ML20095H020

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Forwards Section 2.15.10,reactor Bldg of Stage 2 GE Advanced BWR Tier 1 Design Certification Matl.Submittal Suppls Tier 1 Advanced BWR Design Certification Matl Transmitted Earlier by
ML20095H020
Person / Time
Site: 05200001
Issue date: 04/24/1992
From: Marriott P
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Pierson R
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MFN-090-92, MFN-90-92, SLK-9255, NUDOCS 9204290217
Download: ML20095H020 (43)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:, GE Nuclear Energy (.l j April 24,1992 i MFN No. 090 92 Docket No. STN 52-001 SLK-9255 Docurnent Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C. 20$55 Attention: Robert C. Pierson, Director Standardization and Non Power Reactor Project airectorate

Subject:

Additional Tier 1 Design Certificailun Material for the GE AllWR Design, Stage 2 Submittal

Reference:

Letter, P. W. Marriott to Robert C. Pierson. " Tier i Design Certification Material for the GE ABWR Design Stage 2 Submittal," Docket No. STN 52 001 dated April 6,1992. Enclosed are thirty four (34) copies of the Section 2.15.10, Reactor Building, of the Stage 2 GF ABWR Tier 1 Design Certification Material. His submittal supplements the Tier 1 ABWR Design Certification Material transmitted earlier by the referenced letter. Also included in the attachment is the ieprint of the remainder of Section 2.15, Sections 2.15.11 through 2.15.14, with sequential page numbers following Section 2.15.10 which now occupies 28 pages.- Sincerely, [ 1 ) P. W ' MIirriott, Manager Re ulatory and Analysis Services M 444,(408) 925-6948 cc: F. A. Ross DOE N. D. Fletcher DOE C. Poslusny, Jr NRC R. C. Berglund OE

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ABWR onion 0: cum:nt ' 2,15.10 Reactor Building Design Description The Reactor Building (RB) is constructed of reinforced concrete with a steel frame roof. The RB has four stories above the ground level and three stories Isow. Its shape is a rectangle of approximately 59 meters in 90-270 deg. direction; approximately 56 meters in the 0-180 deg. direction, and a height of about 58 meters from the top of the basemat. 'Ihe Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV) in the center of the RB encloses the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV). The RCCV supports the upper pool and is integrated with the RB structure from the basemat up through the elevation of the RCCV top slab. The interior floors of the RB are also integrated with the RCCV wall. The RB bas slabs and beams whichjoin the exterior wall. Columns support the floor: Ahsa 4 lea The fuel poolgirders are integrated v601 the RCCV top slab am.vis R.. plu ns. The RB is t shear wall str uture designed to acconawbe n % seemic loads with its walls. Frame members such as beams or colues enigned e accommodate deformations _ oi'the walls in case of earthquake cor ditions. The general building arrangement in :luding watertight doors and sills for doorways where needed for flood control is presented in Figures 2.15.10.a through 2.15.10.o. Selsenic Category IStructure i The RB is a Seismic Category I structure designed to provide missile and tornado protection. Major t.ominal dimensions are as follows: Structures Dimensions (m) Outer Box Walls: Overall height above top of basemat 57.9 ' Overall planar dimensions (outside) 59.0 j 0-180 deg direction .56.0 j 90-270 deg. direction L Wall thickness of each outer wall along 0180 deg. L Eighth level 0.3 . Seventh level 0.3 Sixth level 0.5 Fifth~ level 0.8 Fourth level 0.9 Third level 1.2 Secor.d level 1.3 l First level 1.5 6 2.15 38 3'30/92 -, - ~~. . ~. .a.

ABWR oesign occument Structures Dimensions (m) g (Continued) Wall thickness of each outer wall along 90 270 deg. Eighth level 0.3 Seventh level betw. col. lines R2 and RG 0.6 Seventh level betw. col. lines R1 and R2 Seventh level betw. col. lines R6 and R7 0.3 Sixth level 0.9 Fifth level along col. line RA 1.2 Fifth level along col. lint RG 0.9 Fourth level 1.2 Third level 1.2 Second level 1.3 First level

1.5 Containment

Diameter (l.D.) 29.0 nickness 2.0 Height from top of basernat to the bottom of containment top slab 29.5 Pedestal: Diameter (I.D) 10.6 h nickness 1.7 Basemat thickness 5.5 Column sizes and floor slab thickness are provided in the general building arrangement figures. With major dimensions defined as listed above for specified reinforced concrete materials and design proceduret, the dynamic charactenstic of the RB structure is defined. Seismic adequacy of the detailed site 4pecific Reactor Building design will be evahiated using the dimensional characteristic noted above and approved analytical procedures and methodology for dynamic analysis of structures. This work will be in compliance with the required applicable ACI and AISC codes governing design of the reinforced concrete structures for nuclear power plants. Detailed analyses of the site +pecific RB design will utilize appropnate site data for seismic events, floods, tornados, winds and other loading conditions. The RB it arranged and designed to provide a structure with the following characteristics: a. Withstand applied loads - seismic, dead, live, dynamic, LOCA, etc. b. Physical protection and separation of systems, both mechanical and electrical, c. Radiadon shielding. d. Clean and controlled access for personnel and equipments. 2.15 39 3'30/92

ABWR oesign occument ~ e. Primary and secondaiy containment barriers. I \\ The above characteristics are primarily accomplished by strategic grouping of equipment and positioning of building walls and floors. The Rin is arranged to achieve these characteristics as follows: Three Divisional Separation Arrangement - Separation is achieved by a. grouping each division of safety equipment, piping and electrical into separate quadrants of the Ril. Each quadrant is in turn separated by the building structural walls. b. Counter measures for radiation - Radioactive equipment within the Ril is positioned behind shield walls for personnel protection. The basic building layout contributes to minimized exposure since radioactive piping chases are routed vertically within the huihling next to the cylindrical cont:dnment wall. The equipment rooms containing radioactive process equipment are accessed from hallways near the building outer walls. Thus personnel entering radiation /ones for equipment inspections or maintenance move from a low radiation area to progressive higher radiation areas. c. Cican and controlled access - The overall Ril is partitioned into a clean zone and potentially contaminate zone with continuous walls separating the two major /ones. Normal personnel access to the clean l ~ rones or contaminated zones of the building is accomplished by l separate entrances to the building. Contaminated equipment is moved only in contaminated spaces for removal from the building. Flooding Protection To protect against external flood damage. the following design features are provided: a. wall thickness below Good level greater than 0.fim. h. water stops provided in all construction joints below grade. watertight doors and piping penetrations installed in external walls c. below flood level. l d. waterproof coating on exterior walls below grade. c. foundations and walls of structures below grade are designed with water stops at expansion and constructionjoints. f. roofs are designed to prevent pooling of water. 2.15 40 3/30'92

