ML20096F330

Response to Licensee Second Set of Interrogatories to TMI Alert,Inc.Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML20096F330
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	09/05/1984
From:	Bernabei L, Doroshow J CHRISTIC INSTITUTE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT
To:	GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
Shared Package
ML20096F320	List: ML20096F313 ML20096F330
References
SP, NUDOCS 8409070392
Download: ML20096F330 (17)

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{{#Wiki_filter:- s,. TMIA - 9/5/84' _,., g CCNEST bb UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board s 00CHETED U'iNRC In the Matter of ) Docket'No. 50-28h4 EEE~7 blI 14 S METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) (Restart - Management Phase) (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) r~ ~ ~ - - . Stat on, Un t No. 1) ) i i THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT'S RESPONSE TO LICENSEE'S SECOND SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO INTERVENOR THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT, INC. Three Mile Island Alert ("TMIA") files this response to Licensee's Second Set of Interrogatories based on the information currently available to it. Because licensee General Public Utilities Nuclear Corporation ("GPU") has not yet responded to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories or First Request for Production, TMIA does not have access to that information in formulating a response to GPU's interrogatories. INSTRUCTIONS TMIA will refer to the following investigations and/or reports throughout its responses to the interrogatories. Licensee has access to all such investigative reports and investigative mater-ials, including interviews. Therefore TMIA will not provide infor-mation other than the name of the investigative report, the name of the person interviewed, and the date of the interview. In addition, TMIA will not provide in response to any interrogatory the page number of the document identified since the burden of deriving or ascertaining the page number is substantially the same 8409070392 B40905 PDR ADOCM 05000289 0 PDR

..w " for GPU as for TMIA. See generally, Rule 33 (c), Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. " Reporting of Information Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island," The Staff of the House-Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, January, 1981 ("Udall Report"). 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulittory Commission, NUREG-0600, "Investi-gations Into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by the Office-of Inspection and Enforcement", Investigative Report No. 50-320/79-10, August 1979. ("NUREG-0600") 3 3. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Three Mile Island, A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public", Special Inquiry-i Group (Rogovin Report), January 24, 1980. ("SIG") 4. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0760,"Investi-gation into Information Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Inland," January, 1981. ( "NUREG-10 76 0 ") 5. President's Comm[ssion on Three Mile Island,"The Report of the President's Commission on Three Mile Island," October 31, 1979. 1 ("Memeny") 6. Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, " Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant," Part 1, May 9, 10, 11 and 15, 1979; and Part 2, May 21 and 24, 1979. ("E&E, Part 1" and "E&E, Part 2" respectively). 7. Report on The Three Mile Island Accident, Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. ("Senato"). SPECIFIC INTERROGATORIES Interrogatory No. 1 TMIA is not prepared, prior to receipt of discovery responses

x- .. u from~ GPU and depositions of-current and former GPU~ operators and managers, to identify-its' expected list of witnesses. At - 'such' time as it receives GPU's discovery responses and completes depositions of GPU personnel, TMIA will supplement this response. Interrogatory No. 2-All documents which TMIA has within its custody and control pertaining to the subjects listed in subparts (a) through (f) are documents which are filed in the NRC Public Document Room. i. They-include NRC investigative reports, Congressional investi-gative reports, GPU investigative interviews, and the investiga- 'tive materials gathered in the course of those investigations. The burden of deriving or ascertaining the information re-l quested in this interrogatory is substantially the same for GPU, -the party seeking the informition, as'TMIA, the party from whom the information is sought. Therefore, TMIA refers GPU to all L those investigative reports, investigative materials and inter-views, and resulting communications between the NRC and the House and Senate oversight committees to the NRC concerning reporting of information during the Three Mile Island Accident which are maintained at the NRC Public Document Room. See Rule 33 (c), Fed.R.Civ.P. To the extent the interrogatory seeks information as to TMIA counsel's ipvestigation into the facts surrounding the Dieckamp mailgram issue, this information is privileged from disclosure under the work product doctrine. p Interrogatory No. 3 TMIA is not prepared, prior to receipt of discovery respon- ~ ses from GPU and depositions of current and former GPU operators ~

