoeds the design strengths by a minimum of 28%. These strergths were achieved in both the Category 1 and Category II structures. i The Applicant's and contractor's quality control documentation for the construction of the turbine building base mat including the responsible quality control records are available at the plant sites. Based on the equivalent margins of safety provided in the de-sign of the turbine building and the Category I structures, and the quality control provided in the construction, the integrity and functionality of the essential service water piping has beer assured. l Normal essential service water heat loads are as indicated in Table 9.2-1. These loads are supplied from one of the full-ca-pacity loops in each unit, so that one of the supply pumps is in continuous operation. Upon receipt of a safeguards actua-an signal,. both (ssential service water pumps will auto-atically start and the diesel engine generator units will mutomatically start. If power is lost to the ESP buses, all safety-related equipment will be automatically sequenced to start upon restoration of bus voltage. Components are all indi-vidually scaled in (latched) so that loss of the actuation sig-nal'will not.cause these couponents to return to the position held prior to the advent of the actuation s.ignal. F-rom-e-ee-view--o f-Te ble94+Rr4+14-a nd4+H, i t-49-0 ppare nt-that o ne-pu mp-ec n-ha nd ie-4t*-ow n-ESF-lead s-p4 u s-e u b iele-coole rs-o nd l u be -o i-1-c oo-l e r-s -o f-th e-o t he rwli-v i s ionr i 9.2-4 REVISN 4 - DECEMBER 1992 1 i

m __m._ i BYHON-UFSAR 9.2.5 llltimd.te H.qDt S.1Dh 9.2.5.1 Dn iqn.00 sin Since the ultimate heat sink ~is shared by two units,.the condition of both units must be determined for the design basis event. The design bases accident scenario considered for the Dyron-ultimato heat sink is a loss of coolant accident _(LOCA) coincident with a loss of offsite power (Lo0P) on one unit and the concurrent-ordorly shutdown and cooldown.from maximum power to' cold shutdown of the other unit using normal shutdown operating-procedures. The accident scenario also includes a ) single active failure. The ultimate heat sink for the station consists of the two redundantessential service water mechanical draft cooling towers and the makeup system to these cooling towers. As discussed in Subacction 9.2.1.2, heat fron the essential service water system j is rejected to the essential nervice water cooling towers. The towers are used during normal operation thereby providing a means of availability and surveillance not obtainable with an emergency system maintained on a strictly standby basis.- only-essent4ol heat-leads-orwefected-to-the-towerst-Components which contribute to the essential service water heat loads are listed in Table 9.2-1. 5 The-normal:--operat4ng-heat-load-of-a-unit-is-142-x-10 -Btughte The-re fue44ng-o nd-m ai n t e n a nce-ou t a g e-hea t-loo d-is-H-x-1 Btufbry Ta bl e-9 t?-6-s h ows-h ea t-1 cad s-rej ected-to-t he-ess e n t-ie4--se r v4ee wa te r"s y s tem-ve r su s-t4 me-for-the-u nit-u rd e rgo ing -pos t--LOC A-coo l-dowth 1111, a re4ra-5 -shows-the-ene rg y-input--to-t he-con tainme n t versus-tri-me r,Tnd-F4 ure-9r2-6-shows-the-heat-removal-rate--ver-9 s u s-t-ice--fo r-one-reac t o r"co n te l n me n t-fe n-coole e-e nd-o ne residual-heat-removal-heat-exchangerr-Figure 9. 2-7 shows the BOG A-end-cold-s hu tdOw n-hea t-cej eet4en-ra te-to-the--ess e n t4e4 service-water-systemrcombined' heat' rejection rate vorsus-time-for - the unit undergoing post-LOCA cooldoun, plus-heat rejection rate versus' time for the unit undergoing safe shutdown. 9.2.5.2 Sys_ tem Des _grintion 9.2.5.2.1 Ersagatial S3Ivice Wittry Cogling_Iowere The escential service water cooling towers are part of the essential service water s*' stem, a diagram of which is provided I in Figure 9.2-2. Plan and section drawings for the essential service water cooling towers are shown in Figures 9.2-23 through 9.2-27. The cold water basins of the two cooling towers are connected above-normal-water-4evel-by an overflow trough. The essential service water cooling towers are required for safe shutdown and are Safety Category I, Quality Class C, Seismic Category I. The essential service water mechanical draft 9.2-29 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 ~..

- - = BYRON-UFSAR cooling towers are the ultimate heat sinks for the essential service water system. There are two redundant induced draft cooling. towers of the rounterflow design.- Each'of the two safety-related; mechan $ca1 draft cooling towers. consists of a water storage basin, four. fans four riser valves, and two' bypass valves. Ea eh-coo 4-1-ng-towe r-is-d es 1<j ned-to-oceo m mod a te-t h e-h ea t 4 cad-+ rom-bo th-u nfts -e in uite neou sly-u nd e r-bot h-nor mal-a nd emergency-condit-ionsr l E ach-of-t h e-f-ou e-cel4s-pe r-tower-is-Pa ted-o t-1+r00 &-g pm-w ith 9BAF-cold-wate&-supply-temperf ture%nd-130*F-postaceldent-re-turrt-temperature-coneurrent-vi-th-76*F-ambient Wet - bu4t.. Assum-4 ng-the-le ss-o f-onewool4ng-towe r, the-rema4ning eco14ng-tower i con-lese The ultimate: heat wink is capable of providing adequate 1 cool.ing capability-for'a.LOCA coincident with a LOOP in one.. unit, and.the i concurrent orderly shutdown and cooldown from. maximum' power of the other unit to Mode 5 uning normal shutdown operating procedures. Thio scenario also;includos a single active failure.- I t t l l l 9,2-29a REVISION 4 - DECDiBER -1992

a...

~

i DYRON-UFSAR o r e-ceH-d u n-tc-ver t4eal-to rna do-mis s M e-l epae t4 ng-t he-fe ny f4 H-o nd -i n t ernal-p i p i n97-+h i4e-prov4 d ing-edeq ua tte-coo 14 ng-ea pa-b H-ity-f or-t he-u n i t-u nd e rgoi ng-pos t-LOC A-e aold ow n-a nd-t-h e-e th e r unit-undergoing-hot-shutdowny Emergency power to the essential cooling tower mechanical draft fans is supplied from ESF buses which may be supplied by the onsite emergency diesel generators, j-The temperatures of the essential service water cooling tower basin and the supply headers must be controlled to prevent freez-ing in the tower fill. L4is is accomplished by sensing supply heuderpump discharge temperature and controlling hot water bypass ~ valves to the cooling tower basins. A Category I sensing element and temperature controller is provided for each cooling water train for each unit. The controller provides visual indi-cation of temperature in the-control room. The controller also main-tains cooling water temperature between-92*F-end-WF-in the tower basins by opening the bypass valves when the temperature drops:to SEAFaLpredetermined~value, so that the cooling section is removed from service, and closing the bypass valves when the -water supply temperature increases to 4BAFa-predetermined value so-that the cooling section is returned to service. The cooling towers must have a source of makeup water to compon-sate-for drift losses,.ovaporation, and blowdown. The normal supply of makeup water comes from the Category II circulating water system. An emergency source of makeup water is provided by the Category I diesel driven makeup pumps. These are descr! bed in Subsection 9.2.5.2.2. An additional source of makeup water is provided by the Category II onsite deep well purps, which are described in Subsection 9.2.5.2.3. The blowdown system for the essential service. water cooling tower is safety category II since return of the blowdown water to the Rock River is not essential to the operation of the ultimate heat sink. 9.2.5.2.2 Catenorv I EsEpntial_ Service Wahr_liakeup SystfD The essential aervice water makeup pumps, which are active com-ponents required for~ safe shutdown, are ASME Section III Safety Category I Quality Class C components. Under. emergeney low levels in the Byron essent.'.al. service water cooling towers, each tower is provided with a Category I diesel engine-driven makeup pump which automatically starts on low water level signal. These pumps are located in the river screen house and take suction from behind bar grilles and traveling screens. located therein. Each essential service water cooling tower-is supplied by a separate makeup train con-sisting._of a pump and Safety Category I supply line. c Each makeup' train is capable of supplying e-volume-of-water equiv+1ent + sufficient water.to eompensate for auxiliary feedWater supply-an

• or drift, evaporation and blowdown losses resulting 9.2-30 REVISION 4 - DFCEMBER 1992

.,. _ _ _ _ _. ~. _, _. _....,.