ABWR oesign occument g. building will be sited so that the design basis maximum flood levelis one foot (0.3m) below grade, h To protect against internal flood damage, the following design f eatures are prosided: a. Gooding in one division is limited to that division and flood water is prevented to propagate to other divisions b) elevation differences and divisional separation, also by watertight doors or scaled hatches. b, sloped Door and curbs to divert water to floor drains and sumps. sills for doorways to provide flood control. c. d. watertight doors installed below internal Good level. wall thickness below internal flood level g cater than 0.6m. c. f. senice water system does not enter reactor building. The flood protection measures also guard against Hooding from on-site storage tanks that may rupture. There will be no direct entries to Ril. All plant entries start 0.3m above grade. Any Dash flooding that may result from tank rupture will drain away from the site and cause no damage to site equipment. There is no senice water pipe line routing through Ril. All cooling loops have a finite h volume of water. Additional specific provisions for flood protection include administrative procedures to assure that all watertight doors and hatch covers are locked in the event of flood warning. Iflocal scepage occurs through the walls,it is controlled by sumps and sump pumps from perimeter hallway at basement letcl. On the basement level all essential safety equipment is located off perimeter hallway by a second divisional barrier with watertight doors. Compartment Gooding fism postulated component failures are evaluated. Floor-by-Door analysis of potential pipe failure generated flooding events in the reactor building shows the following: Where extensive flooding may occur in a dhision rated compartment, a. propagation 10 other divisions is prevcnted by watertight doms or scaled hatches. Flooding in ene division is limited to that division and perimeter hallways. Flood water is prevented from entering other divisions by walls and water tight doors, b. leakage of water from large circulating water lines, such as reactor building cooling water lines may flood indisidual rooms and corridors, but through sump alarms and leakage detection systems the control g room is alerted and can control Gooding by system isolation. Divisional 2.15 41 3/30/92 l l ____________.__________________________________________._________________________________________m'

ABWR oesion occument areas are protected by watertight doois, or where only limited water depth can occur, by raised sills with pedestal mounted equipment within the protected rooms. Limited flooding that may occur from manual firefighting or f om lines c. and tanks having limited inventory is restrained from entering division areas by raised sills and elevation difTerences. Herefore, within the reactor building, internal flooding events as postulated will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. Fire Protection The basic layout of the plant and the choice of system is such as to enhance the tolerance of the AllWR plant to fire. The systems are designed such that there are three independent safety related divisions, any one of which is capable of providing safe shutdown of the reacwr in addition, there are non safety-related system such as the condensate and feedwater systems which can be used to achieve safe shutdown. The phmt arrangement is such that points of possible common cause failure between these non safety-related systems and the safety-related systems have been minimited. The design object:ve has been to assure that independence of the redundant n systems required or available for safe shutdown is not compromised by fire, the C) consequences of fi e or the failure of fite protection equipment or systems. This design priority was met by implementing a coordinated overall design including fire considerations for die following plant features: Plant arrangement -The plant is laid out with the control building between the reactor and turbine buildings so that power and control signals from the reactor and turbine buildings enter the control building on opposite sides of the control building. The buildings are laid out internally so that fire areas oflike divisions are grouped together in block form as much as possible. This grouping is coordinated from building to building so that the disisional fire areas line up adjacent of each other at the interface between the reactor and control buihiing. An arrangement of this fashion naturally groups piping, IWAC ducts and cable trays together in divisional arrangements and does not require routing of senices of one division across space allotted to another division. Divisional e,cparation - As stated above, there are three complete divisions of safety-related cooling systems. Any one division is capable of safe or emergency shutdown of the plant so that a division may be out for maintenance, a single random failure occur and the remaining functional division would sdll be able to provide safe plant shutdown. In general, systems are grouped together by safety division so that, with the exceptions of the primary containment, the control room and the remote shutdown room (when operating from the remote N. shutdown panels) there is only one division of safe shutdown equipment in a fire j area. Complete burnout of any fire area without recovery will not prevent safe ?.15-42 3/30S 2

ABWR onian Document shutdown of the plant, thercfbre, complete burnout of a fhe area is acceptabic. All divisions are proent in the (ontrol room. It is the purpose of the emote g shutdown panel to proside edundant control of the safe shutdown furiction from outside of the control room. The controls on the remote shutdown panel are hard wired to the field decices and power supplies The signals between the remote shutdown panel and conuel room are multiplexed over hber optic cables so that there are no power interactions between the control room and the remote shutdown panel. During normal plant operation the temote shutdown room is disided into two rooms by a closed sliding fire door. A fire in one disisional section will not affect the other disisional section. Fire containment system -The fit e containment system is the s'ructural system and appurtenances that sene together to confine the direct effects of a fire to the fire ar ea in which the fire originates. The lh e containment system is required to contain a fire with a maximum severity by the time-temperature curve defined in ASTM El19 for a fire with a duration of three hours Combustible loading - Allowable wmbustible loadings for the plant were established IIVAC nstems -The llVAC systems have been matched to the disisional areas which they serve. The divisions are in separate fire areas and each fire area is sened by its corresponding division ofIIVAC. Smoke control system - Major features are provided for the smoke control system for the plant, such as venting of fire arcas, pressure mntrol acmss the fire barriers, pressure control and purge air supply, augmented and directed clean air supply, smoke control by fans and systems external to the fire area, and removal of smoke and heat from the the by fans. Spurh.us control actions - The systems arc separated by fire areas on a divisional basis as stated above. In addition, the multiplexed design is such that in case of fire in the control room, spurious control signals will not be sent out from the control room. Support nstems - Support systems such as llVAC and reactor building closed cooling water systems are designed as a safety-related if they support safety-related systems. They are given divisional assignments and separated by fire barriers in the same fashion as the safety-related primary systems Fire alarm sptem - Fire alarm systems are designated as safety-related. It is a requirement that fire alarm systems be ioned by disision according to the disisional assignment of the area which each 7one covers. Fire suppression 9 stem - Automatically initiated fire suppression systems are initiated on a disisional basis so that there are no inter-actions be: ween divisions. O Personnel access routes - The personnel access routes for fire suppr ession activides have been resiewed to see that access compatible with the design of the i 2.15 43 3'30 S 2

