ML20094N658
| ML20094N658 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1984 |
| From: | Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-TM 2NRC-4-124, NUDOCS 8408160333 | |
| Download: ML20094N658 (3) | |
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"*CW Pittsburgh, PA 15205 August 13, 1984 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch 3 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 Re ponse to Draf t SER Open Item No. 53 s
Gentlemen:
This letter forwards the attached responses to Parts 2 and 3 of the NRC Accident Evaluation Branch's Draf t SER Open It em No. 5 3.
Please note that the response to Part 1 of this open iten will be provided at a later date.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By E.VJ. 'Woolever JD0/wjs Vice President Attachment cc:
Ms. M. Ley, Project Manager (w/a)
Mr. E. A. Licitra, Project Manager (w/a)
Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/a)
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
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SS:
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY
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On this
/Jdk day if
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, before me, a 44u Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, pe'rsonally appeared E. J. Woolever, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file at forth in the Submitta are tru and correct to the best of is knowledge, w
y Notary Public
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8408160333 840813 ANITA ELAINE REITER, NOTARY PUallC hDRADOCK 05000412 ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, ALLEGHENY COUNTY h00 l R
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. Draft SER' Open Item No. 53 (Section 6.4) - Control Room Habitability:>.
The staf f ' review'of the Beaver Valley control room emergency HVAC system indicates 'there are several additional open items, not.previously identified, tha*: relate ' to control room operator thyroid doses.
The following three areas will have to be' addressed by the applicant:
- 1.. Automatic. cont.rol room pressurization on detection of radiation in the outside air - intake is not addressed. in the - applicable FSAR sections.
Radiation detectors in the outside air intakes may be necessary to initiate the control room emergency systems (and main-tain control room dose to within GDC 19 guidelines) in the event of design basis accidents occurring outside the containment, such as steamline break, fuel handling accident and small line break.outside conteinment.
2.
Flow rates of the' bottled air pressurization system, which pres-surizesL the. control room to 1/8 inch w.g.
or greater-for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following a design basis accident, are needed.
If they are greater or much less than the post-accident air makeup rate of 1,400 CFM (Table 6.4-1 of FSAR) an explanation-would have to be submitted by
-the applicant.
3.
Radioactive gases release point E, shown on Figure 6.4-5 of the FSAR a c ~ r.ra to be less than 100 feet from the nearest control room air Because of the close proximity of this release point, an i
ech cion of control room operator doses is needed from ' the appli-cant for those design basis accidents that result in radiation to be released from point E.
Until these matters are resolved, control room habitability remains an open item.
[
Based upon the foregoing, the applicant has not demonstrated that the control room habitability systems will adequately protect the control room operators in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, and 10CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19.
Response
1.
The response to Part (1) will be provided at a later date.
2.
In order to maintain a minimum pressure of 1/8 inch water gauge in the control room following a design basis accident, an air makeup rate of 800 cfm is required.
The BVPS control room emergency
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bottled air pressurization system can provide a total of 1000 etta through the - five supply lines which carry 200 cfm each.
Curicat design changes being considered for the BVPS-1 emergency pressuriza-tion fans may increase the pos t-accident air makeup rate of these fans from the current 400 cfm to 'as high as 1000 cfm. This combined BVSP-1 and 'BVPS-2 air makeup rate of 2000 cfm'would present no prob-less as far as overpressurization of the control room is concerned.
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.._ l 3.
Point E is monitored by a BVPS-1 radiation monitor. If a high radia-tion signal is received, the outflow from Point E is transferred to the BVPS-1 Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System.
The flow ~ then passes through a train of HEPA filters before being released to the atmosphere through BVPS-1 elevated release Point D which is located at the top of the BVPS-1 reactor containment building.
Therefore, the control room operators are adequately protected against any potential radioactive releases from Point E.
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