, ;, l w- ~ and managers to i'dentify documents it intends to offer as ex- ~hibits'during the reopened hearing or which it intends to use during cross-examination of licensee-or NRC witnesses. TMIA-also objects to production of information concerning those documents-it intends to use during cross-examination of-adverse. witnesses on the grounds it is privileged from-disclosure under the work' product doctrine. Interrogatory No. 4 -(a) and 4(b[ TMIA's response to this interrogatory includes all,the infor-mation currently within its possession or control. At this time .TMIA is unable to provide a complete response because it has not received GPU's responses to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatorios and First Request for Production and has not held depositions of GPUoperatorsandmanagersw[threlevantknowledgeofthis~ issue. The following individuals were aware of the pressure spike, spray actuation or thud on March 28, 1979. Included under.the name of each individual are those interviews,' statements, depo-sitions or other testimony given prior to May 9, 1979 indicating p that individual's knowledge. 1. Hugh McGovern: Bubba Marshall's Notes of 3/29/79 2. Ed Frederick. 3. Craig Faust: GPU Faust Interview - 3/30/79 GPU Faust Interview - 4/6/79 4. Joseph Scheimann. 5. LIvan Porter. 6. William Zewei GPU Zewe Interview - 4/23/79 7. Joseph Chwastyk. -8. Gary Miller: Statement to James Higgins - 4/30/79 i Raymond Statement - 5/8/79 i;

-S-9. George Kunder. 10. Mike Ross. 11. Brian Mehler. 12. Theodore Illjes. 13. Charles Mell. 14. Leland Rogers. TMIA also believes that the following individuals may have been aware of the pressure spike, spray actuation or thud if they were in the control room: 15. James Higgins. 16. Donald Neely. 17. James Seelinger 18. Joseph Logan. 19. John Flint. Interrogatory No. 4(c) The following interviews discuss the awareness-of the indivi-duals listed above of the pressure spike, spray actuation or thud. The statements are listed by the individual who gave the interview and/or statement. Faust: GPU - 3/30/79, 4/6/79 E&E, Part 1 - 5/11/79 SIG - 9/11/79 SIG - 9/30/79 Frederick: E&E, Part 1 - 5/11/79 SIG - 9/11/79 Porter: NUREG-0600 - 5/29/79 Scheimann: NUREG-0760 - 10/9/80 ~

.m- _6. Ross: NUREG-0600 - 5/19/79 -NUREG-0760 - 9/24/80 .Raymond: NUREG-0760 - 10/7/80 Raymond' Statement - 5/8/79 Higgins: NUREG-0760 - 10/7/80 Kunder: 'NUREG-0600 - 4/25/79 and 5/23/79 Rogers: Rogers 6/12/79 Memo 4 NUREG-0760.- 9/2/80 Illjes: NUREG-0600 - 5/23/79 McGovern: Marshall < Statement.- 3/29/79 U Mell: Senate Report - 8/22/79 Miller: Kemeny - 5/31/79 P'rt 2 - 6/14/79 E&E, a 4 Senate - 9/28/79 NUREG-0760 - 9/5/80 ChMastyk: NUREG-0600 - 5/21/79 SIG - 10/11/79 and 10/30/79 NUREG-0760 - 9/4/80 Mehler: NUREG-0600 - 5/17/79 and 7/6/79 4 SIG - 10/11/79 and 10/30/79 NUREG-0760 - 9/3/80 Zewe: GPU - 4/23/79

• Leland Rogers June 12, 1979 Memorandum entitled " Statement

-of:the 3/28/79 Unit.2 Transient" has previously been produced [ to GPU Counsel Ernest Blake. l l l. ~

a- .-, g :.; _ 7. + _y_ . Numerous'other interviews conducted in the' course of com-piling NUREG-0760.contain relevant information.. TMIA refers 4 GPU to all such intervieus conducted during the course of that

investigation, since-the burden of deriving the information s

sought by - this interrogatory. is 'substantially. the same: for CPU .as it is for TMIA. Rule 33 (c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Interrogatory No. 5 (a) Joseph Chwastyk; Brian Mehler; Leland Rogers; and Ivan -Porter. THIA also believes that Gary Miller associated the pressure spike,: spray actuation or." thud" with a hydrogen combustion or. explosion. (b) Chwastyk, Mehler, Rogers' and Porter's interviews'and a statements identified in response to Interrogatory.No. 4 above . explain those individualy' interpretation of the pressure spike i in terms of the generation, combustion or explosion of hydrogen or of combustible gas which could only be interpreted as hydro-l gen. Mr. Miller's testimony that he was not aware of the' pressure spike and was'not aware of the generation or combustion of hydro-gen is not credible, given the numerous contradictions between-his testimony and the testimony of other individuals in~the con-f trol-room op March 28, 1979. I In particular, TMIA relies on the testimony of-Mr. Chwastyk i .that he told Mr. Miller that they should not cycle the electro-magnetic relief valve.because of the explosion; that he obtained permission from Mr. Miller to " draw the bubble" shortly after the