ABWR Design 0:cument h( fire barriers,IIVAC and smoke control systems has been prosided. A source of i ) clean cool air is prosided for access routes to fire areas. The air supply is by fans out of the fire area experiencing the fire. Manual fire suppression aethitles - The plant is designed such that the divisional aica in which a fire is occuning will be apparent to the operators at the time the fire is discovered. If the fire is significant, the operator can transfer operations to one of the two unaffected divisions and shutdown the equipment in the afTected division. The intent of providing features described above is to have an adequate balance in: a. preventing fires from starting; b. timely detection and extinguishing fires that occur, thus limiting fire damage; and designing safety-related systems so that a fire that starts in spite of the c. fire prevention program and burns out of control for a considerable length of time will not prevent safe shutdown. In addition, fire protection systems are designed so that their inadvertent (~N operation or the occurrence of a single failure in any of these systems will not \\ prevent plant safe shutdown. It is required that the AllWR design shall proside Shour fire rated penetration seals for all high energy piping or, as a minimum, state those conditions when such seals cannot be provided and what will be installed as a substitute. Pipe Breaks Protection Structures, component arrangement, pipe runs, pipe whip restraints and compartmentalization are designed to protect against dynamic effects associated with a pipe break event. Pipe whip restraints preclude damage base on the pipe break evaluation. Protection against pipe break event dynamic effects is provided to fulfill the following objectives: a. Assure that the reactor can be shut down rafely and maintained in a safe cold shutdown condition and that the consequences of the postulated piping failure are mitigated to acceptable limits without offsite power. b. Assure that containment integrity is maintained. 1 l Assure that th: radiological doses of a postulated piping failure remain c. below the liirits of 10CFR100. ] To comply with the above objectives, the essential systems, components and equipment are identified. An analysis of pipe break events is performed to l 2.15 44 3/30/92

ABWR onlon oscumont identify those essential systems, components and equipment that proside protective actions required to mitigate, to acceptable limits, the consequences of h the pipe break event. Ily means of the design features such as separation, bmiers, and pipe whip restraints, adequate protection is pimided against the effects of pipe break events for essentialitems to an (xtent that their ability to shut down the plant safely or mitigate the consequences of the postulated pipe failure would not be impaired. Tornado and Missile Protection j The Reactor Iluilding is not a vented structure. The exposed exterior roofs and walls of the RB are designed for the required pressure drop. Tornado dampers are prosided on all air intake and exhaust openings. These dampers are designed to withstand the specified negative pressure.of 1 A6 psi. Missiles considered in Ril design are those that could resuh from a plant related failure or incident including failures within and outside of containment, emironmental generated missiles. The structmes, shields, and barriers that have been designed to withstand missile effects, the possible missile loadings, and the procedures to which each barrier has been designed to resist mitsile impact are described and analyzed in detailin the process of design. Tornado-generated missiles have been determined to be the limiting natural phenomena hazard in the design of all structures required for safe shutdown of g the nuclear power plant. Since tornado missiles are used in the design,it is not necessary to consider other externally generated missiles. The essential safety equipment in the reactor building is located below grade level except for the divisional diesel generator units. Thus it is unnecessary to consider external missiles for most safety equipments. The divisional diesel generators and supporting equipment are located at grade level and protected by tornado resistant walls. The primary containment is embedded within the RIl and protected by multiple walls and floors from external missiles. Internally generated missiles (outside containment) are considered to be those resulting internally from plant equipment failures within the AllWR Standard Plant but outside containment. Examples of rotating equipment potential missiles are RCIC steam tur bine. Exampics of pressurized components potential missiles are valve bonnets, valve stems and retaining bolts. After a potential missile has been identified, its statistical significance is determined by an approved procedure. A statistically significant missile is defined as a n.issile which could cause unacceptable plant consequences or violation of the guidehnes of 10CFR100. Barriers are designed based on the approved procedures to protect against the potential missiles. O 2.15-45 3/30/92

ABWR onion Document O Protection of essential structures, systems and components is afforded by one or more of the following practices. 1 Location of the system or component in an individual missile-proof a. structure; b. Physical separation of redundant systems or components of the system for the missile trajectory path or calculated range: Provision oflocalized protection shields or barriers for systems or c. components; d. Design of the particular structure or component to withstand the impact of the most damaging missile; Provision of the design features on the potential missile source to e. prevent missile generation; and/or f. ' Orientation of the potential missile source to prevent unacceptable consequences due to missile generation. Design Description Radoscrive Shieldng and Containment O Administrative programs and procedures,in conjunction with facility design, ensure that the occupational radiation exposure to personnel will be kept as low as reasonably achievable (A1 ARA). The primary objective of the radiation l shielding for RB design is to protect operating personnel and the general public from radiation emanating from the reactor, the power conversion systems, the radwaste process systems, and the auxiliary systems, while maintaining appropriate access for operation and maintenance. The radiation shielding is also designed to keep radiation doses to equipment below levels at which disabling vadiation damage occurs. For further discussion see Section 3.7, L Radiation Protection. The secondary containment boundan completely surrounds the primary containment vessel (PCV) except for the basemat and together with clean zone comprises the reactor building. The seconday containment encloses all penetrations, except those into the steam tunnel, through the primary l containment that may become a potential source of radioactive release after an lL accident. During normal plant operation, the secondary containment areas are i L kept at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and clean zone by the IWAC system. Following an accident, the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) provides this function. Fission products that may leak from the priman to secondary are processed by the SGTS before being discharC 4 to the env:ronment. The HVAC exhaust systems and SGTS are located within the secondag containment to assure collection of any leakage. The secondary containment provides detection of the level of radioactivity released to the environment during abnormal and accident 2.15-46 1 30/92 ._.-_..,__.__-._.___.,__._..._._.----.__._.,...-a

ABWR oesign Document plant conditions. Per sonnel or ruaterial entrances to the secondary containinent consist of vestibules with interlocked doors. Inspection, Test, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.10 prosides a definition of the inspections, tests, and/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the Reactor lluilding. O O 2.15-47 3/3032 m.