BYRON-UPSAR from design basis post--LOCA conditions in one unit concurrent with the safe shutdown of the other unity, low river _lovel, a singla active failure, and the-concurrent occurrence of-the safo shutdown seismic event. Each diesel-driven essential service water makeup pump located in the river-screen house is provided with a dedicated Seismic Category I fuel oil supply. This fuel oil supply is discussed in Subsection 9.5.4. Therefore, Category 1 makeup water 'an be supplied to the i basins of both towers by either of the two lines from che river screen house. Similarly, the system can return wnter to one tower while deriving water from the other tower's basin, by way of the overflow-ttough. The river screen house is shown in Figure 1.2-16. A detailed cross sectica of the river intake structure is shown in Figure 9.2-28. The rating curve for low flows on the Rock River at the structure is shown in Figure 9.2-29. The top of the base mat is at elevation 663 fact 56 inches MSL, and the screens are recessed within the base mat so that essen-tial service water makeup can be provided. A sump is provided i for each essential ser Jce water makoup pump, having a bottom of sump elevation of 660 feet 6 inches MSL. L Minimum pump submergence requirement is 22-1/2 inches. The pump intake is about 15-1/2 inches above the bottom of the sump. The essential service water makeup pumps may be started manu-ally from the control room, locally at the river screen house, or automatically on level controls of the cooling tower basins. Once started-out-emat4eetly, they continue to operate until the fuel supply to each engine drive _(approximate fuel r - consumption is 10 gallons per hour) is exhausted or until the i engines are manually stopped from the control room or 'ocally. The engines and pumps are capable of meeting makeup require-monts_for the actual design basis post--LOCA heat rejection rates under worst caso evaporative loss conoitions. A minimum of 36% of the 2000-gallon tank will ensure 72 hours of makeup pump operation before refueling is required. The Category I makeup purps are designed for the combined event flood, but not for the probable maximum flood. 9.2.5.2.3 2Lt.egory II Deep Well Purpa The Category II, Quality Group D onsite deep wells provide a source of-makeup water to the essential service cooling tower basins in the event of a flood more severe than the combined event flood on the Rock River. Since the onsite wells are located approximately 200 feet above the river at plant grade clovation, they will not be affected by flooding on the Rock River. 9.2-31 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

___..__.______._______.____..____._.__._m DYRON-UTSAR The onsite wells at Byron a re powered by ESF buses E11 and E12. The well pumps will, therefore, be capabic of happlying makeup water to the essential service water cooling towers in the event of the loss of the river screen house coupled with the loss of offsite power. The wells supply the required amount of water for tower consumptive makeup for a minimum of 30 days. An aquifer pumping test was performed in the Byron 4 water wells in July 1980. The test verified that the wells are capable of satisfying the requirement for essential service water makeup. Test results indicated that the total drawdown in each well after 30 days of continuous pumping at 800 gpm will be approximately 85 feet. This is outstantially less than 125 feet of available drawdown in each well and demonstrates f the adequacy of the wells. The deep wells and portions of the well water system, which are an alternate source of water to the essential eervice water cooling towers, have been qualified for the safe shutdown carthquake. 9.2.5.3 Safnly_Uvaluatign 9.2.5.3.1 W_t.11gLt.e_lieat Sink Re_rLlgn Bagin The ultimate heat sink is designed to withstand either the safe shutdown earthquake or the probable maximum flood of the Rock River occurring separately, consistent with the philosophy for ultimate heat sinks for nuclear power plants. The system with-stands a single active failure, ei ther-eet4ve-oepassive7-wi-thou t impairing-4ts while maintaining the syr, tem's ability to perform its safety function. Add i t4ena Hw-d ue-to-t-he-ma nner-in-wh ich emergeney-power-moy-be-supp44ed-to-the-cooMng-towere-f rom-ehe d i ese4&,-O e-s y s t e m-fu ne t 4ene-u n i npa4-red -w-i th-on e-e e t i v e-d i e s e l fe4-lueerTuoles 9. *c-2 and 9.2-16 present a f ailure analysid. The-review of the ultimate heat sink for single active ~ electrical failures war based on guidance from 1EEE standards, the Byron safety Evaluation Report (1983), and-the Standard Review Plan. Passive failures in fluid systems do not represent a challenge to the heat removal capability of the ultimate heat sink because of the cross-tie and bypass capabilities'in the cooling water system. Passive-failures (i.e. loss of a tower) were analyzed for Byron but were limited to non-accident conditions. Acceptability was based on the ability of.the PyStem to perform its safety function in the presence of such a failure. The Safety Category I river screen house is designed for the combined event flood as discussed in Subsection 2.4.3.7,

thus, i

should a flood more severe than the combined event flood occur, the Safety Category I makeup systems would be unavailable. In this event, the onsite wells would provide makeup. The ultimate heat sink is d( ligned to withstand a design-basis tornado. The design basis >f the cooling towers is discussed in Subsection 9.2.5.2.1. An analysis of the effect of a tornado r 9.2-32 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

BYRON-UPSAh more covere than the design-basis tornado on the cooling towers is presented in Subsection 9.2.5.3.2. For the case of a tornado impacting the river screen house, which is not protected against such missiles, the onsite wells will provide makeup. The Category. structures and components of the ultimate heat sink are designed to withstand the SSE. In the event of failure of the Oregon Dam downstream of the river screen house, con-current with a low river discharge condition, the water level of the Rock River would be 664 feet 4 inches MSL, which is above the base mat elevation of the river screen house. Thus the Category I makeup pumps would have adequato submergence. In addition, under these conditions, an alternate source of makcup water is atollable from the seisnically qualified deep wells. 9.2.5.3.1.1 Design Basis.ROIMDgtitutiom A design basis reconstitution of the Byron ultimate heat sink was performed, Reference 10) to verify the design of the ultimate heat sink. The design basis event for the Byron ultimate heat sink is a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) in one unit and the concurrent orderly shutdown from maximum power to cold shutdown of the other unit using normal shutdown operating procedures. The accident scenarios analyzed various single active failurea and assumed that two essential service water cooling tower cells vore initially out-of-service. These scenarios maximized heat supplied to the essential service water cooling towers and minimized tower heat removal capability. The design heat load from the non-accident unit is conservatively calculated as the energy required to reduce the unit from maximum to zero power, and reduce the reactor coolant temperature to cold shutdown conditions (<200"F). Additional heat load is placed on the essential service water system and ultimate heat sink once residual heat removal is placed in operation (at approximately 350*F). Under normal conditions the minimum time to reach this condition, assuming an orderly shutdown and cooldown from maximum power using normal operating procedures, would be eight hours. 9.2.5.3.1.1.1 .C_grJJLimpent _ IIcat load Calculations The containment integrity calculations contained in Subsection 6.2.2 were reviewed to determine the scenario where the highest containment heat load would occur. The greatest heat load occurs as a result of a reactor coolant system double ended pump suctic.) (DEPS) break with maximum safety injection. This case is a scenario in which all emergency core cooling systems inject with two diesel generators in operation. The DEPS ase with three reactor containment far. coolers (RCFCs) and one containment spray (CS) pump running was originally used for the design of the ultimate heat sink. This was conservative-in the sense that it combined a maximum energy release assumption with a coincident loss of heat dissipation capability (i.e., the failure of two essential service water cooling tower fans to operate). Since no single active failure could result in three RCFCs running and two 9.2-32a REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 I .J