' if ~ pressure. spike occurred;_that he made checks'of the containment to-see iflit were breached after the pressure spike occurred; and~that Mr.' Miller probably gave directions not to activate i. equipment in the containment for fear of causing a spark _which 1. I might ignite the hydrogen generated in'the containment. TMIA also rellas on the testimony of Mr. Mehler that Mr. Miller gave a direction on March :28, shortly after occurrence of' .L the pressure. spike,not to activate oil-pumps in the containment-to avoid causing a spark; and.that there was a general awarenessf in the control room on March 28 of the pressure _ spike and the B hydrogen; explosion. Both'Mr. Chwastyk's testimony and Mr. Mehler's testimony is-documented in the interviews listed in TMIA's response to ' Inter-rogatory No. 4 above. See also July.6, 1979 Memorandum of telephone conversation between Dr. Henry Myers, Science Advisor, House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, and Mr. Mehler. Interrogatory No. 6 See generally, TMIA response to Interrogatory No. 5 above. TMIA is unable to respond more fully at this time prior to re-ceipt of GPU's responses to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production, and depositions of GPU opera-tors and managers with knowledge of this issue. Interrogatory No. 7 (a) March 28, 1979; Gary._ Miller. (b) Mr. Mehler; Mr. Chwastyk; Mr. Miller; and Mr. Ross. (c) See Mehler and Chwastyk interviews listed in TM1A's response to Interrogatory No. 4 above. See also Udall Report at 77-88. 1

J -9 j + Interrogatory No. 8 TMIA'deosznot have sufficient information at the current time'to respond to'this-interrogatory because it has not yet ~ received GPU's. Responses to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories y ~and First' Request'forl Production, and has not deposed those GPU operators and managers with knowledge of this. issue. Interrogatory No. Mr. Dieckamp should have known at some' time' prior to May 9, 1979 thatf operators in the control room on March :28, 1979 inter-preted the pressure spike or spray actuation to indicate ~the gen-eration, combustion or-ignition of hydrogen and resulting core damage. It is clear that a number of GPU and B&W personnel in the control room on March 28, 1979 interpreted the prbssure spike-and spray actuation to ipdicate the. generation, combustion or ignition of= hydrogen and/or core damage. By. consulting any of these individuals, Mr. Dieckamp would have learned about-the-status of their knowledge on March 28, 1979. In addition, Mr. Dieckamp should have consulted Mr. Floyd who apparently made the statement during the congressional sub-committee's visit to the site on May 8, 1979 that certain indi-viduals in the control room on March 28, 1979-interpreted the J pressure spike to indicate a,real increase in pressure, the com- ) bustion. or ignition of hydrogen, or other combustible gas, and/or core damage. In. addition,-Mr.-Dieckamp should not have made any statements on behalf of GPU as a corporation to Congressman Udall, the House Interior Committee or any NRC Commissioner I , _I _,..

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without ensuring that his. statements were factually. correct and' forthright.:

s a Interrogatory No.110 a (a).The.Dieckamp mailgram contains false'and misleading

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statements. (b) Two false and misleading statements are the -fol. lowing: (i) - There is-no evidence that anyone: interpreted the pres-sure' spike' and the. spray initiation in terms.of reactor core damage at'the time of the spike..." .(ii) "There is no evidence...that anyone' withheld any in-formation." hit is ' clear that on May 9,1979 there was both documentary evidence and the knowledge or memory of GPU and B&W personnel in. the control room of TMI-2 on March 28, 1979 which" indicated that on that date some individuals interpreted the pressure spike which' occurred'at.approximately 1:50 p.m. to indicate the combustion l of hydrogen and core damage. Further it is clear that this information or awareness on the { -part of certain GPU personnel was not reported to the NRC until' March 30, 1979. The documents on which TMIA relies are listed in response to TMIA's responses to Interrogatory Nos. 2,4, and 5 above, and in-clude additionally those investigative interviews and materials gathere,d in the course of the NUREG-0760 investigation; the SIG investigation; and the GPU investigation. I 4 l bbe .-m.ee.. _c ,,-..r.-., ,,.m e,, -, - -a, --,,.w---,-r .n,m ,,g -,r, ,,m,-

