ML20095B825

Opposition to Licensee 840815 Motion for Protective Order Re TMI Alert First Set of Interrogatories & First Request for Production & Motion for Extension of Time to Reply to TMI Alert First Set of Interrogatories.W/Certificate of Svc

ML20095B825
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	08/20/1984
From:	Bernabei L GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20095B807	List: ML20095B804 ML20095B825
References
SP, NUDOCS 8408220263
Download: ML20095B825 (62)

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{{#Wiki_filter:. V s -F UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s Before the Atomic Safe'ty and Licensing Board f

ClMETEn U '.W' In the Matter of

) ) -METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. SE42SE94M P3:47 ) (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart - Management Phase) Station, Unit No. 1) )' BNyh] j{ '.,;, ) .,g THREE MILE ISLAND ALERT'S OPPOSITION TO LICENSEE'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF, TIME s Intervenor Three Mile Island Alert opposes Licensee's Motion o _for a Protective Order, filed,on Augu'st 15, 1984, on the ground that the information sought in TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories. and'First Request-for Production to GPU is relevant to the issue ~. .before the Board concerninf\\whether the false statements Mr. Dieckamp made'in the mailgram he sent-to Congressman Morris Udall on May 9, 1979, to rebut information. reported in a New

York Times articlW of May 8,-1979, reflects on'GPU management's character and integrity.

Licensee has also requested an extension of over two weeks to reply to TMIA's First' Set of_ Interrogatories. Because of the tight %s time schedule for discovery,iTMIA opposes' licensee's request for . an extension. of time, or,,in the alternative, requests a lengthen-ing of the= discovery schedule by a time equivalent to any. extension granted GPU. I. BACKGROUND. On.' July;31, 1984, TMIA. filed its First Set of-interrogatories and First Request for Production.to GPU. concerning the issue of the 8408220263 840820 PDR ADOCK 05000289 G PDR s

Dieckamp mailgram and its reflection on GPU management integrity. . TMIA requested in the interrogatories information about the know-ledge of GPU and B&W personnel of the presence of hydrogen in the . containment' building and other conditions of the reactor on the first day of the accident. Under the rules governing proceedings before this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Licensing Board"), GPU's response to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories is due on July 19, 1984, and its response to TMIA's First Request for Production is due on September 4, 1984. Discovery is currently scheduled to be completed by September 30, 1984, according to the Prehearing Conference Order of this Licensing Board. TMIA has informed GPU counsel that it intends to depose a number of GPU former and current employees and manage-ment concerning the Dieckamp mailgram and related issues concerning their knowledge of the pressure spike and the presence or explosion 1. of hydrogen in the containment building and/or the reactor coolant system on the first day of the accident. On August 13, 1984, at the offices of GPU's counsel, GPU and TMIA counsel negotiated for over four hours concerning TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production in an attempt L to reach agreement on the scope and timing of answering the dis-l ocovery requests. As stated in GPU's Motion for Protective Order, LTMIA has agreed to extend GPU's time for response to TMIA's First i Set of Interrogatories to August 27, 1984 I-l l

k-II. DISCOVERY AS TO OTHER CONDITIONS OF THE REACTOR WHICH WOULD LEAD GPU EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS TO BELIEVE THE PRESSURE SPIKE } OBSERVED ON MARCH 28, 1979, WAS A REAL PRESSURE SPIKE AND INDICATED THE PRESENCE AND EXPLOSION OF HYDROGEN AND dORE DAMAGE IS' RELEVANT EVIDENCE AND REASONABLY CALCULATED TO LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. Intervenor TMIA is entitled through discovery to information l relevant to the issues in this proceeding, whether the informa-tion relates to TMIA's claim or defense or to a claim or defense of GPU. Further, TMIA is entitled to information which even though inadmissable at the time of hearing, appears reasonably.bly calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 10 C.F.R.

2. 74 0 (b) (1).

All objections raised by GPU, except those to the scope of Interrogatory Nos. 27 t'o 31, 38 and 39, are to information requests about the conditions of the reactor or. events occurr!ag 4 i at TMI-2 on March 28, 1979, the first. day of the accident.1/ The operators' knowledge and information about the conditions of the reactor prior to. the hydrogen combustion or explosion at -approximately 1:50 p.m. on March 28, 1979, is important to develop - the context in' which the operators understood and interpreted the pressure spike which occurred at that time. GPU management's know-ledge of these conditions (or opportunity to bEcome _ informed of these conditions) is relevant to their understanding, or opportunity to understand, that the pressure spike which occurred indicated a _realiincrease in pressure within the reactor building,. the presence orL combustion of hydrogen, and core damage. I. bb The interrogatories to which GPU has:made this objection;as to ~ - scope are ' the following: Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, (, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,134, 37, 40,l41, 48, 49, 50, 51 and 58. The. document ' requests to which GPU has made this objection as to scope are the following: _-Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9.

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l . GPU operators and managment's understanding of the meaning and significance of the pressure spike is central to whether Mr. Dieckamp knew or should have known that GPU operators and manage-ment believed the pressure spike which occurred on March 28 indicated core damage or that GPU had withheld information about the pressure spike. It has been widely argued that GPU operators' knowledge of other conditions of the reactor at or near the time of the pressure spike led them to believe the pressure spike indicated a real pressure increase, some kind of explosion had occurred, and the the spike was not due to an electrical malfunction. Even a cursory review of the Majority Staff Report of the House of ~ Representatives' Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs . entitled " Reporting of Information Concerning the Accident at Three Mile Island" (March, 1981) indicates the importance of the operators' knowledge of other conditions of the reactor to their understanding of the spike.

See, e.g., Udall Report at 14, 17, 22, 32-36, 45, 54-88, 93-97, attached and incorporated herein zus Exhibit 1.

-TMIA has requested information on the following conditions of the~ reactor, all of which would tend to lead the operators to the . conclusion that the pressure spike which occurred at approximately 1:50 p.m. on March 28 indicated a real pressure increase implying an explosion of some type, and core damage: (a) The PORV had been open and/or leaking from approximately 4:00 a.m. to approximately 6:00 a.m.; (b) The HPI had been throttled during the time the PORV had been open and/or leaking during the early morning of March 28, 1979; l

.' (c) Hot leg temperatures in excess of 700 degrees F. had existed during the morning of March 28, 1979; (d) Temperatures in excess of the saturation temperature indicated the core was or had been in a condition to be cooled by steam rather than water; (e) The TMI-2 reactor was in a condition not covered by emergency procedures on March 28, 1979; (f) The in-core termocouple temperature readings for any part of the day of March 28, 1979; (g) The neutron detectors mounted inside and outside the reactor pressure vessel indicated increased neutron levels.on March 28, 1979; and (h) The high radiation levels detected by the radiation monitor mounted at the top of the containment building during the morning of March 28, 1979. For the same reasons, TMIA has requested information on GPU's knowledge of the following events occurring on the first day of ~ the accident: t (a) The uncertainty of certain GPU and B&W personnel on-site on March 28, 1979, prior to noon on March 28, 1979, as to whether the reactor's core was being adequately cooled; and l (b) Whether Mr. Miller or any other GPU personnel gave i directions not to activate any equipment in the reactor building because it might cause a spark and/or a hydrogen explosion. L Further, GPU is likely to defend on two grounds against the I ~:

_= y. argument that GPU enployees and managers knew that the pressure 4 -pulse indicated a real increase in pressure implying an explosion of some sort and possible core damage:S[ (a) Operators and supervisors believed the pressure pulse was caused by an electric malfunction; or (b) The operations did not interpret the pressure pulse properly because nothing in their training led them to believe such a hydrogen detonation would occur. The first defense is not credible if one considers the plant i design considerations and the simultaneous occurrence of pressure Similarly, i and temperature effects. indicating a real pressure pulse.. l the second defense is not credible if one considers the multiple indicators, in addition to the pressure spike, which indicate - core - uncovery and hydrogen detonation. Thus the operators' perception of the conditions of the reactor other than the pressure pulse is critical evidence going L' ' to' the credibility of GPU's expected defenses to the theory that I L GPU managers and employees were aware on March 28 that the pressure spike indicated a-rea' pressure' increase implying an explosion of some sort and possible core damage. I. III. DISCOVERY ABOUT THE CHANGE TO A REPRESSURIZATION STRATEGY l IS. RELEVANT TO THE LIKELIHOOD THAT OPERATORS AND SUPERVISORS l BELIEVED THE SPIKE INDICATED THE PRESENCE OF HYDROGEN OR I CORE DAMAGE, AND THAT THE REACTOR WAS IN A MORE UNSTABLE CONDITION THAN PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED. I-GPU has objected to responding to Interrogatory Nos. 27 through 31' on the ground that the decision to change from a depressurization S/ It is more likely that Mr. Dieckamp knew or should have known .tdtat CPU personnel believed the pressure spike indicated a real l ' increase in pressure and core damage if GPU operators and super-visors. believed this was the case on March 28, 1979, and took

to a repressurization strategy to bring the reactor under control shortly after the pressure spike occurred at 1:50 p.m. is not relevant to the issues before this Licensing Board. -c Mr. Chwastyk is one of the two supervisors who has acknow-ledged he was aware of an explosion which occurred at the time of the pressure spike. Soon after the occurrence of the pressure spike he actively attempted to convince his supervisors to change to a repressurization strategy. It appears Mr. Chwastyk in fact succeeded in changing to such a strategy. If the reason he e ci .believed the strategy of bringing the reactor under control should be changed.is related to the fact of a sudden pressure spike which indicated to him core damage, this information would be relevant to demonstrating operators and supervisors believed the pressure spike indicated core damage. Similarly, it is relevant information whether or not Mr. Chawstyk, in his efforts to_ change to a repressurization strategy, conveyed his belief that the pressure-spike indicated a real. increase in pressure implying.an l. explosion of some sort to other operators-and supervisors, including Gary Miller. Therefore,-Interrogatory Nos. 27 through 31 seek information tending to demonstrate not only.Mr. Chwastyk's belief or under-standing of the pressure spike at the time it occurred, but.other operators and supervisors' understanding of the spike _as well. IV. DISCOVERY-ON THE MILLER-TROFFER CONVERSATION IS RELEVANT AS TO WHETHER MR. MILLER BELIEVED THE REACTOR HAD SUFFERED CORE l DAMAGE, AND THERE WAS HYDROGEN IN THE REACTOR BUILDING, AND WHETHER HE HAD WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM'PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AT A TIME EARLIER THAN THE OCCURRENCE OF THE PRESSURE SPIKE. l r

P v.. Interrogatories 38 and 39 request information concerning the meaning of Mr. Miller's recorded conversation with Mr. Troffer of Met-Ed at approximately 9:30 a.m. on March 28, the first day of the accident. It appears that Mr. Miller believed the reactor was in' a more unstable condition than he had represented to Commonwealth of Pennsylvania authorities and that the plant was in a condition that had not been totally analyzed. If, as appears from the plain words of the two statements which appear in these interrogatories, Mr. Miller did believe that there had been uncover-ing of the core and core damage, his belief and the basis for his - belief are likely to have led him to interpret the pressure spike as-an indication of a real increase in pressure implying an explo-sion of some sort and core damage. Further, it appears that Mr. Miller believed the conditions of the reactor were such at 9:30 a.m. that hydrogen could have been produced. Therefore, a clarification of Mr. Miller's statements made in this conversation is relevant - to whether Mr. Miller believed at 9:30 a.m. that hydrogen had been produced and there had been core damage, which makes it more likely that he would believe at 1:50 p.m. that the pressure spike indicated a hydrogen explosion-and core damage. 1 Moreover, if Mr. Miller, as appears from his statement, with-held information from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania authorities as early as 9:30 a.m., it is more likely that he continued to with-hold information about the worsening condition of the reactor later in the day, including information about the pressure spike the hydrogen explosion, and core damage. Mr. Dieckamp, who talked to Mr. Miller shortly after the pressure spike occurred, may well have discussed these matters with him, including the worsening 7 _-,m m

4 condition of the reactor and whether or not the information about - the pressure spike and other conditions of the reactor should be released to public authorities. Therefore, GPU should be ordered to answer all TMIA discovery f requests concerning Mr. Miller's statements to Mr. Troffer which indicate that he was withholding information from Pennsylvania I authorities and that the reactor was in a more unstable condition that had apparently been communicated to these authorities. V. 3PU SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO RESPOND TO TMIA INTERROGATORIES BEYOND AUGUST 27, 1984; IF AN EXTEN-SION OF TIME IS GRANTED, THE LICENSING BOARD SHOULD GRANT AN EQUIVALENT EXTENSION OF THE DISCOVERY SCHEDULE. i This Board has ordered that discovery, including all responses to discovery, be, completed by September 30, 1984. In order to complete discovery on the two issues currently open for discovery, TMIA promptly after entry of the Board order served both the licensee and the NRC Staff with discovery requests on the two-issues. GPU has asked ' for over a two-week extension to respond to TMIA's First. Set of Interrogatories claiming that they are burden-i. some and will require ~ a large expenditure of time. l TMIA attempted to reduce the burden on GPU by initiating and l [ engaging-in good-faith negotiations with GPU counsel to narrow the L scope of certain interrogatory and document requests, and clarify-- l ing_others. -Second, TMIA has organized'its schedule for discovery according to the schedule set by this Board and the time limits

allowed by the NRC rules.

Since TMIA wishes to depose a number of 'GPU former and current employees, it wishes to receive and review GPU's first1 set of responses prior to noticing the depositions. The only manner in which that will be possible is if the responses . M..

j - lo - are served on TMIA by, at the latest, August 27, 1984. It is unfair to TMIA to allow GPU almost double the time to respond r 'to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories unless a similar lengthen-ing of the discovery schedule is granted.2/ ~ j Therefore, TMIA opposes an extension of time to GPU to respond to TMIA's First Set of Interrogatories beyond August 27, -19 8 4 ~ unless an equivalent extension of the discovery schedule is granted.to October 14, 1984. VI. CONCLUSION. 4 In consideration of the foregoing arguments, TMIA respect-fully' requests this Licensing Board to deny Licensee's Motion for Protective Order in its entirety and Licensee's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to TMIA's First Set of Interroga-tories. Respectfully submitted, [g s L E BERNABEI Gove nment Accountability Project 1 Connecticut Avenue N.W. I Suite 202 Washington, D.C. 20009 I (202) 232-8550 DATED: August 20, 1984 Attorney for Three Mile Island Alert 2! 'As this' Board remembers, TMIA requested a six-month discovery schedule because it recognized that given the other litigation responsibilities of the parties, it might well take six months to propound and respond to discovery requests on the two issues L currently before this Board. TMIA is the lead intervenor on the Dieckamp mailgram issue and on most portions of the training issue as well. y -w.

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J&m7: x, ._.m g, F d 16 { At approximately 6 a.m. on 3farch 28, temperature data began to s indicate clearly that portions of the reactor core had become uncov-7 ered. Between 8 and 9 a.m. in-core thermocouple data indicated the I high likelihood of a substantial steam-cladding interaction. [, Several questions exist with regard to the temperature data: to what extent were TMI managers aware of it; to what extent did they l G j M, l.,/ interpret it along with other data to mean that there was steam within m the primar3; cooling system; to what extent did they infer from this d;-@ S data the existence of a steam-cladding reaction; and to what extent l was this data reported to State and Federal authoritiest N.W - The following excerpts from the record of the TMIinquiries indi-r-v WJL j cate the following: Control room personnel's general awareness of hot-p leg temperatures in excess of 700 degrees, a clear indication of the

• • W"M presence of steam in the hot legs; some awareness that the tempera-

"I I tures in excess of 700 degrees meant that the steam space had extended B E into the core; limited awareness that data from the in-core thermo- -.O. - couples indicated temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees above the 4[* /.I l core: and no admission by those having managerial responsibilities l / 4 *,';- I. as having made the connection between the very high temperatums ^, >l f in-core measurements prior to 0:30 a.m. on 3farch 28 said the tempera-g and a s'eam-cladding reaction. One technician involved in taking the 2 tures were of a n.agnitude to suggest to him that,"You've got a melt- ] down coming." (See p. 29.) [At least one supervisor (who was un- ] $,*,,'I[ g aware of the direct measurements made of the in-core thermocouple .[ j voltages) has stated he inferred on 3farch 28 from the 1:50 p.m. .i - 3 j 'v pressure pulse that there had been a hydrogen explosion in the con-h j tainment building, and this supervisor says that others were aware of 4 g this event and its significance. (See pp.71,'75-76.)] a t.9 :M oo 5 g D. hor-1.EG TEMPERATURE wnaw 8 p' Hot-leg temperature data at T3fI-2 were normally presented on a S,, computer printout and on a strip chart recorder mounted in the re-w.- ' e n actor control room. The computer was programed to record data be-l tween 520 degrees F. and 620 degrees F.; when the temperatmes were outside this range, the computer printed question marks. The strip Q-chart was ca Figure II.) pable of recording temperatures up to 800 degrees F. (See T, 32crum ED r bY9 a h 4 m.yf,t y.%.%.s.:((' J. s.M(*M'Yc.4 .y 4 M .]

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• h Were you aware that the instruments indicated tempera-F@- Q:. Y M ~%p m,~.

+ p:,[%'jM w turesof 700to800dehy indicated temperatures around es Fahrenheit f res C 45i.HpfW A. I was aware t in n - a. hf i .h g Y b.dM"2.Wpg@) qW'7'. at was yourasseSsment of these temperaturesf What did they mean to youf D'MN57Mi. f A. 'I' hey meant to me that I didn't have a cooling method Gt M C&aN.. ;.;.M.' M.z,e. g. teh. s. for the Al r.F M NI someth. core, is what it mean.t at the time. Today it means ..m g ~ m@" @'i w n d M *'~d M i'*.k. ing different to me, as it does to any operator. But at ~ m n.- w. n - M. .the time at m. eant to me that I didn't have~an adequate cool-W$M..wn =[m. --NEN' mhmethod in the core. a- $w.%we~,3 EN I

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. And you related it to method rather than coolant avail-4 ts. ~. ablef $5.WS'es:mu.-d;:. W:p @ fM5 M A I don't think I ever s Isa d, hey,I'm not removm, aid, Oh,I've got a low level.'I think V H 2 @.5 $ J' G E,' G M.s m .i i g the heat. C

1. .mW. : %r Q. Did you at any time on 3farch 28th discuss the implica-9,9@z. h,4 m.+"~".
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tions that..you drew of these temp.eratures.with 3ir. 31 iller. m-4@~2.: n n y s] % T-,d6F (M-9 *- A. I thmk we did discuss them m the thmk tank. (Ross, I&E,9/24/80, p. 25-26.) p bsMM$sN.m..fdMk E. CmmrTT oF WM mmmcom2 DM D g %~ Ipsc-KRbdEM In g 4'i G jp q C R C Other sources of temperature data were the 52 thermocouples in-stalled inside the reactor pmssure vessel above the fuel assemblies. b's$.;h.~OjfSkMfF These thermocouples sensed water (or steam) temperatures at par-bg. F keg".MfDpr.hgri ticular pomts across the top of the core. Each thermocouple provided nM5ch an indication of the temperature conditions above a particular fuel T'agg'7[b *hu'W[;; fg7.T. assembly while th,e hot-le 5 NP"$ 4 A temperature sensing devices (discussed above normally mdicate steam)) leaving the reactor pressure vessel. There 3]dMMDOF2Eb f k j@.6b.+SWgk..v.n.~ MM differences between average temperatures as couples. peak temperatures m,easured by the m. me.a.s Qgy,v.g.p y l and the dividualin-core thermo- . rMbg2=1'g. It was these peak m-core temperatures that confirmed not , )%' i g s $;3' Q Q" M'.'T f 3 only that the core was uncovered, but that the zirconium cladding was M'3;"',g,M .vdUQ reacting with steam, producing hydrogen and zirconium oxide. 'W One or more T31I personnel showed an early and continuing inter-M?MEQ g* g.r:2;6:g@kg @g est in the in-core temperatures. They instructed the computer to print gjj2.2Iy: these tem 4 :11 p.m.peratures at about 8:34 a.m.,8:47 a.m.,11:10 a.m.,12:40 p.m., fggfs , 6:30 p.m., 7:59 p.m., 8:56 p.m., and 9:56 p.m. 'Between g y k @M g hgdgg@d W@ipp'U K .:Os:q 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. the temperature data for at least 40 pewent of the JtM h. thermocouples (EPRI. Fig. ci-11) were printed as question marka. in-F dicating either that the thermocouples had failed or that the tem-Mm.gN5' Mh.Mjg!jy5*1Q$ peratures were in excess of 700 degrees F. Because some of the thermo-rp/-%ga.wxy;3Mr; ht couples alternated between indicating question,ble that t l marks and temp g"MN;76g;fLM e:WA tures less than 400 degrees, it was more plausi b' 'iULlW:48 d :%f were indicative of temperatures in excess of 700 degrees than indicative gs b 4 % % W @# d C of instrument malfunction.' 3foreover, if many had been damaged ,.0 4 i W8 1 *[a@kg&n#*E #Mp. while others continued to function, this in itself would have been a hc u 7$ .ei kMQ reasonable indication that something majer had happened in the core to R M s . J,*./ f, %. e.M qI.,.d.g*Ma. temperatures less than 700 degrees sna were apparenur used thereafte m '"w M co

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• - h y; L Ross. Thermocouple temperatures were brought up to Gary k%i-Styh N h W M-31 iller, and I guess the bottom line they got out of that, was hR.w%5 W,.;",ll%". ghM W

p D, R g f 7-5 that they were not conclusive. It showed the core was hot, / 4A:W. basicall. I was going to say his range varied, very scattered.

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CWCM6 ee/?s@:.:: He had ike... He was saym. scattered throughout. So, well,g he had various temperatures 7 hdL*-~3'%d.A.:.MM3".7 MN I26Fdd,J, Gary and he discussed it, and %@!/S G D M Wf b@$iG;Tgb ig basicall I think the bottom line was yeah, the core is hot, or ~ M~>.T9.*DR rr itis at kast hot. h[isWRh#rm,way.sj7MMihIM.a (Ross, I&E Tape 226,3 fay 19,1979, p. 42.) Ie That the in-core thermocouples had indicated temperatures in ex-pm @. & e w, u. cess of 2,000 degrece (implyin robable. hydrogen production) was .r-apparently not reported to the C durmg the first few days of the FgJ;)Fga,: E E M. M 0"*7'J.2'4 % S h F*l.t h Q accident. Victor Stello (then NRC Director of Operating Reactors trr A m - % @ % Qg " $ C 7. - b ';' under Harold Denton) said he had not known of such measurements nh:~a.n... until the week of April 1. Ro i@@%FM(MU2 gM.%: under Harold Denton) stateker 3fattson (Director of Systems Safety to the E&E Task Force on 3 fay 9 that W;; g g ?-= A : g M :.f p this was the first he had heard of such temperatures.

p

r& rMQ1M.%2fMKg6' Stello however, had been concerned on 3farch 28 about data indi-4 "m @N2NbMhDN5h.{6 cating su,perheated conditions in the hot-legs. He requested computer p?dW:- 1 printonts of the in-core thermocouple deta. There ensued the following @WCM:CiCW:WM;.g dialog between Three 3 file Island and the NRC's Incident Response O MM.w; 4@;Q/gM.m &., dWl;' g Centerin Bethesda: ar.+-- y a n.g[%, w.I..L...gg.@,. _ Mw@n,,m. r. Oksyf Voicz. First of all, I can't get the in-core temperatures. s .u w w 2;; f 2-W Voicz. You cannot get them f W W %:<W:#2@Z G C m .cm S Vozcz, They print out question marks. CIW4Sp@d.~t M E J d M *J E? i E-Voicz. They print out question marks f ~ L~W.i... W-i.4j.

w..v.w w. ~~~.. wa :. %s' Vorcz. Yes.

m c.:.*.: S..wc2:N.dfsueh, w;y'D Voicz. Okay, what's that mean f -D e:4.5-.::,.w.4m Qp..,.n Voicz. That means that either the computer point is messed p n p-:EWB4&g..;.w N:.c up-okay f gMp Vozcz. Yes. . NQQ"ml~sGC@C.q! w? Vorcz. Or that the line--you know the-where you sense MMg'$i44W it, that line's broken or something's me,ssed up with that line. ~ Gfcp$Mg.:: Okayf They were printing earlier. Yeah, the computer just HE A M$$@%@MMgy M won t-the computer won't spit out a good number for them. a.x3 $1NN%$WesMrg They're trnng all of them to see if we can get any of them @R;7. 5 - % K S M Ydt g p to print. Okay f I (01-033-CH 2/20-3fE3f-10.) I' ~W4TENf@k.$dErd' Based on the foregoing discussion. NRC I&E investigators stated ~#KE M M I .Q Ig.