BYRON-UFSAR disabled essential service water fans, now containment heat load ~ calculations were performed to further examine tho impact of containment heat. removal equipment availability on the' ultimate heat sink. The containment heat loads consist of loads from the-RCFCs and the residual heat removal'(RHR)~ system. The RCFC loads were calculated'using the CONTEMPT 4/ MOD 5 computer code. The annlysis examined various LOCA scenarios with respect:to-equipment availability to: generate a series of RCFC heat removal rates versus time. The sump water temperature results / f' rom-these runo were combined with syntem performance data to develop RHR loads. The mass / energy. release data utilized in the new containment heat load calculations was taken from the DEPS LOCA containment integrity ~ calculations (maximum and-minimum safety injection). However, the new containment heat load calculations are-different I in that theLheat removal ~ rates via-the RCFCs and theLRHR, system were maximized'to determine the limiting heat load on the ulti-. mate heat sink. The performance of the RCFCs.was recalculated tce bound maximum expected essential service water-flow rates and: air flow rates. The mass and energy release rates were adjustodito incorporate RHk heat removal. rates during recirculation. The decign basis.~ reconstitution maximized the accident unit containment heat load to the UHS ~by: Postulating scenarios with'four.RCFCs and either one or.two CS pump (s)1 operating Assuming higher essential service water flowrates to the RCFCs Assuming higher air'flowrates to the RCFCs Y Assuming earlier switchover to Containment Hecircula-tion phase and correspondingly earlier RHR heat loads with two-CS Pumps operating, consistent with the design of ECCS recirculation. l The.four RCFCs/two~CS pump care, in. combination'with.the other changes, results in greater LOCA unit Containment = integrated heat j loads of approximately 25% for the first two hours after accident p initiation and an increase in LOCA unit Containment peak; heat j load from_S13 to 830.8 MBTU/hr. ThisJcase results in l n L 9.2-32b REVISION 4 -~ DECEMBER 1992 i .-m = m,- ,..,._ ~.__,..- , _...,_..-_.--. _ -., _.-. - - - - - _.. _.--, ~........_.

BYRON-UFSAR i the maximum integrated heat load during the critical period for base temperature. These increased heat loads were~used for conservatively evaluating > UHS Tower performance and do not affect previous 1UFSAR Chapter 6 containment analyses. 1The'four-RCFCs/ one CS pump case alsolresults in greater LOCA unit containment integrated heat loads ~of approximately 25% and'an-increase-in LOCA unit _eentainment peak heat-load ~from 513 to 841.6.MBTU/hr. Although the: integrated heat loads for this case: vere slightly lower.than for the 4'RCFC/2LCS_ pump case, this. case resul+.s in the highest. peak heat load. See: Figures 9.2-30=and 9.2-31 for the containment response for the 4-RCFC/2 CS" pump case. 9.2'.5.3.1.1.2 E.1Rmly. State Tower Performang,e Analysig Essential service water' cooling tower performance.was calculated based on essential. service water' flow! values,: heat ^ loads, and ambient wet-bulb: temperature.-- Results of'this 1culation give thermal performance as a' function of temperaturefinput and flow and then provide'an essenti-1 service water output temperature, l An essential service water cooling tower, performance.. curve.is I thenl generated:from the_ temperature parameters. This curve is an input to'the. basin calculation which develops a b*. sin temperature-prof.ile as a function of time. 9.2.5.3.1.1.3 Ilmp Dependent.jlasin Temocrature Calculations Theseccalculations predicted the basin temperature using a time dependent two cooling tower model. The time' dependent feature'of the model-was' developed to' account for the transient nature of the LOCA heat load'. 'For example, the containment analysis for the 4 RCFC/2 CS pump' case showed a LOCA unit containment peak heat load'of 830.8 MBTU/hr atl45 seconds and:an average heat load of approximately 450 MBTU/hr for the first hour after-ho accident.- At two. hours into.the LOCA the heat load'has dacreased to approximately 260 MBTU/hr and continued to. decrease. The_ calculations.usedLthe time 1 dependent total heat loads to determine the amount of heat addedito the essential service water l system. The two cooling tower models were developed toLprovide1the capability to model;differeat-flow and energy-(heat-load) going to each of:the cooling towers. Tho' flow to each ofLthe cooling towers could be significantly different under different accident scenarios.- Depending on the scenario, the energy transport l 9.2-32c REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

BYRON-UFSAP also considered;the distribution of miscellaneous ~ heat loads. Cooling was assumed to occur only for cells with fans running at -high speed. 9.2.5.3.1.1.4 .QIng) Asion The ultimate heat sink design basis reconstitution _ concluded that ~ the design accident analyses:and operation have been determined to be consistent with all relevant Regulatory Guiden and standardsicommitted to in the'UFSAR. The capability of the ultimate heat sink to perform ito safety: functions has been verified. The analyses performed ~have shown that essential service water cold. water basin temperaturesdoes.not-exceed,100*F during normal and potential accident conditions. 1 1 i ( l 9.2-32d REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992

o BYRON-UTSAR 4, 9.2.5.3.1.2 Combination of Seismic Event and Drought The_ ultimate heat sink can withstand combinations of events less severe than the design-basis events discussed abovein Subsection 9.2.5.3.1.1. The simultaneous occurrence of a 500-year seismic event with the 100-year 30-day duration drought is discussed below. l The 30-day 100-year recurrence drought flow at the intake is 739 cfs (Tabic 2.4-15). The corresponding water surface eleva-tion at the intcVe with the Oregon Dam in place is 670.6 feet. The invert of the intake is at elevation 663.5 feet; thus, a water depth of 7.1 feet is available. A 500-year scismic event at the site corresponds to a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.05 g. The assumption of a failure of-the Oregon Dam subject to this level of,cismic load-ing is. extremely conservative. However, if such a failure is postulated coincident with a 30-day 100-year recurrence drought, the water surfac; elevation at the intake would be 665 feet providing a depth of 1.5 feet of water on the floor of the intake. A 'mplified evaluation of the seismic resistance of the Oregon Dam was made using data from Reference 1. The lateral resist-ance of sheet piling, liquefaction potential-of the subsurface sand (,aference 2), and the stability of the dam were evalu-ated. On a conservative basis, it was determined that the dam can sustain a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of at j least 0.1 g without failure. From data presented in a recent study by Dames and Moore (Refer-ence 3), it is estimated that an earthquake having a maximum acceleration equal to or greater that o.1 g is about 0.3 x 10-3 per year. Hence, the probability of occurrence of an earth-quake causing failure of the Oregon Dam is much less than 1/500, l It is estimated that the Rock River water temperature would be low enough for ice formation and accumulation, at most, for 2 -months of the year. Therefore,_the probability of not having the Rock River provide makeup water during a 30-day 100-year u 'Irought coincident with an earthquake having a maximum accelera-l tion of 0.1 g would be no greater than: i P= (0.3 x lod) (1/100) (2/12) = 5.0 x 10-7 occurrences / year t i Blockage of the_ intake structure by sedimentation is not ex-l -pected to be a concern as discusaed below. The Rock River is a stable river and past experience (see Sub-section 2.4.2) of nearby induser.es along the river indicates that sedimentation and blockage of intake with sediment is not 9.2-33 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 _ -, _. _ _.. _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _.. ~ _

DYRON-UFFAR a concern. The intake is located about i miles upstream of the Oregon Dam and any significant sediment deposition takes place near the dam and not at the intake. The Iowa Institute of Hydraulic Research measured sediment con-centration at the intake (Reference 4). The bed load at the intake mainly consists of fine sands. The particle size distri-bution is fairly uniform with a d50 = 0.4 mm. The suspended sediments are entirely in the fine silt to clay particles size range. Ninety percent of the suspended sediment is finer than O.062 mm Table 9.2-14 provides suspended sediment concentra-tion at the intake. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has published suspended sedi-ment data for the Rock River at Joslin for the water years 1975-1979. The drainage area of the Rock River at Joslin is 9549 square miles. About 90% of the sediment carried by the river constitutes sus-pended sediment and it is kept in suspension due to the turbu-lence of the river and thus will not deposit and cause blockage of the-intake. Since the Rock River is considered to be stable j and does not meander in the vicinity of the i ntake, blockage of the intake with bed load is not probable, j 9.2.5.3.1.3-Ice Buildup Estimate" of ice buildups on the Rock River are discussed below. t There is no data available regarding ice thick 1.ess on the Rock l River. USGS indicated that the maximum thickness of ice ob-l served at the discharge measuring stations at Rockton, Byron, and Como was 1.9 feet during the 1978-79 winter which is one of the severest winters of record. The thickness of ice on lakes can be predicted by using the fol-lowing equation (Reference 5): hi=L (1.06 iS) where: the ice thickness in inches, h = 1 the coefficient of snow cover and location L = conditions the accumulated degree-days since freezeup, S = based on *F below freezing. L = 0.75 to 0.65 for medlJm siz lakes with moderate snow cover. Average annual snowfall at the Byron site is ubout 28 inches. Hence, L is taken at 0.65. The average annual freez-ing degree-days at Rockford, Illinois are 1123*F-day. The win-ter year 1976-1977 was the coldest year on record in Northern l Illinois. The corresponding freezing degree-days at Rockfora 9.2-34 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 -w-c.--- n-m-n.,m-cy.p-.-,-,-----wwn .y,. .-,.,e a m_, --.,a.-... -a. n..w.e-- ...--a. -,e- ---.- -~~ a aw --v

