ML20095C536
| ML20095C536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | West Valley Demonstration Project |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1992 |
| From: | Rowland T ENERGY, DEPT. OF, IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE |
| To: | Mcintosh T ENERGY, DEPT. OF, IDAHO OPERATIONS OFFICE |
| References | |
| REF-PROJ-M-32 NUDOCS 9204240090 | |
| Download: ML20095C536 (15) | |
Text
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United States Government Department of Energy memorandum WPog:;"Q:fnice 1
CA7E April 15, 1992 SU3;ECT Summary of the Investigation of Fissile. Material Accumulatica-in the Liquid Waste '"reatment System (LWTS) 10 T. W. McIntosh, EM-343 Project Manager for West Valley l
Attached for your infccmation is a ret 7 ort which summarizes the investigation and reso.tution of the 21ssile material accumu:. tion in the LKrS.
The report presents background j
informatsun, details the technical review and conclusions, djacusses chemical cleaning and the final condition of the system.
If you have any gaest4cns, please call Alan Yeazel of my staff at FTS 473-47if 0.
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T.
J.
Rowland, Director West Valley Project Office
Attachment:
Report NRC-hQ (w/att)
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Roth, NRC, Regica 1 (w/att)-
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Piciulo, NYSERDA (w/att)
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(lMLK West Valley Nuclear Services Company InC0rp0 rated -
WD 92:0417 MS V April 1, 1992 Mr. T. J. Rowlsnd, Director West Valley Project office U.S. Department of Energy MS 00E P.O. Box 191 West Valley, New York 14171 0191
Dear Mr. Rowland:
At Lntion:
J. A. Yearel
SUBJECT:
Suramary of the Investigation of Fissile Accumulation in the Liquid Waste Treatment Sys tr:m (LWTS) l Transmitted for your information is a report '. Attachment A) which presents the results of the investigation of fissile material accumulation in the Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS).
The report details the tachnical review and cenclusions, and discusses chemical cleaning and final condition of the systems.
During Nnvember 1990 it was observed that an increase in the concentration of clutonium in the liquid in the high-level waste (ULV) Tank 8D-2 had caused material to accumulate downstream, presumably in the LVTS.
WVNS performed an l
extecsive review of this situation and commissioned several teams or
. independent outside experts to assist in the final resolution.
It was first established that there was no safety question nor was there a criticality concern because of the small quantities of Plutonium and Uranium involved; it was further concluded that this processing phenomenon was not an Unveviewed Safety Question (USQ). A nitric acid cleaning was performed on the tanks, pipes, and t/aporator it. the LWTS to collect the fissile material and clean the system. The acid cleaning was successful in removing the majority of fissile materiet as shown by chemical analysis of the cleaning solution.
The acid cleaning was effective-in removing 251.8 grams of fissile plutonium from the starting fissile plutonium inventory of 291 6 rams.
The difference, 39.2 grams, serves as the starting inventory for continued processinB-Analysis of the LWTS influent and effluent flow streams will be used as process controls on accumulation in the future..This, in addition to controls an STS pH and the use of Ti Treated Zeolite will assure that recurrence of chis phenemenor. is prevented.
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Mr. T. J.-Rowland If. there are ana/ questions in this matter, please contact the undersigned at 4504 or G. A. Smith at extension 4325.
Sincerely,
. /
. ?!C7 A.' J / Howell, ManAber Operaclona Tot. tical Support Wost Valley t'e r.. aar Service Co., Inc.
DA 92:0057 GAsadal 0005DAL.LET Attachment A - Report on Invastigation and Resolution of Tissile Accumular. ion in the Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS) l-a W
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DA:92:0057 Attachment A Summary of Investigation and Resolution of Fissile Accumulation in the Liquid -
Waste Treatment Sf stem (LWT)).