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that at approxin ately 4:10 p.m. on 3farch 28:" Reported incore tem-l ., JEypt$gg@s4&c@4 Peratures unavailable. Supervisor (at TAII) hich means either t (W (in-cores) are all printing question marks w p 9gM computer point or the sensor is malfunction (sic)." . w# @$ g%++gg gkTJmh *4 (NUREG 0600,IA-101.) g,;..w me 553 2R$i Yet racticall coincident with the conversation in which the NRC W% dpM "51p was to d that t e computer was printing out question marks, the ~W ~~ computer was in fact displaving not only question marks but also

4.j$@[%>5b two on-scale readings, one indicating that thermocouple 9-H was 1 -

A showing a temperature of 596.9 degrees F., and the other showing li j by;dgcWT,. W'c$4W..x.MI thermocouple 6-L indicatinfsuperheated conditions in the a temperature of 562.1 F. Both tem- .wP" 6 J.yu -i.d.y[k*M peratures were indicative o y y e n ' r g dhM4bM.f.*.[.*;iC'*.)* < k p.~ m : w w "q." a c m D y:[N 1 ya4w?%*: n l MEh*/ ZIt D 'A m m -. M y"'I )*V*-.Td*2 M.D Y & w.h % ; k d.g @. 8.n k h m y[~ w w ~ M -4"(Bu 1:kdM) b****- I-B9 .f-p Wsx '.$N3:-fiFMW.W -n r! l $stM1 u*%

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~' gr m m ..m, m &- ..e-m._. + (" w 38 temperatures were brought up to Gary bottom line they got out.of that was the likelihood that the reason for the qu Perature rather than a malfunction of the m,estion marks was high tem-iclusive. It showed the core was, hot, i' struments. 4say his range varied very scattered. Is saym A reproduction of the computer printout follows: 5, well,g he had variou,s temperatures ' G:ry and he discusse.d it d O ~ u s:13 n2.7 In.1 nl.4 474.7 ur.4 sRt. el.s 37c.3 2.w.E ttom }ine was yeah, the com 1s ho't, or 15 cia n 132.E 123.9 sr.s 470.0 nsG.6 sn 4n.3 375.3 2nd ' 16 n:32' chTA Ow3 IM HWE T/C 3-H TD P -M?.? -lE Tape 226,3 fay 19,1979, p. 42.) }c is:n:u paTA uw s in iNCORE T/C s-c TJ'4P , -TT7.t 16:11:41.04TA 0k94..lM INCORE T/C. 9-H TCr> 5'.'s.9 mpk had m. dicated temperatures in ex. IG:.11:37_ DATA 043G.lu luCORE T/C,.5-F. TUP -???.7.._ 2 7mgprob:ble hydrogen production) was IG: u:06 DATA O m tw suCcaE T/C s-E m e - m.? o 16 :12:14_ cap TREro.. _.. _.,. _. m NRC Dt'reetor of Operatinghe NRC during the first few d"$e f the PENA m n c w > C = 1" H 03 " 0 1:2.2121.9 sn"U 03n oun 03% o n mer. S u actors .o 16:12:51

he had not known of such measurements 44-.0ATA,,0W3 llD UCORE,T/C 7-F TC P,

.-???.?,,,_ .1 470.4 esG.0 a l. 420.3 37G.3 2:s.0 '}er 3fattson (Director of Systems Safet 16:13: IJ:n:n DATA aw in U S E T/C 7-E MW -MJ t3 the E&E Task Force on 31ay 9 that D 1" 19 3-DATA Js00_H4.HME T/C 6-G MP c'f such temperatures. _f?MJ 1b:14:12 DATA Us01 IN INCORE T/C s-G TC4P -??? ? _ co,ncerned on 3farch 28 about data indi- ~~ ~ ~GR0up TREr.v 16:1:.:22 3 2n the hot-legs. He requested computer U 0PERATOR GROUP C 2032 N03S0- 03 A ocouph d;ta. There ensued the folio 1:2.0 nGJ n1.0 Sn"a 4n".2 JM8 -" 72--" " > m 3. 420.5 37G.3 m ".1 la n:02 sland cnd the NRC's Incident Response ta "G:C3--CATA 0503 H4 inc0RE T/C s-R Toe -?M.? O 1* 3" "^7^ 2 2..H4 H M E T/C s-H M P __ _ y?MJ_ l IG : 1G : 13._ DATA _,0504 __IM,t NCO' E.T/C G-L.TC P._.. ___.,_ %2.1 _ .can't get the in-core temperatures. cWP TRDC o 1e 1G:22 OPERATOR. CROUP.C__ _........ _.......... _.._, hemt 1032 033G 0390 03M 04G3 0393 % 7? 0'. 3 n%3 c

• estion marks, 16:17:03____181.s 110.s al.14 7t.2 us.3 ns. 4 0.3 37n.4 1.s.0 IG:17:s4 OATA Os05 iM HCORE T/C 7-H TCP

-???.?- 2estionmarggg 1G:13:03. 0ATA..Os06 H4 inCORE T/C. 3-N.TBF8 ...-???.?.. O IG:13:13 CROUP TREN3 g L2neanI OPERATOR C't0UP,C __, _ j either the computerPointis messed 1032 033G CMC 03?/) 04G3 03'!3 Mn O' art n%9 t la ta:34_ _Ina lui.0 nl.2 4na.=n.1 n:..29.0 nu m.1 ,c.. u. o n4TA 0s07 su U m E T/C s-n T w -M?.? -you know, the--where you sense Although the in-core thermocouple data was printed at least 9 times nethm,g s messed up with thatline. between 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on 3farch 28 there appears to be no earher. Yeah, the computer just record of any set of such data having been transmitted to the NRC's 1 to see a.t c good number for them. Incident Response Centerin Bethesda. SP2t ou f we can get any of them

o. Nrrraox nrrrerous (01-033-CH 2/20-3fE3f-10.)

T3fI-2 instrumentation ircluded neutron detectors mounted out-I Ession. NRC I&E investi side the reactor pressure vessel and 52 strings of detectors mounted t tat o on 3f;rrh 28:" Reported ne re p nside. Both in-core and ex-core detectors are installed for,the pur-estion(ct T3H) reports to NRC the p se of providing operational data; during normal operations, the sor m:rks which means eith h8 in-c re neutron detectors mdicate power production at vanous loca- !1 malfunction (sic) " tions within the core. During the T3H accident both in-core and ex-(NUREG 0600,IA-101.) e re detectors provided dat,a indicating the core was uncovered. 3 the conversation in which the NRC The ex-core instruments mdicated increased neutron levels. These Prmtmg out question marks, the were interpreted initially as indicating that the reactor was near the not only question marks but also critical pomt where a self-sustaining chain reaction might b occur-ring. Tlie o ocating that thermocouple 9-H was insufficient berators believed that this might happen as a risult of y degrees F., and the other showing ron concentration in the primary s stem coolant. In

temperature of 562.1 F. Both tem-actuality the apparent increase in neutron flux resulted from the fact perheated conditions in the core and that neutrons-produced at small rates in a reactor core even when the reactor is suberitical-because of voids in the core were more l

likely to be leaked from the pressure vessel and were ther,efore reach-l .- &v Q[.g

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. i u.. ., r u.. fM:gr ; ~. :, <,.. u m,w.- zty. MMyd($ f.UMW.O ing the ex-core instruments in greater numbers. In short, the increased W: W W.. M T neutron flux was due to the pressure vessel having lost water and FC cum g,fe. ::,4., ??M D used ?BM ' : not to a restart of the chain reaction. Gyn"MDM. S.W The in-core neutron detectors also yielded data indicating that the una meg d L'. $....$.. V. core was uncovered and the depth of the uncoverina. Once the water tiall 1 ~. 7 G'ENEistp M level went below the neutron detector and the temperature of its sur. e resu D W w.7 C -Q.,p; U.;- roundin Dur became,gs rose, the detector responded to the higher te at tl i;.Mf.@R' @.M - %. F'_"*% o,4.. f. y.,n' t..x,s.,,.. p indirect indication of water level in the core. (See figure IV.) incri gl.. %2 w'+ ..p Flin ,.-..x e~ 4,2,, M.,U.P.'.G.G2; e.. *M T 41.- e. mWW p w.. g.Mg h,:yy Q.g.gu - F ovas N n -q.m. f.. 4 7 - h D Si Nactor Wssed w. e.:y s-. u[. b.s v. . ~y f [.*' .n~.h,C. h Y N'..,- .J N ~

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• mocouples *

-4 - - -ibove 52 fuel assembliest E. IIIoII RADIATION LEVELS IN REAcroR COOLANT SYSTEM AND IN .. A CONTAINMENT BUILDINo At 6:35 a.m. a radiation monitor mounted at the top of the contain-n,c m.,,,,, ment building indicated radiation levels of about 0.1 Roentgen (R) o n iow> per hour. By 7:30 a.m. this monitor was indicating levels in excess of } 10,000 R per hour

• in the vicinity of the monitor due to fission product gases near the top of the dome. (Approximately 50 percent of persons co,,

,%c' exposed to this dose rate would receive a lethal dose in about 4 min-utes.) These radiation levels implied that radioactive fission product ex.co,e gases had been released from a significant fraction of the fuel rods; the acutrea >- S'8 co**'ad ''A only way such a release could have occurred would have been through i development of cracks or perforations in the cladding. a.n EDO,'cl' e, 1 At approximately 8:50 a.m. on Afarch 28. a reactor coolant sample l sor tow e sw was obtained by technicians who, in order to obtain it were uired i to enter a room where radiation levels approximated 200 R our. Analysis of the sample and knowledge of the procedure by'w ich it had been obtained would have indicated fuel rod failuIe much more. l- - ---.-.._ _.. extensive than that publicly reported on 3farch 28. The record is un-clear as to who among the 'hfI managers was aware of the sample or to-ono memey the conclusions reached from analyzing it. It is also unclear as to the

---

y time at which the NRC was informed of the analysis.The taking of the

/ sample (but not the circumstances of its analysis) is discussed at } length in Section II of NUREG 0600. F. UNCovERINo oF TIIE CORE As the primary cooling system continued to lose water, the water level in the pressure vessel dropped below the tops of the fuel rods. - To em so<eaus.oom The fuel was then cooled by steam rather than water, and as the water 50,'000 R/ hour.M111er recaued that at about 7 a.m. the dome monitor was indicating on the order of l i f ation and estiument locatu:ms tMuler. Tape No. 158.5/7/79,p.26.] 1 I - g.% e \\. M h dk.,.A. ~..E a 5 [ b-M" h *djM A*.~.WT"iDVL3'"~.2$"Is'a. ,a t Q %m..' M #f,' f [," W b [f y ^. f - 1 2 P D 'Wk'[7.L ,.4 6a~, PWW.y d ~ tTf**;p%W ve: @bep. C'C.**p.: e.mya-p h ~ D= M 2.61 M Ny AN: ' N ' N 'M :4#f*. - 9mW :~M@W.E,@q@AMM.:Mril'GNW W TC d;- ~.%: ~: n ~ EMC ? Q. h

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Et e.: m.2:';p u w m y;:p. y n %. f-n m.e--S,c;c s 2:m. MM3hMQ,E$M::..z.Q 1evel drupped further, cooling became inadequate. The temperature W.. -Y.,E R ' G M Q* & d. m. T. G W.d %+f of the zirconium tubes holding the uranium fuel pellets rose to a pomt

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l bm1,1W...r,.O...M.h.- where the zirconiu.m re. acted c.hemically with the steam, producing the hydrogen and zirconium oxide. M l W, h"$ ks*,-3D M C T The manifestations of the core being uncovered have been discussed %'dNUd!? in previous sections: superheated conditions in the hot-legs and above w m#.?:isy.CMhN the fuel, high radiation levels in the reactor containment building, and ti y, %d

.$'Mn j-T-31 high neutron fluxes outside the pressure vessel. Several of those present h$@t'C

.M4@MEi@C interpreted this information to mean the core had been uncovered.

PJJgh N3.)"$'?.32; 0:hers recall beirq unsure as to whether it had been uncovered or not. h.J.P.MMNWR The recollections an this regard as presented to T31I investigators h.'O M M iM S M2%:N. are as follows. J#MWMS.'IM5.. As is indicated above, the technicians who measured the in-core 'C%j $~p WM.4 thermocouple voltages concluded that. the high temperatures they ob- $%.'m,@p(.@@d.,lg@g 'f served implied that the core had been uncovered. (Supra, p. 25.) s: G'. 6 6 $ 5.h **- John Flint, the B&W engineer stationed at the site told I&E investi-NfCRMis:@jM4@~41 gators (D/2/80, p. 4) that it had been his impression on March 28 that 44.:!:dWCS.TQ the PORV had been open for 12 to 15 minutes and that it was not @ Mfk h Ch? until 2 days later that he "found out that it had been open for several M w*f. U *k.; g @ @.:.s.., N L. 7 D t n% hours." He was also apparentl.y unaware of the thr.ottling of the high- .a t* fry'NCWM'. I pressure inj.ection and of the du ect measurements or the in-core thermo-MMrdb%iiNW couple voltages indicating temperatures in excess of 2,000 degrees. On h *.h d 3 @4 W M. M i.( M Z QL2Q0 t sfc J. G; k the basis of temperature and neutron data, Flint did conclude, how-E ever, at 10 :30 a.m. or thereabouts that the core had been uncovered ear-b~-N;g$.b.L M);.ME~O lier, even though it appeared to him that by 10:30 a.m. it was again WW3. LWCW ~ myemd., Flint, engaged in the following dialog with the Kemeny Com-f-%m,.. p:N.. ggt.- m.. nussion mterviewers. The answers are Flint's: -%cm % ;::'*It%^Qi;F'?e.wdbitT' h n $ T& W ;.17 ... MM Q. When you reached the conclusion that the core had been 5 tr. covered approxima"1 an hour to an Imur and a half after h?? N you arrived, which woufd be something in the order of 10 to %.qg @e..g % w.i.:Q $, 4!hhd; qg.,4 10:30, did ou tell anyonel H.-.5fdh.,.?p\\ W. - A. Yes k did. I believe I mentioned it to Lee Rogers at x.. o,v d cige. the time., wn

m,s i + W. h '

Q. What was his reactionf

• Mi'sL7@i$

,N Q. Were you present during that discussionf I @,b A. I believe he went to discuss it with Gary Miller and f IMn George Kunder. ,hpg dd M M.e@?.Sr s M,W.i. A. No, I was not. ( g i..f. Q. Did h A. I don,e report back t.o youf W. m y ~ gr t remember him addressm.g that specific riuestion, m,,4 gr,rg-n. y f. J.' m' ' .y f!m. no- .m Q. Did you c er find out what discussion he had with 4 g;;g3(y,t .. g h,under and 31 iller with respect to core uncoveryi bs Qgf A. Not that I can remember, no. , Whc Q. Did you tell anyone else that you had reached the con-h.T'Gy

1. • tp;b q clusion that the core had uncoveredI i

P W-A. Bell Zewe, Ed Fredericks. f@Mk.n; j Jr'R Q. What was their reactionf gre$kg ,, 'A;j($- i J A. I would say surprised. 3.ir w,$ Q. It was news to them f g. 2 n;~M.,.4 J,;c 9 R F. A. Yes. bh 0 ' $~ 'A Y$ h $$$.#,l. p w. %W 2 M M.t l .q:f.h. R:r...., Mci 1*J,iv na m

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o. cNcERTAINTY AS To ADEQUACY oF CORE CooMNo AND RECooNrrIoN TIIAT

'e, c'k y, now do we all think the nber thatf PLANT WAs IN A CONDITION NoT COVERED BY WRITIEN PROCEDURES remember the core coverage was After the last of the reactor coolant pumps was sh I could-you know the single imately 5:40 a.m. on 3farch 28, the T31I,operatm,ut down at appro r th:n the emergencv, plan, which procedures no longer applied to the conditions existmg m the plant.

me.

Lntil a reactor coolant pump was started at approximately 8 p.m.,the not convinced that you h'ad flow lirincipal path for heat removal was via,the PORV block valve at the i thought that the h'igh pressum top of the pressunzer. purmg this period a relatively small amount passing the core or parts of the f heat w coohng m, as removed via the reactor letdown system,and,by reflux the steam generators. The method of coohng pumpmg water into the pressure vassel with high pressure (mvolvmg could be done. I think the tem-injection ild indications told us that some (HPI pumps, through the hot-leg and pressunzer and thence throu-)h the PORV block valve) was known as " feed,nd bleed iink we discussed that. Oka ring curselves what the levek. I a in proce3ure for which the operators had not been trained and one for which there were no written procedures. The followmg e,xcerpts from ller, SIG,9/20/79, pp.17-19.) interviews in,dicate the plant mana,gers were in fact aware they were T9,3 filler said: using a coohng procedure for which they had no trammg and one for which there were no written procedures. They were so uncertain t periodically throughout the )iectives re-reviewed the emer-as to the effectiveness of the strategy at high pressure that they ms. Our, concerns became one of switched at about 11:30 a.m. to a strategy involving depressurization of the system.' The latter, if successful, would have allowed cooling .rt circuiting the core to the Re. by the decay heat removal system which was one in whose use the plant ossibir th? core might not be personnel were schooled. I h:ving RCV-2 fail (open or T31I-2 Technical Superintendent, George Kunder, has provided did not convince us that water extensive comments to T31I investigators wit h regard to his perce on 3farch 28 as to the cooling procedures and adequacy thereof:ption ny firm decision was to always ion. Tha group discussed and I ?ressure and attempt to use the KcNDER. OK. I believe, as I indicated on the previous date, rselvesthat the com was covered somewhere around 45 minutes to an hour after declaring the site emergency and getting the emer

hanism wa might get the plant way we-we being Gary 3 filler, Jim brene,y plan fairly under-eelmger and 31ike Ross, E' TMI o 5/7/79 P. 269.)

Iee R gers, and myself-met generally as a small group to discuss strategy and our perceptions about where we were and 2 Eat rs on 3 fay 7,1979,3 filler said: where we thought we should be going. Because it was pretty tey cavitr.ted. We kner we had clear based on the hot leg temperatures existent in the core at cd to pull (sic) pressurizer I that time that we wem mto a very senous problem, that we , not secure HP injection wit'h-did not yet have the cooling of the reactor well under co,ntro,1. Ged. TI'e icere not m our minds I think the general perception at the time was that we intui- !corered. t rely thoucht that we had the core covered. I think by that i 7,1979, p. 23, italic added.) time we felt that we were getting water into the core, but them was no md, cation that hit you m the head and said a conditions after 3 filler had issaed i fection flow was to be mal'niained

• • • 8 d c ' d 'h '

'hi tm r **1 d 'h* or e rstlab"l"e 'a'nd co"nc'er'ne'd tha't Ef oV" bloc' 'h'lve mig'*t fall o' pen'.'*"idnt app'ea"r to 'b'e' re"t. u D '" ' b'

• Itce 3Ijller expressed doubt 33 to 3

k va h Hug anywnm p the group decided to drop pressure to get core Sood tanks (CPr) to Sont cred with high pnssure injection Eraeor were coneromne prmore with the nrt and rsrov. The atarr was concerned @ be]3;ye the cope gag hpjgg coojeg that the nPi Pow m1tht be bypassine the core: since 'ru., 620. T.,220 and the pressurtner ressel and out the hot leg, he would a"ad : so ther decided 'o deare=aa'ti+ in "a a"amot ta p' ' ore riaod initiation and waver evece RTD was re'attrete constant at 350* F. They wanted to mobe sure the core was core wnS covered ear}ier when the

• • # P*II'"

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some of e rooms; the readmgs were horrendous. u.sm.pi,f.,m M P-W W.7 8 (Miller et al, GPU,4/12/79, pp. 24-25.) RES N fj* m. F M W)@m ... Our major concern was that the fuel didn't degrade g. m .~ - 4MMNA233B any more than it had degraded from thereon, and to some- , M imc:(%;f# w@ how figure out how to pmvent that and how to stop this. I ~ khN.O.ifM.%i$I didn't really feel that we were stopping at the initial stages M 7& h X.r.7'1".d M - "dk/2E'F I was scared of runnin,g out of water. The outside pressure; . h MAP ~MP@d@M@.?_ that I was getting indicated that you could just pump this ! !'I thing solid-and I couldn't get it solid. You could have , M9?M-NUMM. pumped all day because you had to collapse those bubbles.b GF ' M L@5l' M +7 M N i. %.fc up the hotlegs-t mmc y-We didn't have a 4000 pound system. It was a hell-of-a jM-FqC&! W W.W scenario. = Mh5ETG%in'MM,-.;v (Id., pp. 28-29.) P .V p%q w &w e W,1. ; w c m W64m -s b;-.A . v..q

n. nronooEN connesTrow

.s. c~ 2 v."1 k@9&iQ@M9,7Mby$nn.J portion of the hydrogen produced in the zirconium steam reaction was F Durm. g S. g the morning and early afternoon on March 28, a significant t f M[,g.4EM@P -m:r N& I.On,%+ released from the reactor coolin system into the containment build-mg via the pressurizer rehef va ve. At approximately 1:50 p.m. the W peq s%. hydrogen ignited.'= What is probably more accurately described as a a d fire than an explosion caused several ef!'ects including a 28. pound-per-j

f.. m..-ui,&yer/h 4.M. 3 - M Q g@m G 9 "dJ' $X square. inch (psi) pressure pulse in the containment building.' This E s i W @E. g S M s ~5.4 cat

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puls was recorded on the strip chart that recorded containment build-e mg pressure. It was also recorded on a series of other pressure meas- @:.5Egyl-3.WN urmg devices which used the containment pressure as a reference." %.hp%'fh.e@W@W PdWF.Nd' E The fire raised temperatures in the containment from about 125 de- .3, grees to 175 degrees F, an increase of 50 degrees dissimilar to any other In.. s'OMMeaS#jh? 'MW M.. %,e ~ %, r temperature changes observed that da7, these temperature data were A 9T* t 3-..m recorded on strip charts in the control room." The mereased tempera- ,y N M Mt.pic. g tures triggered several alarms. The containment pressure pulse also $g $ 4 d, W " h M @ff53.1 actuated various emergency systems, most notably the equipment that 5 caused water and sodium hydroxide to be sprayed into the contam-p ya.%..w.IMip%.m=$g w c-m:m.wm d. e ment bulldmg. u.