4 } E i 1 r Table 2.15.10: Reactor Building Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria ~ Certified Design Commitment inspectiens, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1. Reactor Building general arrangement is 1. Plant walk through. 1. The configuration conforms with Figures shown in Figures 2.15.10.a. rough 2.15.10.a through 2.15.10.o. 2.15.10.o. 2. Design features are provided to protect 2. Review construction records and perform 2. For extemal flooding: against design basis internal and externa. visua; mspections of the flood control a. Exterior wall thickness below flood floods. features. level greater than o.6m. b. Water stops. 4 j c. Watertight doors and piping penetrations below flood level. d. Water praof coating on exterior wails. e. Foundations and walls of structures below grade are designed with water 1 stops at expansion and construction joints. [ f. Roofs are designed to facilitate drainage and prevent pooling. u, E g. Building will be sited so that the design basis maximum flood level is one foot (0.3m) below grade. j For internal flooding: a. Flooding in one division is limited to that division by preventing flood water-from propagating to other divisions by elevation differences and divisional separation, also by watertight doors or j sealed hatches. l b. Sloped f!oors and curbs to divert water i to floor drains and sumps. c. Si!!s for doorways as required to provide flood control. d. Watertight doors insta!!ed below intemal flood level. e. Wall thickness below interal flood level greater than 0.6m. f. Service water system does not enter p Q reactor building. 38

Table 2.15.10: Reactor Building (Continued) Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 3. The RB is a Seismic Category I structure 3. Plant walk through to check and wrify RB 3. Structures have dimensions compatible and ha ; major dimensions defined in the major dimensions including column sites with data in the certified design. (Figures certified design. and floor slab thickness. Review final 2.15.10.a through 2.15.10 o). design record for materia! properties, site input data and analytical procedures and methodology for seismic analysis. Visual inspections of structures and review of as-built documentaticn w;!! be conducted to assure compliance with the certified design commitments. 4. The detail structural design wiil be based 4. The Reactor Building design 4. Confirmation that the as-built design is in on required applicable ACI and AISC codes documentation will be reviewed. compliance with required applicable ACI and wi!! use site data for seismic events, and AISC requirements and is based on floods, torraados. winds and other loading appropriate site design data. conditions. p f !!. The RB is designed to have adequate 5. Perform dimensionalinspectionsof the RB 5. See Section 3.7, Radiation Protection. radiation shierding to ensure that the walls, ceiling, floors, and other structural occupational radiation exposure to features. personnel wiil be kept as low as reasonably achieveab!e (A1. ARA). 6. The RB is designed to protect against 6. Review construction records and perform S. design basis tornado and tornado visualinspections of the tornador a. Per Figures 2.15.10.a through 2.15.10.o. generated missiles. protection features. for RB wall and roof dimensions. b. HVAC dampers designed for differential pressure > 1.46 psi. c. HVAC dampers and tornado missile barriers are provided. 7. The RB provides walls and other facilities 7. Review of construction records and visual 7. Confirmation that separation c.f the for separation required by the three examinations of the as built facility. redundant systems for safe shutdown is independent divisional safe shutdowr.- provided. systems. 9 ta ~ O O O.

Table 2.15.10: Reactor Building (Continued) Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Accepttnce Criteria - Certified Design Commitment. Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8. Pro +ection against pipe break event ~8. Review the design documentation to 8.Comformation that the as built structures are dynamic effects is provided to assure that assure that the analysis of pipe break in compliance with the design - the reactor can be shut down safely, that events is performed for design ft.atures documentation. For radiation protection. { the containment integrity is maintained, such as separatior's. barriers, and pipe see Section 3.7, Radiation Protection. and that the radiological doses of a whip restraints provided for essential items postulated piping failure remain below the for plant safe shutdown. l limits. I I 3. Secondary containment boundary perform visual inspections at the as-built a. Per Figures 2.15.10.a through 2.15.10.o. l 9. Review RB construction records and 9. t copletely surrounds the PCV and encloses all PCV's penetrations that may become a arrangement. Reference to Sec.2.14.4 for

b. Sec.2.14.4.SGTS.

potential source of radioactive release s'ter SGTS and Sec.2.15.5 for HVAC functions. c. Sec.2.15.5. HVAC. f an accident. 6 . [ t N i f 8 i t I l t i l t [ l i i i [ i sa i N I } t i I i.

ABWR ocsion occument wA i i i l WA n(Y PLAN ,) NO 1300= - 10 5 *J 0 - ----* i0 $00 8000 sooo icsoo- _ - g $oo- _ t300 tutt ag?co ?* s H s ?u5L 36200 ) j [ t u s t 31700 W -~ J L ~( l t u t t 77500 ( . f ] .~ f u $ t 23Soo ~ 3 t u s t itico 5 Y l' 4 W FUNNEL FCS f u 1 L 1:300 ( Cti u 5t 17000 F ~' I*I i X C S SENTI AL CL( C T RIC AL 1 i f u s t 4600 (B) I h CRD lTIPl TIP n' NIfNAP'L4 I OulPMENT f I R 5 0NNil REWOvat ACCESS t u l t -2700 Townri TUNNEL !?~ Z230 Z; [d L_ -i MCU ggy tuSL -8200 l ~ SE C TION A-A FIGURE 2.15.10.o R E A C T O R B UIL DIN G A R R A N G E M E N T - O ' /18 0 ' 2.15 51 T30/92

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3 00 VVN DiVENSONS ARE 2.CW X 2 CV ('Y'/:CA'd

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BOWE 2 *5.10 C RE AOTOR BUILO NG ARR ANGEMENT - T.V S1. -9200 2.M 53 .V30S2

ABWR oestga occument ) l ( ~, wY \\ h h R1 1300 4 8500-10 5 0 0 --+ 1200 l ~ M' _________,1f,2 __ {O N f I ~ 95C0 Ps I.*l TJ v ~ aj i'd W u CWw PS Y s 10500 / -/ <~? te [ (J hkC1 m ki. s L_a ~ v u NOTES: 1. COLUMN DIMENSIONS ARE 2.0M X 2.0M (TYPICAL),

2. FLOOR SL AC THICKNESS is 0.6M.
3. MAIN BEAM DIMENSIONS ARE 1.5M X 1.8M.

FIGURE 2.15.10.d RE ACTOR BUILDING ARR ANGEMENT - T.M.S.L-5100 O v 2.15 54 3'30S 2

ABWR ossign Document 0 9 8 6 0 1300. -- e t 00 10500 r?00 8000 10$00 8L00 - e-130 { '3P l O' or + + + c m.,_ n- __...,__ m,_ _ m m y. m-, _ ___-.c ym - y~_,____- d n.. n u 4 m,__yt g, Sj: 0 r( lI j c_ D e-1 1 l l 9 il l 0 o r 1 y r-~,. m n 6 g 3 ' { f f ~ ii. d-vq j 43 ( ll CL* j l / l N ij Cvw b /! K g ,:500 i a 7 a 4

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q y, H. e i f' ',C / f p 2000 d ] { [ 'A' I ers000/ h-270.i ep l g-A \\ g1 l _u f k'. h. e-gaa l r.*+' = l c10600l / j M d.) (+l 8 30 05 Pi i IC) (B) g d 1700 r+4 ym V - *4 ( .:t \\ 'u d.) + +-t y.y \\ i 0 0 { lh l j f:Y q y w*k c.y J "? ^ =$.b.- f.h V ~ d' iI s i 10500 'l 8'# I l W AINTEN ANCE CRD W AiNTD ANCE l l 1 _w f} 5 7% ;. P */ 7- -_ J 7 I l 1300 ggg. I NOTES: " " DENOTES DOORS WITN R AISED L!LLS. 1

2. "B" LLNOTES WATERTIOHT 000RS TO I

PREVENT WATER ENTER:NG ROOMS FROV CORRIDORS.

