ML20095C130
| ML20095C130 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah |
| Issue date: | 12/06/1995 |
| From: | Shell R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-95-03, GL-95-3, TAC-M92274, TAC-M92275, NUDOCS 9512110377 | |
| Download: ML20095C130 (5) | |
Text
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i Tennessise Varley Authonty Post Omce Box 2000 Soddy Daisy. Tennessee 37379 i
December 6,1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tenncssee Valley Authority
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50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SON)- UNITS 1 AND 2 - RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING GENERIC LETTER (GL) 95-03
References:
- 1. NRC letter to TVA dated September 6,1995, " Request for Additional Information - Generic Letter 95-03, Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. M92274 and M92275)"
- 2. NRC letter to TVA dated September 20,1995, " Supplemental Request for Additional Information-Generic Letter 95-03, Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (TAC Nos. M92274 and M92275)"
Enclosed is TVA's response to the NRC request for additionalinformation contained in the referenced letters. The enclosed information was verbally provided during a September 25,1995, teleconference between David Goetcheus of TVA and Ken Karwoski of NRC.
This information is being provided in writing within 90 days of your request as discussed during a subsequent phone call. If you have any questions concerning this issue, please telephone D. V. Goodin at (423) 843-7734.
Sincerely, Y-f R. H. Shell Man.ager SON Site Licensing Enclosure cc: See page 2 l
~ 9512110377 951206 PDR ADOCK 050003 7 p
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4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2.
t December 6,1995
- ccjEnclosure):
Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager ~
Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike l
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 NRC Resident inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 lgou Ferry Road Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee _37379-3624 i
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Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Region ll 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 l
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- ENCLOSURE i
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The following provides the TVA response to NRC's request for information as provided ~-
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in their September 6 and 20,1995, letters.
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i NRC Reauest
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t TVA reported that 16 expansion transition circumferentialindications.were j
detected in Unit 1 during the last steam generator (S/G) tube inspection outage
- and that over 50 percent of the tubes were inspected with a rotating pancake coil (RPC) probe ' Please discuss the expansion criteria used during these j
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examinations.
TVA indicated that the expansion criteria contained in the Westinghouse Owners' L
- Group WEXTEX Guidelines would be followed for indications detected at the expansion transition. Provide a summary of these expansion critena.
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TVA Resoonse The expansion criteria used during the last Unit 1 outage top-of-tubesheet l
- examinations was the Westinghouse Owners Group WEXTEX Guidelines, Revision 2, October 15,1991, and a copy was provided to the staff for their j
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- review of the expansion criteria.'
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NRC Reauest l
TVA indicated that dents greater than 5.0 volts were inspected with a RPC probe.
I Provide the procedures used for sizing the dents. If the procedure is identical to the procedure for the voltage-based repair criteria, a detailed description is not l
necessary.
I Future inspection plans for dented (greater than 5 volts) intersections concentrate l
at the lowest hot-leg tube support plates (TSPs). A large dent at an upper TSP t
may be more significant in terms of corrosion susceptibility as a result of higher stresses than a small dent at a lower TSP even though the temperature is lower at the upper TSP. Given this, discuss the basis for the proposed sample strategy
. given that cracking depends on many factors including temperature and stress levels.
i TVA Resoonse The procedure used for sizing dents is identical to the procedure for voltage-based
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- repair criteria. Sample strategy for dented TSP intersections was established as a
.part of Sequoyah Technical Specification Change 95-15, Revision 1 (Enclosure 4,
- Section 1.3.b.3), and TVA's letter to NRC dated September 15,1995, " Additional i
-'Information for Technical Specification (TS) Change 95-15, Revision 1."
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. 3. NRC Reaugal.
During the Unit 1 Cycle 6 outage, TVA indicated that one tube was conservatively plugged for a circumferentiat indication in a tube with a small radius U-bend and r
that the degradation mechanism is not active. Discuss the basis for these statements, particularly with respect to being conservatively plugged. For Units 1 and 2, clarify the extent of the RPC examinations performed in the U-bend region of Rows 1 and 2 (i.e., percentage of tubes inspected). Provide the expansion criteria implemented during the previous outage, if applicable.
. TVA Resoonse The one tube conservatively plugged for a circumferentialindication in a Row 1 U-bend was a preexisting indication in a previously heat-treated U-bend that had not significantly changed in service since the mid-1980's heat treatment. TVA elected to preventative!y plug the tube.
During the Unit 1 Cycle 6 outage,100 percent of Row 1 and the following percentages in Row 2 were RPC examined in the U-bend region.
S/G Nos.
Percentaaes S/G No.1 10 percent S/G No. 2 10 percent S/G No. 3 26 percent S/G No. 4 19 percent At the Unit 2 Cycle 6 outage, the Rows 1 and 2 U-bends were heat treated and 100 percent RPC examination of both Row 1 and Row 2 U-bends were performed after heat treatment.
4.
NRC Reauest Please provide the month and year for the completion of the last two R/G tube inspections at both Sequoyah Units 1 and 2.
TVA Resconse llL M2 Cycle 6 Completed inspections Completed inspections Refueling Outage on May 27,1993 on August 24,1994 i
Cycle 5 Completed inspections Completed inspections
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Refueling Outage on November 24,1991 on April 19,1992 i
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NRC Reauest
- During the Maine Yankee outage in July / August 1994, several weaknesses ~were
' identified in its addy current program as detailed in NRC Information Notice 94-88, " Inservice inspection Deficiencies Result in Severely Degraded
' Steam Generator Tubes." In Information Notice 94-88, the staff observed that l
- several circumferentialindications could be traced back to earlier inspections when the data was reanalyzed using terrain plots.- These terrain plots had not
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been generated as part of the original field' analysis for these. tubes.
l y-For the RPC examinations performed at your plant at locations susceptible to -
circumferential cracking during the previous inspection (i.e., previous inspection
, per your Generic Letter (GL] 95-03 response), discuss the extent to which terrain
. plots were used to analyze the eddy current data. If terrain plots were not routinely used at locations susceptible to circumferential cracking, discuss -
'j whether or not the RPC eddy current data has been reanalyzed using terrain i
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' mapping of the data, if terrain plots were not routinely used during the outage i
and your data has not been reanalyzed with terrain mapping of the data, discuss j
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your basis for not reanalyzing your' previous RPC data in light of the findings at Maine Yankee.
l Discuss.whether terrain plots will be used to analyze the RPC eddy current data at locations susceptible to circumferential cracking during your next S/G tube g
inspection (i.e., the next inspection per your GL 95-03 response).
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l TVA Resoonse I
In previous outages at Sequoyah Units 1 and 2 terrain plots were used and are
.j included in analysis of all RPC data. Sequoyah site specific analysis guidelines-l
, requir's terrain plots for analysis of RPC data and will be used at future S/G inspeetions.
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