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of water. The outside pressure; NN M 1 thit you could just pump this get it solid. You could have 32 ovmeed without pumping water

. hid to collapse those bubbles. 28 md system. It was a hell-of-a Hyeogen burn g (Id., pp. 28-29.) ? 24 s N COMBUSTION $ 20 efternoon on March 28, a significant E is in the zirconium steam reaction was F system into the containment build- @ 12 v. At approximately 1:50 p.m. tha S tbly more accurately described as a 8 a r:1 effects including'a 28-pound-per-j in the containment building.' This 4 art thtt recorded containment build-1 on a series of other pressure meas-o ' t;mment pressure as a reference.2' i ha contzinment from about 125 de-I I I I I I _4 of 50 degrees dissimilar to any other o 2 4 e a 10 12 14 - t day; these temperature data were Tirne Aher Turbine Trip (heurs) ' ttrol room.22 The mereased tempera-ha containment pressure pulse also nt, most notably the equipment that Reactor BuMng Pressure Versus Tirne ide ta be sprayed into the contain-1 1 1 l l 1 l 1 l l l l l ..s- -s' .,sv

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m %.$??j >, .6 EQ'5' ,"$'sCh?...Y.IW%.~,?? hlEs'&g $yq_..,s+$d?O$*Nr*HM G. N' \\ W G gf. y3.W-l.r_p 7 n' A. m;g M M, M. x.1;;,. e-y 74 p. gm _ .s 4 pngg.g.,3 g,y, -m .m _r .f.. w. e,a x. g, w. m _J 56 67 Fzovat V-C 190 5 Supplyair 180 - 6 Supply air 170 - 7 Arnbient stea'n and feedwater penetration 160 - 8 Ambient sump area 9 Ambient let down cooler area GURE Y-3 150 '8 -5 C y 140 g 12 15 130 1 3G *A" 120 7 10 3G *B" O e-o 110 8 100 6 ~ 5 10 Ambient drain tank area 90 - 11 Amtnent elevation 35}1 5 12 Arnbient etevaten 353 2 o 80 - 13 Ambient elevation 3301 o 14 Ambient elevation 330-2 70 I o 1300 1400 1500 o o 10 Time o [cn Reactor building temperatures during tiydrogen ignition. O e .o a ' Officials at NRC headquarters in Washington and Bethesda did not o o 15 h become aware of the hydrogen denotation until March 30."* State offi- > '/ o cials, including Lieutenant Governor Scranton, who were briefed in N Harrisburg within I hour of the detonation were not told about it then, o and they apparently did not learn of its occurrence until 2 days later, 20 on 3farch 30. At least one TMI supervisor has testified that he in-formed an NRC inspector in the TMI-2 control room that the pressure spike on the containment building pressure recorder represented a real pressure increase. The NRC inspector has denied that he was so ini rmed, and whether informed or not, he apparently did not report - 25 it to his superiors. The most likely reason for the inspector's failure to report the spike assuming he was aware of it,is that he did not under-stand its significance. It is also possible, but unlikely that the in-spector was aware of the pressure pulse and its signidc,ance, but did - 30 not report it through an oversight or through intent. Statements made to TMI investigators indicate the following: most of those present in the control luom were aware on March 28 of the pressure spike"6 and associated actuation of containment sprays: l l l several of those present were aware on March 28 that a detonation pos-sibly involving hydrogen, had occurred; and Station Manager Gary '13.50.50 13.51:00 13.51:10 13:51:20 na Appendix H contains a transertpt of discussfon at a March 30 Commission meeting Time where the Commissioners were informed of the discovery of the reactor building pressure pulse and its po.stbir in.1icating a hydrogen explo= ton. 8m Four Commissioners subsequently stated they had been unaware until May 1979 that the persons in the control room knew of the pressure spike in the containment at the time it occurred. one Commissioner stated he was not sure when he learned that the pres ? f0 ion on mMsured steam pressures. sure pulse had been observed by persons in the control room at the time it ocentred. but that in any event be did not know this during the critical time of the accident. (E&E. TMI-2. pp.190-193.1 75-801 0 - et. 5 i I @n. d%@%WNQhWd"fN/yf5@$@%m@1s@@MlNEsh5M=NNUM$$%s i M

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.n .. n., A..., __^* M D E'.d;' N C. W.$.. _h_, h m m m. m r q y P. rp,. s.%.._ A.o...,_: ~,&_ .,_. m.. m. m-W %.Di Md;+h.-- M F - p ' M $s @ E y 3 h 4. Miller (notwithstanding his failure to recollect being aware on 3farch 28 of the pressure ulse, actuation of containment sprays, dis-Mk.: M'W"; hW.*L cussions of hydrogen pr uction, and the need to take certain actions QO.CNb5M@N di.' %.h@3?- v.@Q.Yh*vu,h;g,,' based on the~ existence of, hydrogen of the detonation and its significance). was more likely than not aware .M MM d-NJQ.yE.e The hydrogen detonation was a clear indication that the accident N Fi g,p %m,v.7 mweg t%".l~" ucli more severe than Federal and State offic at the t.as m.t occurred. Chairman IIendrie answered ul,ials believe,d, to the w .w: :-~-4. m..w ,g qc4, e.%vcum mj%iM question of whether the fact of a hydrogen explosion would suggest the MNDNdMfMas: ime i es, clearly,

i. N O D O F..14 M;$O Possibility of deformations in the core that might block flow of cooling NZ'd MSMGM.;i,g@e.Nc,2lW/.

water. (E&E, TMI-2, pp.195.)in the containment could only ha IIe elaborated by noting, "A flam-Wy@Nk d ;MMM .Ws. mable hydrogen concentration Mi F~MIE resulted from substantial zirconium-water ivaction, and that would d NMEM.D have meant core overheating and substantial damage to fuel cladding W-MS'JM0nM'tii'JJN; that could cause flow blockage." (Ibid.) He stated also in response to h.'G'&$%ff5GEMM.' the question as to whether it would be important that he know of such EYMMN.M.5EMMM deformation in order that he might develop appropriate plans for [m'iDM Mf@Mj K @Nd dealing with,the situation:"Yes, very important: lack of this knowl- -T M w r p h.M W. edge at the time it occurred delayed our understandin @e$6N MEC$ME9h condition of the reactor for almost two days." (Ibid., p.g of the actua 196.) [h.pdy;. % c;L' w : @d,;;;-.g g$ The question thus arises as to why TMI managers failed to clearly t %Ms.%9 E-N.Mf'" inform the NRC and State of Pennsylvania of the event and its signifi-C. ,%.- h M@fW k'd.@:6 'b$ 6,MM% @b.jh cance as soon as they themselves understood what had hap ^pened. 9 Gi i The following discussion sup rts the conclusion that on March 28, " f$6 the TMI Station Manager an[some of his subordinates were more , S a W J fgt. W 6 & ? % ]ikely than not aware of the detonation and its potential significance. NsNNNN'D5. The discussion that follows is based on excerpts and inferences from h87 W@w %' ! M yr W)y U,M-n pr Q,n the record of the TMI investigations conducted by the President's dF %dW Commis,sion, the NRC, and the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear ...w.. t.w.fGMMC'UW ~. Resrulation. t#Wgyams j3/%E.egM.- TMI supervisors who have said they did not believe the pressure m N Pulse to have been,real, have given any of three explanations in sup-w & G 5 M W.C W i M 5 %.pg.W.~.a?C-, SWf;g.h.;; port of their statements as to why t. hey had not recognized that the q,W-9 Mg. ressure pulse,and associated actuation of safeguards systems had - 9F*1@ge. a---. {act been an indication of a real increase in containment buildm,in +y?mb, @uM;9c.& r h.; g pressure. 544M!ldt@

1. The explosion manifestations wem caused by spurious elec-k8U#45-hM trical signals.

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2. Because the pressum,did not remain at a high level, the e,

cause of the pulse was not important, and the operators were too p.Mg; gg*64y ' - engrossed with establishing a stable cooling configuration to pay RAM.24.v4We9, attention to it. Odt W4.gf i(

3. They did not think it could have been real because nothing in g!fdi;g%#5@W7 d

their training led them to believe such a detonation might occur. M pA ~ s T.he first o.f these explanations should be considered in light of plant %-m - design considerations and the simultaneous occurrence of pressure ,h. g. Nyi%w.. m.. q, gfj G and temperature efreets indicative of a real pressure pulse. The second $4 M n A @% : .FM' of the TMI supervisors' training and multinle indications of core un- $%%,. P-and third explanations should be considered, on the one hand, in light AN dQy .M. my{, covery and hydrogen production, and, on the other hand that their Whp.,.M, traimng did not prepare them for situat,ons in which sigmficant quan-i %.,a 4q%mmwa:+fhk ,e tities of hydrogen would be produced. - a. 6.:d. % wn.- mes r s com. ?- -[ ,, bib IMb.WFWf, 4, Ng4Gdp32: w rA.wA,....,e ' _An,5g .- 1. I. r !* Ns *' .a .o w.~. r fC, y y,tWal*..6*. k- '" I d 'sf/ +.* I

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s wn _. _..p n y $0 illun, t3 recollect being aware on The following excerpts from the record concern whether the elec-actu; tion of containment sprays, dis-trical malfunctions could have caused the pressure pulse. T311-2 Re- , cnd the need to take certam actions actor Operators Ed F rederick and Craig Faust engaged in the follow-ten) wts more likely than not aware ing dialog with the ELE T311 Task Force : noe. c cle:r indication that the accident 31rras. What cculd have had two of those three sensing de- .ral end State officials believed at the vices sense high pressure and lead them to think the pressure idrie cnswered "Yes, clearly," to the was high, other than high pressure, real high pressure, actual iydrogen explosion would suggest the high pressure f Is there anything that decides the pressure is e core that might block flow of cooling gmng up that could have led those sensors to think the pres-Ib ehhorated by noting, "A flam, sure was high I n the containment could only have Fatornica. A test signal. ium-w;ter reaction, and that would 3Ims. Would a test signal go to two of them at the same subst:ntial damage to fuel cladding time t Id be im) He stated also in response to FArsr. No. In fact,you would have to hook it up. (Ibid. portant that he know of such Fatornica. It would have to be a lengthy manual action to iight dtv: lop appropriate plans for get it to do it,other than actual building pressure. . v;ry important: lack of this knowl. 3hTas. Is there anything that you can think of other than yed cur understandin excess building pressure that could have simultaneously led it twa d ys." (Ibid., p.g of the actual the meter to read 28 pounds per square inch and to turn on thy T3fI managers failed)to clearly the spray tanks or turn on the containment sprayf 196. msvlv^ nit of the' event and its signifi. Fatornicx. No it had to be high level pressure. mderstood what had happened. Farsi. There h;ad to be a pressure surge m the building for )rt: the c:nclusion that on 3Iarch 28, it to happen. some cf his subordinates were more (E&E, T3II Part 1,3Iay 9,10,11 & l5,1979, p.147.) n: tion and its potent sed on excerpts and m,ial significance. At a later date (on September 11) Frederick told interviewers from ferances from the NRC's Special Inquiry Group that he did not believe the pres-itrns conducted by the President's sure spike to have reflected a real increase in pressure because his Sen:t Subcommittee on Nuclear training had not informed him as to the possibility of such a spike. Frederick stated that none of the b>ersons $ resent thought it plausible id th:y did not beh. eve the pressure that the pressure in a 2-million-cu ic-foot uilding could rise and fall en cny of three explana,tions in suP-so rapidly. Frederick stated: iy they had not recogmzed that the That's why none of us cons.dered it plaus.ble. It's impossi-i i untion cf safeguards systems had in il increase in containment building ble to do that. SIG interviewer Ron Haynes responded : tions wem caused by spurious elec. I wouldn't say it was impossible. I thought it actually

i e u m d.

lid not remain at a high level, the pportant, and the operators were too Frederick then stated: 3 st ble cooling configuration to pay Based on our training, it was impossible. It was complete-Iv foreign. If you look back through everybody's training and ,1,d have been real because nothm.g in the FASR and safety analysis and the building construction, her? such a detonation nught occur. you will not see a paragraph that projects that type of tran-hould be considered m light of plant sient. Nor will you see it in anybody's training so fu as-that imult:ncous occurrence of pressure is so particularly foreign and unbelievable that it has abso-

cf c re

1 pressure pulse. The second lutely no significance. That's why nobody did anything about

~ jonsidend, on the one hand, in light it for two days. and multinle indications of core un-( Faust, et al., SIG, September 11,1979, pp. 264-265.) cnd, en the other hand, that their situations in which significant quan. IIugh 3fcGovern, a T311 operator, made a statement to 3fet.Ed's ' ed. Ilubba 3Iarshall at approximately 3 a.m. on 3farch 29 wherem 3far-shall's notes show 3fcGovern stating that at 2 p.m. on 3farch 28 there had been "... an RX building pressure spike that went off scale on narrow range meter--definite spike straight up, straight back l b N ~^ I N L c ~ m : a k.~ m. w;'? L g."a % q @ pn% E-qy -Wr**vs=F h.,m a m m w 'h W zir d f.;. q~ 4:.s. n mn x...nm ~.,.r. w a s.M.umtN.ak:n:.tq ; ^ %. - vu p~.- ". < : : m.p a i.. m* % m.m:~ =,) Mur-r*& :ru ..q ~ rmms c. ,a,.+ W.n ow.J%

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g. Someone secured eray pumps, shut bS-Vi's and DH-V's f;pms,s.a,g%.r. g-c.m.

..w: DSL}e'. re (Hu.hese no)tes are a contemporaneous record (pr ?p%1;f...y. s W '1 .Mhd7.%M -.U.' before NRC ofliciais in Bethesda knew about the spike) confirming red some 30 hours f $ s % '.W Y,St$ O h@.- i 1-0bgJ I,ticy$ that control room personnel were aware of the spike at the time it hMQ'MG4MMf'$Q occurred. These nom do not suggest, as did some personnel in sub- '.b sequent interviems, that t,he control room personnel ascribed the spike -in W N E Er W W m.9.y3.h Y,Msi,MMDM.vv;,.- to anomalous efectr. cal signals. (Control room logs, presumably pre-pared on March 25 are a further contemporaneous confirmation of .kE.U L~ M;$1$$712 M C, control room persor.bd unreness of the spike at the time it occurred although these logs indicate res IQM4WW.@9tMWI,@. i

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4 and approximately 5 psi. Seep.pectively that the pressure pulse was 1 $g$g My7k C On October 9 C 080, Joseph Scheim) ann, who was on du 5MT,1 89. p'mp.p, g:D@M. F,'W@v(a room foreman a,t the time the accident began, engaged in the follow l g:;qffly,fp tr dialog with NRC t to what he saw m. 5vestigators regarding Scheimann's recollection as l yvre u:;.pgp @ x m n the pressure pulse occurred. Pe.IhG;... ]hh i g i Q. Could

&_ m.< p.n.%m when the sp, ou describe your recollection of what you saw W. - -y u ~ n ys,

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i e occurredI o..m e.: n . -ma..e.e. r.w A. Oka>. At the time the spike occurred I was con.trolh. m EY$@~DN.$w$m;. r,#.MM n s.rf.M6 pressure in the RCS by throttling on the electromatic bloc %. n; M valve. At the time the spike occurred I had just gone to open b,dW S W 76 @2'5 N ' M /b. on the electromatic. M Q. What, evidences did you personally observe and hear of A% h; M p g.. p,@h N:. a;& WWi[3?b. the spikeI W,: p .%7 M-$ A. Essentially what I heard amounted to something along g@*n.f.plm.9). wep%,s. D@w@s;.W*%.@6 the line of "Look at that pressure." That is all because I was y , over mmding the pressure control. .1-.# Q; p s y %+ M;dNd@[y;;M. k@m e. 1 Q. Were you aware that the SFAS had come ini 9.Wo.pfME.h M ' ' ' A. I had heard somebody say something to the effect that fe ' b $*g N E b the building rpray pumps had started. h i':6. T M W 2[D F6f 4 [I&E,Scheimann,10/9/80, p.4.] 4LD.M ky'R h 'Inkrument Engineer Ivan Porter was asked by NRC investigators ( hsMh74",gdg.a%.~,L.g" - I would think not. It did look like a real s ike to me. That whether Porter thought the pressure spike could be explained by any .W5.T. QWM.*k.;-% EE-i e. - m, g form of instrument malfunction. Porter responded : oj N 6:2i 4 ' g- #dOffGt%%-r$$N@&5'$Q W 3I ' was when I was specifically asked if it could b real. "iMh ' Jl@3%'p&j. @W[ (1 orter, I& E Tape 237, May 21,1979, p. 35.) ' kh-n-M ' With rea Porterbtil:n-d to whether he saw the pressure pulse on March 28, ,y b;r ./.c r[w ~. k.84t v$b N \\.But homehow I ha w /g dr & ;w%p W. W... ut.'il the next day. I,ve a feeling, I didn't look at those charts 3 ire w d. h QfE M m not specificall, sure that I was aware 3 ,MPMDs,@M of it that day. I know that I very specifically remember a dis-F cussion where we looked at the chart, was asked if it could M W tC. M I-we my.c. o.-.a@.x m.4,m possibl be reals and I also look at the wide ranged pressure 3 . u;. : e ir:t:. '. N chart and saw that [the pulse] showed up as a decrease in res- .eg.,isqgn.,.~. m+rn#!P'p4g6~mp'P; O sure on the wide range reactor coolant system pressure, ut I SE'. / p sincerely believe that that was the next day (Ibid.,p 3

1. MWCMn%M.

that I looked through the stuff.u . Asennt,~ w.y,[.; g y:.re,;.ph~fe.$w:. D [o M47.tAst 4 , y as Even if Porter is correct that the epike was not perc+tred to be real until the nest hak:"t'.*f,s A v < q***[*."per -'g~M a '*g,,. ". gN yt -@ *O day", l.e. 3farch 29. there remains the question as to w hy the NHC use not Informed 5 *;** d',' 3 until )ltrch 30, e question ubich has not been ad.fressed by the 7318 latestigations. b $h%h@. E'*-Il4J@l0-%M 5 . s? k ~$ d.W.*s.~&} W 8 d t'- f4 / WR,,. w -* ~ ' pw. -* ?* Qf.yy& .Y a ( N a,a.;. qb h b. M. k p"h. ...-7.- .J- - - %.w s-L 'Y W bTJ%s1+f M=- n.:n.r.~C;C ~8'g* g.~.$>,:h2. .vdN, y-.mo n-p-

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3 Y r g;W.:y;m&rM;Xg.3.Q:g.c.m;.WM :.f., rm 24- ..yy. man. m.,_gpy n 7g y..__.;..- w m _. m _ 60 61 b straight up, straight back down-It is not clear,if Porter's feeling about not having looked at the, data imps & BS-YPS, DH-V8's) isolation on 3farch 28 is correct, what it Avas that caused the delay m examinmg raylunnps, shut US-Vi's and DH-V's the data, and if the delay did occur, what it was flynt led to,the ex- ) ment for building." anunation of it on 3farch 29. Lendmg sut7 port to his conclusion that the spike was real was Porter's finding a similar negat neous arcord (prepared some 30 hours tract r coolant system pressure history. Such a negat,ive spike in the' la knew about the spike) confirming ive spike would re ew:re of the spike at the time it be expected smce reactor coolant system pressure was measured usi,ng

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the containment bmlding pressure as a reference; when the contain-rol room personnel ascribed the spike inent pressure went up, the reactor coolant system pressure would ap-(Control room logs, presumably pre. pear to go down. As noted above, a similar negative pressure pulse was ier contem17oraneous confirmation of observed in other pressure histories." as ef the spike at the time it occurred Shift Supervisor William Zewe said that he had observed the pres-pectivdy that the pressure pulse was sure spike to occur at the moment the pressurizer relief valve was 89.) cycled, but that he did not associate the spike with an explosion. He 2eim:nn,who was on duty as a control said that he had not been aware of temperatures in the core of suffi-ident began, engaged in the following eient magnitude for the cla.dding-steam chemical reaction to have oc-egarding Schenmann's recollection as curred. Zewe was apparently unaware of the in-core thermocouple pulse occurred. measure;nents that implied production of hydrogen. Zewe said, not ur recollection of what you saw knowing what the spike,could have been, that,he ascribed it to an elec-trical malfunction associated with the operation of the valve. While spika occurred,I was controllin( Zewe may have considered the pressure pulse to have been an electrical attling en the electromatic bloc an maly, thers seemed concerned that it was real. occurred I had just gone to open WISupenis rJosephChwastyksaid: ... I actually saw the recorder, the pressure recorder on u Personally observe and hear of the building. spiked upward. I didn't know what caused it d amounted to something along but the fact that the spray valves started indicated to me that we actually had some kmd of ssure." That is all because I was sensors orIn the buildina itself. pressure spike, either on the I was not sure. The spike of ntrol. course started all the Euilding spray pumps, decay heat a SFAS had come in f say somethmg to the effect that pumps. etc. The pressure spiked up and it was only up briefly, 3 st:rted. as a matter of fact, a couple of heart beats. I know because I (E, Sch;imann.10/9/80, p. 4.] missed those heart beats. It came right back down again." (Chwastyk,I&E,5/21/79 p.9.) t.r w:s asked by NIIC investigators Chwist 12 noc.n, yk (who arrived in the control room between 11 a.m. and ture spike could be explained by any and who was apparently not aware of the direct measure-Porter re:ponded: ments of the in. core temperature's) also referred to an explosion in )ok lik3 a real spike to me. That describing how it was that he came to realize that the reactor core sked if it could be real, might have been significantly damaged : Fape 237,3 fay 21,1079, p. 35.) It was like I said, everybody was pretty busy and I didn't w the pressure pulse on 3Iarch 28, want to stop anybody from what they were doing so I just tried to get a feel for what was happening by lookmg around ng. I didn't look at those charts and asking the operators at the panel what they were doing. .ecificallt zure that I was awa.re Up until the tune or sometune after the c.rp?onon and it T 11 be dawned on me what it was, I didn t know how much core -h chait, as a$ebf it co ld damage we had."" (Italics added) (Ibid., p.18.) ok ct the wide ranged pressure The following discussion and excerpts from the T3fI investigations showed up as a decrease in pres. relates to Station 3fanager Gary 3 filler's awareness of the symptoms ricool:nt system pirssure, but I of the hydrogen detonation and the manner in which the symptoms es th; next day that I looked '(Ibid., p. 34.) = see rme v-n. p. so. u See p. 66, a C not ivecefred to be real untti the "next Dtion ts 33 sh.t the NRC was not infortned en Editrened by the TMI larestfgations. = 2 h b ~ ; U n a, n,7N.b .>[> m-. h

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aw w$ 4 $w &.OdMh' were diagnosed. 31111er wrote that while in the control room on P 3.. ;.G g% g.3.4.:.q.n l p..s.ts._..y4B$m%... >.ra. 4 F":l;C.-- .Ag 3farch 28: P,1 9 /M.3, I heard a noise at approximately 1:50 p.m., however I did WCM.5y' f7 W S'!.RS2.6 not associate it with the burnirg of hydrogen or the act.uation 9 su )fgy M h.A.W M E W /? of the safeguards system at that time. I was first aware of the $ W D '24 S U. W D dt h%2MMTfEES JY.' recordtd pmssum ulse and associated actuation of the Fafe-guards system on riday morning,31 arch 30,1979. IM,.% -- 4@.s-f-M.3. W.m._D i45W.D - m (E&E, T311, Part 2,31ay 12 & 24,1979, p. 208.) 5.w.9,i 7E7.WCM.. 31 iller told I&E investigators on September 5,1980 that : n: 2r 2 n..