3. COLLVN D uCNSIONS ARE 2.0M X 2.0M (TYPIC ALL l

4 FLOOR SL AB TH!CKNESS IS 0.6M.

5. V A'N SE Av D:VENS!ONS ARE 1.5M X 18M.

FIGURE 2.15.10e RE ACTOR BUILDING ARR ANGF. VENT - T.M.S.L. -1700 2.15-55 3/30/92

ABWR nesign occument W (J @D 4 9 6 S

: 0 -* - s 00-10 t *. 0 8000 6000

-10500 at 0 l i i, 'n ,s l l C* 1, ii g y .,.y- - 7,., 7,. b ,.w . - rw-~.. .==;. x ~ p - -- t\\ /' lj '}.( b an.- - pr-j )l 1 X d N I g+ L {y d:: ,7 V 'y i l 1,!- 1 4 Ji l I 's L-ml e di

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n x. r-i ~ m Q ', ~ $ Qi D ,/ m '87 l W ,\\ . i. 4 ) ! j !' cua cun f 'T 'A' f\\ [ig- '0:00 / \\ l' fl'*lio / / i i j / / \\ f,' s o j a ,1. j : i l" m+- / / l -p i rr / / I' q t '8 o .4 ,\\ fo i ,i 2000 i 4. m.4 ti, na-u cW k ) 't.1 [l 'l 1 !^ t J l t l1 l a /I I t.0TES " " DENOTES DOORS WITH R A! SED StL LS. gj i su 2, ' D" DENOTES WATERTICHT DOORS TO PREVENT w ATER ENTERING ROOMS FRou C O R RiOOR S. 3 uN DIMENSIONS ARE 16M X 16u (TYPICALL .\\\\j 4 . _0R St A8 TH6CKhESS is 0 Su. r==M=s 5 M AiN BE Au 0:uCNSIONS ARE 14u x 1 eu 7 t,"a : 1 I FiCURE 2<1510f RE ACTOR BUILDING ARR ANCEMENT = T u S.L.1500 l ,mv\\ 1 j 2.15 56 3'30/92 I t

ABWR Design occument G 8 9 8 8 8 8-e t 00 -~@lm 10500- - --800; - - 8000 10?no '3:0 + --- E t : 0 =-- 10; v. i ~~.' 3A NJ"; - .i . y/ l ,A 4-f It Lj i j l ess 11, m I U j i ,,.mn.. _---a, 7.--- - i i i! t iss.e.. ij 90 g .b [i ' ic,'

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  • NOTES:

'." CENOTES DocRS WITH R AISED SILLS. 2 "U OENOTES W ATERTICnT DOORS TO PREVENT W Ai;R ENTER.NO ROOVS FROM CORRDORS. 3 COLUMN C'MENSiCNS ARE 18U X 18M (T YAC ALL 4 rtCOR SL AB TH!CKNE 55 is 0.6W

i. V A'N 3E AM C WENS:ONS ARE 1,$u X 1.8V.

FiOURE 2.15.*1g RE ACT OR BU1 DING ARR ANC EVEN T - T VS.L. 4 800 2.15-57 3'30/92

ABWR Design oocument ('T h h fe' R3 R4 Rt o I u:ow stoa ca nos 1_ . ut,s gig._ .,53; I .I j Q, no r. r. r ; ~, r;, req 4 C R y- ~ ~ "*nKqi=gy*-- - d==j. L- ~- q' T N' g'J ' #,N pr A J ,6] \\ en, h,% /,MLQ \\ v G;:. =-- t u e q\\ a-m rx 7['~ i I b / j a:o J/. AI / Y, i m b ~Q i, h [~ ~\\c I LJ

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2. COLUMN DIMENSIONS ARE 1.8M X 1.8M (TYPIC AL).
3. M AIN BE AM ClMENSIONS ARE 1.5M X 18M.

O FtCURE 2.15.10.h RE ACTOR BUILDING ARR ANCE8sENT - T.M SL A500 2=1548 13032

ABWR oesign 0:cument 9 e e e e e e e 1.)C0 - 8500 - 10h00 8000 6000 10500 -et00w -- uc a (1 o n O' 1 "n q r nr-o T, '; 2 5015 95c; c =,r=se - wam 00tal z- $f(aw TVNNEL 8 + -y p s ca

jj3-w m

[c -7 i0sc0 {,_ Cvw/f PO CUw / G 3,/,, ,\\ x \\n, \\ g a,.. q +m. =,., s 8000 N f fj P5IAI 'w: - ~~"'- a- / l hf.ai Q a 10600 l ~ E000 \\ 7$(81 1700 P5tti g -= y\\ \\y q w 10500 0 -m.n.rdsszz ,/ E G sh -r-n

D S-v D0tBl 00tc)

FCs ~O C 15 , j-It' 3 t '.! l 1 t l = ti ~ } N 1. N 1300 18 0

  • NOTES:

" " OENOTES 000RS wiTH RAISE 0 SILLS. 1.

2. "D" CENOTES WATERTICHT 000RS TO PREVENT WATER ENTER 4NC ROOuS FRou CORRIDORS.

1 COLUMN DiuENSIONS ARE 1.6W X 1.6W (TYPICAll.

4. FLOOR SLA8 THtCKNESS IS 0.5M.
5. u AiN eE Au DiuCNSiONS ARE 1.4M X 1.8W.

flCURE 2.15.10i RE ACTOR BUILDING ARRANOEMENT - T.M.S L.12300 2.15 59 3/30/92

AEWR oesign oscumen: /U e e e e e e e -uoc

  • 3;:- *.-- e s ; '

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2. "D" OENOTES w ATERT10wi DOORS 70 r,;[ v;NT w AT[; ENTER NO 109uS FROM 0044,0095
3. 00LLvN O VEN5f 0NS Af 4M (T YP;0 ALL
4. FLOOR SL AB TK0KNE'

.C'U-S. V A;N SE AV 0 WLNS CNS ARE 14M

  • 18V.