C. A.
Smith A. J. Howell R. F. Gessner EV.CKGROUlH)
The West Valle" Demonstration Project (WVDP) is a cleanup effort which is aJtively removing liquid high level nuclear vaste from an underground tanx, extracting radioactive cesium from the liquid usin6 an ion exchange system and stabilizing the resulting low-level vaste (LLW) in an NRC-endorsed cement waste form. This proc ess takes olace in the Integrated Radwaste Treatment System (IRTS).
In May 1988, tne tank contained approximately 650,000 gallens i
of liquid high level nuclear waste containing about 39 weight percent total dissolved solids (TDS) left from the first commercial spent fuel reprocessing j
opecation in the United States.
Since May 1988, VVDP has successfully 3
processed over 420,000 gallons of hisc-level radioactive vaste, resulting in j
19,294 cement drums vLth an average surface radiation reading of 35 mR/nr.
On November 14, 1990, the IRTS vas placed in standby becauce n-going sampling and testing. associated with completing the liquid high level vaste :reatment
]
indicated that dilution of the supernatant caused dissolution of fissile nacerial out of the sludge which has formed beneath the liquid.
Sample analysis of the liquid reflected very slowly increasing concentration of i
fissile material. Associated with tnis concentration increase was some small accumulation of fissile material in the IRTS components downstream of the l
l Supernatant Treatment System (STS). The secumulated fissile material and all solution concentrations were significantly belou the site's criticality 1
operation safety requirements, and no operations occurred outside any site safety limit or limiting condition for operations, However, the IRTS was j
placed in standby while a full assessmer.t was completed to atsure a thorougb understanding of this phenomenon and an occurrence report (Reference 1) was issueC.
A strategic plan (Reference 2) was issu-1 te the Just Valley Project Office (VVPO) on December 17, 1990.
The plan was set up with three major goals to be completed before the resumption of IRTS Operations c.ould commence.
1.
Characteriro changes in Tank SD-2 supernicant and the distribution of fissile materials across the IRTS.
2.
Make a d:cinion as to the need to access the evaporator internals.
3.
Prcvide an assessment of this situation to determine !f it was an Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ).
l 0005DAL.LET A-1 l
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DA,92:0057 Attachment A
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INVESTIGATION A. CharacteritG71on of Liquid i
WVNS characteri td the changes 'in the Tank 8D 2 supernata*: and the distribution of fist.ile n cerisis across the IRTS.
The focus of this step of L
the investigacion was two-fold-One was to determine the exact changes that
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had occurred within Tank 8D 2 during 2 1/2 years ei proces. sing the liquid: and L
second, to determine the consequences of these changes throughout the IRTS.
This work was initiated with extunsive sampling (F1 ute 1) across the IFTS 5
systems.
L
. Samples were taken and analyzed for uranius, plutonium, total dissolved solids (TDS), and density. A plutonium chemistry expert from Westinghouse Savannah River was brought to VVNS to perform an independen: review of the wethod used at WVNS for plutonium enalysis.
The results from analysis of Tank 8D 2 i
supernatant were compared-to supernatant sample results from samnling performed _ prior to IATS start up in May 1983.
The sampf.es indicate the
{
plutonium concentration of toe liquid in Tank SD-2 increased free 7.32 E 02 L
uC1/mL at 37.5 Wet TDS ta 11.4 E 02 sci /mL at 23 We% TDS.
Thesa data were the first indication that the chetaintry of 6D-2 had changed.
H. P. Mc1 comb agreea j
vith the method uaed at WVNS for plutonium analysis and with the results t
l obtained, catafled in his repore (Reference 3).
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B. Sacpling Components of LVTS l
t 1
One of the first aspects of our study was to determino what effects, if any, vere caased by the increase in plutoniam concentration in Tank 3D 2.
The intense samplirg plan was continued to sample upstreca and downstream of all major process equipment 'throughout the IRTS.
The sample points-used cre i
outlined in Figure l.
The. resvits from this sampling dotormined that the
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avaporator and tsnks -in the Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS) vore
.aqcumulating fissile material.