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The spike in the building, I am sare, was never, or its at-h t. h M ' @d.,F M K W tendant actuation was not discussed with me. WWy('?v?.R. /P-@!C%. ; L&J.,F. i G M., (31 iller,I&E,9/5/80, p.134.) WMM: p 31 iller engaged in the following dialog with I&E investigators in pe M d M b ".Y M M.@ N which ho sought to explain why he had not been aware of the pres-fr.liWMgt sure pulse and associated actuation of safety systems : Lp; W+:s;m G'. m.p - w e - .m.n s e- %:awfA Afr. Simn. Why didn't you recognize it the actuation of safety sy] stems caused by the pressure puls[e in the Gr.c.g-t.t"p G yJ' D N %MMME p N..[,..:%@MN-DN.SQI-building that day i That is a conflict I have a very, very dif. -fleult, time with. 'I'he one thing that all of us are aware of, t h fg

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sensitive to, everybody in this mdustry, is if we get a safety $Md.fMS9P.b injection signal. en ECC signal. that is important and we are %bs.4,%d;t::<rffpc all trained to mcognize we just got it. How could you be stand. J i %g4ff-' ing there having had one and not know it t M f. W M y @Q W m - @Q'n$7.565 is, you know,I waion the way out of there and was relieving gMC The Wimss. The only answer I can come up to with that nyt h,. N;Ms.; M'#~5d the post and heading for the state [to brief the Lieutenant .M pAf@$p:C^r-%@:d.% Q t. W; 5 Governor]. I feel that if I had stayed them, you know, my M.C W recognition might have been better. I am not trying to get MN43hM over that question, but I just feel the sequence I was in at the $k M,,$9 D3% % Q same time, you know, cause me, you know, to be exiting the site WFCOMMcQpfM,1 and, you know, I wasn't concentrating at that time on that 2 3 TQ?.t W @-W 'h yzs*.? particular set of parame(ers. If the people there concluded it +.2 9-FiS was an instrument error for instance,it might not have gotten I $Cr@yMNW66d'Mi

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' to me in a timely manner,. M-ist WO ;T 3Ir. Sni.to. You are missing my point. I didn't care what A % -..' '~ fAM hM anyWd1 e1so was (1oing. I am J'ust visualizing you standing L71Md%iyp'OTF) there when it happened and you were there. Now, the whistles dr WB$.u y$@y(2.p;;;fg . d r.'.y,6 down. You are standin. there. Is this n.ot somethmg that you. d and the bells go. Equipment starts that was originally shut e 3 w.a .,.m .--. c:~ m .i %'r$qca.g.;,j.~4+ MAW".'MgEd The Wirxr.ss. The only answer I can come up to with that were very sensitive to i vou got an SI signal t W PQ QweMe sensitivity that day was already heightened to the crisis we MWNMWM'M were in. It kn't like I we m.Jng in the control room on an MW$PgQ$vf operating day and I P a. SS. It is like I had been in that M35t.MY,M.gj' control roam for !N + mig ader a c. is situat, ion and I can't

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hat while in the control room on Others who were present say that AIiller was aware of the pressure pulse at about the time it occurred. When Reactor Operator Frederick

.mittiv 1:50 p.m., however I d. id was asked whether others in the control room had reacted to the pres-sure spike, Frederick stated: img of hydrogen or the actuaticn hat time'. I was first aware of the I think 3f r. 3farshall tried to figure it out, and Gary 3 filler associ:ted actuation of the Fafe-was particulativ interested in it. 3rning. 31areh 30,1979. (E&E, T31I Pa rt 1,31ay 9,10,11, & 15,1979, p.145.) d 2,3Ey 12 & 24,1979, p.298.) An NRC inspector made the following notes based on a statement n September 5,1980 that: made to him b Donald Raymond. Raymond is an NRC inspector who 3 ,I tm sure, was never, or its at-was at T3II on 3farch 30, when the pressure pulse and the possibility iscucsed with me. of a hydrogen explosion became general knowledge. These notes con-(3Iiller,I&E,9/5/80, p. 334.) cern Raymond's perception of 3 filler's knowledge on 3Iarch 28 of the . _ tors i pressure pulse and associated events. ke fad n e aw re f 1 e pws-In an additional interview NRC Inspector William Ray-m cisaf:tysystems mond conducted at approximately 11:15 a.m. on 31ay 8,1979 Inspector Raymond stated his notes reflect a meeting con, ou recognize it [the actuation of a pressure pulse in the reactor ducted on 31 arch 30,1979 in which 3Ir. Gary 31 iller, section superintendent, was asked to comment on the 3Iarch 28 a conflict I have a very, very dif-iing that all of us are aware of, activation of the containment spray system. Inspector Ray-iis mdustry,is if we get, a safety mond states that 31 iller,in discussing the event, recalled hear-ing a thump at his location in the Unit 2 control room nal. th:t is important and we are concurrent with the activation of an E3IOV valve in the con, ist got it. How could you be stand-tainment by one of the CROs, and concurrent with the activa-Inot hn witt iswer I c;n come up to with that tion of the containment surav system. Inspector Raymond nealls 31 iller's postulation of th'e association between these

ycut of there and was relieving three events and the possibility that a hydrogen burn may ie strt: [to brief the Lieutenant have occurred.

had st:yed there, you know, my n bettir. I am not trymg to get (Excerpt from 3 fay 8,1979 Raymond Statement reproduced t feel the sequence I wa,s m t the in Raymond,I&E,10/7/80. p. 4.) us,you know, to be exitmg t e site In the course of the October 7 1950 interview with I&E, Raymond neentratmg at that time on t int implied at one >oint that he was,no longer certain that the foregoina

. If the people there conchided it excerpt referre to 3 filler's knowled e on 31 arch 28, but when pressed instance,it might not have gotten Ine engaged m' the followm' g dia1og with NRC m' vest'gators

i By 3fr. Horruxo. dng my point. I didn't care what Q. Okay. Bill. Do you have any reason to believe that im jus't visualizing you standing 31 iller heard a thud at approximately 2 p.m. on 3farch 28th t y:n were there. Now, the whistles A. Yes,I do based on the conversation that I heard on Fri-it starts that was ori inally shut day. As Gary, spoke about things that occurred in the Unit F re. Is this not somethmg that you 2 control room on Wednesdav. the way he said it would appear got an SIsignalf to show ob insw:r I can come up to with that Wednesday.jectively that Gary knew about the thud on madv heightened to the crisis we Q. Can you recall what he said f l andingin the control room on an A. I'm going to very loosely, if I could summarize his l ES. It is like I had been in that words, it's something to the effect of,"Do you iemember when mder a crisis situation and I can't we heard the thud on Wednesday!" didn't this new thing cause me to Q. Okay. Now let's go to actuation of the containment ,e situltion because I already was sprays, which we all now know occurred on Wednesday at asis on it. I just can't answer vou approximately 2 p.m. 31 arch 28th. 3 . air csking me without consider-Do you have any reason to believe that Gary 31 iller knew at or close to the ti'me of the actuation of the sprays that they iller,I&E,9/5/60,pp.126-127.) had actually actuated f i l 1 'W I h h k k IthgM NN k b ih h Eb2M: h >e % ~M'e w m..~.m d e f.. wcev-g~/.:%cnc [$bbhh,m%4:;;;n.W_ my - s i ~ W. ve;: r-.+y.w.z W M G.M .W #-o.p m~m pn .w c - -s w N hi b b bg h N hYhb UnkhkS[fe m m,a.m_km,m.$m,, y&.a.,.a.. f %w wge.m m_ %_a.._w w. n. w n l ~

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?- ~ .f. -l0 g the 3 ter s .q y.O. M ;.wy.c ; - 1 hng spray. which agam, thinkmg back f wd JF4 M.;. e. on it, would seem to mdicate he knew of both of those events $.5 N at the s.ame time. $+u&M-t. >S.T.'T.e%.m.,.: r.a ~. - .n. fn Q. T ou say he may have mentioned it.1ou re not certam. f

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Wm.M F I. A. I'm not certain, based upon what I remember.now, and ?, e + W.- p !. Mc.; c. m probably relying upon the statements made back m 31av- 'f%@N!b.MG9,?. n-MQS ' I ~ on 31ay 8th of 1979. NM 'S.N.A'.. - A. That}s correct.Q. You e referring now to the draft stetement I g".*:%/d v..~E- ?; W - c.s.%; M 'iIl;7.N Q. You recognize that draft statement was a reconstruc-I'MW.I.#py trm.',23 h tion of an oralinterviewI NMQ*'j4.Q..W'E A. That's correct. I recognize that, but again, after think-Mds.$91d-r37.W

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ing about this, and talking about what I recall, I would-w- I would-I seem to-rm not being very positive here. I will FWMFM. T state that

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mment sprav system, as well as the thud, on the 28th. @.W l Q. Okay. Now let's turn to the pressure spike indication w p.EX. W.&.. ..N,.. ~r.M,,ffEMM If6', which anam, as we all now know, was recorded at the time of e the hvdrogen burn on 3/28, abproximatelv 2 p.mlieve that' Gary 3ii M f'S .sa.r. N.. w$MF8gd EU~ 1 Do'you have any reason to Mm?gd'@@yE. j'M'. that recording at or close to the time it was actually made on the 28thf m ju 3 p.. w %w u-mw ~; e v-M.hi&p/tf*iUM.ff% A. No. In the conversations that I overheard on Friday k morning. there is nothing that I remember in hearing that

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h,.r% s M M* w y@$ h % hD $'*5 L Q. Was the pressure spike discussed f $d.$.@ the buddmg spray activat,the pressure sp,ike, together with A. On Friday morning, ion, together with the thud, were p,Ch M.0%%1=' ? n '. 9 hM$di.DdM$'" all mentioned as-were all mentioned during the discussion in g; m m -yg.a % W. W support of the conclusion that,' yeah, that was probably a hy-3 i e s./Mf2bMSM 2, drogen burn on Wednesday. I M.:.;/ b b Q. But to your recollection, there was no indication by rfp*ffdI%s@iU;84@??i,c./ c4 &E 31 iller that he knew of a pressure spike on the 28thI i Y.! A. To my recollection, there was no indication that he M M "3 d g,..E 6 E. M E,. p%r.p n. .. JI.--e.e vw, e. mxw.y knew of the pressure sp.ke. l . A.FGf i 3pi Q. Okay. Turning to the actuation of the E3IOV valve on " ::y g g# N T; g. g b 3/28 at approximately 2 p.m. when the hydrogen burn oc-ts;~ t f5'.,W z:r.G p y curred, do you have any reason to Feheve that 31 iller knew M.p!f:h,,W 'ZeTLF of that on 3/28,in the timeframe of tlje hydrogen burn f $M G.,WSM:$ A. In irgard-I can be least positive m my statements re-h garding the E310V, because I cannot recall that at all now, g e m~~A.T m e U % dra.;dw ;.f. so I'll M - Q @M,~~S :.- N jd M;Y.W W If Q. You cannot recall that at all,looking at this draft docu-ifDUM ment, which indicates you speaking to that point to the I&E pD intervieweri This does not help you refresh your recollection k g 6. Q $ Q E g g - .-&,L.gpWA on that pomtf WtM+GTM,;n $d FN.MQ A. That's correct. E N.t. e' n % 4.~... p. u$g .Eu (Raymond, I&E. October 7,19S0, pp.12-15.) W M % ii's.. James Higgins, an NRC inspector who arrived at T3II at about p dW p4E C '.W.m:f/ D 5. W. > r.g2bl 10:05 a.m. on 3farch 28 and remained at the site or vicinity thereof

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. y.- .QM O. M.M f.r. 3 ec? S 'ch m L % R'm w M : ym &L;, - a +.v.wh x.;g@ ;;g m, rc9.# e efer - , % av ---c = w...n r-~ 7;ppxj.4 ' g., 64 65 ne Otement where Gary talked recoHection concerning 31 iller's awareness and in-had the followindarch 28 of the pressure spike and associated events e m'y have niso mentmned the terpretation on irav. which again. thmkmg back e h'e knew of both of ~those events By 3fr. Cano. Q. I beheve the question before we went off the record was, mentioned it. You're not certainf was Gary 3Iiller aware that the containment spray pumps had upon whtt I remember now. and come on on Wednesday, the day of the accident t he str tements made back in 3Iay-A. From reviewmg my previous notes and depos,tions now i to refres,h my mind on my discussion with Gary 3 filler on Friday, it, appears to me that on Friday,lly on WednesdayGary 31 i t;the draft statement ! he was aware of these gether, and that rea piecmg this all back to the fact there had been a spike, the raft estatement was a reconstrue. spray pumps coming on, and a thud, but had never really znize that. but again after think. connected them or even given much of a second thought to any 4 cbout what I recall, I would-of them on, Wednesday. But now I guess I got the impression 't being very positive here. I will from my, discussion with Gary 3Iiller on I.riday, that it was o tv: known about the actuation of the first time he was really tying these things together and at- ~ m, as w:ll as the thud, on the 28th. tachmg any significance to them., L i to the pressure spike indication Q.Let's goover these one at a time. know,was recorded at the time of A. Okay. mproximitely 2 p.m. Q. Was Gary 31 iller aware on Wednesday of the thudi abelieve that ' Gary 31 iller knew of A. Yes. 3 the time it was actually made on Q. Was,he aware that containment spray pumps came on f A. I beheve so. ions th:t I overheard on Fridav Q. Was he also aware of the pressure spike as indicated by thit I remember in hearing tha't the recorderf reviewing what I sa,t again the only reason I say that is from A.I.behe,so,bu sositively knew about the pressure id when I made my depositions, and right e discussed t now I cannot say forcertain., . the pressure spike, together with (Higgins,I&E,10/7/80, pp.2 >-20.) ion, together s Zewe stated in a deposition for the Special Inquiry Group that 3Ir. nr.ntion:d durm,vith the, thud.,were 3 filler was in the control room when the pressure pulse occurred (Zewe, g the discussion in hat,ytah, that was probably a hy-et al., SIG,9/11/70, p. 257). Zewe also stated that : I found it so hard to believe that an3 one 8 who was in the 6 2 -tion, the.re was no indication by trol room ob. servin anythinE would have m.issed that (the con.ke) or turnmg off he pumps or any of the discussions at essure cpikeon the 28th t spi there we.s no indication that he all. [ Ibid., p. 260.] $ cetu;ti:n of the E310V valve on 3fike Ross, who was T3fI-I Operations Supervisor, but acting as 9.m. when the hydrogen burn oc. .-econd in command to 3 filler at T3fI-2 on 3farch 28 stated when asked vson to believe'that 31 iller knew whether he was present when the pressure spike occurred : Crame f the hydrogen burn f Yes.1 was near the console at that time and if we are talk-Est pcutive in my statements re-ar'g about the same time was around 2:00, sometime in the in a,e I cannot recall'tl.at at all now, en. And at that time we got an ES signal and some of the components restarted, decay heat, what have you. We got mg at tly. draft docu-Imilding isolation again and we took care of that and we ttttalLlook. s cpe:. king to that pomt to the I&E looked back and the control room operator said "Jeese the . help you refresh your recollection spray pumps are running" and we looked back at the charts a TMI-2 superintendent for Technican Support George Kunder has stated that on i rocairection appears inconst estement that it cemed to him that twe -t mrch 2A. he was unst are. tent with zewe a.ike. (Kunder. IAE 5/2:t/79. v. 50.) of the prenure sp This 3&E. October,1950,pp.12-15.) 1, ortke co.ild not have been f. vie.ed by anyone in the controi room. The seemine inennsistener fmlined ct the s.ved at.T.3f.I at about mar be esnistned be the fact that at about the time the spike occurred. Kunder saa la l mS ec.t:r who arri rnit i gathering information to be used in brie 8ng the Lieutenant Gavernar. ite or vicinity t)lerco{ (Kunder. i&E. 4/2s/79. p. 5.u m% md .m i % w ~w. -vw w w.sw'm3w. k m.p.. &>T 5 9 iI w.w %. q.,. :,%:m.x. m..

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'i MM *~4 oa Q:.W NrlJ. Wh k. ++ m* M d # h Q *:*. %j e;s id L( I; % t,Xg=M..M. a. c;' Aug m. r-h.- .n . ~ ~.. r.n,M, h;,~d;?6-~ 66 . ~.. m n g +M,.wn/ ;f.G;'s.56.E,l. W.'C # G.. W M.9.1-r n.- - a.. v. LY $w.i.h $ D '5 7 i exact pressure at this time I don't know,... it, was around to ce at that time. We saw a fairly large spike on the chart and the T1 WMNDOW64.Q. ;y&. 30 pounds. My thought at the time and Miller <cas out there or ul MYtMWDR'k seith ta and he guestioned he said,"jeese you know I thought hant @N G Q. bC #gedEp~ I heard somethmg, too." We are movmg down the road there

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%M%d;4f.h.E'.N[ spike was so short it must have been an instrument." That was M Zr-V ;P 3 Q D ; D our reasoning at the time. We reached over and we said you !W@,@rs hq ai._:. can shut the spray pumps off now because the pressure came DMMQ$M. right back to 0... almost very, very rapid return and we P' dW/4 Wm;isc.J.m shut the spray p, umps off. I now know that spray pumps were ' 9 5 E @+ %.'s. M ' on about five minutes when looking back because I did look %@;4% $MfWIN' back on that particular one. I personally didn't associate it at h &.W 2Mi.W % the moment with any kind of explosion in the building. I as-Ib W5hy.SMQ sociated it seith an instrument problem perhaps and I think so Gov. r W 's. m@ m 5. q $ $ did Miller at the time because we 3ust went on to something Don S7WW F[$-h else. It wasn't until the next day that we thought about any. I ha 4.W W f & thing like that and started looking back. (Ross,I&E Tape N@IWS W E M ENNMNEMMSE u 226,31ay 19,1979, pp. 3-4.) [ Italics added.] Oi .but di.d not hear the noise referred to bShift Supervisor Chawstyk had %'flM.M.,@.w@WP 8 Gary 31 iller. told the R. C in se n.~- e. N,L, s r p C L@, C m g,. n ;; mvestigators of a suggestion made to 31 ller on the basis of the spike yap 1 =,4ps-u..o s c @m,@.y having occurred upon operation of the pressurizer relief valve: e Fgr~"N 3:sMWm#,, CHWAs'rvE. No I did not hear the noise. But, that was the e 1%mCW hum..bu..Mm:l;f-D%> point at whic.h I,had ass.umed that we did have some kind a

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e of explos.ion in the bu.ldmg. And that is when I suggested h.g@ S @[. @, W M g, G. gs.-- i NE gpft to Gary 31 iller we no longer cycle the electromagnetic nlief valve because it had... the explosion... or rapid rising M 1?';g$ $ ilfy h^ pressure in the reactor building corresponded to opening the M gdg&GQ,*$y&q Lgpr4h j<M electromagnetic relief valve. unti g g Q] (Chwastyk,IAE Tapes 232-233, Afay 21,1979, p.18.) 4.::W $$TCf Chwastyk stated in subsequent interviews with the SIG that he $ g g,. M E-p f n j w W a i recalled informing Gary 3 filler of his concern that an explosion had

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occurred. On October 11 he said that on 3far-h 28 he had been con- @. ehWiA te'w. ?e.+1-~R.wem.nJ. cerned. even prior.to the explosion that water should be pumped into n-t,v..p c g the primaryat a higher rate and that: C g egw Wjm;;w-Mtw.m ff W ,e foj1 It was n. ht after the hydrogen explosion and I mentioned .cm. n: g WMM6FM that I correlated the opening of the valve with the detonation KMpSM;@@; period that I again went to Gary 3 filler and explained what I J +'WM'#d-43; thought had happened as far as the hydrogen detonation and W. m k q.1 % e W $c i h Ri the simultaneous opening of the valve, and it was shortly

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after that, Gary 3 filler got back to me and said go ahead and Vr.r ~.,,.M,&".4.w...We (Chwastyk, SIG,10/11/79, p.18.) . ::M u..aMOW WMWDE 3 filler, however, does not recall having told Chwastyk to draw the G' x % .f-bubble. iia fold SIG investigators: WM.,..w4"Wi&@t.r FN I don't remember that. In my mind, operating with the bubble in the pressun,I don't believe I was g q & $ 1' k,a 2. zer. M D % ;. N.O.M.N Uc (31 iller, SIG,10/30/79, p. 26.) W m m b@T"d-@ITfD WdN Sys:,:'AM":r;.;-:

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rEEfhE -.2: of who else you may have actually discussed it with on the j . e e%yc.. o8thf r a C17 - A. I have some recollection of talking to someone from the @.M(y}@drj.^Q NRC about it. At the time, I did not have the time to discuss WM ~T 1 1 possibilities with him and I think I related that I think there A; paw'.# ' T2.5 S may have been some, kind of explosion in the building, but hs;S.W ..E h' 1 t* I didn't know what, int (Ibid., pp. 20-21.) I@M /'j At the end of the October 30 interview 3fr. Chwastyk was again M/ asked by the 3fetropolitan Edison atto'rney participating in the depo-k~Q 3'['f i n sition, about, whether he had told Gary 31 iller on 3farch 28 that he .1 .i had correlated the pressure spike with a possible explosion : Mag. M ~. i i Afr. Daz. I don't want to put words in your mouth. You g ,.7, I recall making tl conveyed that m,ie inference, but you don't recall whether you g,p g;. j ference to Gary 3Iiller; is that correct or ~. Mr .e m -1 incorrectI We The Wrrxr.ss. 3fy best recollection is that I did related (Mc; 99 that information to Gary. That's the best I can remem(sic) WQQ M How much of that information though, what information ber. WC. 'On n f .'? I gave him, I definitely don't amember. I do know that I .W@W,ii .. i 1k gave him the information of the bank (sic), the valve open-7p mg simultaneously with the pressure spike. l d,

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WM 0 1 k 31[ Now, if I related that or if I put that together and told ..t him that I thought it was a hy'drogen explosion, if I thought G wA J ' $,..h.phy-_, s% it was an explosion at all,I don t remember. y (Ibid., pp. 28-29.) -., ~ W In sum, on 3far 21,1979, Chwastyk told I&E investigators that he t @ ;p*P {. c.. %gW.M.. 4 7 N t s believed on 3farch 28 that an explosion had occurred.and that he had 4 k? told Station 3fanager Gary 3Illier that they should no longer cycle g:9.g.@%c-g!M/ _.. ' L

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the electromagnetic relief valve because the pressure pulse had cor-f@j ' -O tr.4 responded to opening of this valve. On October 11, Chwastyk said, lyeg:4G ;. "after the hydrogen explosion", he went to Gary 31 iller and ex-6 5 :.h[M.jft'W,4.MF ~ plained what he," thought had happened as far as the hydrogen deto- .,,$.- FA W'T We l nation and the simultaneous openmg of the valve." (Chwastyk, SIG, pW gf . ~ * ~ [ ggh;,CT s.f.'$m.Q 10/11/79, p.18. When pressed as to whether he actually did tell 3Iiller that he th)ought there had been an explosion, Chwas M."iM o MQ6p4'i.. "-E E first time. on October 30) said that he could not be sure, although he .4 M thought he did. It is not clear from the record what was the basis for .= p @r # c . re ~; .y .M '" Chwastyk's changing his mind except that his recollection differed MkM,@E p(,Ei=,yM@*'rw:.A. 1..; [*e from 3 filler who had said he (3Iiller) did not recall learning on M 3farch 28 that there had been an explosion. a Wp;/ ' WS 4 Chwastyk engaged in the following dialog with NRC investigators $Qtg&, a'p@.g "9 on September 4.1950 wherein he states that he had surmised an ex-WN 6..w,,.r. _::, 54 N plosion, probablv involving hydrogen had occurred and that he had t..* P 9 - 1W& JJ + related this to 3 filler: m.p*.m w. vv..m....< m. mv-

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QQ t out specific individuals that my Q. During your testimony of 5-21-7,9, and again later on Ie. and talked to them about,it. 10-30-79,you addressed your conversations with Gary 3Iiller h:t you pmbably discussed it with regarding the conclusion that the spike was related to the st recollection is'that you discussed operation of the E310V. u h;va a pretty specific recollection What is n,0w your,best recollection with regard to the sub-a cetuilly discussed it with on the stance and time of this conversation f A. 31y best recollection, as I have testified before, I think ion of talking to someone from the I talked to Gary 31 iller not long after the spike actually . I did not havt the time to discuss occurred. I think I related that I think there Q. Did anyone else participate in these conversations, or cf cxplosion in the building, but was anyone standing by who would overhear themi A. WhenItalkedto Gary? (Ibid., pp. 20-21.) Q Ye8- {0 interview 3fr.,C,hwa,styk was again fice b i$sef. so a torney articipatmg in the depo-By 31r. 31osrm. ry 31 ler on 3farch 28 that he Q. Could you give us the substance of your recollection of o widi c possible explosion : the substance of the conversation with 31illeri b put words in your mouth. You A. Well, essentially, I think-The substance was that-i, but y:u don't recall whether you Again, as I remember it, I put together the spike, the' spray e G:ry 3Iiller; is that correct or pumps coming on, the simultaneous operation of the valve, and someone telling me about a loud noise they heard into, ollect, ion is that I did related (sic) actually, some kind of explosion in the building. Th;t's the best I can remember. I tal' ed to Gary about that with the idea-because of that, k ~ i;ti:n though, what information get permission to redraw the bubble. to get the bubble back m't remember. I do know that I into the pressurizer so we would know where we stand as far if the b:nk,(sic), the valve open-as the reactor cooling system. Pressure spike. This is substantially why-It was one of the reasons why. if I put that together and told That was the object that I used in discussing this with Gary hy Iondrogen explosion, if I thought 3 filler, to again get permission to redraw the bubble. 't remember. Q. So you really believe that there was a real pressure spike. (Ibid., pp. 28-29.) A. Yes. as I remember it. at whia de penn puk occumO,y 1:50 p.m.. the time Until that time [i.e. appr ximatel r:styk told I&E investigators that he I E nd My know picaon had occurred.and that he had Iler th:t tl e3* s1i uId no Ion er cycle what the status of the plant was. I only knew what I was told. But when I put together the explo'sion and the hydro-k d ilve. On Octo$r 11 C sNksa{> gen. I knew then that we had suffered at least some core ~ daniap. I did not know how to quantify it simply because, '. he went to Garv' 3Iilleber*ldeto: y u know. i,t could,have been a locahzed explo,sion,like I men-appened ts far as the hydr honed eark, or it couM han bn a nununal amount M ning of the valve." (Chwastyk. SIG l cs to whether he actually did te.ll' hydmpn. That was about the time that I understood that we did have becn an exp1osion, Chwastrh. (for the et he could not be sure, althou h he om the accord what was the basfs for q, [i.oS conc 15$ this Zire water reaction on 3farch xce t that his recollection differed (3fil id not recall learning on o$hfIn my mind, you know, when I put the explosion