BYRON-UFSAR were 3727'F-day. The above equation gives the thickness of ice cover for a lake at 23 inches during an average year and 29 1 inches for the coldest year (1976-1977). However, these values are for a lake and not directly applicable to rivers. For rivers, the flow resistance reduces the thickness of the ice. Freezeup starts in late November and reaches a maximum in March. Based on historic flow data, minimum flow occurs during August-September. During winter, the flow gradually increases from November to March. The minimum monthly flows and the aver-age monthly flows at the intake based on the recorded flow data at Como gauging station are given in Tabic 9.2-15. From the abcVe discussion, it is clear that ice (maximum thick-ness is 29 inches) does not block the irtake since the depth of water availaole is 7.1 feet under 30-day 100-year low flow con-i ditions. 9.2.5.3.1.4 Erazzle Ice Frazzle ice is a term referring to small ice particles whic' may form at the water surface if the air temperature in quita low and the mixing and conductivity of the water is insuffi-- cient to prevent e-sFight-supercooling-offreezing at the water surface. Based on operating experience, frazzle ice is not expected to affect the operation of the river intake at the Byron Station. If ice forms on the intake bars, the trash rake may be operated to remove the ice. Ice and sediment cannot block the intake because of the avail-abi'.ity of the 7.1 foot depth of water. The probability of the dam failure during the 30-day 100-year recurrence drought and in the winter months is very low. Even in the case of no flow in the Rock River, the Oregon Dam will maintain a water depth of 6.75 feet over the invert of intake (the crest of the Oregon Dam is at 670.25 feet and the invert of intake is at 663.50 feet). 9.2.5.3.2 Essentd3 1 Servi _ce Water Coolina Towers An analysis of the effect of multiple tornado missiles on the essential service water cooling towers has been performed. The following components of the essential service water cooling towers are unprotected from tornado missiles: a.

fans, b.

fan motors, and c. fan drives. [ An analysis of cooling tower capacity without fans has been i ade. Using the most conservative design conditions, it-is pre-victed if the plant is shut down under non-LOCA conditions with l loss of offsite power, the temperature of the service water sup-l plied to the plant will not exceed 110*F. Although this 9.2-35 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

BYRON-UFSAR exceeds-the normal maximum temperature of 100'F, no adverse impact on safety equipment will result. If all fans are inoperable, additional cooling can be achieved by blowing down service water using the strainer backflush system and introducing makeup water (approximately 55'F) from the onsite wells which are provided with a safety-related,swer supply. This would reduce the predicted maximum supplied ser-vice water temperature to approximately 105'F. The analysis assumed no wind, /8'F wet bulb temperature, con-servative plant cooling loads (normal shutdown loads for both units plus diesel cooling loads), and a maximum initial service water temperature. In reality, the wind velocities and reduced wet bulb temperature which could be expected in conjunction with weather conditions which produce tornados would insure that the service water temperature would remain below 100'F. Tornadc._ protection has been provided for the exposed supply pip-ing to the cooling towers. Icn formation on the fill during cold weather operation is ana-lyzed below: A Category I temperature controller is provided to actuate each of :wo bypass valves per tower during winter operation. When tht temperature of water in the basin drops to SOAFa predeter-minee value, the bypass valves open, diverting water'from the cooling section to the cold water basin. When the temperature of l Water in the basin increases to 46AFa predetermined value, the l bypass valves close. Computer code TODTBM was utilized to verify that the basin tem-perature does increase frc-50*F tn 80*F. Under -25'F ambient conditions,- the length of mime required is 12.7 hours euximum 6 under minimum refueling heat load conditions of 11.0 x 10 Btu /hr. Under extended bypass operating conditions, the great-est-potential exists for vapor rising from the cold water basin and condensing on the fill. The maximum ice fot-mation rate would be 0.1019 lb/sec for one tower, which would over a 13-hour p'riod, result in an ice thickness of 0.15 inch on che lowest row of fill. However, each pound of ice that forms on t the tile fill releases 144 Btu which tends to increase the tem-perature of the tile, and in addition the tile absorbs heat by radiation fror.the EE'F-to-762Fwater in the basin. It is, -therefore, doubtful that any ice will form on the tile fill. The wind speed-across the basin was_ assumed to be_at an ambient i i average of 10.7 mph in arriving at 12.7 hours of continuous L ' bypass operation-By comparison, a 4.2-mph wind speed results l from operation of the fans at_ half speed. It is, therefore, -concluded that if the fans are inadvertently left operating under minimum ambient temperature conditions concurrent with minimum refueling heat load, 12.7 hours of operation in the bypass mode is not exceeded. 9.2-36 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

d BYRON-UPSAR When the fans are operated at half speed, air flow into the tower (i.e., across the basin) is 391,475 cfm per cell which results in a velocity across the basin of 4.2 mph. At full speed, the airflow is 782,950 cfm resulting in a velocity across the basin of 8.4 mph. The average ambient wind speed of 10.' mph is therefore greater than the velocity produced by run-ning the fans at rated speed. The critica) wind speed derived from Ryan's equations is the wind speed at which the heat dissi-pated is equal to the heat added. The critica] wind speed for -25'F ambient air and-O paia ambient vapor pressure was found to be 137 mph at 40*F basin water temperature and 109 mph at 50*F basin water temperature. The maximum wind speed recorded at Rockford airport for the 1950-1970 period is 46 mph. Inasmuch as the fans occupy only 36% of the total projected area above the drift eliminators, it is concluded that adequate cooling can be obtained from the remainder of the tower should a heavy snowfall occur. Moreover, a maximum snowfall of record, 44.8 ir'ches during December 1909 through January 1910, i l wo91d_ produce a loading of 70 lb/ft which is well within the l load carrying capability of the drif t elimir3ator and its sup-l ports. 2 The design snow load of 104 lb/ft from Subsection 2.3.1 is clearly for roofs of safety-related structures. A roof is a relatively flat receptacle for falling precipitation whereas the plastic angular drift eliminators are sheltered by 11 fan blades per cell, and to a lessar, extent by the velocity recovery stacks. Thus, 70 lb/ft-is a conservative design snow load for the drift aliminators. Failure of the nonseismic blowdown line would not affect the ability of the cooling towers to perform their safety function. The portion of the line that is nonseismic delivers blowdown from the essential service water cooling towers to the natural draft cooling tower cold water flume. The valve -is-lockedromains in a position to maintain water chemistry during normal operation so that scale does not form on heat transfer surfaces. The ex-pected setting would be for approximately 250 gpm of blowdown from each tower. In the event of failure of the downstream pip-ing, ne significant increase in blowdown will occur.-Under po s t-bOGA-eva porn t49e-cond-i-t4cns7-the-blowd ewn-firem-en eh-towe r would-be-i nc rea sed-somewha t-d ue-to-t h e-h i g he e-hen t-load-on-t-he toweer Und et"wo re t~ea s e-e va pora b4ve--los s -co nd i-t4 on s-o f-M A F-we t-bu4 b7 4%* F-d r y-bul b-fo r---o-3 -4tou r--pe r i-od H Ju y-147-1%4 3-a nd-7+^-F average-wet-bu4h, NS AF-a ve rage-d ry-bul b-fo MP-24--hou r-pe r-iod bTuly-18 -1%4 h-the-postoeeident-evaponat4on,-blowdownr-end T i l I-3.2-37 PEVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 1