,1 6- -. Interrogatory No. 11 (a) TMIA does not accept the assumption-of this interro-gatory' that-Mr. Dieckamp did not know on May 9,1979 that he made inaccurate or misleading statements in his mailgram to Congressman Udall. Therefore it is unable to respond to the question of whether Mr. Dieckamp should have corrected such in-accurate or misleading statements. Notwithstanding TMIA's objection to the interrogatory, TMIA responds that it believes Mr. Dieckamp should as a general rule at the earliest possible opportunity correct any misstate-ments or inaccurate or misleading statements he makes, on be-half of GPU, to Congressman Udall, the House Interior Committee, the NRC or any office of the NRC, and the public. (b) See TMIA response to'subpart (a) above. Further, TMIA has not at this time received GPU's responses to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories and First Request.for Production, nor had the opportunity to depose current and former-GPU personnel with information relevant to this issue. Therefore, TMIA is currently not able to respond to this interrogatory. (c) See TMIA response to subpart (b) above. [7MIA has read Interrogatory No. ll(c) to read, in relevant part " Explain pre-cisely the basis for your answers to Interrogatories ll(a) and ll(b) above.] i l l Interrogatory No. 12 (a) Mr. Dieckamp, as GPU President, has held a leadership role in the licensee corporation both prior to and after the l 1

o accident.- In this position, he often served as spokesman for the licensee on-issues of importance for the safe operation of TMI and of material importance to the NRC, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the U.S. Congress and its oversight committees, and the public. Mr. Dieckamp failed either to ensure that all statements he made in his mailgram to Congressman Udall and-Commissioner Gilinsky were accurate and not misleading; or failed to consult with the necessary licensee employees and managers to ensure that the information and/or statements he made were accurate and not misleading; or deliberately or recklessly made statements which were not accurate and true in significant respects. Mr. Dieckamp's deliberate, reckless or negligent misstate- ~ ments in the mailgram reflect on GPU's competence to operate TMI-I safely within the, current regulatory framework in which licensees have primary responsibility to provide accurate, timely and comprehensive information to the NRC. If Mr. Dieckamp deli-berately or recklessly made such misstatements this indicates that GPU's top management lacks the requisite honesty, character and integrity to operate TMI-2 under any set of license condi-tions or other requirements the NRC could impose on it. Mr. Dieckamp's failure to ensure that the statements he made in the,mailgram were accurate, taking the case most favor-able to GPU, is significant in context of the historical lack of integrity on the part of GPU management from prior to the accident to the present. r I

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~ . _ ~ ~ m.. Further,.Mr. Dieckamp's failure to correct the misstate-ments made in the'mailgram at any' time, and GPU's current posi-tion that no misstatements were made, are indicative of the in-ability or deliberate refusal of GPU to acknowledge.or identify past mistakes.and to correct them. Mr. Dieckamp's other failings as GPU President make his misstatements in the mailgram and his failure to correct such misstatements more serious. These failings include, inter alia, his failure as GPU President to ensure proper reporting of information to the NRC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania during the accident and to ensure disclosure of the Faegre & Benson, BETA and RHR reports to the NRC;- his failure to take adequate disciplinary action against all those persons making material false statements to the NRC concerning Mr. Floyds certification; his permitting a post-ac,cident environment to continue in which I operator cheating could occur; and his failure to ensure that - licensee's response to the NRC's NOV contained no inaccurate, in-l complete or questionable statements. [ Finally, Mr. Dieckamp and GPU's refusal to admit that Mr. Dieckamp or GPU acted improperly in making misstatements in the mailgram or in failing to disclose certain information to -the NRC and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania during the accident indicates that GPU will under all ci2cumstances refuse to admit its own mistakes,nd failings. TMIA infers that GPU will act in a similar way in the future'with respect to its failings and mistakes. f (b) TMIA has explained the basis for its response b subpart l (a) above. l _.,., _.,, _,.... _. _.. _,. _ _..... -. - _ _ +.. _ _. _ _.. _,

