ML20094N259

Staff Exhibit S-30,consisting of Rev to Justification for Continued Operation Forwarded by Ltr

ML20094N259
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	02/12/1992
From:	Gandhi K BECHTEL CORP.
To:
References
AP-13541, CIVP-S-030, CIVP-S-30, NUDOCS 9204060252
Download: ML20094N259 (19)

Text

.

s-30 i

So -BMf36 y - D VP Staff Exh. 30 Mc"'

Bechtel Eastem ' Power Company Engineers - Constructors 72 MAR 13 P12:11 18740 Shady Grove Moed Galthersburn 20877 1454

@04 2M, Maryland m nr r stui v...

Docniigg'4 SEP 2 3 $$7.

m In reply refer to AP-13541 l

Mr. W. G. Hairston, III Alabama Power Company 600 North 19th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400

Dear Mr. Hairston:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Unite 1 and 2 Bechtel Job 7597-011/021 Electric Hydtogen Recombiner Splices -

Justification for continued operation (PCR 87-0-4441)

Bechtel File A-78, E-91 AP-13541 l

l is a revision to the Justification for continued operation forwarded by AP-13525 dated September 17, 1987.

This revision is based on "As-built" information provided by APCO on the 1A Hydrogen Recombiner (see Appendix A).

This includes the clarification that tape is g provided between the individual heater conductors.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact us.

Your

'very truly, 7

Et c: Gandhi Project.-Engineer ECG/AJD/DGBisg Enclosures As stated above I

ce J. R. Crane, w/1 J. D. Woodard, w/1 J. E. Garlington, w/1 R.

G. Berryhill, w/1 D. H., Jones, W/1 9204060252 920212 PDR ADOCK 05000348 G

PDR 2

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NUP tP R:GULATORY COMMISSION a

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SUBJECT:

Evaluation of splices deed on-Hydrogen Recombiner heater leads to field cables EQUIPMENT:

RECOMBINER JUNCTION DOK Q1E17K001A-A Q15170001A-A Q1E17K0015-3 Q151700013-3 Q2E17K001A-A Q25170001A-A.

Q2E17K0013-5 Q2E1700015-3 INTRODUCTION Each hydrogen recombiner contains five three phase heater banks.

Each heater bank is provided with-a 4/C:08 AWG-. power cable (as described-in Appendix D) terminated on Terminals 1, 2, 3 &

of the' heater bank terminal block.- The other end of each 4/C 68-AWG power cable is brought into-the power-junction box as leads-A, B, C & N (Refer to Westinghouse drawing 1366C51).

The power junction box is located.on-the outside of the recombiner enclosure (Refer to Westinghouse-drawing 7189D19).

Each heater lead:ia provided with a Hylug YAVOC-L3 ring tongue connector in the junction box.- The field (power supply) cable ; consists - of ~4~1/CD #1/0 (Cable Code 304) Okonite cables.

Each t!ngle conductor of the field cable is connected to the scrrespondirq1 electrical phase power leads from-the.fiva harster her.ks.

The splice detail shown on Appendix A is typical.for each electrical phase (A, B, C and neutral).

This evaluation assumes that the field cable to heater bank lead terminations have beenLmade using:n-bolted lug connection which-is insulated by-Okonite'T95/635' tape-materials.

It is assumed that the. details of Appendices A and B are applicable to both recombiners on eachzunit.

EVALUATIOT Du' ring normal plant' operation the hydrogen recombiners-are de-energized.

The recombiners are manually actuated.after-LOCA initiation,.if required, based.on the~ applicable emergency. operating' procedure.. In : add'ition, the recombiners are tesi.d- (avery__6 months) :and inspected 1(every 18-months)

.per technical specification paragraph-4.6.4;2.

These: tests and inspections,'which verify. operability of.the recombinart, include heater lsheatt operation atidesign powet' conditions, visualfinspections of the cabloo in:the power

$ unction ~ box and=reco2 iner enclosure, and-I\\.

insulation resistance checke of the heater electrical-circuits.

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" to letter AP-12541 Sheet 2 of S Ckonite's test report -(HQRN-3) qualified a -5KV taped inline These tape materials splice using T95/935 tape materials.-

have a qualified life of over 40 years at 90c operating temperature, 200 Mrad's radiation exposure-and a DBE with a i

i peak of 345F and 114 psig.