BYRON-UFSAR ma keu p-ra t es-a re-o s-f o14 cws-ba sed-on-lor 4-<f pm-of-d eif t-losses 7 3 000-ppm-to t-a l-d i s so l-ved-c o l-id s-i n-t h o-co l d-wa ter-ba s in-e ty.1 hea b -rej ec t4 c n-co n t-i nu ou s ly-a t-t h e-pos t-LOC A-ro te-o f-500-M-105 Btu / het-Worst Wor *" Hour-Pet'iod lione-Period evepocat-ion-rate -<Jpn 970.4 1992r4 r blowdown-rater-gpn 563.0 $}&ro makeup-rate 7-gpm 544, 0 143&r6 The-wors t-en se-e v a po ro t-ive-los e-fee-o-30-d a y-pe riod-le-303r3 gpmr Th e-wo rs t-e a se4 ea t-t ra ns fe r-fo r-o n-e t mosphe rde-cond i t4en-o f 62*F-wet-bulb-for 3 houes-on--Ju-ly-30, 1961-would-have-resul-ted 4n-o-eeld-wa te e-ou t4 e t-tempe ra tu re-of--h&'F-o t-a-hea t-re-j ee-t4en-er'e-of-500 :: 1ek--Bt ufh e-based-u pon-p redict ed-towe r-pe r-formance-eurvesr Meteorological _ data for worst case conditions is presented in Subsection 2.3.1. The cooling tower -thereferer is adequate for all worst case r meteorological conditions concurrent with a loss-of-cooling accident 4n-one-uni-t-whl4e-the-other-unit-is-bedng--sof-ely-shut downrcoincident with a loss of offsite power af one unit and.the concurrent orderly shutdown-and..cooldown from maximum p..or to cold shutdown of the-other, unit using normal shutdown. operating procedures. The accident. scenario also includes a single active failure. 9.2.5.3.3 CatecoJV l_ Essential Service Wah r Makeup System The capability of the essential service water makeup pumps to function under low Rock River level conditions is discussed in- - Subsection 9.2.5.2.2. An analysis of the ability of the ulti-mate heat sink to function during flood conditions coincident with a loss of offsite power has been performed. The combined event flood coincident with maximum wave runup_ will have an elevation of 703.39 and an annual probability of 1.0 x 10-6 The engine is mounte: on its subbase at elevation 703 feet 8--1/2 inches and the engine shaft centerline elevation is 705 feet 4 inches. It is anticipated that the latter~ ele-vation would-be limiting under flood conditions. There.is approximately 2 feet of margin between the combined event plus maximum wave run up elevation and the elevation at which the engine would stop. Battery and engine starter elevations will be approximately 705 feet 4 inches. ' The engine-driven essential service water makeup pumps will I automatically start and continue to operate regardless of l whether offsite power is available or not. I 9.2-38 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 rv g r-gen -gm-wqci-9 -mi-a-ge y-r + w-me g s9 gg ,,yg----- ,7g y-yg. ypgmy i,,.*m,.ym,a w y, y ,,y -irw-,- ie,---ymy-u-__y.um_ y. _, +*. ,4a,m m aw ne -v-ww.e4,

BRAIDWOOD-UFSAR 9.2.5 Ultimate ligat Sink 9.2.5.1 psfig11_i3as is The condenser water cooling facility at Draidwood Station is referred to as a cooling pond rather than as a cooling lake. This is consistent with the definition of " pond" in EPA Effluent Guidelines and Standards for Steam Electric Power Generation, 40 CFR 423, Section 432.11, which became effective in 1974. The Braidwood Station's ultimate heat sink consists of an= excavated essential cooling pond integral with the main Braidwood cooling pond. The excavation is made such that the essential pond remains intact in the event of failure of the category II retaining dikos impounding the main cooling pond. Thus, the essential pond does not depend upon man-made struc-tural features for retention so that redundancy, per criteria, for ultimate heat sinks for nuclear power plants is not required. 'Ph e-h en t-re-j ee t-i o n-re te-v e re u s-t-iee-is-s how n-in-Te ble-9re-6-for. th e-u nd-t-u nd e rg oi ng-pos t-LOGA-coeldow n. Figuee-0. 2 -- 5 chows energ y-hea t--I npu t-to-the-cont *inment-u nde r-equ144 brium--fue4 cy el e-e nd-wo rs t-ea se-los s-o f-c oole n t--o ceM en t-cond it4 e ns-os-a funet4en-of-t4me. Figure -0. 2 -- S shows-the-heat-removal-retes I of-one-reacter-contelement-fo n-cooler-end-one-resM9al +eo b re moval--hea t-excha ng e r-es-e-fu ne t4 on-o f-t4 m c. Figure 9.2-7 shows the combined heat rejection rate versus time for the unit undergoing post-LOCA cooldown, plus heat rejection rate versus time for the unit undergoing safe shutdown. The LOCA unit containment heat' load was maximized to determine the limiting heat load to the ultimate heat sink. Refer to Byron Section t'.2.5.3.1.1.1 for additional discussions of the containment heat load calculations. Figure 9.2-8 shows area and volume versus surface elevation in feet for the essen-tial cooling pond. The maximum operating revel of the essential cooling pond is assumed to be 590 feet above mean sea level, at which point it loses communication with the main cooling pond. 9.2.5.2 SystSm DescriptioD Under normal circumstances, the essential cooling pond is indistinguishable from the remainder of the Braidwood cooling pond. The essential cooling water-intakes and discharges are arranged, however, to extract water from and return water to the-_ cooling pond in that portion _which would become the essen-l tial cooling pond, should failure of the Category II cooling j pond retaining dikes occur, i The substructure of the lake screen house, which houses the essential service water intakes, is designed as a seismic struc-ture. Postulated failure of nonseismic portions of the structure and equipment will not affect the intakes due to the location of ~ 9.2-43 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

.-..~ .-..~ - _.. ~. -. BRAIDWOOD-UFSAR the intakes awe.y from any nuch structures and equipment. In addition, the intakes are protected by concrete enclosures protruding abo'to the top of the mat. The throo r l ,l. I i l l 9.2-43a REVISION ~4 -DECEMBER-2992 l l l l .., _ _ _ _ _ -. - - -,. _.. - -... _. _. - _ _.., _ -. _ - _ _.. _ -... - _ _... ~. - _.. _ _ _. _.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _... _. _._ -. _

B/B-UPSAR 4 5. Flow balancing valves are provided to initially I balance the system. Pressure indicators are provided on the suction and discharge lines of the heat exchange coils. Temperature wells are provided at many points of the system to mea-sure the water temperature, if desired. 9.2.8.3 S3fety Evaluation The station heating system is a non-safety-related system. See I Table 9.2-10 for system failure analysis, i 9.2.8.4 Testina and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable specifications and codes. During various stages of construction, field inspections are made of the equipment. Component demonstration tests are performed on the i

system, The equipment manufacturer's recommendations and station practices are considered in determining required maintenance.