L C. Evaporation Test L
A' controlled! full-scale test of the LWTS was conducted. Decontaminated superns* ant vas analyzed fer plutonium before and af ter evaporation (from 8.86 Ut! TDS to 41.03 Vt! TDS). The actual gross alpha in the g
concentrates of the evaporator was 1.35 E 01 uC1/ml as compared to the
[
calculated expceted value of 7.82 E-01 uCi/ml (Reference 4).
E h'
A lab scale boil-down test of evaporator. feed material was initiated tc 1
further check the theory that fissile material van being deposited in the evaporator.
This test further confirmed the results given above.
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d DA:92:0057 At tachment A D. Testing Cemented Dtums lI As a final check, and to assess whether excess fissile material had carried thru th evaporator to chu Cement Folidit'ication System (CSS) waste form, five drums were sampled to dote.mine the amount of fissile material in the cement product One drum prcduced in 1988 was :ompared to fov drums produced in 1990.
S e results of this testing indicate that there was no unexpected increases of fit.sile plutonium in the CSS waste form from 1988 to 1990.
The data are listed in Table 1 (Reference 5).
An evaluation was made ta assess how.'ach plutonium and uranium salts had deposited in the L'a*TS tanks and piplug.
This was accomplished by performing mass balance calculations across the Lk'TS.
For plutonium, gross alpha
_(one way of estimating plutonium; data were available t'or every evaporator feed tank ano every evaporator concentrates tanx that had been processed through the evaporator, Thin led to an estimate of 359 100 grams of total plutonium in the evaporator Reference 6).
For.araniua only one data point existed for uranium across the evapornor.
This data point led to an estimate f 26 Kg of total uranium in the evnporator (Reference 7).
o RESOLUTION AND RECOVERY A. Expert Reviewa l-The extensive sampling plan suggestad that the UiTS evaporation (volume i
reduction) operatians were caun n5 the fissile salts to accumviate. The next recp was to determine the best ano safnst way to recover from this processing phencuene. To this erd two separate engineering evninattens were made.
The first was a plan to gain accass to the evaporator incernels by pullind the
-reboller tube bundle. A survey of the evaporator and the surrounding area, (Reference _8),
howed a general area dose of 50 to 100 mR/hr and
- . 2 R/hr hot 47 o t n the evaporntor reboiler.
Based on this survey, the in cell location of the. evaporacor, and the knowledge that the removal of the evaporator i
(
reboi ar steam chest _ would be n labor intansive p*ocess, accessing the l-ev&oorator was not the preferred methoc iot AIARA reasons.
!=
Tne second engineerina, assessment was to develop a method to chemically clean the evaporator with nitric acid. Off-site experts H, P. Holcomb from Savannah River and R. A. Corbert from Corrcston Testing Laoorstories Inc. ware enlisted to help with the determination of the parameters to be used during the acid
. leaning. Holcocb a plutentum chemist, suggested that as a minimum, 1 molar l-
.ntwric acid 'should be used to remove the acale (Reference 9).
Corbe.rt, a l
titaniu.a cacrorion expert, after examining the design data of the evaporator, l:
susgested the nitric acid not exceed 2.nolar (Reference 10),
i l
S. Unreviewed Sai~ety Question (USQ) Review t
Ustng tne knovledge n! the processing phene that had occurced in the IR.TS.
WNS conducted an 1 :vestigation to deternit.
there was an USQ with respect to this avent.
0005DAL M T A3 f
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DA:92:0057 Attachment A
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DOE order 5480.13 " Environ.nent safety and Health Program for Department cf Energy Operattens" states "a proposed change, test, or experiment shall be deemed to involvo an unrevievaj safety question if:
(1) The probabiliev of occurrence or the consequences of an acetdent or malfunctics of equipment imporcont to safoty evaluated previously by naiet, analysis will be significantly increased or (2) A possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previe;.aly by satety analysis will ce created which ceuld result in significant safety consequences."
VVNS convened a peer review panel of plutonium and etiticality expertr. from Savannah River Plant and Oak hidge National Laboratory.