COURE 2.151Dj RE AOTOR BWLD % AR ANGEVENT - i.V.5 L iS100 t' I / iv l l 2.15 60 3'30/92 =

ABWR Design Document ~ G 1300W l--~ E 5 00 10500 j 10500 1300 N NJ C*E 7 i N /[/ \\ N/ VNJ _\\/. .400 s-_4 d,W .WG bh e ,/., u, ~ ,aA, ( v [m 10500 g 30300 !!e_Z: Nf\\ U El g. y Pe 3 a s I T.M.S.L 20800 T M.S.L 21200 NOTES: " " DENOTES DOORS WITH RAISED SILLS. 1.

2. "D" DENOTES WATERTiOHT DOORS TO PREVENT WATER ENTERING ROOMS TROM CORRDORS.
3. Cf _ 'MN O!MENSIONS ARE 1.4M x 1.4M (TYPICAll.
  1. FLOOR SL AB THICKNESS IF ').5M.

5 V AIN BE AV O! MENS:ONS ARE 1.5M X 1.dM. FIGURE 2.15.10.x RE ACTOR BUILDING ARR ANOEMENT - T.V.S.L 20S00 AND 21200 0 2.15 61 3'30.92

4 !ABWR Desion Document .( h h R - 93 R4 R5 1300 4 _ *- - 8600 ~ 10$00 8000 8000 - 10500 850' ^ d -t300 f ~ 1300 g -e =p_ x l} i.! ! D A Y T ANaj 00 (a b 07 U l ' 5," j

  • - SE * ;j I

Mi ^ F f t SYSTEV i i e 'j ,? A. - L.a 4 Q-j sa u. i kSENT4 i i l SCTS l LEC;R Q,, lt d mV AClaw L 40t03 I II 1 1 I -I b. HlK l ~ 'm N ' y,C*, = s = +- p ,A g o I C CNT AINME)I I 8000 PURCE k l /. SUPPLY 2 ) [- MWl.1 4 p270 ' } 4 g o _p p !t w q l i

liS, Msive f

! l-SLC JSRV e000 g l,' g4 MAN TENA CE (,, 0: h M r4 g }Syfe",'I E 1 SYN #[ isi E MV ACIClg M VAL (B) l} j j ~ jN l' l<n B M i ~2. ,w 20s00 oc<ci ~ DC(bi- )AY TAhl s )AYTAN6 !'5 - p I I ~f. x + x q m a s.. l l l l l l 1300 18 0 ' NOTES: t "." DENOTES i. 3 ORS wtTH R AISED SILLS.

2. ~ 0h" DENOTES W ATERTICHT DOORS TO PREVENT w ATER ENTERING ROOMS FRou CORRIDORS.

3 COLUMN DlWENS60NS ARE 1.W2.2 x 1.4u (TYPICAL)

4. FLOC 9 SL AB THICKNESS IS 0.5W.

5 MAIN BEAM CIMENS 0NS ARE L264 X 18u. FIOURE 2.15.10.4 RE ACTOR SVILDiNG ARR A.4 CEMENT - T.u S.L. 23500 V-2.15-62 3/ 0/92

ABWR Desion occument r O e e e e e 9 u::-: L-es : m:0 - - e:e: =- ' ecco mac esco-- Fueo up: l l g f Er

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.,- - : z.:

x 1 i ) i i l i ua is:- NOTES " " DENOTES DOORS wiTH R AISED S!LLS. 1. L "Ch" DENOTES W ATERTIGHT DOORS TO P9 EVENT W ATER ENTER;NG ROOVS FROM CCRR;OORS. 3 COLUMN DeVENS10NS ARE 14N2.2 X 1.4W (TYPIC AL)

4. FLOOR SL AB THICKNESS IS 0.5M.

$.VENSEAV0:MENSIONS ARE 1.2V X 1.8M. FIGURE 2.15.10.m RE ACTOR BU:LDiNG ARR ANGEVENT - T.M.S.L. 27200 O 2.15 63 3/30/92

~ ABWR ossign Document a m h, h ( R1 R2 R3 r< c R7 w. 1300 - I - 8500 10500 ---8000 8000 10500 e500- . L 13 00 1300 0' A h I ! Q F. ~ 'o' .. --g _3A' [., O i il i iS00 'l I, l dl g e. 2 Q G4 w ~ l l ll R >P wp 10500 i COMER C 001. t d u I 181 (Al i] h 1 f;, n-b n-y i -'~= 6 q! %= g ;a c- -t - l 2000 i I ( i i c Q 70* d ac-N l., l d 'a b/ hl \\ h l l l ~C~ f' ~000 i L A) 2- ~ Y NL C% .'.J r m. n es g W d L l h i 10t00 !l I i 4 h! b l o m O y A- ~-q I e I i E SSE N TI AL '0500 l ELECTRIC AW b D HV ACic) I! lI .e l r, j ID l .i. I 7

aJ

_T"- } l l l l l I I 1300 18 0

  • P.0 T E S:

1. "." OENOTES DOORS w TH R AISED 5 LLS.

2. "D" DENOTES W ATERTICHT DOORS TO PREVENT W ATER ENTER:NC ROOMS FRou CORR.DCRS.

3 COLuvN DivENSIONS ARE 2 2V X 16M (T YPrC AL) 4 FLOOR SL AB intCKNESS is 0.5u

5. V A:N STEEL M-SECTION BE AM 0:MENSIONS ARE Bm-t 5 x 0 7M l

,, ~ FIGURE 21510n RE ACTOR BU:LDiNG ARR ANGEMENT - T U S L. 31700 2.15-64 3/30,92

+^ ABWR oesign 0:cument O 8 -- 8500

5 5 0 0--

0' / / / ) A- ) ) ]~- 0500 ii ( R2 - R3 ~ Y ' ---8500 10500 10500 7 7 /1 g\\ At,' J ? g} e. it f( '6 y u l \\ ,i 8000 Z A QF .i .h - sa. g; 3 y 8000 l N [ [ \\ P ~~- ~ S l \\j i j ~ Z [ 10500 (' l l l r ,--]/ k w t-n 3 3 i 10500 t Y i l l i ..e w t t e i I l / / l / / [ 1300 33 3 T.u S L 34500 TW $L 38200 l-NOTES. {FOR T M 5.L. 345001 NOTES: W OR T.M S.L. 382001 1. COLUMN D#ENSiONS ARE 2.2M X 14M. t COLUMN DIMENSIONS ARE L4M X L4M (TYPICAL).