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[fiiMf4 By 3fr. 3fosrLET. myD Q. But given that this is something that none of us ever ~ ~ fiI.h. ,[ ". ; W p]i%4:g{]. conversations w,ith others about your conclusions of Zire i. A" expected to see it was not enough to move you to have i 2 m. ... ? E, water reactionf lVuw c g%"- - y.y V y it was iust an explosion, and possibly a hydrogen explosion, En - M's l A. No. I think that it was enough for me to know that d p 9h.' f MM' ~ -J <1 i Bv 3fr. Cano. e h Q. Wfien you discussed your recommendation not to cycle Nfg%[.,, 4%f ically, Gary 3 filler, Brian 3fehler, and in general anybody $9 , ?] :f the block va'Ive and your discussion about core damage 'and $$:N the hydrogen. w, hat reaction did people have to that, specif- $js-Q - ...{ ' 'i else that you have talked to f h-WA 7,+ E A. By reaction,did Gary 3 filler say. "Oh,y panict do you mean, did anybod us.Q%

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Q. No. I mean, come on." Did 1 f.c;M.i 1 ther believe what you were sayingt Did thev take you seri-2F%:7~< _ 3 ouslyI Were they those, "Okay, Joe," going to think about itl'Was it one of p g h $p c h. L ' _ % W. and then he went on with what he was mei doingt l i'hy 'i ? ?.J.b-L. A. I would have to say, Brian 3fehler believed me that we I @{i,$pDP,4,T^ ,g ,h. had had an explosion. ~ g;;MW m 15A Gary 3 filler, I assume-I have no reason to believe that he 40 2 Ghit f did not at least think about it, and take it under advisement. g%fi au g y-n g. 7 5 (Witness conferred with counsel. ts' M @ut EQ d'; A. The reason that I say I think) Gary took it seriously is ? V, ? ~ y;f a because it was very soon after I related to him what happened r %,- J' that he gave me the okay to go and draw the bubble to find out

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wmwt 4% @ f & Q E,&... &..; & h55$_Q & & R.y Q Q.W y,T: >5%$ Yid: R M 1 3,. ~- 70 71 2nclusion in the afternoon of March Zire water reaction was shodly before the restart of the re-actor cooling pumps. Did I misunderstand you f A. Yes, I think you did. I did not mean to intimate that a bit. ir concerns or inferences concerning Q. Straighter. me out by saying it again, and relating it in ,m. ith cn.vone! w tune. osmn, y:u know, and my thoughts that there had,been a hydrogen A. It was shortly after-again, time really did not have hat I mnt mto Zire water reaction much meaning. It was shodly after-when 1 say shortly, I axpl: nation or discussion of what mean within 15 minutes to a' half-hour after the-probably retty much assumed that h even less than that because although it seemed like a lot. o'f < rogen came from one place,ydro-time, I don't think that it really was. Zire It was shortly after the actual explosion ~ nnd the pressure spike in the building that I surmised that it was, in fact, an n someth.mg that none of us ever explosion and robably a hydronen explosion, and I related iot, enough to more you to have that to Gary. Y>his was prior to Dary leaving for the Gover-chout your conclusions of Zire nor's office, as far as I can remember. Q. Did you have any c(onversations on the 28th concerning Chwastyk,I&E. 9/4/80, pp. 24-27.) .vas eno, ugh for me to know that od possibly a hydrogen explosion. primary system inventory with Gary Miller i A. I'd have to say yes, but indirectly, okar f And that was when I went to Gary and requested permission to redraw the rour re, commendation not to cycle bubble in the pressurizer to find out where we stood inventory-hscussi:n about core damage and wise Did you explain to him that's why you wanted to draw n did people have to that. specif. Q f:hler, cnd m general anybody the bubble f mean. did anybody panicf A. Yes. (Chwastyk, I&E, 9/4/80, p. 62.) ' Mill:r sav. i'Oh 'come on." Did qm f U wing c n erns the time at which Chwastyk was given per- ' thm,mgi Did the,r take you seri-sar nussmn to draw the bubble: k about it t'Was it one of Q. Concerning your attempt to redraw the bubble on m he w:nt on with what he was 3/28n9, can you explain the sequence of events and times re-lated to those actions! And you can refer to this chart from t,r2an 3Lhler believed me that we the Rogovin Report, also. have na reason to believe that he A. Can I ask you what-what is your q'uestion f When did I start f itgnd take it under advisement. """S*I-Q. What did you do when you started to draw the bubblef U thmk) Gary took it seriousiv is What did you seei ?Irelated to him what happe'ned A. Okay. Okay,I got the permission to g~ o nhead and redraw pand draw the bubble to find out the bubble somewhere around 2:00 o' clock. The first step we ear c2 water. This was. of course, did, of course, was to turn on the heaters, and then I think we o had been domg it before. sent some one of our operators out to verify that we didn't have any of our heaters trip ed; if they were, to reset them. G:ryleft togo to the Lieutenant hhwastyk,1&E,9/4/80,p.67.) 0 he left. When it wa~. Q. You said you got permission about 2:00 o' clock. You niersation when you talked to seemed relatively confident of that time. Can you tell us why nd then you got permission to that sticks out a: > ta his departure to talk to the A. Well. it was not very long after the spike in the reactor building. You know, I said 2 :00 o' clock, it was somewhere in Ik ts the Governor,I know that. the neighborhood of 2:00 0' clock. It wasn't 2:00 o' clock exactiv because I'm sure I couldn't even say that, but le with time.Ithought that ou Q. Is it related to 3 filler being there or not being theref lusi:n on the hydrogen andkhe Would that have an effect on att r 5$555).5$$1?Q.?%2WfCN=>%2Mi 4 a... e..m. w. w & n.v;y y w.m s s w y.4 yy~ m n,x. g;,.y,i) yA",x :.,-d.EQ.]Li.. - O.4. X.T= . ? : '., y3.M.vOt. g w pc w ww ~-vdm,.; e .: a .,v w ~.q-w..w e6MM# 2M..arwrEEG! Jdi.tm-A. W ! .e.

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7;,41%C;6'.y' to do anything to the plant unless I could improve the Mk;g.5: Q. And you did get permission from 3 filler to draw the r.. E T. M r, P % -.a'. b r - bubblo around 2 :00 o' clock f Wr~. W M. / 6 M M. QM.i Wy A. Yes. m% G' W Mks> Q. Who else heard this instruction or participated in this

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' M. A. No one that I'm aware of. I think Gary was in the shift .-TM;k@b69.% '.) supervisor's office by himself at that time, an'd again this was, Ms.W,u. rM. s..w' T'" yo.th theyressure spike,you know, I went mto the shift s -u h..t"@'*... r N.-g:c. ph62m';179s:K wi visor's omee, reic,ved that information to Gary, and asked per. MZ?:W h f D ;. 4 0.3 mission once aga,m to reestablish the bubble to find out where hffI.$pk;;O,W;"M;A.rf,1 U .M$ ' ' we stand. And it was soon there afterwards--the reason I gy remember at was soon was because it kmd of surprised me. EM.~ fWlsOD; +.P. You know. I expected more of a time lag to get the informa-c %..,.w._% g y:n,#,'L'. 5 : q g..u..4 Mn _ 4 makmg these decisions, and then go back to me. But it was a n. ...m. tion assed on to where it was beina thoupt over and discussed wherever passed on, and to be n ,w .C~ [#9'-M/m~7h;c:^m. wherever they were iA W 6: f I fairiv short amount of time between the time I asked Garv, [pu i.R NM rou Fnow again for permission to reestablish the bubble unt'il r.w.. eKM 3,n. n.5..'a he gave m,e the word to go ahead and do it. 4,5 W rel - g 84, _-C,2. 'm?_'1. R.D.,c.tw,.. 'c' ', ; Q. Yo'u just made one request of Gary Miller to reestablish bei . ~... - Bv Mr. CRAIG. C p the bubblef %.-.. m.w p'N,u n. m ss,e q./A.. M... MA. No, no. I had requested it earlier, soon upon takinw the 4.u : - .W; bgC cA

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asked him between the time I took the control inom and the (55Mf2N 4 spike. (Chwastyk. I&E,9/4/80, pp. 6941l) kM rE L.J$@5%'s%gir 3fr. McEnna Another question is, after pdDin with Mr. Miller about the pressure spike, your conversation the fact that you P;CnhsgGN.y believed that an explosion had taken place. did you make any (9605%gY@F#nTtdW;;.y assumption with respect to whether Mr. Miller had passeil M*c'E h D ' 9 %g,h,,3.. - w.c c, along that information either to his sup.eriors or to the.NRC! f v.;a.@WF+;M.. 4/-;M.iTN,@!jW,. W. q-, - u. e ;J.:,y % and he would pass that m.ed-he was their emergency d.irector.

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B v M r. M osrs.t r. ' N.[w-. r :.wA3.h d Q. Iset me ask a coupic of questions related to that. In Nh. J.*h'.7@dd@@[DdR %%;gg; pL.- N answar to the question. You used the term explosion. Was the term explosion used on March 28 f 42 ' Q[de c; m*.tv. e..a~.~a~~f;q~. -l w.E.M@O - A. I don',t know that. I remember the word "real pressure spike or the explomon was real. because m,."that the . g.tv.T m.tMjaurs the pre. dI-q&e~W viou M'. W;1 W W @Q & 47.5D. 3~.~c A~ earh.s discussions I had. there was some doubt like I mentione re p er. 5M.M When it dawned on me what had happened, the first pen:on d %.:.y Se that I went to was Gary Miller. . ww,.. N....,:,,vk,., -

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J f* L ,_e. 12 73 ense th:t, you know, one of my-Q. In your discussions with, we will assume it was Mr.

ontrol room. one directive was not Neelv, did you have the perception that he understood what it uni,ess I could improve the--.

you were tellinghim t rmusion from Miller to draw the A. I assumed that he understood what I told him, that the 1 i pressure spike or the explo< ion, whatever word I used, was real. I assumed that he knew what that meant. I am not sure mstruction or participated in this that that answered your question. Q. I am not sure it did either. e c f. I thii3k Gary was in the shift What I am lookin f Et that tune. and again this was, significance of this,g for is whether you felt he perceived the either by the questions he asked, or by twned en me what had happened comments that he made, or by any other actions that you saw kn:w. forne t,I went mto the shift super. him take, ion to Garv, and asked per. A. I assumed that he knew what I was talking about, and blish the bubble to find out where when he left I just assumed that he went back to notifv his there afterwards-the reason I bec;use it kind of surprised me. chain, whoever it was at that time, which I don't know. 'I' hat of a tune lag to get the informa. is the oniv thing that I assumed at that time. By Mr. G.oints. wrs bemg passed on, and to be Q. Ile did not,in fact, indicate to yoa what he was going wherever-wherever thev were to do when he left i then go back to me. But it was a A. No. IIe just walked away. between the time I asked Garv. .on ta reestablish the bubble until ( Chwa st'yk,1& E, 9/4/80, pp.105-106. ) t d C n d d 3 t. The following discussion leetween Chwastvk and NRC investigators relates to Chwa3tyk's perception that. not oniv had there been a real test cf G;ry Miller to reestablish biressure increase In the contaimnent. but that the increase might have een sufficient to breech the. ontainment integrity. Iit carlier. soon upon takink the the Q. Joe, during the recess you had a chsnee to finish review- .w I a ked as soon rm I too ing the portions of your October 30,1979. deposition before skid him between that time and the Special Inquiry Group that was referenced before the

m. nothine had happened.

d recess specifically page 20 ed immedintely after the sis $e. Now. Koing back to the questim re cf. if tnd how many times I not broadcasting.would you esphu,i of what did von mean by n that to us ag'ain i I took the control roorn and the A. Yes. It was just simply-von know. I would not make a tyk, I&h. 9/4/80. pp. 69-71.) general statement to the contro'l room, or the personnel in the control room, the announcement type. tion is, a fter essure spike, your conversation Q.What was it that cau ed von'to be scared f the fact that you I taken place. did you make any A. Well. it was a combination of things. One,it was the ex-rhetlyr Mr., Miller had passed plosion it elf. You know.the fact that it was possible that the 12 hu superiors or to the NRC ? explosion could have been of a higher magmtude that couhl n:t;s their emergency director. have, you know, done some damage or more damage than cw what it did do. know.the first tbirimarily violate contnimnent. That was,'you un alone up our cham, and ing that came through mv mind. IC notification. The second thing that came through niy mind was the fact quest.mns related to that. In that we did in fact suffer some core damage. That one is not g1 the term exploq,on. Was the as clear simp 1r because there are so many variables that I didn't know h' w to interpret. For instanc', you know, what o e ~ .mber the word "real,." that the kind of ventilation did we have around that pressurizer and, n was res1. because m the, pre-you know, was this stuti really concentrated around the pres-a some doubt like Imentioned surizer, or was it thoughout the whole building. You know, I had no means of knowing those things. hcd happened. the first person Q. On 3/08 or even 3/29 was the possibilitv of containment integrity ever being breeched ever discussed t' 75 001 0 - 31 6 ~ ~.. ) , ~ -- c ..e % G Ndiip~m.M M. m w ; e s.1.y ;;..T.c.V 4 =1.; W W+ W.jg) w: F - A '.5 R W +;.a% W: n..; V M = M + wm W " r s ~. d P.pi.W.~. e

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the building, and I think I mentioned this earlier, a steam tJJ s leak, and simultaneously containment was breeched and we ats gM',y ;.M.D ".A t therefore relieving the pressure. You know, we checked ever drM. ' d. .i, Afr. 3fostr.tr. What specifically did you check and whom thing we possibir could and found that, wasn't the case. y-fs .c 4, D -- did you ask to check thist tF,'h. The Wrrxtss. Well, things like the stea.m generator pns-h 'QlL f - Ji ~ sures, the containment isolation, you know, the valves to en-5ifyr.~.T l sure that the valves were closed, that were supposed to be MQM. closed were closed, I think, and I don't really remember,'you m. kt y'.. 'f know, I can't say. and this doesn't stand out in my mind, but i gd . ~' (gr@ji' I think I had someone get the procedure for loss of coolant A .a which describes containment' isolation and verify that, you 66;f,,Q ' - g know, what was supposed to be isolated was in fact isolated. t*/a rf.z c .g 3 You know, reactor coolant pressure, of course. There were a QJQp'.,;- number of things that we did check just. to verify the fact (~.P'-jbyf that we did still have containment, and not, only to verify W L-Kj. cp.IMhc

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%g;. y% ? k.e % operators who work out in the plant. D'4.M 1 7%'-U I asked and directed someone to make an inspection. Now, MM%.b.;.M..4MW~'M I don't remember who, you know. It was just a possibility p f: M ~*:. J 7 T, U T ,y that came into my mind, you know, that something in con-e:C.h[f' j'.c-:.*.PJTih ErMd L: tainment or some part of the structure itself had pocsibly , yi ;Ay" - wM3.,NtM..., 9'D b.t was something that I had to check anyway.roken or fell ap 9* J

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fr _ au,;.. - a $ c-M W U,ilG.' @.; w, N E @ 3fr. 3foser.tr. Did you discuss with 3 filler. kunder,Itoss or i p.'.w.j/g Q.;:e.'*,;.DM.; others that you were having these checks made f NdMDKW 3fr. 3fcEntos. 3faybe the problem with the question is could M.%hM.d? MW.Z.Mb ~ WW.W5r5.'69/M'Wo.d:.J you explain who you mean the others to be f ~~e iW ir-W W,".*C M i' % @d n The Warxtss, bt me sayt n nnaHy I w uld as part of the diF.4 report you know, to the cham,in of her words Gary 3 filler,I w uld,n t only eIP ain what had happened but what I am p: p..>:.. %-n. g@i. O..-. M ' k. m$ $,,[ M. %y.} MN U l x ~ w w A.m.m.9 s.. m r e -- +4: D, u.]# ;7 4.%;. **: f' *.% c, %.... g N 8* 9 ,,w b. n., u. - - e v .. m, fl# d.M !/.

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• "t but also to try to deter-A. I don't know that I ever got the nport back on that

,"y}u.;ws have either a loss of outside, you know, check of the containment. I guess I don't ng that caused pressure to remember because I think by the time they could make any ne kind of inspection I had come up with th'e idea, and quot'e t find nIti", ment. M e checked if you will,of the hydrogen explosion. And I think after that n "E- -jf;c jjy ask for the radiation I just sort of forgot about the containment check. quick survey around the build-(Chwastyk,I&E,9/4/80, pp. 32-36.) 'eadmgout t Chwastyk engaged in the follow.ing dialog concerning his discus-directing someone to make an si n about the pressure spike with T31I Supervisor Brian 3fehler. I think it wa,s an operator type Q. Could you try to recall the approximate time or related ics er radiation cont rol person' event in the substance of the conversation with Brian 3fehler em:n, a senior CRO. or some. concerning the pressure spikei tu mu,st understand how,hthere is. Essentially the s ift spiked, and 3fehler was somewhere in the background. Of you A. As I remember,I was at the console when the pressure , the control room operators comve,I did not know what caused the pressure spike, and fperators direct the auxiliary 3fehler came over and asked why the spray pumps were on. nt. I really told him. I don't know why they are on. I don't know ' f3 m:ke nn inspection. Now, why they started, but we got a bad pressure spike. This thing or. It was just a possibility was happening.and I did not know what it was. mow, that something in con. By the time it came back down to about where it had been ytructure itself had possibly befo're the spike, someone then asked permission to secure the fally behere it but I thought spray pumps and I denied it because I did not why they had che'ck cnyway. started to start with, and until I had a better feel of why with 3 filler. Ender, Ross or ? checks made f they started and what was happening, I did not want to secure them. fem with the question is could A fter a few seconds or minutes,I don't know what,it looked hm ta be f like the pressure was going to star down, and then I did allow mally I wouhl as part of the that the spray pumps be securcil. 3fehler was either at the i other words. Gary 3 filler,I cd happened but what I am sprav pump or in that vicinity at the time. After we secured the sprav pumps and' secured the other equipment, then I discussed what had happened, some of the )

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v .A.. m.* ?.. >.%.:c., v .h., A rh,,M W,. 7g $ A-c'.;g'.M U / '. N O. possibilities. I think that it was during this period of dis- %.M u. " ') 'T 1 cussion that we decided, somehow, I am not sure what the W. A.i n.' .r** n M..m wording was, but that we kind of felt that something had happ.ened in the buil. ding beca.use of the spray pumps start. ~w' Q@Q m l mg simultaneously with the spike. j (Chwastyk, I&E,9/4/80, pp. 9-10.) u?If.s J F. 6_ de 3fehler himself has said that he believes there was general aware-ness of the occurrence of the pressure pulse: w ~~ g ~.1 g bd4 ((v.9 Q. Was there a reason why you wouldn't have discussed it h% yL with Gary 3 filler, or it wasn't. discussedf Can you recallf A. Well, I don't know. I-the reason I made the assump-

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to the control room. It was obvious to anyone in the control l room that it happened, and I did discuss it with a gentleman w.- from the NRC. n. .e p q32 -? '- M.qf By 3fr. 3fosrm. Q. You would consider it to be general knowledge, then, b.'w@k ~ l M e both that the containment spike had occurred, and that the

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.a W ... n 3 A. That's correct. q v,.. : - ~. -,* i, (3fehler, I&E, 9/3/80, p.14.) p.

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. v. j [ g ~' Q. 3fr. 3fehler, you indicated right after the pressure spike l M;f&;J F . a.~ G.v.w. ' 7. you assumed it was common knowledge, and everyone came, i . S M h ',' N., . /,., out.n the control room. Who were you speaking about coming outi I W.w.- 'I m the control roomt 'y ' A. When I make that assumption, when the pressure spike @fMr.%d ., _,2'?. 3 occurred,I was in the shift supervisor's office. I do not recall i 'I' 0It.c who all was in the office at the time, but upon seeing t.he people{ m., s,. h>Cl3 [fr.4;-M4.. "it 7

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move around there when we got the SAS, I knew it myself, . w. I got up and went out to the control room and to did,I would u. g '. . 4 say, the majority of the people in that room, and they had to .De'C.i ~4 -. dE,. l be aware of the pressure spike, because we all went over to the .J;.= Q. f.f.m '. m'

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console where the pressure i-at it, %r. W.- L.;un g and we seen spray pumps r. dica. tion was,and we looked.t

h. W g~M,' E unning, and we discussed i

, J.19,f Q. Do you recall any of the people who were in that room f

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n e.M@ I realize you don't know them all, but .JFE99,. M,1 : -- %.,e,$ W g,'~ $@$ Sh e A. I believe Afr. 5 filler was there, and it's only-I'm not >C,+e@.....%,...p:WZ. y@+m. sure, and I believe 3fr. Ross. But, you know, I would never t y 3 L;P .h.m g say definitely they were there. %...s... m... m. C_ :..,. D,*' W M. m ; (3fchler,I&E,9/3/60, p.16.) .pu - e sc. pup kQ05DN.NYI.s %MM Ug74.O*.* 2.9% 3fehler engaged in the following dialog with NRC investigatom concerning his training with regard to what was necessary to activate

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I. h.k h I h., /., s-~_; y v.::3. w,. m n...- 3pe, : q. m:m.. -.c: n M.?~. n ;;. n. m..n w :. m. n. _ m.- m. xp.,. u:.a *. m-ys - se <e ~- -m, m a . ~... a mp.v,. '3 x,_ s .,..w- ,, - ' ~ - f i n i n it wa during this period of dis-somehow, I am not sure what the Q. What training had you received prior to the T3II-2 , kind of felt that something had accident with regard to tlie instrumentation and logic asso-bec:use of the spray pumps start-ciated with reactor building pressure f c spike. A. I don't quite understand your question. hwastyk. I&E,9/4/60. pp. 9-10.) Q. The instrumentation and logic associated with activat-ing containment spray pumpst t he believes there was general aware. A. Okay. 'ssure pulse *. Q. Those k. d of thm, m hy you wouldn't have discussed it A. We've had-I cou n't tell you when I had the specific .ar,n't discussedf Can you recallf training or anything, but I do know we had training on it, and it's based on ou have to have an ES signal plus two out I-the rerson I made the assump-re e fit, becauce everyone came out of three logic of 0 pounds to start spray pump,s. You know s obvi:ns to anyone in the control that training itself could have been any time over a period ol 1 I did discuss it with a gentleman a year from probably 1969 up till the day of the accident. l (3fehler, I&E,9/3/80, p.12-13.) In a similar vein 3fehler told investigators that he believed the it ta be ganeral knowledge, then, instruments to have, indicated occurrence of a real pressure pulse and spike h:d occurred, and that the not to have been a manifestation of spurious electrical signals. 3fehler referred to the pressure pulse as having originated with a chemical reaction; he stated that he did not recall thmking that a hydrogen detonation might have occurred. (3thier, I&E, 9/3/80, p.14.) Q. Okay, I think in your I&E interview you said that you o thought initially that the pressure spike in the containment, ited r. ht e,fter the pressure spike when ou saw it, was probably due to somebody fooling ig m kn:wledge, and everyone came, with the tranunitter. aroun a werey:u speakmg about commg A. Yes, I said that. But then I also said it couldn't havo been possible because buildingspray p>2mps started. umption, when the pressure spike Q. Which meant that there had been a pressure signal that supen isor's office. I do not recall went through and started the building spray pumpst A. Right. ic time.but upon sceing the people e got the SAS, I knew it myself, s control room and so did,I would Q. Now, after looking at it in that initial dismissal, did you pie in th t room, and they had to later realize that there had been pressure in the containment kr. bec:use we all went over to the that caused that spike on the instrumenti A. Yes. ,dic: tion was, and we looked at it, Q. Do you have any idea what could cause that kind of a running, and we discussed it. rapid pressure spike t e peoph who were in that room f A. I know Joe and I talked about ~ hem cll, but what could have caused it and I don,it later on that day, about t think hy vas there, and it,s only-I'm not mto it. We thought maybe some kmd of chem,drogen entered ical reaction or

But, you know, I would never something happened because it was up and down so quick.