This pscel consisted of H. P. Holcomb H Dyer, and C.
Parks.
Their tas': was to evaluate the evidence and adviso VVNS on the 05Q issue, review tl,e pertinent Safety Analysis Reports for the IRTS. investigative data and analysis with respect to criticality issues, anu _ammarite their findings in written reports
(".eferences 9, 11).
Vith respect to the USQ issue, the group agreed tbat even with continued processing cf the supernatant a criticality could not FSve occurred in the evaporator.
The Peer Review Panel concluded thst no USQ existed.
The information concerning the fissile accumulation in the LVTS evrporetor was alsa presented to the VVPO Independent Review Group. The minutes (Reference 12) of that meeting stat s "that the Independent Review Group agreed with the review process for IRIS anu concluded there is ne unreviewed s fe ty queation."
Based en the assessment provided uy ths Paer leview Panel, the Independent Review Group and the evidence accumulated during the investigation, WVNS concluded that there was nor an USQ associated with the accumulation of fiurlie material in the LVTS evaporator, components (Reference 132 The West Valley Project Office (WVPO), Collcwing an independent review, and the Office of Health Phyuics and Indt.strial Hygiene (EH 41) corcurred with this conclusion (Reference 14,15).
DOE-HQ.EM-343 also agreed that there was not a
'JSQ in the approval ietter for resumption of IRTS oporations (Reference 16).
C. Clean out of Fissile Material It was determined that nitric acid should be uced to chemically clean the LVTS and SIP 91-03 (Reference 17) was isrund.
During the cleanin5 the evaporator van run in reflux, meaning all distillates ware recurr-d to the main liquid pool in tne evaporator. Basically, the acid : leaning solution was ollowed to siener in the evaporator while samples of the liquid were taken to track tne effactiveneas of the cleantrg.
Three separate acid flushes of the evaporator ook place during Augus t 1991.
The acid s trengths used durius these flushes 12 Normal Sitric acid vita 1 g/L Soron added for additioral criticality were safety.
Figure 2 summarizes the mass of fissile plutonium and fissile uranina that removed f rom the LWTS during tbn acid cleanin6 cvolutions, The total were plutonium at,d uranium recoved free the LVTS awounts to 310. 5 grams total Pu (251.8 grams fissile Pu) and 12.12 kg total (212 grams fissile U)(figure 2).
Also, as a conservative step VVMS in ccnjunction with the VVFD and the NRC, snipped four samples from the evaporator cleaning solution to New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) for indecendene Uranita and Plutonium Anaiyses.
NBL analytical resule;, agreed with VVNS analytical results, within approximately 2 percant fcr both t ranium and plutonium (Re ference 13).
CCOSDAL.LET A*
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f LA:92:0057 Attachnent A Af ter the completion of the acid cleaning et LVTS, an extensive flushing of all possible acid exposed pipes, pumps and vessels was done.
This flush was inten.-1 to return the eleaned LVTS and all of its equipment to a processing ready condition.
P nally, a survey of the evi.peratar and associated vessels was performed after the acid cleaning.
This survey shoved that the general radiation field surrounding the evaporator was reduced from 50 to 100 mR/hr to 0.$ mR/hr, and hot spots were reduced from approximately 2 R/hr to less than g
1.5 mR/hr (see figure 3).
D. Process Control for Processing To lower the concentrations of uranium and plutonium in the liquid fu i:
Tank 8D-2. twenty percent sodium hydroxide (caustic) was added to elevate the pH.
Testing perfor=ed at !TVNS indicated that at an elevated pH the uranium and plutonium concentrations in the 1. quid would decrease. Table 2 shows Tank 8D 2 sample data from befora and af ter the addition of caustic to che tank.
This addition reduced plutoniua concentration level in the liquid 15 times and the urani.m concentration level 17 times. Additionally as part of sludge washing titanium treated geolite vill be used in the Supernacant Treatrent System (STS) wou}d further reduce the level of pluconium in the liquid.