2. FLOOR SL AB THC#. NESS 13 0.5M.
2. ROOF THICKNESS IS 0.5M.

3, V AiN BE AM OIMENS!ONS ARE BH-0.8 x 0 4 5. FIGURE 2.15.10.o RE ACTOR BUILD;NG ARR ANGEMENT - i.M.S.L. d4500 AND 38200 2.15-65 3i30I92

ABWR oesign Document ~ 2.15,11 Turbine Building g)_ iv Design Description later. Stage 3 Item. "w R.) 2.15 66 3/30/92

ABWR oesign 0: cum:nt ~ 2.15.12 Control Building Design Description The control building (CB) is the building that houses the main control room, control equipment and operations personnel for the Reactor and Turbine Islands. The control building is located between the reactor and turbine buildings. In addition to the control room and operations personnel, this building houses the essential electrical, control and instrumentation equipment, essential switch gear, essential battery rooms, the CB heating and air conditioning (IIVAC) equipment, reactor building component cooling water pumps and heat-exchangers, and the steam tunnel. The general building arrangement including watertight doors and sills for doonvays where needed for flood control is found in Figures 2.15.12a through 2.15.12g. The CB is a Seismic Category I structure designed to provide missile and tornado protection. The CB is constructed of reinforced concrete with steel truss roof. The CB has two stories above the grade level and four stories below. The building shape is rectangle. hiajor nominal dimensions are as follows: Overall height above top of basemat 30.5 m Overall planar dimensions (outside) 0 deg-180 deg direction 24.0 m 90 deg-270 deg direction 56.0 m Thickne;s of Outer Wall from -8.2m ThtSL to 17.15m Th!SL 1.0m from 17.15m ThtSL to 22,2 m TAISL 0.6m Thickness of Steam Tunnel Walls, Floors, and Ceiling 1.6m Thickness of Walls supportira Steam Tunnel 1.6m De CB is a shear wall structure designed to accommodate all specified seismic loads with its perimeter walls. Therefore, frame members such as beams or columns are designed to accommodate deformations of the walls in case of earthquake condition. Column sized and floor slab thicknesses are also provided in the general building arrangement figures. With major dimensions defined as listed above for specified reinforced concrete materials and design procedures, the dynamic characteristic of the CB structure is defined. beismic adequacy of the detailed site-specific control building design will be evaluated using the dimensional characteristics noted above and approved analytical procedures and methodology for dynamic analysis of str uctures. This work will be in compliance with the ACI and AISC codes governing design of reinforced concrete structures for nuclear power plants. Detailed analyses of the site 2.15-67 3/30/92

ABWR vesign Document -(3 specific control building design will utili/c appropriate site data for seismic () events, floods, tornados, winds and other loading conditions. To protect against external flood damage. the following design features are prosided: a. wall thickness below flood level greater than 0.6m. b. water stops prosided in all constructionjoints below grade. watertight doors and piping penetrations installed below Dood level. c. d. waterproof coating on exterior walls. c. foundations and walls of structures below grade are designed with water stops at expansion and constructionjoints. f. roofs are designed to prevent pooling oflarge amounts of water. To protect against internal flood damage, the following design features are prosided: elevation differences and divisional separations from remainder oithe a. CB. v b. drainage system to divert water to assigned floor and location. c. sills for doorways as needed to proside Dood control. d. watertight doors installed below internal flood level. e. wall thickness below internal flood level greater than 0.6m. Inside the steam tunnelis the mainsteam piping, the mainsteam drain line, and the feedwater piping. The steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnel into the control building. Any high energy line breaks inside the steam tunnel will vent out to the turbine building. All standing water will collect in the large volumes in the lower pertions of the steam tunnel at the reactor building or turbine building ends. On Floor BIF, there are fire hose stands and reactor cooling water (RCW) piping. It is designed that any rupture of the fire hose stand will leak onto the floor and drain to the -8200 level by floor drains. Sills will be provided at doonvays to prevent the entry of standing water into the control room complex.- The RCW piping runs vertically in a concrete pipe chase. No flooding outside this pipe chase is possible. 'v) ( On the floor where cornputer room located, there are fire hose stands, RCW piping, and other piping systems. A limited amount of standing water is expected upon a rupture of any of these systems. Sills will be prosided at doorways to 2.15-68 3/30/92

ABWR oesign occument prevent water from crossing divisional boundaries. Similar arrangernents and designs are also prosided for other floors for floods protection, g During normal operation, the concrete surrounding the steamline tunnel provides shielding so that operator doses are below the value associated with uncontrolled, unlimited access. The outer walls of the control building are designed to attenuate radiation from radioactive materials contained within the reactor building and from possible airborne radiation surrounding the control building following a LOCA. The walls prcvide shielding to limit the direct + hine exposure of control room personnel following a LOCA. Shielding for the outdoor air cleanup filters also is provided to allow temporary access to the mechanical equipment area of the control building following a LOCA, should it be required. The control building is not a vented structure. The exposed exterior roofs and walls of the structure are designed for the required pressure drop. Tornado dampers are prosided on all air intake and exhaust openings. These dampers are designed to withstand the specified negative pressure. Inspection, Test, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.15.12 provides a definition of the inspections, tests, aad/or analyses, together with associated acceptance criteria which will be undertaken for the control building. O e i 2.15-69 3/30.'92 I

O 0: Table 2.15.12: CONTROL BUILDING. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1. Control buildint, 'Jeneral arrangement is 1. Plant walk through to cher^ and verify 1. Per Figure 2.15.12a through 2.15.12.g. .i chown in Figures 2.15.12a through requirements are me t. 2.15.12g. 2. Design features are provided to protect 2. Review construction records and perform 2. For external flooding: against design basis intemal and external visual inspections of the flood control a. Exterior wall thickness below flood floods features level greater than 0.6m.

b. Water stop c.