Q. That is Joe Chwastyk t cre. (3f;hler, I& E,9/3/80, p.16.) A. Yes. Q. So you really didn't have a good diagnosis f o A. I personally didn't think hydrogen could form that eing dialog with NRC investigators quick in the buihling to that concentratmn to cause it in that crd to what was necessary to activate period of time. (3fehler, SIG, 10/11/79, p.13-15.) y pumps, training from which he ressure sensors would have tc detect 3fehler also recalled in his conversations with investigators that on tamment sprays to be triggered. 3tarch S he had been told not to turn on oil pumps in the containment, apparently out of concern that electrical sparks might be produced ~... u %,. ; w,'..f e d e ..d4 O ,,Y 9 4i Q D "u y v.~%',7"*.:.*:.

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-.m:w '87GlESt!GE' *O S3+- 1 18 . %_.M..@ -eM_,,WA T4 e.a X s i h. w A".4 f g,,:*st2 0. ! which could cause detonation of hydrogen in the containment f y-t. 7 x Wrd $M..W,Ek.fn s.f.M.. MM R,y 4lW %w structure. On October 11,3fehler told 'SIG investigators that: Wi. iia 0,775 $h C'. 1 ... I do know sometime after the pressure spike hap-4 u N.; Jg;.e,a !. E=. w.~r&a4.,.Fe :.ea 1.J -... v ,..r.,o - l pened we were told not to start e u,ipment because they as- . - ~. n-n . -. t,.a c ay sumed that it [the pressure spike could happen again and y y;cr. e ; J ,ts.iO.'"S'.'fm C.T.E6 they probably,put it that there was hydrogen in there, but that was sometime after 1:50. Now how far past that,I don't ,.h ?;d fE.W.T.* C';- T '^~7 M o know. And I do not, I said-well, to Gary 3 filler I said-he M...uwp,h. g.g.- &..-,+t ;., p.. said don't start an.y more oil to, I already tested them all, pumps and I said we don't havebe '%m: -......,.. ~ C D 's,q y; h. %e6,C., ?.I'f.QL N'3ef. - 75 but how far into the afternoon at that time, I don't know J:.L._.,gg%s-.,M.;>v.. ggOf J whether it was 4:00,2:00 or what, but it was som.d.,P.1 etime after. .m...,. m,. .ec.y... um... %, -z. g j.. y Ibi f; P[WS n.h+.tr,j"*-M"".;'p,. r-d t M.E j.S,.y 3fr. 3fehler was interviewed again on October,30 and at this time A, he was less certain that the above noted instruction not to start the s q?'yys-M pumps had been given on 3farch 28. The following exchange took b n*.C O R. w. b. l'h^p a % place during the October 30 interview where the questions are being gW ca .cc .~rm mue &y-::t M w v i asked by 31r. Frampton of the SIG and the answers are 3fr. 3fehler's: 7*. W:., g* M g.tc N - W Q. Since the interview that our group did with you on .v. < rL. 4 -f October 11, as indicated by 3fehler Exhibit No. 2, you have d'3d; *,Tf QF become less certain that this instruction and the conversation d p$ y ?;'A M b.f/ you had with 3fr. 3 filler was on Wednesday, the 28th. ? 2'."' D @iM,0.T. -., ;/ A. That is correct. NEM "~ Q. What is it that has caused you to doubt the recollection i FO/M that you had before f M,m' % W M [..eis A. I've talked to some other people that were there on the g:-C.R;&g.m 2Sth, and also thinking back upon it, certain that it did happen on the 26th. you know, I cannot be M:m'% i.m EWND ~ i Q. In talking with other people-well,let me ask you who WcP.P you have talked to aboutit f [jW A. I've talked to Gary 3 filler 31ike Ross, Joe Chwastik,* %..iG;." Q - /, a Ilill Zewe, and none of them re, collect that instruction being (f W J R given on the 28th. 1/.@;c.90 .T4 Q. Do any of them recollect such an instruction being given a m{e,w Q;6e. 4 re on the 20thf O.p

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n.- : a:. p.~ ..y * ; s s wr ~ ^ ~> __ _.,~ .~ .x_ C7o /g i of hydrogen in the containment Q. So this is in part conversations with other people that tr t;ld'SIG investigators that: you have had and in part sort of a general reconstruction of n; aft;r the pressure spike hap-events that's made you think that you're wrong in thinking st:rt equipment because tigey as-it was the 28th;is tliat fair to savt 2 spik3] could happen agam and A. That's fair to sa, and also. you know, there was hydrogen in there, but pened the 28th. And [did come back the 20t!). It could haveuite a bit hap so...o.v how far ast that,I don't very well been the 29th, and I wouldn't even say for certain . -w-ll, t2 Gary pfiller I said-he it was the 2Dth right now. d pumps cnd I said we don't have Q. It's conceivable it could have been the 30th f 11, becc.use they were concerned-A. I wouldn't want to get definite and say it was-you noon at that time, I don't know knew, I'm Hust not certain right now which day it was. r what,but it was sometime after. Q. Would it he fair to say that your own recollection, faulty (Ibid., p.16.) or not, standing alone has~been t' hat it was the 28th, but that cgain cn October 30 and at this time in talking to other peo,ple, you think that your recollection is twst likely to be somewhat faulty and it was more likely that ove noted instruction not to start the it was the 29thi ch 28. The following exchange took A. That'c correct. c.rview where the questions are being .IG cnd the answers are 31r. 3fehler's: (3fehler, SIG,10/30/79, p.15-17) . hat our group did with you on Chwastyk also :. dh being told,"... not to restart any equipment 3fehler Exhibit No. 2, you have in the reactor buildine. And someone at the time had j'ust finished ~ 4 instruction and the conversation starting a p;cce of c<,u)pment." Chwastyk said he thought the equip-ment referred to was the I)C oil pumps on the reactor coolaht pumps, ras cn Wednesday, the 28th. presumably the same pumps referred to bv 3fehler. Chwastyk said that 2 sed you to doubt the recollection he thought the instruction had not been ' issued on Wednesday,3farch es,'" becauw he remembered receiving it in the supervisor's office, and "... I don't think on Wednesda fico at all." (SIG, Chwastyk, p.y I was in the shift supervisor's of-her peoph that were there on the 16, 10/30/79.) This recollection of k upon it ithe 28th., you know, I cannot be Chwastyk is referred to in the blG report (Vohime II, Part 3, p. 907) and is part of the basis for the SIG conclusion that 3fehler was prob-people--w:ll,let me ask you who ably inconect when he rememlwred the discussion, about not turning ll:r,31ik? Ross, Joe Chwastyk,"a on the oil pumps, as having occurred in the shift supervisor's calce on Wednesday 3farch 28. On the othcr hand, T3fl supervisor 3fike Ross l a recolket that instruction being did recall C',hwastyk being in the shift supervisor's office of 3farch 28: (i.e. the shift supervisor s o)ffice where supervisory pers 9 such an m.struction bem.g given aid say spec.fically that it hap-convened during the day for the purpose of assess,ng events i i )I d:lich:ve some of them recol-and deciding upon actions to be taken) where we were at, and he would enter discussions."* honest (Ross, SIG,10/30/79, p.15.) The SIG report, prepared prior to the NRC I&E inquiry begun

f in 3farch,1050, does not mention that Roe' recollection as to Chwastyk's appearance in the shift supervisor's office conflicted with

>with them, what is it that they Chuastyk's recalling that he did not think he had been in this of- 'mk that your recollection is prob. fico on Wednesday. 3farch 28. The SIG report notes but does not com-Cht .Tliller:pon a further dnerepancy m the testimony of 3fehler and ment u been in the room the same time 3fehler testified that it was 3 filler who gave the instruct, ion e3 and it oems funny 1f I would not to start the pumps even though,the dat ,bered it happening o,n the 28th Se 2Mh, but after talkm,on was that the instruct,e was uncertam 3fehler's own recollecti inn had been issued on, b in the roon. that don't remem. g to other people, he said that his recollect on was most likely faulty and it was more likely that it was the 20th. Nat tember 4. into that to the best af ble ree-(Ibid.) 3 filler, on the other hand, did not recall at any time having Eltment wis glien on alarch 29. (See pp. 81. bl."*recolfection he had t++n in the sacertitor's omce en Af arch 24. tree p, AS.)Che n flon' Che antik subsequently rhaheed his testimony, stattne that to the best of his recoute- . the lostructico not to operate equipment was glien on Alarch 29. (See footnote Sa.) - u $p w-k h k h f :N: ?; h. S pf"vy.-Q"yLy w~ P yg;p%~n&.s~*1w w we w& hif ww .m m n =w n w.gm..a.:#mw+4. e. q.~ e M A N-? i I ,l 4

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Group's conclusion regarding the time at which the instruction had .~, L/6 -..? t,.pp &C been given. < ppt :g 3gA.J. N Y.2:M.1 T.$ g y - 7:1MM6 . On September 3.1980 3fehler was again asked about his recollec-(SIG, Vol. II. Part 3, p. 908.) k',J . de.@U H.4fMPT$il A b 'p tion and changes therein regarding a March 28 directive not to start M,;r.W @..W'm . k, i~hMY.f f.Q h ib.6. ' ~ equipment in the containment building. 3Ichler said the changes from M ki;.V.'$,L. j @l D' M i-de. %, his recollection as of October 11,1979 to that stated on October 30, E iM.;3 pM,M - ; 'y 1979 were based on his having talked only to Chwastyk and Zewe y (n,ot,Ross and 31 iller, in addition to Zewe~and Chwastyk, as he had @D:p,:. n.r.-: m%:.m?j.S J d ^~.J,d ; h d. C M~ M 'J.'u of these discussions that he decided that he had been wrong about e. said in his SIG interview on October 30,1979) and it was on the basis ( M 6 c;E $ h E y K receiving on March 28 the instruction not to turn on equipment in the . NCICGt .E'N M'. containment building. However, Chwastyk. as indicated below, says gf]f L-a. x-d@.CU:~9.WdTid,% y9 4 9.E~bff'M [ %"N, on the 28th, and that it was in fact Chwnstyk's recollection that this GE@dd55 that he did not tell 3Ichler that the instruction had not been issued (" .l.) was the day on which it had been issued. Furthermore. the most likely t- - @..,.h.e....r.m %WM ;-M.'.~.7 :~ time for issuance of the instruction was after 6 .m., the approximate

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an.1 thus it is unclear what would be Zewe's basis for leading 3Iehler to believe that his Dichler's) recollection was faulty. (See 3fehler, p,G Q'h:U; Q@ dy77-Ay I&E,9/3/80, p. 27-28.) tgeC:..t F, Vu On September 3,1980 3fehler recalled, as he had previously SIG,10/11/79, p.16), that it was Miller who gave the ins (truction3fehler !#d'".*@.MMT.2 %-WW. ; p-;T.c e %:M.5. rC':;@ 3fehler engaged ~in the following dialog with NRC investigators: ,4 d 4 W.Q :M although the day on which it was given remained unclear in his mind. w~

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$ hig.o..,w. p%;;m. p~M V M.+ w Q. Your best recollection now is that an instruction was W> % ~ g. M w W :.5. %.r. @;-.:W W given. -vu r m 5Wc,' ,A,,.. i~ A s. i ew;q,- a A. That's correct. @W,;u. t *. u N. ~.:d :- ~... g..w,. Q. By whom was it g.iveni .. g. g,r w ;; p ;. w - A. Mr. Miller. (3rehler I&E,9/3/SO, p. 30-31.) M.W-W N W,~L,crn. s r n:

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.ca. e 9E7j jh M.t: p h W 9.r w$ p @M M Q. Your recollection is quite certain that it was 3fr. 31 iller C-V who gave this instruction. Could it have been anyone elsef M*C: i You're quite certain it was Mr. Miller f ~ $@NDiMEQ&OQ'im

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A. The best I recall, it came from Mr. Miller. MrQ MNM-i (Ibid., p. 32.) M..G@&@Q:bC.*%@Ki M e '.,i M..y %. 'i' W W D.,.. n.5 ~e In a meetine. w. ith I&E investigators on Se. tem.ber 4.19so.Chwastyk ..a hn

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{YdfL'IM*Mhi'1M.k%&c-#,N':di'dMWJ'Q,' significance, and the instruction not to start equipment in the contain. ment building, an instruction Chwnstyk now appears certain was issued M.,.. t D'A Q' x;C['f'Gdy on Mareh 28: W.5,c m & }$.p:t W u ? i s $di sM4 Q. At what time and what log.ic caused you to conclude that t**p e.b.h.cffR+4:,v,e$.'E %M n:.r-LJh.i.Kd4pi -; the spike was caused by hydrogen f A. The time, I have to sa ,;y! W W.-vr'.m/,WO;i W much meaning on the 28th. y, the time, really did not have i I don't thmk it was very long I @K. M@bM7S@$1G@~; EPA M simply because it did not take us long to-It did not take the I

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the tu,n. which was the Special Inqui,

a matter of exchanging ideas. ne at which the instruction ha3 It was shortly thereafter that someone related to me that they heard a noise of some type. Again,I don't remember who (SIG Vol. II ler was,agam as. Part 3, p. 008.) related that to me. Somehow, the noise, the pressure spike, the ked about his recollec. operation of the valve which was being operated all came to-rding a 31 arch 2S directive not to start gether, and it scared the hell out of me. That is when I as. buildmg. 3fehler said the changes from sumed that we had had some kind of explosion, a hydrogen 11,1979 to that stated on October 30 explosion. g talked only to Chwastik and Zewe' Q. Your best neollection is that it was on 3-28 f tion to Zewe and Chwastik, as he had A. Yes. b et9 er 30,1979 ecid,rd th:t he)had been wrong aboutand it was on the basis Q. On testified on 5-21-70 that you recommended to Gary 3 filler that the E310V should not be cycled. What was the er, Chwastyk, as indienteuction not to turn on equ[i ment in the basis for your recommendation not to cycle the E3f0Vf below. saya A. The basis for the recommendation'was what I have just at the mstruction had not been issued related. The operation of that valve with the pressure spike, f:ct Chwestyk s neollection that this I therefore assumed that there was something wrong with the n,i issued. Furthermore. the most likely operator motor, or some kind of connection there that was tion wts after 6 p.m., the approximate causing a spark.

2. control room. Therefore, Zewe would Q. Was your concern based on the failure of the motor for mstruction been issued after G p.m the block valvet ild be Zewe's hAsis for leading 3fehle?

A. No,I will be quite frank with you. my first concern was, recollection was faulty. (See 3fehler, IIoly Christ, we had an explosion in there, and if we operate that valve we may have a bigger one. Of course, you know, recalled. as he had previousiv (3fehler' I did not think it through and the fact that the first bum was 3 filler who gave tha instruction should have burned anything that was then. isfi: log with NRCinvestigators:iv:n remamed unclear in his mind. Q. Were you concerned r. bout localized concentrations of I hydrogent sion was locahzed m the pressur, hat I assumed that the explo- . A. Well, yes. I will state also t i now is that an instruction was izer area. One of my concerns was that there may be othei pockets around there, and that would be dangerous. f.1 der, I&E, 9/3/80, p. 30_31,) Q. Why didn't y,our concem or recommendation include other equipment inside contamment I o o A. At that time, we were not operating any other equi .i.t ] cert a.m that it was Afr ment in the containment. Our mode of cooling was eveling the-uld it have been anyon.3 filler e elsef va1ves. fr.3 fill;r f ne from 3fr. 3 filler-Q. If ther equipment was to have been energized would you have neommended to Garv 3 filler that that not be ener-(Ibid., p. 32.) gized alsof A. I will be quite frank with you,I did not think in those at:rs on September 4.1980 Chwastyk terms. As a matter of fact,then was word put out not to oper-5 (2nd clarification of previous recol. ate in the equipment and I sort of kicked myself for not ,eness cf the hy,drogen detonation,its thinking ahnut thnt myself f ' lot ta start eqmpment in the contain. Ilv 3fr. IIonmo: astyknow appears certain wasissued Q. Wlien was that word put out, do you recall f A. To the best of my recollection, it was on the 28th. fogic caused you to conclude that Q. Who put it outf igenf A. I assume that it came from Gary 3 filler,but I cannot say that Gary 3 filler told me specifically'been passed along from .v, the time really did not have Q. You mean that it might have I don't think it'was very long ? un l_ng to---It did not take the smne ne chef G there v:ry long. 3fehler and I A. Yes. and I am not sure of that. m - c.. < x,, a s 6 ,? ..*e.*

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.vr Ev 3fr. 3fostur. Q. Following up on the same thing, do you recall any N: w" W~.w.%r..,,, reason for the order o.r instructio.n not to. operate equipment't .-g NpQ$h Was anv reason for this order or inst ruction f A. Iilon't remember now ifit was stated orIjust assumed D$ I that it was so that we did not cause any m, ore sparking. ". rW.R u. kk%MMF Q. You don't recall whicht .a STE'K.y'ri.s t

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A. Can I talk to mv lawyerf 31r. 3Iostur. We w'ill ro off the record. W ,5Ai3 [~ @7" W.f.'U R g s. [ Discussion was held off the record. 3 3fr. 3fostur. We are back on the re] cord. + SN f % +CT-9 The Wrrxtss. 31ay we have the question asked againt EbT By 3fr. 3fostur. %yOfiw Why Q. The question was, do you recall at the time that the order was given whether or not there was a statement as to 4Mf udhA,%, 4 7 why the equipment was not to be operatedt yr, 1 d A. Again, I don't remember specifically that the reason EDM'Q:.it* 44 m 3r W*M*# b was given or that I just assumed it that this was to prevent "A sparking in the building. 4 R Ndu d '% S. e I do remember the encumstances and who was present. l ?$ey%d M.,_ Essentiall was there.~y Gary 3 filler had mentioned, and Brian 3fehler e:4.C g.MS.W, 3fehler said something to the effect that it was too p, M*$l/Zk & '/..,

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late and that he had just started some piece of equipment SX3dW'. in the building. I remember some comment of mine to the effect "E'jm J# - % g@ 2* g "*.'6 j was sometime later, " Don't worry about it because, and this n we have rg%;gh.vCa - burned up that was in there anyway." .~ r ,0 Q. That was your commentf WJ;M%.: ~ y, 5. - A. That was my comment. y i Bv 31r. GAMBu. nO. =.-D;%aw.iRWs - , Y, Q. To hIr.31ehler f Y. w M-c ~t.cu A. Yes. WML Q. And 3fr.3fillert ~ ' a A.To whoever was there. j 4?ygp Q. 31r.y 31r. 31osrur. . c-**' E W B p;;hQ@*$.'4- / %.*J9 h, gEk,W.. ~: l 31 iller, to your recollection was t here f c. U w,.. A. Yes, to my recollection he was. .m.,

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(Chwastyk,I&E,9/4/80, p.14-18.) investigators indicating that no generaOn.Septemb.er.4, ~. @ @eg...c.,.w,. m ......,..y y a gg hN.#M.w.Of g;iM.*la., e c f M ;, announcement was made in the control room regarding the instruction not to start equipment in r .c. /, W the containment. In addition, Chwastyk recalls that he was not sure .I .s *4t2 m h'BM W ".Y.,,j,. ;gi

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N **,M. .t.g' u~--+r..~w ~p.mm.:., cently started a piece of equipment and "nothing happened," i.e. there m w v ~~...a STop;'5:;R w-v:'.N, M N had been no indication of a hydrogen detonation. The discussion dFM 1 hQfjyGQ s.y' f Ilows: Y, S$'Y[-/".5 c.'O;Q M $ Q. Ilow was that onler transmittedI M l.t. m.../ e... $s?.E..* m,.i p,.v. We. Se?- . A. Again. I don't remember specifically Ga Miller g. iv-t, y . m..c. M.c y mg that order to me. I do remem r t. hat so.on W';m.e%a....dmai. after it, was g. specificalliven. Gary. filler and myself were disc w C*#E%e4TJX'.MJ/P. v .c something when 3fehler walked in. IIow the order was ac-2 e s Tg c. m crx:=,./Wep y tually t ransmitted,I don't know. uDon,It was not somebo.dy sayi.ng to vou in a calm voice, b w 5. ~9 s/ W 5..%. N.mP. Q. W t, restart any electrical equipment,was opposed to some-a.... . ; %, %r.% @; y/)p$..-@ _.[:.-lf r,*/.W;9..c i 3 body standing back and saying in a loud voice, so that other l the conta.uld hear," Don't restart any electrical equipment in people co y e.. f69, w. . a. & .w., ,N .. m mment." q,.,,- a m. .,.c 'I A. It was not a eneral announcement made in the control I:. i.*k'dM $;.E,; .ah. d..W. . 7l M 9 M@. n room. I remember t at defin.tely. . : 5:CMW,.@c r," By 31r. IIorrorxo. i 29.- g

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. } }OgI IW' M:'MEd:d b -. c L - ~ / c p P.Jc,r../. 4 somethin.g like that be recorded or logged I i A. It is difficult to answer because I cannot think of an pn.. r.Q..t. ;M._.e m-4; d.. 4 analogy to use during normal operations for an order like u _7:,j i .,u e that. %

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and th.at would be tagging it out, which involves a lot of time 'c'f?. x s to get inst.tuted. i t n' J;pME f

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Prior to that time, it would have been a verbal type of D M k h;ippfM @O. commimiention to whoever was in charge of the shift.'Right 'b'.DQ 9}iN.*;;Y d.:t W J p',% M, l now, presentiv, the shift foreman. If I had a piece of eqmp-tagg that I did no.t be safety tagging. or a caut.the proper ment t want rim, I would institute 6e.,w,3. m.-2 7v.'. &, 4v mg, whether i ion tag, or ay.;.Wl~r""'ph$y.1'c'-

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were placed, I would give a verbal order by way of the shift T6f.W.'i4 C.'. foreman not to operate that equipment. but I don't think 3 $'T M.I. M @ f w 7;% v P' e4, that ther would log it.