The Farley total integrated dose of 50 MRads for inside 1

containment is far less'than 200 Mrad's test level and i

Okonite's test temperature and pressure provide adequate margins over FNP design basis accident conditions of 317F i

i l

(psak MSLB surf ace temperature) and' 48 psig (peak. LocA i

pressure).

The 460 VAC splice configuration shown on Appendix A has T95 l

tape dimensions less than required by the 1000 VAC and 2000 In VAC design details shown on Drawing A-172396 dheet 1.

addition, it cannot be verified if each heater-lead is 4

l wrapped with T95 tape to fill.the annular gap.between-the I

individual heater cable conductors.

i For the purpose of this evaluation it is assumed that five heater lead cables-per1 splice are stacked-and wrapped with-T95 tape insulation and #35 jacketing material, and that the minimum dimensional requirements necessary to provide adequate electrical insulating charcatoristics for 480 VAC l

operation under normal plant service condition exist (Ref.. Tech Spec! Surveillance).

With this configuration, the only potential. concern existe under postulated accident environments when moisture incursion into the terminal lug area due to. wicking or. entrance via the annular gap between the heater power-leads could be postulated.

~ Even though there is a potential path for moisturo to-L intrude on the bolted splice area under the insulating tape, l

this intrusion is of no concern to the operation of each-

-power cable phase splice-since all individual like phase conductors are electrically connected at the bolted splice-l Also, moisture in-leakage is not' considered degrading to the material properties of the T95^ tape itself since the-splice L

is not subjected 1to cyclic voltage: spikes which occur during

.energitation and de-energitation.

Therefore,:the only viable potential concern.is a phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground short external to the: splice.

For these l

shorts.to occur, a substantial current path due to' moisture-would-have to be. established from the bolted connection to the power junction box or to the. bolted. connection of

[

another phase.

i I

Attachmont 1 to lettor AP-13541 sheet 3 of 5 A moisture current bridge allowing substantial current flow leading to faulted condition from the splice to the box is not considered credible since the current bridge would have to be established from inside the tape bundle then traverse the external surface of the tape to some postulated point of contact with the metal box.- Even if such a bridge could be established'it would necessarily be current limiting to the extent that it would not impair the function of the heater circuit.

Similarly it 12 not considered credible to postulate a moisture current bridge from-inside one splice to an adjacent splice which would result in loss of Hydrogen Recombiner Heater operation during design basis accidents.

The current bridge would.have to extend from inside one splice across the external tape surface to a postulated point of contact with an-adjacent tape bundle, across that external surface, then inside that splice to another point of exposure.

Such a path is not nearly'as likely as-that discussed below.

It is considered credible to postulate a moisture induced current bridge along the individual conductors to the point-where they come in contact with conductors from a different phase.. The most likely point for the postulated. leakage currents to-occur would be within the cable' jacket of the 4/c #8 AWG heater cable. -This point is most likely because the individual conductors are held in contact with each other within the bounds of the jacket.

Since all three phases as well as neutral are carried in each of the heater cables, any shorting scenario due to excessive leakage currents, phase-to-phase or phase-to-neutral, could be postulated to occur near the cable lead ends.

To examine the problem of msisture-intrusion in this instance, then it is neesssary only to examine the situation from the point of intrusion on the unjacketed heater lead =cenductors to the point where the cable-jacket begins.

l In the hydrogen recombiners there are two-general points of intrusions at the. power junction box and at the heater terminations.

Since neither of.thesa'two points is directly exposed to spray, the only source for moisture is through the ambient moisture contained in the relevant environment which-will vary from saturated.to superheated: conditions during the design basis accident.

This ambient moisture is all-pervasive, so it can1be postulated that all points of the conductors will be equally exposed where the jackets have been stripped-back for terminations.

Thus regardless i

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.-___ w -, -. -.,

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• to lettor AP-13541 Sheet 4 of 5 of the length of the unjacketed conductors, the probability of a postulated leakage current is equally Jikely.

In WCAP-7709-L Wentinghouse has documented the test p In that generically the same as those installed at FNP. program heaters were the same as at FNP except that in the power junction box the splice was made up in an unidentified At both points unjacketed conductors were configuration.

exposed to the test chamber accident conditions, since no problems with any of the terminations was experienced by Westinghouse, it can be concluded that moisture related leakage currents either did not occur or, 4 no significant heater if they did occur, resultedEither vty the recults indicate that operation problems.

the installed configuration at FNP will be free-from any postulated electrical malfunctions in the field power cable and heater lead system.

Additional verification that postulated moisture related leakage currents are not of concern for power terminations 17859-02p.