9.2.9 Hgferencen 1. Schumaker and Svoboda, Inc., " Oregon Dam Inspection and Evaluation," report prepared for the Dept, of Conservation, State of Illinois, January 1979. 2. H. B. Seed and I. M. Idrics, " Simplified Procedure for Evaluating Soil Liquefaction Potential," Journal of Soil Mechanics and Foundations Division, ASCE, Vol. 97, No. SM9, September 1971. 3. Dames & Moore, " Seismic Ground Motion-Hazard at Zion Nuclear Power Plant Site," July 1980. 4. R. Ettoma and T. Nakato, " Sediments in the Byron Power Plant," IIHR Report No. 82, Iowa Institute of Hydraulic i Research, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, January 1981. 5. .V. T. Chow, llan@pok of Applled Hydrglg.gy, Chapter 23, McGraw Hill Co., New York, 1964. 6. P. J. Ryan and D. Harleman, "An Ana Qtical and Experimental Study of Transient Cooling Pond Behavior," Report No. 161, R. M. Parsons Laboratory for Water Resources and Hydrodynamics, M.I.T. l l 7. Calculation RSA-B-91-03, Rev. O, dated August 28, 1991, ~ " Byron Station containment Response-for Ultimate Heat Sink Requirements" r l 9.2-61 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 l _. _ _ _... ~. _., _ _.. _ _ _...... _ _ _ _.. _ _,, _ _., _ _ _ -... _.,... _ _ _ _ _... _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.., - _

- -.... - ~ - - ~.. -... -. -.. - B/B-UFSAR 8. Calculation NED-M-MSD-9, Rev. O, dated October _21,_

1991,

~ " Byron. Ultimate lleat Sink Cooling Tower Basin Temperature Calculation: Part IV" 9. Calculation NED-M-MSD-11, Rev. 0, dated December 17, 1991, " Byron Ultimate lleat Sink Cooling Tower Basin Temperature Calculation: - Part V- (Dypass operation)"

10. Letter from T. K. Schuster (Commonwealth Edison' Company) to T. ' E. _ Murley (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) dated January 9, 1992, transmitting the-" Byron Station UBS Design Basis Reconstitution Final Report" '

r

11. Calculation UHS-01, Rev. 1, dated' August _S,;1991, " Ultimate Heat Sink-Design-Basis LOCA Single Failure. Scenarios"

12. Calculation ATD-0063,'Rev. 1, dated April ~1, 1992,'" Heat Load to the Ultimate Heat Sink =During a_ Loss of Coolant Accident"

13. Calculation ATD-0109,.Rev. 1,-dated April 27, 1992, " Thermal t

Performance _of_ UHS During Postulated--Loss--_of Coolant Accident"

14. Calculation NED-M-MSD-19, Rev.

O, dated March 2, 1992, " Byron Ultimate Heat Sink Cooling Tower Basin Temperature Calculation:. Part_VII (Initial Basin Temperaturri at'96'F)" l l l l-9.2_-61a- _REV1SION DECEMBER-?992

-.... -... -... _,. ~ -. - -. _ B/B-UFSAR l TABLE 9.2-1 ESSENTIhL SERVICE WATIR_J1 EAT LOADS LOSS-OF-OFFSITE LOLA POWER OR SHUTDOWN LTIM NORMAL Q Diesel-generator coolers X X Containment fan coolers X f2t X 44f4)* X -(-Et Component cooling heat X fit X tit X i-1-2t exchangers Diesel-and Motor-driven X or-O X oe-o auxiliary feedwater pump lube oil coolers . Diesel-driven auxiliary X or-O X o&O feedwater. pump cubicle coolers Diesel-driven auxiliary X or-G X or-e feedwater pump diesel coolers Essential service water X X X pump lube oil coolers -Essential service water X X X pump cubicle coolers Centrifugal charging X X -pump cubicle coolers Centrifugal charging pump X X X oil coolers -Positi' displacement charg-X ing pump cubicle cooler l r Safety injection pump X l.. cubicle coolers Safety ir.L,1 tion pump oil X i coolers t Containment spray pump X . cubicle coolers

• Fou&f oe-f4fst-20-minutes-then 2.

9.2-62 REVISION 4 - DECEMBEP. 1992

, -. -. =. -... -. _. -... B/B-UFSAR TABLE 9.2-6.HAS DEEN' INTENTIONALLY DELETED l \\ 9,2-71 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992 , ~......

BfB-UF6AH TAHf rE-9r?-11 EtiMENHAirdEllYiG-WATFH E"PLG1celidR-PDUGEEMW-iGTES 2H1ekEdoDJse-- -lh-Pl!HL' .L&PUk!li 6afety--Injeetdun-Pump -4 5-9 pm----4 Hj pm Centr .-Chorging-Pump LO-gpm S G-<f pm PIPCho nyrng-Pump B9-9pm j HHR-Pump- --4 5-<f pm 45-gpm Contsi nmentm6prity-Pump- -7NJpm M wype spent-fuel-Pool-Pump 49-gpm Esse n t-i+i4-SW-Pump H&-gm 1-05-qpe Totel-Flow -35&sjpn - Howjpm b l l - ~... _. - -. - - --~~ Ce T'b ~S 5 ~ l ~ _ ~... - ~.... _.,.., _. _ _. - _.... _ _ _..... ~.. ~, - .__......-_-_-.._.._.,_.........,-.--,.__,.....-..._,.,,..m,,s.-m,.-.,,,-..

B/B-OFSAR TABLE 9.2-11 ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER -COMPONENT NOMINAL DESIGN FLOW RATES Component Equipment No. Nominal Flow (gpm) CC lleat-Exchangers 0,1,2CC01A 8,000 (Note 1) SX Pump Lube. oil coolers 1,2SX01AA,B 10 SX. Pump Cubicle Coolers 1,2VA01SA,B 105 A" Pump (Motor Driven) Lube 011 1,2AF01AA,B 14 Coolers AF Pumps (Diesel Driven) closed Cycle-HX 1,2SX01K 250

Lube Oil Coolers 1,2AF02A 14 Gear 011 Coolers 1,2AF01AB 20 Right Angle! Gear Lube Oil-1,2SX02K

-20 Coolers Cubicle coolers 1,2VA08S 150 CV Pump l Lube oil Coolers 1,2CV03SA,B 15 CV-Pump' Gear 011 Coolers 1,2CV02SA,B 25 CV Pump Cubicle Coolers 1,2VA06SA,B '60 D/G Jacket Water Coolers 1,2DG01KA,B 1650 Spent' Fuel Pit Pump Cubicle 1,2VA07S 45 Coolers (Note 2) SI Pump Bearing Oil Coolers 1,2SIO1SA,B 33 SI Pump Cubicle Coolers 1,2VA04SA,B 45 CS Pump Cubicle Coolers 1,2VA03SA,B 70 Pos. Disp. Pump Cubicle Coolers 1,3VA05S 25 .(Note 3) Control Room Refrigeration OWOO1CA,8 950 (Note 4)~ Units RNR Pump Cubicle Coolers 1,2VA02SA,B 45 RCFC SX Water Coils 1,2VP01AA-D 2660 Primary containment 1,2 WOO 1CA,B 4160 (Note-5) Refrigeration Units 9.2-97 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

=.. i 11/ Il-UTS AR I TABLE 9.2-11 (Cont'd) RO.t_92 : 1. SX flow to the CC Heat Exchanger is manually throttled between 5,000 to 20,000 gpm.

2. The Spent Fuel Fit Pump Cubicle Coolor is served by the "B" SX train.

3. The Pos. Disp.-Pump Cubicle Cooler is served by the "A" SX train. 4. Centrol Room Refrigeration Unit flow varies automatically in' response to condensor load. The Control Room Refrigeration Units are served by the Unit 1 SX system. S. The Primary Containment Regrigeration Units are in series with the RCFC SX water coils. Flow varios automatically in response to j 4 condensor load. i i i i i i i 9.2-9?a REVISICII 4 - DECEMBER 1992 <v-- y-em-,a--,.m-emww,--,.,..--w,,,- .p w e y.y.m, ...w.,,..y,-yw. ..u.->,,w.,,....+..y ....----e-. -4,,--,w--..n,m--,--r.-.wwr_w,-.-w.w. e. ..r .-e, ,1--,c-

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 9.2-12 E_SS_FliNAIr-GEWISE-WATfR .k,4 FORM Ak-G P ERhfi NG--A N D-GO b&-6H UTOGW N -D E S TGN -Fist _B_A$ffi i W _C3 lip _tiENJ ^ lA P"MP -1R-PUMP -350-gpm -CM-g pm ji Cubiele--Cooleese N. RC-Fen-Goeders -53ik gpm-5320 gpm m $.:.;. Gontre4-Room-HVAC-- ^ 50-gpm---- 950-gpm fj. o Jir qo-gym o K, Cornponent-Cooting 10 000-9 pf- .in s '"i Toto-1-Flet. 22d eo-gpm 22 6to-gpr= 7 Thi table has been intentionally deleted. t. s

• St-raicers-baekwash-c t -49G0-9 pm-is-interektent.