y, 7.- p ~ 7,. A n TMIA refers-GPU to all documents listed _in' response to Inter- .rogatories-2, 4 and 5 ~ above; 'and all documents ' relating to - E reporting failures during the accident; licensee's failure to disclose'Faegre II Benson, BETA and RHR to the NRC - licensee's- { , improper, inaccurate and deficient response to 'he.NRC's NOV; t ' licensee-inaction against individuals involved in the cheating-incidents and in the material false statement made to the HRC l con-1 'cerning Mr. Floyd's certification; and the cheating incidents Lthemselves. :See also NUREG-0680, Supp. 5, 8021, 13-5, 13-13. The-information requested by theLinterrogatory can be as "~ d 3 readily ascertained and derived from the above cited documents by GPU as by TMIA. Rule 33 (c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Interrogatory No. 13 s, The information requested by this interrogatory relates to the mental processes of hMIA attorneys and requests information i j on statements of-potential TMIA witnesses. TMIA objects"to pro-I duction of the information on the ground that it is privileged ] under the work product doctrine. l ' Interrogatory No. 14 Undersigned TMIA counsel; NRC Staff, through NUREG-0600, NUREG-0760, and NUREG-0680; Dr. Henry Myers, through the Udall-4 Report. Interrbgatory No. 15 l TM'IA refers GPU'to th'e documents listed'in TMIA's response i l to Interrogatories Nos. 2,4,.and 5 above. The information re-quested by this interrogatory is as easily ascertaine'l by GPU as. 1 by TMIA from these documents. Rule 33(c), Pod.R.Civ.P. i L L

- Interrogatory No. 16 and 17 Undersigned TMIA counsel. Interrogatory No. 18 See TMIA response to Interrogatory Nos. 1,4 and 5 above. TMIA also refers GPU to.all interviews conducted of ~PU, B&W or NRC personnel in connection with any of the investigations listed in the " Instruction" portion of TMIA's response. The information requested by this interrogatory can be as easily ascertained by GPU from these documents as by TMIA. Rule 33(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. Interrogatory No. 19 TMIA objects to this interrogatory on the ground that it seeks information which is not relevant to any issue in this reopened hearing and is not reasonably calculated to lead'to the discovery of admissible evidence. TMIA also objects to,this interrogatory on the ground that inr ofar as it seeks to discover TMIA counsel's trial preparation and trial strategy, it is privileged from disclosure under the work product doctrine. Respectfully submitted, NM h 05 Joanne Doroshow The Christic Institute 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20002 Telephone: 202/797-8106 0 A AJ-w Dated: September 5, 1984. Lyn e"Bernabei ~ Gov nment Accountability Project 15 5 onnecticut Ave., N.W. Wask ngton, D.C.:D036 Telephone: 202/232-8550 Attorneys for Three Mile Island Alert ,..,.-,.-n_.- n

.. ~.. ~ ' UNITED STATES OF-AMERICA CORQ,,,,,,,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-Before the Atomic-Safety and. Licensing Board In the Matter of ) I ) 2 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-{89 SP j ) UGhRC (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart - Management Phase) Station, Unit No. 1) ) 84 SEP -7 All :14 September 5, 1984 m, DOCnETm3 4 SFrer THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT'S RESPONSE.TOULICENSEE'S SECOND. SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO INTERVENOR ~ THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT, INC. Service List Administrative Judge Thomas Au, Esq. Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Office of Chief Counsel Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Department of Environmental i U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resources Washington, D.C. 20555 505 Executive House P.O. Box 2357 Administrative Judge Harrisburg,.PA 17120 Sheldon J. Wolfe Atomic. Safety & Licensing Board John A. Levin, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistant Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 i Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Administrative Judge P.O. Box 3265 Gustave A. Linenberger, Jr. Harrisburg, PA 17120 i Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ernest L. Blake, Jr. Washington, D.C. 20555 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W. Docketing and Service Section (3) Washington, D.C. 20036 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Henry D. Hukill Washington, D.C. 20555 Vice President j GPU Nuclear Corporation Atomic Safety & Licensing Board P.O. Box.480 Panel Middletown, PA 17057 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt I R.D. 5 t Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Coatesville, PA 19320 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. Louise Bradford Washington, D.C. 20555 TMI ALERT 1011 Green Street Jack R. Goldberg, Esq. Harrisburg, PA 17102 Office of the Executive Legal Director Joanne Doroshow, Esq. U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Christic Institute Washington, D.C. 20555 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20002 .d -. ~.

f ~ Michael F. McBride, Esq. Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq. - LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae William S. Jordan, III, Esq. 1333 New Hampshi, Avenue, N.W. Harmon, Weiss & Jordan-Suite 1100 2001.S Street, Northwest Washington, D.C. 20036 Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 Michael W.-+!aupin, Esq. Hunton & Williams Jack Thorpe 707 East Main Street Manager of Licensing Post Office Box 1535 General Public Utilities Richmond, VA 23212 100 Interpace Parkway. Parsippuny, New Jersey 07054 f dw /1 M T ernabei~ O

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