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a Ily 3f r. 3fosE1.EY. /TMf N, -Q. '" l pubh. I.n this circumstance, wou.ldn't that be sort of well Q. .a .. c -.a cized to all the operators in the control room because pw,p..ht. ;p".Necgh. ;,

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cach of them may have had some reason to operate some N*E.SpM>"f'6'#g rir,T r / m= d,.W. C.:' equipmcntf W k:E'!,dG7? A. Normally it would. except for the fact that at the time 'NMd.t!MWCiN)% the word was put out, it started a piece of equipment and I SM,h%*7&7f 1,C nothing hap'pened. So I am not too Sure how far we carried T..h',/:$s AF./1/; it out. I don t think that we did at all because that was about si. am %c M,2;.p % @$ p y M icG I in the time we were starting the reactor cooling pump. Q. This u ould have been about six o' clock in the afternoon f 41.WOf.. 1 re. A. Hetween 4 :00 and 10:00,I guess. T:wp

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NQ' :- e.. 4.. :n#, '-..m-.%.v,u Q. The pump was bumped at about 7:30. m.4 v.r..;; ;er, :g A. I remember, to the best of my recollection, that it was d -~'T*.MMM I, !%g,.&f y)g3].%['i %" about that time that we were getting ready to run the reactor U ?i j. ,fi,

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coolingpumpthat allof thishappened. D.fN@/4-Nf 2YiYl *E.TGA... Q. Could you tell me from your knowledge what precipi. ~ T:y,.fGM.: 4.15.>cm%.;.l ' tated at this point in time, sonie six hours or five hours after r* c 5 &f6 M;M M t the time of the explosioni IInd there been discussion of thist M :,Wrt;v.: *? T;W, .W, What caused thelong time period f gi A. I don't know to tell you the truth. All I can relate is p[A.M.i 7Qrt >'7QF MN what I remember, a,nd my first impression was,"Oh hell, why

14. C Q - M s!N$'. r.:e#,5 C didn't I think of that "

iDM (N;S;G.My,f4r W M. M ',. After I thought about it a little more. I thought. oh hell GM g : e. T.,'2. w w e s.d g d.,.. ;.;a% 5.9 ; cycling the rafves. so we have not been putting any more we have already burned it up in there. We have not been re., .3 s M u.-5w h . ;;j ; u.' jiy<jrogen in the but'l(ling. a . :. ~fe., - - by. M* g..W.;. c m e C:'n. mW p ?m. -., -.7.. rd.? liow the order came about,Ijust don't know. e h,.m'hM,'2 7-4/pp ' i.n :#ew.fi'. M.X.: v..l!, _. d C-NE. Q. I just wondered if you overheard or knew of any con-fh8 versations in the interim'in which this was being discussedt %w?p S-- O..p'.M.d,,. :.' A. No, I didn't, or at least I don't remember any. ohg . as .f. -- ~ : : k ;; By 3fr. GAMBLE. 2 C_ me Q. Do you recall. hearing an.y comments from any of t 4 e 6 2 rsu e.,;. r.u. personnel who itceived this ord.er, operators or anyone, m.he $P;hc - W.W;W;7.. e.... :: n, w. a. :4.h;r e - Qy..,., dicating that they understood the order was to prevent any- .f9 y. .- wh ve,.u, sparkst rE** @;wr. ~.O.w.~. nm C '.%'-J:v G ;t h.. pm v y. 7.cf...,.' A. I don't really remember that the order got. out to the M3 M contml room operators. As I think about it. now, there would e%A,@1.07: $.EQ,^ be no reason to because we had just started some equipment =!Q m,J %e. M - d n,p @W N 4-in the building. htM y -... - ; M ' T.Wf.d Whether the word got out to them prior to my knowing + gf.;%w.M.,D. zQ' C'/. hmm%.w.#ww..". p,;+M,. 3.W.:w?, 2 what ha ppened. I don't. know. arm.. W. %.E Q. Was there any discussion amongst the personnel, aside NvsWO from 31r. 3fehler. Air. 3 filler and yourself, which you have p-w~. t ... r.. m.. _ y. ..y e. ccgp.%=m... talk,ed about earlier.f um. s. 7 . WJ' 7lP N r.d & S $i%Cs.r.Gi*g.W N.c M as there any dimussion along tJie h. have to worry about this problem because,"we ju,st started nes E, ell we don,t t[We1L+s.f these pumps and nothing happened," any discussions along P3'Gfb.er.wA&'M.9%4 e. that hnef i';5Wm.,'/ Wi$h .w., N~@.. m_ce.wy%nG.*M...,.a,. ty.r *i.m A. The one between 3fehler,myself and Afiller,I def'mitely 'iM*J' Y..m. %M Ma know about. ,A.pe .~m ta,e.?.tme.pf " -fr.& Q+.4 a # % w-a a. ~.. t m (Ibid, p.19-22.) ~w%W.M The follow.ing is Chwast .dWfp ber 4,1050 regarding his pr'yk,s explanation presented on Septem-W E W,;5,-R $.s h @% @'F .%i/ in the shift supervisor's office on 31 arch 28. a recollection that was part evious recollection that he had not been $D 1 G. -y> w-d s.. yW,,; of SIG's basis for concluding that the directive not to start equip-p,w,, %mh $,%i$$.x. ment was given after 3f arch 28. $rlA@ !W.%e,g4M[Or".[yWD@ Q. Ross has testified on the 30th to the SIG that you were I NQUM** k. in the shift supervisor's office on 3farch 28th, and today you [NI**d.y'r:C,$.'.'*:".~P&&g have also likewise testified that you were in the shift super-mm.m. mw s;.%, visor's, office. Is that correct f v,c m, s,,.,.,.*.sey M. .- s A. ) es. m $ :% 9 %M,nef.n"LM%t,.,,*Y'.,? Wy..% .,@ Dr.:.4.W.t Q. You, however, testified on the 30th to the same group,

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• going on at the time. I wasn't involved in that type of thing.

pg%e-+y; T "* I was in the office, MIp>/,g d!0*.%y-make reports only.you know, just to receive my orders and to CNWT&fr k ' l.h Q. Well, the reason I asked the question of course was the y[d.Mi.-J-q h p M 35ed I fact that two people, yourself and another person, testified 9%@ 7 con-y.)jM r' g (*;; y ;P that day. Those two testimonies we,re taken to discount that that you weren't there on that day weren't m that office on y nc .* W w. H w?gg.M v4 ' N. of the is. now toda.y.vour recollection von were in the shift super-the order was given on the 28th. I just want to clarify that it p % w w. m.4 ;. WA s. .s m '-: r m.. #...fW

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visor s.ofh.ee on that day, and I.have done that. en ....s+ stany A.1 es. p p.M M.MAM (Chwastyk,I&E,0/4/80, p. 45-46.)

$$$#.NM'El to the On September 4 1980 Chwastyk engaged in the following dialog would with NRC investiga, tors wherein he seeks to explain how 31ehler might

.c._..g.;; W eJ. 7 ;. 4 ment ...,.w [dMl.L, nkm y...n...- ? hav.e Votten.from h m th.e impression that the ins.truction concermng p w-v s r i w e.~ MWJM r> o, $. N b @. W Q M JA yd equipment in the contamment had twt been given on 3farch 28. .fhi -N Sag Chwastyk tells the investigators that it was in fact his recollection W 4.Q. Te E .v %....fd, W - that the instruction to not start equipment teas given on 3farch 28. mde Z @o h@ @m s ; p l Q

P have By 3fr. Iforruxo.

Q. Joe,let me go back to something we have already talked ~ 7'>6 t .".c. -5 ~. N.c 3 w - ,1on t about. This is the instruc. tion not to start el.ectrical. equipment ~- i r.tN.%. m.,.c. arted that we talked about earher. What you basically said was that Nws ~ 7.- s t%]-{.Wdi.'W<witoRM tiong any electrical eqm,s given on 3farch.26th by 3 filler not to start the instruction wa $. ;;q7pg pment in the containment. hb.M,.,.1 ;fd%!"MM *g about t.he instruction and when it was given. This is how that .qgI h*ow. we have talked to Brian 3fehler on this same subject, a~vc;q fi:-% @ CW7N ') spun out. On October 11th,1070 Brian testified on this subject a and he said basically what you have said that he recalled the W-EM Septem-instruction having been giien by 3 filler on the 28th. A# er t ,d Mt been that he had some doubts, reconsideration, what-havr rou. !/g",q.gg c.- y.h : . ; d'" ras part and ha later testiSed that he wasn't sure when the inst? uciion yM[M !T.p. t equip. was given. IIe wasn't sure if it was given on the 28th or the b@W74, 6. Y < ! 29th. IIe still recalls such an instruction being given, but he < A.. nre didn't know when it had been given. liWF2 4 tou We talked to Brian about this yesterday and asked him b6W ser. what prompted him to think about this and begin to doubt O. T A 7* C I N] the time. Ile indicated that he had smne conversations. Spe-a2 cifically he said he had a conversation with you. IIe asked [b.]' dk? /. treh and that you tol,d him that it h9d not been given on the 28th, c!4 N E""' yup, von diil you recah the instruction being given on the 28th $..r,$.;,l. to your recollection. x. .s - M.u"~C;.,( 4 e ?.;*: h.n. n..W . -i J n e.. ^ f%. ;* i x;- -. ,\\ ...qd g.-- ..t"-q D> ~ g,& w_ .. ~ g -. an w: ;... g.; w-. m,- - *.g. g, o. SM .. h,EW.'A T,,7. j :; .3b M ^*5. ]m. wh 5 8 M E,.2.:";;.' 4.z.,.ye.ydi.M SA,I,M N.2. ET i %#.k' : ..n

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w%1 that on October 30th, but so far as I recall he didn't say spe-i?c-2?4 M M %.t>

cifically yesterday that Afr. Chwastyk said what you just WAt.m.s. 2.g.hW w related that he sai'd. . &a mm,,. (Short pause.) ,m v-w g.g. h. .-m E?$Id~d.N Ci.E. 3fr. IIorruxo. Can I read from the 3fehler interview.

ZdET.C 3fr. 3fcBruor. Please.

pc ~@$'f.g$i[R3i .a. w -A. ' 3fr. IIorruxo. This is B rian t alking yesterday. N.N.$l$ 3fr. CnAm. Excuse me. For the record, that is the 3fehler F,:.'j.'i.f $ $ I5 $ d W NM interview of 9/3/80. O dM@MM.M ' 3f r. IIorruxo. This is the question to Brian. .V1.MA N$ " Question :Whodid you talk toi N'$'$e.A.SXWE! C,@J.p;j; " Answer : I believe I t alked to Joe and Bill. .yg ygx ; " Question : Chwastvh t !w-hhip:Md<i-~ " Answer: Chwasty'k and Zewe, and I really don't know Ol.@.y.;f:' *!IEM;-/.a.e;# 4 v t.c n who else. BC.M " Question : What did they savt What did you ask themt $qf@dMirW Qip h9 uAnswer: I asked them if they recalled the conversation p%NENYEkNNN.Q where they said not to start any electrical equipment in the .:.p h H M reactor buddme.

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" Question :What did they say to thatt WJ sap /.q:r'.-W.r..~ r.'c ; " Answer: They don't recall that conversation happening . m.1 w

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%.. w-m - ~-- on are 28t " 7'.,%'WM;;S6;,%;.% - n-W. M 7.:.02:f. m - The Wrrxrla. I remember a conversation with 3fehler .Mid.'s-about that. I am not sure I remember exactly, you know, what 4.W was said. 3fy first impression when you asked that was that J4JRsd:M:s-% Bj;;, y 3fehler related to somethine about someone saying that

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. rM,.pr% iPM> :?h..;. it didn't happen until the 29th. IIe wan.ted to know what I -Y2 rh -. TesRW3.fp thought, or maybe even to try to help him, you know, in his re.W W Et,F'D E M j E ~;* p f f E - own mind, you know, get it straight on when it happened. It ' ib.5dOj0'*.4My someth,o me I remember, at least I, think I remember saving seems t t mg to the efTect that-I think essentially I told hun, Vg$.$MQ,6.b ::vW M M Nd D.$.W M von know, that he has just got to go with what he remem- ."W. ^r' k 7.'W.M hered, and I may have made a comment of somcthing to the ?$$,6 effect that, you know. I didn't think it happened on the 29th, hTNN.M@@S.PWj'o% "'Mdi~If.d/ 'S' W but I don't remember saying that. c's .a"- W. I...F.rt e.

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wantm.e only t.hing I remember of that conversa. tion wa.s my not Th ar A g to impress anything on 3fehler, or him not impress-M.r-Wr .u. p' "E'M. kWhin3G ing anything on me. I don't think I really wanted to talk kh Q -p# h i 74 i about it. You know, I sort of glossed over it and tried to n..%r, v r change the subj,ect type thmg. 8FrMMM.2 By 3fr. IIorruxo. 'LN'h g#,dN E Fl M p e -~ Q. But you don't recall telling 3fehler that it didn't hap-i F' tuW.DMH@tf!, pen on the 25th or anythinglike thatt %s.g.pg,% tW A. Well,I don't really remember. I may have. f NW2%p[40@SNndyphg, ?ct.N*@W~ EW Q. You may have said that to him, that it didn't happen Ngf. % we on the 28th f want to discuss it with him at the time, gain. I really didn't A. I may have. I don't know why. A r % f..d W~h* W'.tWy's.; 9 and I may have just A -~ p.1.K'+Qrf, ed,%'*Fh,.W.m;_P k.g.,*M M" - said it to close out the convenation. ' ::' n% J7J Q. But you are clear that the instruction was given on the x,.a..v,,.,3 e..;:- 28tht pn,. t..ms.a%. %...s...r... kj l w,. u h... h. m'Y. $ Y. n'?..E *R*' M tt?sv. m'.2"Q ~.* ' N &W l(f.m*;,.as,.i1 ~: M p p :c-f:.6t/.~-.--G %. y heu .xi ~ M :V w m. Q' u m' M l-d** h~ '.. Q.wv ... -. - ~. - - - -. - - - - - 15.YNdWQ.Ph.44Rh:: 'Q.~.% i m%,Ri%, ::v.l2G(etir, FM:?w'W':,W, Q< T~ ' d. O',2.. .=&.r-b Q.. u wi.' ;D : -u 1 . e m'.. ~... c.. :;;.,',. hg$~v. w. e. :.w< &,.,. ! N$y.e;Q '*Q '~. m:.3 w,"-r,- .Wr e C~ ~w; h : <? m.:..,..-.3. e y:n: y .c c s 1 'f

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.w+ h .-i W. g;.<e p. .@,M,,,.c ~&.,. w.e ;~r % $7 a .~..M.W: $.Md W $55 4 r..,;efhm.m e.9,h_5Eh A. Yes to the best of my recollection, it was given on the M m.w 28th, you,know, and I think it was after Miller came back 3 ire said rzMe mW,u. _,..O W h6 W.MJSAdi 4 on just from seemg McGovern. my spe. f.#M%m& -m, n., n..~ @ Q. An,d you are clear that Brian did come up to you, I W. ~ r.. - e E - 6 wJ,.h oseit would have been afterthe su k;Y M;D*F'.h g'h Yes. kNM. N$3S OI h -ie r. Q. What do you recall of that conversation f Can you recall when that happenedI i$$WEPC$ M right abo,ut the time we were getting. A. No I don't r %@W@g.$Mi2.f - k.:.% W Mehler M %4 a views. You know I didn't know where, you know, all the inter-2s g y 'M we stood.and Iwas told c:g,m:a.c. q.m q s.L not to discuss it,hv a number of peo

9%#J,388G[8Y?-

to discuss anything that happened. ple. I really didn't want Q. Y ,r a A. E.ou were t.old.lar previous mterviews you know W%m%v. v-... %v ~. n not to di.scuss. what.f g hDMMY/-TW2' ell on simi mentioned,not to you know, discuss-may,be not even at the i know .Q.t.gr/hreL U.C.:.-q h mterviews. Mayb,e it just came from someone else. I don't M.9 9 M d. M I I-E d hthem t know. We had'been given instructions not to talk amongst M, C.;i. % M sation kgiWE.df.M.I.yri ourselves about some of these items and I never did. I never dl

in the W c. rf really sat down and went through the whole scenario of what i.h.....w$ @G,'by:,c,. g.Lm y;rd.j control room op,erators saw,. happened with you know fo m

W.N"% 2 a. @SM 'ening Q. So the general instruction that you were, operating M##iCT!.11 H.n;Q;;;q under was not to discuss the events on the 28th with othersf NE;EJW/%FML ? Vehler A. Yes. essentially. & ;c. M m ;x m 7 <.what WMO.RY,,& Ithat Q. And it was your personal objective not to impress others GFA %.WUbs.? with what happened on that date or to receive impressionsf fyMWQ.R M:;_.? 4 ithat A. Exactly. Exactly. And I think that is the thinking.

1. GC ' d

'-hat I Q. Why would you then have told Brian that it happened on WC %+.M@phspT%:QWOQ 'y,his the 28th duringsuch a conversationi

n ky It b Nt;;@iM@SMWM n}ing A. Well, the only reason I can think of ber specifically, is that it may have been, and Idon't remem-4 g

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him the conversation.

a way to close out M420f8FE mem' %;s SpWA.~MS Q. W uldn't that have broken the " standing policy"f ME:4 Si&ecTv .o the A. No. I think, and I probably said it under the assumption h.W'*di*--n@@d ..c that if you think it happened on the 28th, you know, that is M' b' what you have got to @s d..~.,rm dg.,%.: - q what I thought. I. don'go with,fI mention,ed,you know what you know and I will go with m

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ber trym.ht at the time to Mehler As a. matte.rof fac.t,I re,mem. ress. $ 4EMNQ W *' talk g not to you know. Five him an impression of what I thought simply,because I didn't think it was right for us to ,1 to W M E*Tfi'M u [M M@h M M F @ff 9dic be talking about it because we were told not to. Q. But still ou recollect M A E. hip. could not have fappened on the 28thfou told him it did not happen W 5 5 7 e, y % -L W.et. b ge R WW Ms. BOAST. Excuse me,Ican t hear you. MGtW.:Jg$ Y@% By Mr. IIorruwo. .'Q 4 A. sty @d,: fig Q. I said but still during that conversation you recollect that you told him it did not happen on the 28th f I am trying cM. M W iM N P

w. aux.sp b't to get a feel for what the words were that you gave to Brian MWYi@.hN.

NL on the subject. E

• 4" D :N M+'P@O A. You know, as I think about it a little bit, I think it came

$* w. Aq .the ut in the context of someone x'# yME.h"'%.../MN..UM or something said that it hap,you know,it was Zewe or Miller ww;.su np 1, W8 pened on the 20th. And I said,

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8 ~7 v i. ~MhihMN'l_$.5.b..* well if they said it happened o's the 20th maybe it did. I @ G %~ M r.i ';.. W. ?'* A *A thinkc that vas the kind of context that we held our conversa-hf'; tion in. i utg.9-vW ;' fp.4 */ ! f * @ ',.W M ';9'.c. W,.. % m%.,.p;,,E,. 7 Q. Do.you re. calf biling him th.at ou thought it happened s -.. n-t W ge m W E 9 Dm?9Ju'W ! O,id',. On the 2Rh during that conversation A. No, I tried t> stay away from telh,ng him what I I%M;'9.QTI9 AT.C.WF thought, quite frankly. %'/EV. R. m.sm.4,.;UT@E.. M...,. %Q.r. T T'E* - .TIr. IloEFr.INr.. Okay, Joe, let me show you page 16 of your q,.. g M..C %....

• 't W. e deposition given on October 30the 1979, to the SpecialInquiry 4

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rg;g' 91%+i 7 (f m! G- *t-C (Document anded to the witness. %p.a >. %.Q.,'.rM.N %. By 3fT. HoFR.INo. kd s I.57R.O;'My,.' d-f. NIOf',, Q. Joe,is the substance of the testimony on that page that y.7 & *~"S.*.b h' !-b g d '* 6 8 you weren't sure whether the instruction had been given on k.r":.hy$'t.W.'- ;%iEMddl-4@h @N.'O the 25th ! Is that what you were saying there f $4 '. A. Yes, I think that is what it say't sure that it was thes. At t d52'i'::3 C?s.ARW v!M &@M: know, imply because you know, I didn't really have tim when I did this interview I wasn ,..r.7 q y @ G. @. Wc-l N. n... ped.. ?U 'S 2Rhs I. s... - l:m think a. bout it and relate it to you.

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4pi hevm-Q. M hat is your recollection nowf M%,.=2.MGFW py fdp.Mj.'MiMM.dW".."*."J.gI 6 isth and it was nbout the time we started those reactor coolant r . A, Well, my recollection is now that it did happen on the kM*# :..: M.Jg%, 'R.7 pum is, you k.no.w, the fir.st react.or coolant um s. B. ut again, f

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.a,m.< ~.wTr . - V..r. c. vou w, this is some time period even a ter t at interview. ....n. 'I th. no.t was about that time, and again I can't be absolutely w. ~

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m M,. n'IiM.$; <c uL..,fS, Y.%. y,;. mki - ~M ^. (Chwasty k, I&E, D/4/80, pp. 30-42.) sure. e tr% p. m*W.I M'S;73.9-s ~t. A reactor operator, Theodore Illjes, who arrived in the control room g. i .r, p. m.m. a..,r w.d. %;_d after t.b detonat. ion., told NRC investigators that he had been briefed W. w. v. u, u. c g ~ w,._. g-.g on th reactor buildmg pressure pulse : .a. . y. w..e..,p. 9

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..,.m.. N..w.~.A, o% ...w /p w m ; J x,.. r-as ar %w - +g #v v tor tu.s t.old they had a spike on both indications of the reac- .4 n Idmg pressure recorder. There was some discussion as , M. g &r: % pr.r. A. N.p.? h 9 r to wh.at it was. A, hydrogen explosion was discussed.This was r>. . w n%* w',*e.,.- . h* % '. h@frW$(M'Wl-hDdM@d htf f r in the evenm{Illjes, I&E Tape 261, May 23,10 ~ N .6;P$.N Ms.L$ EQ. g tW. '." hen asked again as to whether the discussion of a possible e:,f rg-@n$W'ly., [7;.%%.-f.H hydro N2f rm'S p. said: gen burn had taken place on the first evening (3farch 28) Illjes M.?.,tr".*q.flf*$$h * ($5,, M ), Aa far ss I know that posaibility was discussed that Qj.Q' p&N&lgm ever.ing. (Ibid., p.10.) fM.,@@ s' %, W e,g h,M V 7p !fr. IIerman Iheckamp, President of General Public Utilities, M%M*d&d 6 stated h: a Tiay 9,1970, mailgram to Chairman Udall: MMM:8.[h2 There is no evidence that anyone interpreted the " pressure " yfg+ L g)%7."M, D.*.,y ~ " A ddn'"ip :2 rpike" and the spray initiation in terms of reactor core dam- ~ M t.., age at the time of the spike nor that anyone withheld any' "Qg%gM'/y@ks.g'j?y ' information. (See AppenJiz G.) .%r. h t l.M2s.GM?Mh.J,%<k: Two logs containing a listing of significnnt events that occurred on lag Tntries I .- ursM,>..A i: a f.p.,.. p< nrr W-'J%w,,Al/ %.4.e w :b.,-. I. Afarch 28 indicate that a pressure pulse occurred at approximately nw:q w~ y iMMIM M n. w. W 2. #v ~i. w@ M G :M W.Q d- .n m. c. b: m.,,.g &.f.. cW= 1.m. ..,4 w.,.., g.

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-+ ae. M.'- 8 y.a; rre i*-S Q ;s e :. p ('IWM6 W S,Y ' N tb Q e, ' f y. ;. c -- ura N*fC N 14,t 4 7. ? Q g r%j [ I. $UMMARY: MANAGEMENT AWARENESS oF REAC'1VR CONDrrioNS .. -. w.s.,2,.. na Mr en D.Ah.E-O ..f... A - Upon arriving in the T3fI-2 control room at apIroximatelI fMM~~M3.'7. P E"i group, consisting of senior plant personnel, which convened frequently D 7:05 a.m., Station 3fanager Gary Afiller established a ' command ' C" ic % F.Mi &J<.7 "l' i :.h during the day for the purpose of discussing plant conditions and p7,'Mg.g. developing a response to them. 3 filler stated that the group meetings bcMllT@g9%. ?

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"... were held in the shift supervisor's office in a calm atmosphere,at fb; Fj a point removed from the control room, and the decisionmaking was p p -;.m v'x.f-done precisely, at intervals dictated b .r. 7 than 30 to 40 minutes apart." (Supra,y the plant, and in no case longer py..R'alC.. . a.t pp. 4-5.) The record of the T31I $@d ZFen,~ li:1 investigations shows that on 3farch 28, the T3fI plant managers were I hp.G Gr % d,M,; 3 aware of information indicative of a situation much more perilous 1 p.. m.Q,. 2. 7.,, m.._r' ~

6

' c., than was reported to State and Federal officials.