Aloo-miscel- -leneces-pump-lubem ri-coolers-not--ine44tded-i-n-the-above-wi44 -rerpt k e-approwtmutMy-b50-9pa-per CSF-Divis-ietw-Mhis-is-the-tete 4-f-lew--ret-e-for all cubiele--eeolees-4-isted4tt 4 -M-4-for-pumps--whieh-are-operat-ittg -Taele-ha-14. See-Tab 3 c -due-ing-this-plant-cono1 -ion-to-obte-itt-the-eet-uel-eubiele -coe4ee-f4ew-crt tes r 9.2-98 DEVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

B/B-UFSAR TABLE 9,2-13 ESGFN5d &-GERVM E-WATER .PO&T-bOGA;DEGIGN44.rGW-RATES EQUHHENT* 1A-PUMP IB-PUMP Gubiele-Coolers ** 390-qpm 370-gpm RG-Fan-Coolers 5,3es-gpe 5,320-qpm eenttolMoom-HVAO-- O SO-gpe-090-gpm Componen t--Geo14ng-13,600-oprt 13,600-gpm E -+- 1--Ganera tor - 1,650 gpm I W O-gpm s } Auxi44ery-Feedwatee Dicee4-De-iven -Gubiele,Tnd Engine-Goolers 350-gpm Tote 1--F4cw 21, 3-70-9 pm ae-240-9pm This table has been intentionally deleted. 2 -o

• st-en4ner-beekvash-o f - leOO-q pa-4d -inter 1wittent.

Also M seel-1aneous-puep-4ube-o44-coolers-nat-included-in-the-ebcvc wi11 -rect u-ite-a pprox4ma t-el-y-460-g pm-pe r-ES F-Rivis-ien r

• • T4ri+-is-tne-t-eta 4-f4ew-ret-e-for-ol4-eubielc coo +ees-44sted-4n

-Teble -9,4-H.--see4eble 0. 2 f or'-pumps-which-are-operet-ing --d ur-ing - this-p&on t -c o nd 4-t-le n-to-ob t ain-the-ee tual-eu biel~e -cooler-+1ov-ec ' esr 9.2-99 REVISION 4 - DEC1'MBER 1992

BYRON-UFSAR-TABLE ' 9.' 2'-16 SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS OF THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK 't i Component Failure Comments and Consequences Containment spray pump Failure to. opera'.e A minimum of six: cells'will-' remain (accident unit) available to linit' tower' basin I temperature below.,100*F. Essential service water Failure tu start A' minimum'of five' cells"will I tower fan remain'available toLlimit tower basin temperature.below-100*F. Emergency diesel generator Failure to start Diesel generator' failure results ( in a. reduced rate.of' heat. input:to the ultimate heat sink. cA minimum of'four' cells will remain. i available to limit tower basin i temperature beN.100*F. [ i Essential service.~ water Failure to operate Al:minimumLof' ax cellsLwill remain i pump (accident unit) available to limit' tower basin temperature below'100*F. I e ' Alls ingle failurefanalysis cases' conservatively.' assume'twoi'cellsIinitially.'out Note: s of service in addition:to.the subject: single failure; e 9.2-102 ' REVISION 4 - DECEMBER'1992 h L

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/ ^ ' 'I t' 3, s \\ ~ / 600 i i i 900 s \\ / /ST{ AM GENER ATOR ENERGY 500 \\ 800 \\ / \\ 700y h400 s ~ 3 3 + THIN MET AL AND CORE [ /STOREh ENERGY- [ 600(- - 9 300 / \\ w \\ / 1. -$200 \\ ,/ 500k a 3 5 \\/ h. OtC AY HE AT $'100 ~ \\ 400$ / _ >STE AM GENER ATOR ENERGY THICK METAL ENERGY.\\f l '/ 01 N y ,300 u 10000 100 LOO 10 100 / 1000 x TIME, SECONDS \\ \\ l 1 i l l 1 l s .Y BYRON! BRA!DWOODsSTATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT \\ FIGURE 9.2-5 ENERGY INPUT TO CONTAINM$, l DOUBLE ENDED PUMP SUCTION RUPTURE

.. ~ -. \\ wEA? R E MO V A L R AT C', \\ 10 Bit.1 ' 0C C. 160 \\. 140 \\ \\ 120 \\ \\ CONT AINME NT J AN COOLERS x 100 \\ \\ / 80 / 60 'y 40 RESIDU AL HE AT REMOVAL HE AT 20 EXCHANGER N f' I O 1 10 100 1000.. 10000 100000 TIME, SECOCS l. l l l-BYRON /BRAIDWCCD STATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT N RGURE 9.2-6 HEAT REMOVAL FROM CONTAINMENT

_.,_______-_------------v-B/B-UFSAR INTi: OA$LIDE!ET ~ ) 4 REVISION 4 - DECEMBER 1992

00 i i ieii e ii>>i ie i iis = i sisi i iiisi iii>>. > i isi e i e i >T1 > i i iisi iaiiis i e i a i 4 iiis \\. a0' - E \\ ~ M LOCA + LOEP gr / 00 x _o / c / UNIT 1 - LOEA / / w 7' ';00 - g' ?o s e10 l ~ 00 w ij 'A B I l '.h ) _ _P_.2 UNIT 2 - LOLP N---___ ________.___-__,-----------J '''I' L'- 0 2 2 10' 10" 105 loc l1 10 19 TIME AFTER SHUTOOWN (SECONDS) I C m9 o o -4 2>g, N ym m g m g [8 g$ UNIT I - UNDERGOING LOCA (LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT) o -< o$o s 8pTd gz UNIT 2 - UNDERGOIND LOEP (COMPLETE LOSSx0F EXTERNAL ELECTRICAL POWER) N b r @-4 2' e$ REACTOR RESIDUAL DECAY HEAT BASED ON 102% 0b1HE ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS. m I d w OM30@ $6 SYSTEMS DESIGN POWER RATING (102% OF 3579 fMt)N h70*e }I 'A - START Of RHRS HEAT EXCHANGER .' N 0 3-I" o B - START OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE P0OL COOLING 'x @E>c r-to >o / mmd4 zq$ c m c gm w. N % d O s o oI WS 2m09 as ili us o a m y o; Replace with a new figure z as X --i

REVIS;ON 4 DECEMBER 1992 1000 900-s N ,i,.:,e .r......,. I i s 3 700F l cc P 600- \\ i l ( 0/ ~J ~ "' \\ l ) o i \\

s n

e= ( ~\\ ci 500i- \\ j i s O \\ i \\ J 400F s H N x ~ w, $ 300l 7, N i i i i 200; x -- e. i x_ 100-0 ' ------- 1-2 -*- CI' ~ 1.0 E + 01 1.0 E + 0 2 1.0 E + 0 3 1.0 E + 0 4 1ME+0S 1.0 E + 0 6

1. 0 E + 0 7 TIME AFTER SHUTDOWN, SECONDS

\\ V BYRON BR AIDWOOD STATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FtGURE 9 2 7 otAT R E Ec a rf.;'O THE,_T-iariEti AT 3 v -- ~ ;... g.,..;.f r ;g.Jt.P AN T E E D COR E rHEn'.tAL POWER) PWR REACTORS BRCUGHT TC "Ot n SNIJTDOWN Y 7- 'EN ,=

.= - ~. peplace with a new figure \\ VOLUME IN ACRE FEET 10 0 200 300 400 500 600 0 g 592, ---,---------m i j i 6 l l \\i i t h f l N $9o N -p-I x W \\ f 'a l '\\ .I 2 '\\ f 1A f l~ $68 , VOLUME 1 i l s 8 A j f x j -d

S86, q-

= ~ l 4 1 i i y S84 i - - - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - --1-- BS. 90 95 60 0 IO$ 11 O I15 l AREA IN ACRES l l L L / BYRON!BRAIDWOOD STATIONS l i UP:ATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 9.2 8 ULTIM ATE HEAT SINK AREA, VOLUME (C AP AC!TY) CURVES