Process control procedures to monitor fissile material distributions throughout the IRTS. TR-IRTS 11 and OSR IRTS-12 (Reference 19, 20), have baen developed to monitor the volume of Tank 8D 2 liquid that flove through the titanium treated column in the STS and track the' accumulatten of fissile materini in the LVTS evaporator.
Both of these documents use extensive sampling plans to track volum5s processed and fissile accumulation, These documents also include safe limits for a) total volumes processed, and b) fisrile accumulation in the respective areas.
The baseline or initial inventory of fissile material in the LVTS was established as part of the process control. VVNC conservative estimates for plutonium and uranium in the LUTS vera reported to be 359 grnas total plutontum (291 grams fissila) and 26 kilograms total uranlum (455 grams fissile).
Subtracting the grams of fissile material removed from the LVTS from the estimated grams of fissile material yields cha 2 allowing values:
approximately 39.2 grams-of fissl a plutontue and 241 grams - " fissile uranium. These values will be used as the initial invoutor f fissile material in the evaporator per TR IRTS-11.
SUM!MRY VVNS characterized the changes in the Tank 83-2 Supernatant and the distribution of the fissile materi.als across the IRTS. This characteri:atten determined that the evaporator and canks in the Liquid Veste Treatment Sysees (LVTS) vern accumulating fissale material. An engineering analysis developed a method to chemically clean the LVTS with nitric acid. This chemical cleaning was effective in removing 251.8 grams of fissile plutonium from the starting fissile plutentum inventory of 291 grams. Additionally, using-the knowledge of the processing phenomena that nad occurred in the IRTS, WVNS "onducted an investigation that determined there was no USQ vich tespect to this e7ent.
The investigation that took place hare was an excellent example of cooperation throughout the entire DOE system. VVNS received ineut and help from the DOE WVPO and DOE ID field offices and from loveral other DOE sites in the form of technical and peer review groups.
00050AL.'lT A-5
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.DA:92:0057 Attachment A o
REFERENCE 3 1,
occurrence Report WVNS.90 0026, LVTS 90-0001, "Significant Curtailment of Operations by VVNS to Perform an Investigation of a Processing Phenoctnon*, dateo 11/14/90.
2.
Letter VD:90:1317, I. J. Rowland from J. C. Gwynar, " Strategic Plen for Investigation of Fissile Material Accumulation in the Integrated Radwaste Itnaument System (IRTS), dated December 17, 1990.
3.
Letter NMP STL 90 0044, P. J. Valenti from H. P. Holcomb (Savannah River Company), " Trip Report - Visit to West Valley Demonstration Proj ec t to Discuss Plutonium Chemistry Associated with Integrated Radvaste ;reatment System (IRTS). December 3-6, 1990", datad December 10, 1990.
4, VVNS analytical request formr 910087 and 9100106 5.
Memo DC:91:0023, P. S. Klantan Irom J. C. Cvynar, " Confirm Vaste Classification of CSS Drums Final Report", dated April 11, 1991.
6.
Mesa CJ:91:0047, P. J. Valenti from J. L. Mahoney, "Best Estimate and Uncertainty of Pu in the LVTS Evaporator", dated May 28, 1991.
7.
Meno CJ:91:0082, P. J. Valenti from J. L. Mahoney, "Best Estimate of U in the LVTS Evaporator", dated September 23, 1991.
4.
Survey Form No. 18633 dated November 2}, 1990.
9.
Letter NMP-STL 91 0004, P. J. Valenti from H. P. Hol.como (Savannah River Co,1, " Trip Report Visit to West Valley Demonstration Project to Serva on Peer Review Panel to Evaluate findings, Status, and Path Forward for Integrated Radwaste Traatment System (IRTS),
February 13-14, 1991'. dated February 20, 1991.
10.