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..a Stuck Open PORY b,bhhdY. I 3 20Wc, Ross, 3fehler, and Bryan have made statements to NRC %qy -1.E- .] investigators mdicating that pnor to 7 h.m. they were aware that the N-C/kl 'G'.@@A...... ~.' j i leaking PORY had been the cause of symptoms observed in the early ([f m! % eyAg.g. p.....a h hours of t had caused pn.he accident. Zewe stated that closure of the block val v sure to decrease.ystem pressure to increase and reactor bm p ?w'O. ;f,(CB '.2. 7 Pj fr -l f.'. g y"/:*s E,C'q.:B P mary s g pres-(Supra at 7.) Ross said reactor building pressure rT. J. .^%@$ e.XT decreased following closure of the block valve, and recalled Zewe %a commenting on this to him. (Supra at 6.) 3fehler,k, I assumed we t who arrived at e.;.gyk. Z:.7,3 about 5:45 a.m. said that "... upon closing the bloc A M 'p4J['.bg: & y[1;; - MUS.MQYK i found the problem." (Supra at 8. 11 a.m. anti noon recalled that "wh)en he got to the control room" heC 3dM '.2dd ,( had found out about the stuck open PORY and that 3fehler had $g M 6 h @h

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stop ed the flow from the system by closing the block valve. (Supra !i. at D. 3 filler said he did no't recall having been awara on 3farch 28 p '%~fj :.a .%.' ;i "A9f.$.h of the PORY having been open for an extended {eriod of time, EpWA e.: ' (Supra at 10.) Zewe, however, said he had briefed.hller upon his dpgr g"g%

• 9,s.'._$y r

arrival as to what hap >ened up"should have been" the shutting to that time, and that among the J..! m;;pt*t g a:bg matters covered in the riefing the block valve, decreasing containment pressure, and increasing pri-k[ N ),l R fA W N U mary system pressure. (Supra at 11. Ross recalled that information j 5N *W.~M abotit t'he POHV having been opene)d had been passed on to 3 filler NY. 'e9yng;i'?4cGld;N5tEh (Supra at 11.) Kunder's statements indicate that he became aware of the PORV having been open sometime after the General Emergency kw5hfQ'T?fN;Qi;e5'. li. b :- W L W had been declared, probably no later than 8:30 a.m. (Supra at 8.) .. +, 'h* a.c v.s y Throttling of fligh Pressure injection (TIPI) e p.pg b;/D.i 9..prp@h Zewe knew about the IIPI status because he had been the shift super. .DS6 $J visor under whose direction the IIPI cont rols were manipulated. Zewe 2 M% Whh.apM said (Su ira at 13) that he had discussed with 3 filler the status of the .D*7; W.E S.g M fk igf IIPI an letdown systems as they had existed prior to 8:30 a.m. [y $$M$Mg% Kunder said (Supra at 12) that when he arrived at about 4:50 a.m. he became aware that IIPI had been secured. In answer to a question as to whether prior to 11 a.m. there had been f/ p%. W W Q #.E WG$ discussion of the fact that an open PORY and IIPI being turned off FWOd.M !

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En$.% een throttled 7C-9 % after his arrival at about 7 a.m.t 3 filler recalls his having issued strong W@W Mg'c'QS instructions that the HPI not be throttled again without his explicit p@g %@ g dh i l b h t Y,t;A ' instructions. (Supra at 13.) The preponderance of evidence (including pg M%.@.WiflLTjhe-%NE.'.m.O&t ds@ ~- the command group on having been informed as to what had tran-h= the likelihood that he would have insisted in the periodic meetings of W Y [M'3 e.W H %(e spired prior to his arrival) suggests that 3 filler, followim his arrival, Lp W "1+; $.g%pM-Q was informed as to the state of the HPI prior to his having arrived h yW;,#w % p; A:ct;;;M:Pw& at the 81te. .y : c:& < @W,hE M W M M n't-Superheated Conditions in Hot-Legs @r.wyy' % SN@isjW5!'N$$$;ib 3Iiller was aware that the hot-leg temperatures were in excess of 620 degrees, the upper limit of the computer readout, and consequently adN,;cE5?nW2/g@d2W i.yW he instructed that an instrument capable of indicating temperatures in M3pbWfdM w %$tdOy n'4. excess of 620 degrees be attached to the hot-leg temperature sensor. hit $3lip@p. 31 iller recalled that the latter device indicated 720 degrees (Supra at ,.Si.D. WMM.S E3M@N.Ms; kn)o,wn to imply the existence of superheated conditi 10 a temperature that Miller, on the basis of hi:. trainmg would have Qm."#.i3'$$M;. M li M Q Ivan Porter, a T31I engineer was responsible for connect p i k ;,J y T. N L W y :. W,; 700 degrees. (Id.g and was aw,are of hot-leg tempe vice to the hot-le excess of e.47,W&t S g va.,s.~s:JW.W W. F x:44.x" ) John Flint, a B&W engineer at the site, said that s n.m %y&~_ - tures m.r had shown him the setu that was mdicatin.g hot-leg tem Porte ,,,,/W.u =-W '$$$.s r,y@M:e.Aew;c.mr ra-excess of 700 degrees. ( upra at 19.) A strip chart at the ack w i-3bx d&m.d:;r W. 9,iRM of the control room showed the hot-leg temperature record ; this record v was monitored by Flint : but his statements are ambiguous with regard W .Fu w to whom. he discussed this data which clearly indicated heating and wwMm r- - w2-W.h h+.S N b h.a %@ h. N M, G . mW:MA.e w. E coolant pumps was turned off at about 5:40 a.m. Zewe said that he had uncovermg of the core that began shortly after the last of the reactor 5 N D.N:j recognized temperatures in excess of 700 degrees to have indicated k:yvw:r@ b.Qg% AMfM the presence of superheated steam; Zewe further recalled conversa- --,wc m 7%d.$ y& tions with plant managers about this, although he did not recall the names of managers with whom such conversations occurred. (Supra ? MfdMfggg at 20.) hunder was awam of hot-leg temperatures on the order of W %gpg n, T + 5t. W J h S M d ; % g g s00 or 800 degrees (Supra at 20. Ross said he was aware of tempera-tures around 700 degrees which)at this time meant to him,"I did TI'r29 r w.d N M n;MJDIMN @& W ht have a cooling method for the core." (Supra at 22.) jk& $.t&f h @J M Q lT5 @. D @W C k M n;: JF nTQ Superheated conditions above the core. {See Supra at 22-U.) John Flint. a B&W engineer at the site, monitored the computer $g printout which indicated question marks for temperatures in excess of ,p:me%"!yb.S$8p,p;,$h629h in fact bad. These temperatures were monitored for the rest of the day dE gy?.3ty .00 degrees. Flint said,"Only one or two seemed to indicate they were '* N h jR4ng.gg g to follow what was happening in the core." (Supra at p. 23.) 3 tiller % :fg. @ g y n 6 b said that he "... was never tramed that those thermocouples were too . MWh gL;[ghF much of a device which you were to use but I used them because they yW h 4pg"fjh44@ were the only indicator (of) what was going on in the core. (Id.) 7 9ma .[jy% ppa QWgtida Porter recalled that shortly after 7 a.m. 3 filler had asked him about IkMDk< d.6D@MIM?,th, the in-core readings and tliat he had called for the computer to print them. In all, the computer was called upon to print in-core thermo-O- tg5 Cp couple data at least 9 times between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m. on 3farch 28. @ n.m.cbp%%T %yyy (Supra at 22.) Because the thermocouple data was valid for higher W 81 s~.GM e%. A.,-.a-t m r a. n,N .b N dO e. h - bj::. : me,=.@W*) ar%%: 2(p?g'n rM' -~g' M m p di wm whopweghr.? m w yW gmris-c. N?9*f'Q'f s U***W,Q.x-q.-,.S%. y r':Vn"*T* %c-.s.m .~w-ov.; # <. - N.f m-2'% Q tf w e$h..., %;bo%$$.,-1-G%;* $5sh-Ww%c.-5-W :-5.M p* ~mW-c r ~- - d W W:i V;' &r::w ~ mr:4':;'.??+w. - 3 n w-m ~~ W We .qg h.WP9Wg.b@MR5e~ w & 4WW$'1.f: .Q-O a e m'% 2 OW &l ,w gm.w&

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mt as to m,fyp.rv.g.; temperatures than could be processed by the computer,3 filler asked a pe :W. the HPI for direct measurements of the thermocouple voltages. These were F#TMhMf tiler was y d.Q.iQ,.3!4 M,. made between 8 and 9 a.m.The data showed 9 out of 51 thermocouples ${ ggi throttled indicating temperatures in excess of 2.000 degrees. One technician told

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Al stron,g NRC investigators that the data was such that"... it was the general c ih :7. 04 23g ~ + expheit consensus amongst the instrument g$,tC..EP:d,"% f

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)dudmg definitely uncovered."(Supra at 25.) people there that the core was 4GUTIV ftings of The foreman in charge of making the measurements said,"We had !94-MW'M'.! ad tran-possibl uncovered the core was the only way we could see that you

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j 4 rnval, could have obtained temperatures of that magnitude." (Id.) hen that Another ps,cWh:fikp

strived technician said,"I feel then that there was a definite sign t Y!jf,Pdr.~4;T >

the core had definitely been uncovered to the point where it suffered (QMMf"f.St.e yr damage."'(Supra at 25.)he technicians, the engineer who, at 31 iller's Ivan Porter hl. R2.;s:1tN;.in".?A request, had instructed t to obtain the data, has given scess of 'f%'id@ 4.. M ,e uenti conflicting testimony as to whether he believed the data was credible. k NN M At various times he' implied he did not believe the data because of tho $Nh 57E!MD

• atures in wide scatter m the readmgs. But when pressed as to whether he con-e sensor.

Nd9lMGd s pra at sidered a reading of 2.300 degrees to be anomalous, Porter said, "I u Q$h@P@CN.Nn N $1d have don't know. I was afraid it was real." (Supra at 20.) Three of the f. W Mb e hot-leg. technicians involved in making the measurements recollect that Porter NA)GMMMM '

• l

@Qy@EE*'q.E-jtem .the de. did accept the data as a vahd indicator of core conditions. (Supra .-iM SJ l sees, of 28-30.) 3Iiller has implied at times that he did not believe the in-core .f f,V;g. said that data, but as indicated above he also said that he had used them be-Mi h.E[il'1 ' ",' cause they"So, I did utilize them to tell me that what I had was that were the only indicator of what was going on in the core b @M@W@@7.E* ra-hWh.$. cthe ack and that, D $b his record severe, more than something to prescribe a procedure or action or g% .W .iting and 3 filler also said, with regard to the direct measurements of the -ih regard somethm, g." (Supra at 23.) EWM;2;.Q kD.E E: zd 4. M'MeD se reactor in-core thermocouple voltages:"So you know the bottom line here was NEW ist he had that they (the in-cores) are hot, they were hot enough that they scared ^W~Mi@Mg indicated you, as far as what you're looking for. It told me that the reason the N M v.r % UT's Nbd nonversa. computer was off scale at 700 degrees F... The in-cores were readmg @'er%# necall the anywhere from 2.500 or so, and I picked 2.500. It could have been G MQ: q (Supra higher than that." (Supra at 30.) Ross said the thermocouples were N.k'dAs-fD)%:r'n W . order of discussed in the think tank: " Thermocouple temperatures were O 3 i/ W.fl Q } tem brought up to Gary 3 filler, and I guess the bottom line they got out k--pWm$;$ . I[dn't of that, was that they were not conclusive. It showed the core was hot, ra-iMC$ fh'Nl&- basically." (Supra at 32.) .y,) Core uncorering and uncertainty as to adequacy of core cooling N.MIMOLM , computer Prior to 10:30 a.m. on 3farch 28, B&W Engineer.Tohn Flint con-T'F @ % @5@ Tl 3,xcess of cluded that the core had been uncovered earlier and he said he in. Of8 ,they were formed Lee Rogers (his B&W supervisor at the site), Bill Zewe and M D EL Mthe day Ed Frederick of his conclusion. Flint said he believed that Rorers i 6 W[@dNh$5 XrMA .:.) 3fillei. had gone off to discuss his (Flint's) conclusion with Kunder and 3fil-g %E g-5~ Wet .nrere too ler. (Supra at 36.) Kunder said the high temperatures indicated to ~R

• • use they him that the core,had been uncovered. (Supra at 39.) Apparently in K

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reference to the situation between 9 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., h,under also mn.A.. Sn about espressed concern that cooling water from the high pressure ini,ection MGe.hg 'rto print might be bypassing the core and therefore not adequately coohng it. 9!.$.zm.diis d > thermo. (Supra at 40.) Ross said in reference to the strategy employed pnor hMM5D$ Varch 28. to 11:30 a.m. that there was uncertainty as to whether the core had ~4,:.~.\\" Q*R'-5..Q.w[ W; E: M.??7 d*9 % *'thigher been uncovered. (Supra at 50.) N '=m. ms Qg p'W~~%gn:e~'a

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a. o v 2* ^ Q E Q d. f. e. nCWr :~ r %rh,.a "nu : .~-- p:t GUSX..%7L 96 hd @5 N'N N k( h@ Q.i,, lNh M; .E 0;bnWilf L !A Seelinger said that he had concluded on the basis of radiation alarms NN on the morning of 3farch 28 that the core had been partially uncovered. .-:.::g>@M;F8Wd' ??@#S.F6#,[Q.% e (Supra at 40-42.) 31 iller said in a statement quoted on page 114 of the K .u .n Senate report: " Based on the instruments we had,in k-fSG* R M; p,@ iD.dg % ' e @M we didn't know whether the core was covered." While ihe record conta pq e ftMc o clear state-M,M ment by 3 filler indicating whether on 3farch 28 he believed the core E-f%d.$ %D@N,c--Wf5@f %. was or had been at least partially uncovered for some part of the day 3 filler did say that,"We were not in our minds convinced the core was, $d6E@M,3.@M;M?? ' conditions after 3fil(ler had instructed that the hig c.GF6. W h','g. not be turned off without his approval. On the basis of his understand. C;xd-@Q3MHO $3t L"S ing of reactor theory, includmg the significance of superheat, it is bFAM@iWyi.E;dh Ads.dg'6W..., likely that 3 filler did understand by 9 a.m. on 3farch 28 that portions xS of tlie core had been uncovered for some interval during the period Mifd.tfQ@$267

- TM between G a.m. and 9 a.m. It is also likely that 3 filler was uncertain with regard to the ade M.qhg f d8: E'E M D s?. *M pursued between 9 a.m.quacy of first, the " feed and bleed" strategy Sqs.^.c,MHip,k,M.Wl:g

~ and 11:30 a.m., as he himself admitted in the 3Mii course of posta'cident discussions, and second the depressurization %FM e eiw yNv'l:ge strategy initiated at about 11:30 p.m. and pursu,ed until an uncertain ,7;qpAm... $..,M.IC,.~g@M hour, but in any case no later than approximately 3:08 p.m. when the d pressunzer block valve was closed. 'L.. CRAW %n.y c% M O:. Utg;$e $?.h.Q Q M R Ascareness that there teere no Trritten Emergency Procedures Appli-cable to Conditions Existing in Plant fr-x W W@.%.D.$D M IO-gn 65% $ i f M* :M 9:30 a.m. on 3farch 28 indicate an awareness tha hx $M..MW"W. ~ condition that had not been analyzed. "... to be honest with you &;G # W %gg&lEZ M. we've been assessing the plant... We don't know where the hell the iW9:$dj M@My#0

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%g'yMil.W4'MW3E. TM plant was going. The situation we're in is a delicate one because we f actually have plant inte A 3 filler also stated "...grity... If we had a leak we'd be all right." rtge44 hp'8h~ q$.M?f,m nized anywhere that had ever been studied..."" The disc gM h.

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the think tank "... involved how to cool the core from a condit r54,w.$iM@*aQdn.ds - that we didn't (sic) have recognized in any formalized training or in/M M implemented (sic) document." (Supra, p. 52.) 3 filler also said, after h t g$; d ag % k [S

WLW referring to the high in. core tamperature: "... but we just know Wh (sic) we didn't have control, we were out of control. We knew the M %iy

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situation was one we hadn't anticipated too many times here." (Supra, p.31.) Kunder,in referring to the abnormal situation in the J ant said M SGI& M gE.h gy@NM" 5 .h 7N"$M l "I think that those conditions were bevond the bounds of phnt condi, M M 4-9+ tions that I was used to dealing with." (Supra, p. 47.) Ross sa I with - M 3 I % [d,' h % k. regard to conditions as ther existed on 3farch 28 that:"Our mlus-iiF'"W tions were not very thorough that day admittedly, but the evaluation W q [g @2QMD$gd we made is we didn't have a known ',ethod to cool the core, and we m ghr.Mh[d gQ? were trying to cool the core with high pnssure injection.'(Supra, rq

p. 51.) Chwast,'... primarily because it's so alie mg procedure,yk stated that he did not like the " feed and bleed" cool-T n!YT

.ww gdtdjp h.:608%.k plant." (Supra, p. 51.) AM A A tcoreness of Hydrogen Bttrn andSymptom.s Thereof p% v. dx; Q E k '; ~g Persons m the control room at the tune the pressure pulse occurred s 'a were generally aware of it. Zewe said he found it hard to believe gpi,g.y that anyone could have missed it or the ensuing discussions of it. ent%d ,hJ g f 1.T

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f h.. n.MA.$.. c@< ^ ~ ~ ~ ^ "O M R$1 Wr-p. .a. MJ.,.<fr.$y ~~~ 4 r %.,v..$ $b$. N.1 (MGn&29 % W@WWQu y y 3 .h ition alarms E (Supra, p. 65.) T3fI-2 operator, Ed Frederick said that Gary 31 iller EMMF..w~.4 ~ ~ he114of the r inncovered. (Id.,particularly interested in the pressure spike on the chart recorder. was

p. 63.) Itoss said that he was aware of the pressure pulse and

[TMM.M.z .s - s : lidn't know that he was standing near 3 filler when the pressure pulse occurred. PCMW.*6 : d%W: 2.J.".odear state. (Supra, p. 65.) Chwastyk said that soon after the pressure pulse P' ted the core occurred, he realized that it had been real, that it was indicative of tP.E -M.W4 sof the day core damage, that he explained his conclusions to Gary 3Iiller, and k g W 6 y.J~ ' hhe core was, that on the basis of these he recommended that they no longer cycle rg4 W. c.: 4 et concerns {$UM."i-dII. 6.A^.re injection the PORY because the explosion had appeared coincident with open-ing of this valve. (Id., pp. 60-73.) Chwastvk trcalls that he was L G # S K dry .anderstand. concerned that the contamment integrity might have been breeched $.;n-.i ?. W W..' T <rheat, it is by the pressure pulse; he recalls directin'g that a radiation survey be L. ~ s MM.. ist portions made outside the containment to determine whether cracks had devel-(MZiG @ the period oped in the concrete cont ainment building. (Supra, pp. 73-75.) 1 I b ;p& M N.A 2s uncertain Chwastyk also told I&E investigators that to the best of his recol-rM ete..JM.Zv7;.*a ' ',i' strategy lection that someone (he assumed 3Illier) had given a directive on .A :; v%m.x. m..a;? ' ..itted in the 3farch 28 that e tipment in the contain. ment buildin.g not be turned Q;/*f A

E r, ?

. wurization on and the reco indicates that the basis for this durctive was con- .M % Q.i.l !! n uncertain cern that turning on equipment would cause a spark that would f F% e '.C hr-7.OQCM'%;,uhen the ignite hydro [-en feared to be in the building. (Supra, pp. 81-88d 3fehler recal s having believed that the chart recorder had indicated ym.s. M yp% *.g mp that there had been a r.eal pre LQa Vito 4pph. rather than an electrical no.ssure. pulse in t.he containment building M-eyC fMSNo.e@Gy ;r4.w.c.? d ise signal. Prior to October 30. 1979 3fehler recalled the instruction not to start equipment in the,contain-e E Ql q; Q;.V. y 9 "onma,tely hM i it was in a ment building. (Id., p. 78.) While 31ehler said on October 30,1970 and subsequently that he was unsure as to whether this instruction had it*

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.hehell he been issued on 3iarch 28, the testimon' on balance indicates that 3 filler e g ,m . OW.W. mm.. '. 'lecause we gave the mstruction (or it was g ven m~ his presence) to 3fehler and P.t s i Chwastyk in the shift supervisor's office late in the day on 3farch 28. s M F.ia W Q T -all right." (Id., 5 3Iarck1 78. S2. 53.) Theodore Illjes, a T3fl od>rogen explos MGk.Mb in'tmcoF-erator sinted that on 28 the pressure pulse and a possible hy ef%nphQ%, xussion, m W 3 e ndition discussed. (Id.. p. 88.) 3Iiller admits having heard a noise at the @ Q p.g,5 R,q p. .::mmg or time the pressme pulse occurred, but he has denied havinn been aware @qur ga.MU:- tud, after on 3farch 28 of a pressure pulse having been recorded, of'the contain-ment sprars having initiated or of an engineered safeguards systems .kQ@g.g@;&@ggj . pst know gi actuntion." T .E : Qnew the a (Supra, In sum. of thee senior personnel present in the control room on pg

• Jmt said, 3farch 28, most recollect the pressure puise and actuation of contain-kM 76$ p"57 f. co".di-ment sprays: Illjes said that on 3farch 28 there was speculation about r%i+@.0 W

i M4? t. ud with hydrogen: 3fehler and Chwastyk believed on 3farch 28 that the reac- %.hME@.pp,.-".revalua-tor building pressure chart had shown a real increase in pressure; MFu5ddiy waluation Chwastvk recalled that he told 3 filler that the pressure puhe was "an explosion and probably caused by a hydrogen explosion"; 3fehler and % pp=ngry v.anu we hMMM'i.? Chwastyk recall that someone the' evidence mdicates 31 iller) in-structed that equitunent in the c(ontaimuent building not be started, 'M c (! Supra, gMM-d ? ' cool-g h u ; v d ig g atmg the the record indicating this being out of concern that a spark would Mc8 cause an explosion of hydrogen; and 3 filler states that he heard a $ Q.S M p 2 $ '.E noise but was unaware of the pressure pulse and the possibility of h h?k(G@h;fg*Lkp%pyEWirl hydrogen ignition being the source of the pressure puhe until two 21ays '-3% W. E!Edi' later,on 3farch 30

1. "rred

[ns o]f h* On balance, consideration of statements describing the situation at 3 ,p W be YOJ6 the time the ignition occurred and in the following hours leads to the glGA -yM r M.,. iE O M f M.7II:ta,$ conclusion that it is likely that 3 filler's recollection of not having been aware of the pressure pulse and its significance is erroneous. M s ~.v P *vC*.'m;M>p A N 1 t::W.*.W Q:,c *jy - N* t -.,.+lp. #,, n-. .c N'

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+ ' d: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board y".qip-In the Matter of ) MC i ) METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket N$4 QOggj9SP ) P3:47 (Three Mile Island Nuclear ) (Restart.-r Management Phase) Station, Unit No. 1) ) bCh A.- Bb$Ch' I hereby certify that I have served this 20th day of August 1984.a copy of the foregoing Three Mile Island Alert's opposition to Licensee's Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Extension of Time on the following by mail, first-class, postage prepaid: Administrative Judge Thomas Au, Esq. Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Office of Chief Counsel Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Department of Environmental U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resources Washington, D.C. 20555 505 Executive House P.O. Box 2357 Administrative Judge Harrisburg, PA 17120 Sheldon J. Wolfe Atomic-Safety & Licensing Board John A. Levin, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistant Counsel' Washington, D.C. 20555 Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Administrative' Judge P.O. Box 3265 Gustave A. Line'nberger,'Jr. Harrisburg, PA -17120 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Ernest L. Blake, Jr. Washington, D.C. 20555 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge t 1800 M Street, N.W. . Docketing and Service Section (3) Washington, D.C. 20036' I Office of the Secretary l EU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Henry D. Hukill Washington, D.C. 20555 Vice President GPU Nuclear' Corporation l Atomic' Safety & Licensing Board P.O. Box'480 l Panel Middletown, PA 17057 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamodt l R. D. - 5 L Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Coatesville, PA 19320 -Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Ms. Louise Bradford l

. Washington, D.C. 20555 TMI ALERT-1011 Green Street Jack R. Goldberg,1 Esq. Harrisburg, PA 17102 Office of the Executive Legal -Director Joanne Doroshow,-Esq. .U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission The Christic Institute l Washington, D.C. 20555 1324 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20002

I ,- t Michael F. McBride, Esq. Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae William S. Jordan, III, Esq. 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Suite 1100 2001 S Street, Northwest Washington, D.C. 20036 Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 Michael W. Maupin, Esq. Hunton & Williams Jack Thorpe 707 East Main Street Manager of Licensing Post Office Box 1535 General Public Utilities Richmond, VA 23212 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippuny, New Jersey 07054 1 Adi _ /1 M _i Ly Berndbe .m e y -}}