. =.,. - i REVlSION 4 DECEMBER 1992 I i Volume in nern feet ] O~ 100-20C 300 400 500 000 5 9 2 e-f s. i -r l 4 i s99 i ./ I / / / .g. t /- 5 o seai a._.. _ _._ _ _.,.$. __ ___. _ _ j/ ( V o tu m e i Area e ~; / / .i 'C l t ( E i t i 1 i l /. -I /: ___ _L ses __7 / \\ [ I i I l 584) I' 85 90 95 100 103 110 11M A'aa in "c re t, l _- I. t L l' BRAIDWOOD STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPOR7 rnunc 9 a e l i ULTiu ATE HEAT SINK AREA, VOLINEi,i' ADACITY) CtJAVES i l s,.. l ,4-w, = - -.,.,

Replace with a new figure CN N.,\\ N \\ \\ H \\ c. x f-tv % N \\ [s[\\* p/d % \\ s. f. !vfk,\\ ? , (q \\ ty fy y ffd ' \\\\ 1 l \\A, e \\.s ?s (fy I n '\\rs \\ e ' \\'g! Ir W C g -c_ S W I 2 LJ Cco C I0:cl L *y vi uJ !a' O c: C INLET TEMPERATURE 4 Ocj Z. BUTLET TEMPERATURE t ~r ; l C 1 l i I ei a; c_ N! I ei i i i i 5 15 2: M c-l-

avs af:e: em e t er LocA n o 10E?

i BYa0NIBRAIDWOOD STATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANAL.YSIS REPORT l l FIGURE 9 2 9 HEAT SINK TEMPERATURES FOR MAX VUY TEMPERA TURE CONDITIONS

...n REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 Degrees Fahrenheit 120 00 .115.00 i 110 00 ,e )I M r. - ice t errer e., c 105 00 t ' l: 100 00 ' % !au\\? ns \\ l '\\ ! l. - t s;

• t 4

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• j *:_T[L'TTMA'U;1ESFOf)

I-~ !I.,*, V:\\n ;P.1 ' 2 L4PER ATURE CONDiT!ONS +, u w: -. ~ , _ _... ~.

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3 3:

's G ti

vs a :e- :.se: ef LC"> /_' ' LC U 9

BYRONIBRA10 WOOD STATIONS UPDATED FINAi. SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 9.2-10 DRAWDOWN FOR MAXIMUV TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS i

REVISION 4 DECEMBEP 1992 Feet 590 00.. 50550 ' ~.. .. ~ * ~ 539t,u -- r ~ ~ ~ . Iw., + 5 A 6.50 $36 C0 ' 587 50, 587.00 i Average UHS depht = 5.8 ft. 586 50 ' (referemeco to start +g UHS e'ovat or cf 500 f t ) 5E4 M $35 50 ' 5S5 00 ! ) 3 5 9 11 13 15 t '? 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 p 35 Days a"er onset of LOCA and Loop BR AIDWOOD STATION UPD ATFD F!N AL S AFETV SN ALYSIS REPORT FGJRE 9 210 CR AWDOWN FOR M AXi!.'UM i P.'PERA7 U AE CONCITIONS

e Replace With a new figure N'N --7o N e c: c. N C ( x x n 9 '\\,, lV 's c' % ' l \\ O ' g{\\,j, ,'s.rN,N ,, %',' ' \\ \\t .s ,t - s 1 W" ~ f 2 x.. l x y ,l s c. C c., L. C j LO u i uc ZC CC y,.;; a l I e: c cJ NATURAL TE.MPEP^TURE cs. i C C. : i i 4 i 1

s

e-t: :e- :-ec:

-e t;p BYRON'BR AIDWOOD STATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 9.2-11 NATUR AL TEMoER ATURES FOR M AXtMUM TEMr 7RATURE CONDITIONS

.~ . -. -., ~.. REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 _ Degrees Fanronheit 120 00 ; r 115.00 i 110 00 j t .105 00 i i 100.00 Natural 'e reratare 95 00 ,r, g ,s 90.00 .t u ' [\\, sf* \\,\\ '\\/ l* J. 85 00

• v

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A am'"+n a Ap;RES rcn

'44) % M r EMPER AT URE CONDinONS us '.:<x ;-a w i h --.w.,

'N Replace with a new figure xNC tw s h i s o N 4 o o. ,x v, C 6 t i C-(. - x, s -r t \\> N, (^s., n N //\\ Vs jg/ l A (s Al gs/(! y/v\\7\\'.1 s i, - rs' s'. \\' W A p!' %' N (y i '/V V y r e l 1 \\r* p,4 (rfb \\'p ~9 7 fy v N -g-I N z N uwo 29 C c. N te 'N 4 INLET TEMPERATURE U? \\ Z SUTLET TEMPERPTURE W 's WC s W4 Oc y,. O C C i' Col C C ! i 1:

3

[ R's ef:e e se: er 10:: aH tr:e i BYRONIBRAIDWOOD STATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIGURE 9.212 HEAT SINK TEMPERATURES FOR l MAXlMUM EVAPORATION CONDmONS

REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 Degrees Fahrenheit 120.00 i 115.00 m, 110 00 l, Ir iI' 105,00 I li .t i. \\,,0

1. "' "dtI't t*?'

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REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 Elevattor. (f eet) 590.00 *-... - :. % 589.50 ' '.,_ /*.. ~~. _ ~ '

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589.00 N.,. 588 50 588.00 < l ' 30#~30 -i Average UHS depht = S 8 ft, I (referenced to starting 567.00.; WS elantion of 590 H.) 580.50 i 585 00 i 585.50 _ $35 00 t-3 5 7 9 't 3 15 t? 19 2t ?J 25 27 29 Days a$ or enset of LOCA and LOOP t L BR AIDWOOD STATION f; UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT F'GURE 9 2-13 i DRAWDOWN FOR MAXIMUM EVAPORATION CONDITIONS wem u w

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35 0 65 / ,vs af:e- : sn e ' ; :/ or L:" l l-BYRON /BRAIDWOOD STATIONS UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 1 FIGURE 9.214 - 1 l l N ATURAL TEMPERATURES FOR 1 MAXIMUM EVAPORATION CONDITIONS l

m. . _ = _. _... _ REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 Degrees Fahrenheit 120.00 l 115.00 110.00 4 I j . 105.00 100 00 Nstarol ie verature 95.00 g i\\/g\\* 93.00 t.'.. 3 Y r .1 'A j ~, I N \\ es,co \\ j( / t f N,'; g ! {l _V' _ f,l '! \\ l\\ l 3 \\l \\l \\ l T V \\ i\\ l'\\ / \\l' 80.00 \\ \\ 75 00 70.00 1 3 5 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 Days cher onset of LOCA_ ond LOOP d BR AIDWOOD STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT RGURE 9 2-14 NATUA AL TEMPERATURES FOR M Ava.auY EyAnOR ATiON CONDiT!ONS ve ;yNn ~ -- .. -. _ _....... - -,. - - ~

~.. -.. ~ .~. REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 i ) 45 40 - - - - ~ -- ~ ~-~ ~ - ~~ + - ~ - d ) j 35 "+~ H 30 + ^ cn 5 25 -r-c. ) T 4 g 20 l e p I 2 15 e ) f ~ 10 ! i,_...._... - _ -.... _.. _ _ c t I 1E.01 1E+00 1E+01 1E+02 1E*03 1 E+04 - Time (sec o nds) j i BYRON /BR AIDWOOD STATION UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FIG':RE 9 2 30 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE 4 RCFC/2 CS PUMP CASE l e.u :.u n

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REVISION 4 DECEMBER 1992 I s 300 1 4 250 j 200 Ef I j c j 3 150 3 1 2 c. g 100 TS 4' I IV i t 5 ^" TS: Reta: Samp Tem; TV: Vispor Temp l 1' c.,. --. 1 E 01 1E+00 1E.01 1E+02 1E+03 1E+04 j Time (seconds) i i J BYRON SR AIDWOOD STATION UPD ATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYS;S REPORT FIGURE 9.2 31 era; A9p qw;- ~;:uncp A7pqE ' r r c, < ' r :. *

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