Watertight door and piping penetrations below flood level d. Water proof coating on exterior walls e. Foundations and walls of structures below grade are designed with water stops at expansion and construction joints [ f. Roofs are designed to prevent pooling ? of large amounts of water. 5 For internal flooding: [ a. Elevation differences and divisional separation of the mechanical functions from the remainder of the CB b. Drainago system to divert water to assigned floor and location c. Si!!s for doorways as needed to i provide flood protection

d. Watertight doors installed below internal flood level
e. Wall thickness below internal flood s

level greater than 0.6m. f. Steam tunnel has no penetrations from the steam tunnel into the control building. Any high energy line or feedwater piping breaks inside the steam tunnel will vent out to the Turbine Building. 9 is

1 l Table 2.15.12: CONTROL BUILDING (Continued) l Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria l Certified Design Commitment inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria t-3. The control building is designed to have 3. Performed dimensionalinspections of the 3. The concrete thickness for the steam adequate radiation shielding to protect Control Building wa!!s, ceiling, floors, and tunnel wall, floor and ceiling shall be operating personnel during operation and other structural features. greater than 1.6m. The steam tunnel following a LOCA. interface structure and contro! building wa!! below the steam tur.nel should have a combined th;ckness of 1.6m. 4. The CB is designed to protect against 4. Review construction records and perform 4. For tornado design basis tornado and tornado mi:,siles. visualinspections of the tornado protection features. a. Roof and walls abow grade designed greater than 0.5m b. HVAC dampers designed for differential pressure > 1.46 psi. c. HVAC dampers have tornado missile [ barriers. 5. The CB is designed as a Seismic Category I 5. Plant walk through to check and verify CB 5. Structures have dimensions compatible [ structure and has major dimensions building major dimensions including with data in the certified design. (Figures ~' defined in the certified design, column sizes and floor slab thickness. 2.15.12a through 2.15.12g) Review final design record for material properties site input data and analytical procedures and methodology for seismic analysis.Visualinspecticos of structures and review of as-built documentation will be conducted to asses complie'ce with the certified design commitments. 6. The detail structural design will be based 6. The control 5uilding design documentation 6. Confirmation that the as-built design :s in on ACI and AISC codes and will use site will be reviewed. compliance with ACI and AISC data for seismic events, floods, tornadoes requirements and is based on appropriate winds and other loading conditions.- site design data. O a ~ 9 9 9.

O O O' 9 1 i mTV1 l 1;. n j_ -- q ,w; =f tw l

== tw = 2F ~~ u-1 tusmx _ __J _ k l J f [ T-- [ j i. ,i i. a j-7

==' D .7 4p J izmanm_ L J -~ e 1_ ! _.._._ M _ _ g, _.] -[_ _ _ __= I_ _ _ _ _ l lL.gg_O. ly l-I ! s ' PJ "- l I }1 _j 'j_..___ ' B1F ' 7.9 TUSL' mds. , gk g jwr ";we we j wr .B2F: i! m 3.57USL gL pl .1 3 i I rl B3F ~~ t r.w. 115TMSL (( J L.; ___.__ j L__., f ~E-a., .~

c. e I

N .B4F' l' ~1 12 uTun 1 a i. se w Figure 2.1!i.12a CONTROL BUILDING ELEVATION (90'- 270 ) g + v

ELEVATION 17150mm TMSL _. __ __ _ _ __ _ _.__ _.-- 55900mm - m ---10300mm --.-e--10400mm --g 14300mm - -- <--10600mm y I i I l 600mm i i 1 1 Y~ ~Tl ~:::: , V' i iY 8000mm =rkt=5 ,g00mm 2p.EU'E l EE,NY i E JL j 7 g _4_ q fj au=1 L_ i t mu.. d 1600,_, _.!L i f 8000mm U W f- ~ .I .2 _ 2400dmm L_ i r s d 7 3 6 _43 +f] +f Zt I _q

====4{-}41=nq%n=4 l I p=ij 02 90 s nu 90 s Un gg t 3 m = ( y=i! i f-. gg L jr-9. v w_A I '1, Il F G y l u.as i. _it 1 =: L J tt a L_F~_J gi q y v_ _ _ L f_ L_I Notes: Doors marked with a

  • have raised sills Floor slabis 400mm thick Columns are 1000x1000mm typical t$

G Figure 2.15.12b CO%OL BUILDING - FLOOR 2F9 ~

g n(_f g A )- sd t ELEVATION 12300mm TMSL 56000mm - 16600mm ---< 14300mm s 10600mm 10200mm -

i
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.i .[- I-4 l' _X j fi. __ + _._{3 h, .L 800emm L, m.,,. -( v i s, L O O O,. ,_ y i .,m+-/ 1 7 ', = = y us t ? 24000mm 7900nm 'l ~7 J;. ,f_, 3 s 9,80,. MAC MG SET e i i g O O O .l_ - g . r A $q 4l 3 g gg ... = j - E 2 54.. c 4 lj;! C~lCf CL _IC l[ R _] 'Q l e_ li !i [_ _ ( y-. .Ll LL .A u. v t-t Notes: Doors marked with a

  • have raised si!!s Columr:s are 1000x1000mm typical Floor slabis400mm thick ti Figure 2.15.12c CONTROL BUIDING FLOOR 1F-GROUNC GRADE

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m g" 4 _ Ju_; j. g!e i g i i i -h! h e h ! L__,___ __qm_ _. h m Tifimiii" L L nun i L s E E y. E.- G y y 5 a E _ E y ev 2.15-75 3/30/92

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ELEVATION-2150mm TMSL 56000mm .c ( 10200mm --s--~---10600mm ---y 14500mm -/--10600mm i l l' t 1000mm y _3 k-p-- i d 8000m ' n_2}rg- ,xr ___ p. aa_' y_2.a_] _p l j. 4 4 Q p-j 0 l-0' i s-l

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1600mm di 8000m n mio m ~ ~" =* "v 2e i i l _J;,a e, lU E-# I l Jj r a 1600mm ij d 7_l j Q b= p 5 Y;

==,.A =-=___..._-_'? ' : -~ d-- -.: 1 .-.3 p_ __ Notes: Columns are 1000x1000mm typical Floor slabis 400mm thick U Figure 2.15.12f CONTROL BUILDING FLOOR B3F ~ O O O.

G O U]: N ELEVATION -8200mm TMSL> t-- -- ' 56000mm ' -- ' 10200mm s--10600mm 14300mm - s--10600mm l 1000mm ) [ ~~ 8000 Tim WATERTGC 000R WATERTCHT DOOR , __ _ g_____ 7 1 O O O s 36o0mm. y 5 8000T:m =i]- new.T ncn. A-ncw v '._ l %_. 24000mm i 'O O I ' s0cmm O i = 3 E_ . a L_ ? Notes: Columns are 1000x1000mm typical Basemalis 2600mm thick (mm)_ 8l Figure 2.15.12g CONTROL BUILDING FLOOR B4F i . i

ABWR oesign occument ~ 2.15.13 Radwaste Building Design Description later. Stage 3 Item. O 9 2.15-79 3/30/92

ABWRonion0:cument s : .. 2.15._14' Service Building - d Design Description - LI2ter. Stage 3 Item.- 9 ' 7 - t 4 i 5 9 0

h. '

1 a l 4. g -. 5 e h. , e -- f. M 2.15-80 3/30/92 s +s. --..,..w.,..~., ,.--m-..-. 7.., ..-n...#. y_.. }}

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