Wyle Report 17859-0?P is provided by Wyle Report (Qualification test program for Commonwealth Edison provides qualification informati'on on Company's PWR's)

V-shaped splices using T95 1:sulation tape and #35 jacketing material that were subject to moisture incursion since the crotch of the V was not filled with any insulating material.

These V-shaped splices (specimens 84, B5, 86, and B7) are shown in Appendix C of this evaluation.

The spe cimens were subjected to an accelerated thermal aging equal to 40 years plant life, radiation exposure of 200 MRads vamma and a DBE 58 psig.

The profile with a peak of approximately 360F ani specimens were energized during DBE test with input voltage As discussed in Section IX, Paragraph between 528-544V AC.

3.0 of the referenced Wyle Report all spAnimens except Bl___

passai the rCuired acceptance _tes3M Specimen F4 f alled 14 Specimen B4 apparently aours and 26 minutes into the test.

arced at the crotch (located in very-olose pror.imity to the metal enclosure) of the splice to the?. NEMA 12 enclosure.

This specimen had visuci evidence of chemical burne from the chemical spray which apparently concentrated on the bottom lodge of the enclosure.

The splice shown in Appendix A is installed in the junction box such that the crotch area is not in close proximity to the bottom-of the junction box.

In addition, the plant I

l

Attechm0nt 1 to lottor AP-13541-Sheet 5 of 5 conduit system and junction box offers much more resistance to moisture / chemical incursion into the junction box.

The power. cable from the electrical penetration to the-hydrogen recombiner is routed in a totally enolosed conduit

system, The conduit length is minimum of 30 ft.

The conduit leaves the side of the recombiner power junction box and-il routed to the penetration junction aox at a lower elevation.

At nc point is the conduit installation directly open to the containment environment.

The plant-installetion prevents chemical spreys and condensation from directly-entering the power junction box via the conduit.

The tested configuration in the-Wyle Raport used a NEMA 12 enc'.osure-with the test leads entering-the enclosure via an l'8" long, 1-1/2" conduit that iras directly open to the test chamber environment.

CONCLUSION The hydrogen recombiner hetter lead system was qualified by Westinghouse WCAP 7709-L.

Failure of-splice configuration shown in Appendix A is not considered credible as discussed

-above.- Therefore, reasonable assurance has been provided to establish that the hydrogen-recombiner will perform its.

intended functions in the relevant environment.

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fPPENDIk < SM'YI*fi tage No. II 7D ta6Tfdit if9. /35 9'l 0

Test Report No. InibO2P l

3.0 REPORT FORMAT The test program was performed as speelfled la Reference 8.1 and as detailed in this report. 'I '

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l Individual test results and the test procedure are presented in the fol!owing esctions:

l Basellns Functional Tests o

Section !

l Normal Radiation Exposure o

.5ection !!

Post. Normal Rediation Exposure Functional Tests l

o f estion !!!

Thermal Aging o

Section !Y Post. Thermal Aging Functional Tests o

Scotton V Accident Radiation Exposure o

section Yi i

Post. Accident Radiation Exposure Functional Tests o

Section VII o

Section VIII.

Accidict (LOCA) Test

$setlo'n IX Post. Accident (LOCA) Functional Tests o

Wyle Laborsterles' Qualification Plan Number 178.,

o Section X Revision C ti.0 TEST $PICIMEN DESCRIPTION The test specimeM consisted of seven Byron /Braldwood samples (specimsas B imd 13 Zlon samples (specimen 21.Z13) as detailed in the following table.

specimens, except B.5 which we.: constructed at Wyle Laboraterles, were constr by Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) tschnicians from the appl-generating station.

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B.1 Raychem Single conductor old Rockbestos to 21 1/2' WCSF.N conductor #14 Rockbestoe WCSF.N splice B2 Raychem Slagte conductor old Rockbestos to 21 1/2' WCSF.N conductor old Okonly WCSF.N splice B.3 Raychem 2 conductor wi6 Rockbestos to 31 conductor 1/2' i

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' Overlap refers'.o.the amount of distance that the splice Insulating materla! extended past the end of the metal used in the physical connection of the joined wirsa.

• • Refers to the applicable sketch in Appendix ! of this scetion.

i WYl.8 t.ABORATORitt Mwnterme Fatdsty 1 _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. _....., _ _.

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5t M&4 N air +v Pa,,No,Ili Test Report No. 17889 02P (IO TEST SPECIMEN DESCRIPTION (Cestissed)

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