Letter CTL REF 907196, P. J. Valenti from R. A. Corbett (Corrosion Testing Laboratories, Inc.), ' Chemical Cleaning of Titanium Liquid Vaste Treaccant System (LVTS) Evaporator", dated March 20. 1991.
11.
Letter OV:91:00ll, P. J. Valenti from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, aviair to Vest Valley Demonstraticn Project to Discuss Criticality Safety Concerns Associated with Fissile Materini Accumulation in the integrated Radwaste Treatment System Evaporator, February 13-16, 1991",
da:ed March 19, 1991.
12.
' Draf t Minu:as of VVNS Technical Review Group (TRG) Meeting of.
Februa ry 19-20, 1991".
S. *. Szalinski to C. Cercel dated February 22, 1991.
13.
Letter V3: 41:0324, I. J. Re,wland from J. C. Cwynar, " Conclusion on Fiasile Material Accumulation in-the IRTS Evapsrator*, dated-March 22, l' 9 L.
s C005DAL.LET A-6
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l DA:92:0057 Attacrunent A 14 Letter DU 91:0426,.J. J. Buggy frca T. J. Rowland, "WPO Decision en l-Unrevievoo Safety Qucstion Issue", dated June 20, 1901.
15.
Men.o to T. W. McIntosh from D. M. Rohrer, " Review of Documentation Related to the Resumptie of Operations for the Integ ated Radvaste Treatment System (IRTS5 e the West Valley Demonstrelon Project (WD?) ", dated September 17, 1991.
16.
Letter J. E. Lytie to T. J. Rowland, approval level for resumption of
-IRTS Operations for the purpose of High-Level Vaste sludge washing, l-i j.
dated February 18,-1992.
17.
WVNS SIP 91-03, Rev. O, " Operation of the LWTS i.'igh TDS Evaporator (31017) to Chemically Clean Accumulated Scale Deposits and Return i
Cleaning Solutions to BD 2 Tank", dated 7ebruary 1991.
18.
Letter AY:012:92 0390:92:08, W. G. Poulson from T. J. Rowland, " Final Results of Ar.alysis on Vaste Evaporator Acid Wash", dared February
'7,
- 1992, 19.
TR-IRTS-ll, Rev. O, " Fissile Material Mass Balance Acroan the LWIS Evaporator" datid August 1991.
j 4
20.
OSR-1RTS-12, Rav. O, "Supernatant Treatment System Feed Requirements",
dated January 16, 1992.
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0005DAL.LET A-7 l-
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DA:92:0057 Attachment A' TAELE 1 Sample Results Showing No Unexpected Fissila Plutonium in GSS Vaste Form.
- Dru:n Produy1qn Aetiv!:v D,3,gg -
Jfrom drum)
Drum (172830 7/20/88 Gross Alpha.
1.71 E 02 Radionuclide Total Pu 1.90 E-02 Pu 241 1.48 E 01 Orum #81712 11/1/90 Gross Alpha 1,7 7 E 02 Radionuclide Total Pu 2.82 E 02 Pu 241 2.48 E 01 Drum #80949
'10/29/90 Gross Alpha 2.66 E-02 s
Radioneclide Total Pu 2.67 E 02 Pu-241 2.77 E 01 Drum #7981o 7/16/90 Gross Alpha 1.30 E 02 Radionuelide Total Pu 1 87 E-02 Fu 241 1.39 E 01 Drum #79953 7/16/90 Gross Alpha-2,51 E 02 Radionuclide Total Pu 1.64 E 02 Fu 241 1.36 E 01 I
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.0005DAL LET A-8 7
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i DA:92:0057-Attachment A TABLE 2 Tank 8D 2 Sample Results Show Decreate in Total Uranium and Alpha Pluconium Concentrations.
Before Caustic Addition dil.8L austic Addition C
t Date 10/28/91 11/14 91
/
Lao Log Number 910207; 9102216 j
pH 9.9R 12,6 Total U 197 Ug/g 11.6 Ug/g i
-Alpha Pu
.238 uC1/ml
.0171 uC1/ml l
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