ML20094E470
| ML20094E470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000605 |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1992 |
| From: | GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20094E462 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9201240141 | |
| Download: ML20094E470 (30) | |
Text
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ABk'R DESIGN CERTIFICATION CEFERIC iTAAC FOR SEISMIC CATECQRY I STRUCM/Pli 0-JOSITION PAPER O
JANUARY 17, 1992 CE NUCLEAR ENERGY O ,
MJ8:16 921 l 9201240141 920117 PDR ADOCK 05000605 A PDR _____________ ___ _ __ _ _ ]
e ABVR DESIGN CERTIFICATION ITAAC POR $EISMIC CATECORY I STRUCTURES O '
Purrose I The inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) mat nial being prepared as part of the CE ABVR design certification process will i include generic ITAAC entries covering technical issues affecting multiple systems. As part of the CE/NRC discussio~m aimed at reaching consensus on the scope and content of ITAAC, it has been suggssted that an example generic ITAAC be prepared covering Seismic Category I structures in the plant. CE has evaluated this suggestion and has come to the conclusion that such a generic ITAAC is not required would not be appropriate. CE studies indicate that solemic structural considerations are best addressed in the set of ITAAC entries associated with each of the individual Seismic Category I structures. The purpose of this memorandum is to present the bases for these CE conclusions.
Backrround CE is currently preparing ITAAC material to support design certification of the Advanced Boiling Vater Reactor (ABWR).- The ITAAC concept is an integral-part of the new 10CFR Part 52 licensing process and there are extensive ongoing interactions between the nuclear industry and NRC aimed at reaching a consensus on the scope and content of ITAAC. The memorandum
'Cuidelines for Preparation of Inspections. Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)," A. J. James, dated December 1991, presents GE's interpretation of the various ITAAC related issues and defines the scope and content that CE believes is appropriate for the ABWR ITAAC. The following is a brief restatement of the key consideratLons that form the basis for the CE approach.
The requirements for ITAAC for a certified design are contained in 10 CFR 52.47(a)(vi). In accordance whh this section, an application for a design certification must it.clude proposed ITAAC that "are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that, if the tests, inapections and analyses are performed and the acceptance criteria met, a plant which references the design is built and will operate in accordance with the design certification.'
! In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated February 15, 1991, the I
Comraission endorsed a two tiered concept for design certification rulemaking. Tier 1 is the design certification and may not be changed absent a rulemaking proceeding or an exemption.--Tier 2 contains the information in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the certified design L and say be changed by a licensee in accordance with 10 CFR 52.63(b)(2).
As indicated in various documents such as SECY.90 241, SECY 90 377, and SECY-91 178 Tier 1 will only contain top level design criteria and performance standards selected from the SSAR. In order for the ITAAC to be sufficient to verify conformance with the design certification (Tier 1).
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i tho serp 3 cnd c:nt:nt cf tho ITAAC ne:d cnly b3 commensurcto with the scope and content of Tier 1. Thus, similar to the Tier 1 design ITAAC will only reflect top level design criteria and performance standards.
O Part 52 does not prescribe any particular form for the ITAAC. In general, it may be expected that there will be ITAAC applicable to the design criteria and performance standards for particular systems. Additionally, because there are some commonalities among systems, it may be possible to have generic ITAAC applicable to several systems rather than repeat the l
same ITAAC for each system. !
The potential use^tiness of the gensric ITAAC concept has always been recognized. Frequi cly quoted examples of technical subjects which could potentially be covered by this approach are Environmental Qualification, Seismic Integrity, Instrument Setpoint Methodology and similar issues.
During CE/NRC technical meetings in December 1991, the NRC suggested that Seismic Category I structures be considered for generic ITAAC treatment; CE agreed to evaluate this suggestion and to prepare a draft ITAAC for review.
CE ha e now completed an evaluation of this generic ITAAC proposal and has concluded:
- a. A generic Seismic Category I structure ITAAC is not required and would not be appropriate,
- b. ITAAC treatment of AWR Seismic Category I structures is best addressed in ths set of ITAAC entries associated with each individual structure.
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) The following is a discussion of the basis for these conclusions, ITAAC for ABVR Structqgg, CE is proposing to have system specific ITAC applicable to each ABWR system (including each ABVR structure). The level of detail in the ITAAC for a system will be commensurste vith the level of detail in the Tier 1 design description for the system. This level of detail will vary from system to system, depending upon the system's importance and safety significance.
i Nevertheless, it is expected that the Tier 1 design and ITAAC for each Seismic Category I ABWR structure will address, amongst other things, the following types of structure related information; o The structure's general arrangement and configuration o The composition of important valls, ceilings, and floors o The dimensions of important walls, ceilings, and floors o The seismic classification of the structure l- These attributes are the most important attributes associated with
- construction of Seismic Category I structures, and conformance with these i attributes will provide reasonable assurance that the as. built plant has p been constructed in conformance with the design certification for the ABVR.
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f Generic ITAAC for Seismic Category I Structu ng CE does not believe that generic ITAAC are either necessary or appropriate for the ABVR's Seismic Category I structures. Unlike system functional performano tests, there is no test or inspection that can be performed to demonstrate the seismic integrity of an as. built structure. Instead, the ability of a structure to withstand seismic event is a function of numerous individual attributes. Furthermore, although seismic category I structures do share some common attributes, none of these commonalities rises to the level of importance to be included in the Tier 1 design or ITAAC.
For example, possible common attributes among the structures include:
- 1) rebar (type, spacing, ard splicing); 2) concrete (mixing, placement, and curing); and 3) structural steel (material type, size, configuration, and connections). However, for the reasonn expressed below, ITAAC for these attributes would not be appropriate.
- 1) In some esses, inspection criteria for these attributes will not be the same for all structures, or even for all components within a single '
structure. For example, criteria governing rebar size and spacing elepend upon the stresses within a wall, which differ from wall tn wall and from location to location within a wall. Thus, it is not possible to specify generic acceptance criteria for such attributes.
- 2) In general, the Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) for the ABVR does not identify values for these attributes. For example, Section 3.8.4 of the SSAR a0 dresses the requirements applicable to Seismic Category I structures (other than the containment). However, in accordance with the guidance in NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.8.4 and NRC Regulatory Cuide 1.70 Section 3.8.4, the requirements identified in the SSAR consist largely of 1) criteria governing development of the design nf the structures, and 2) references to industry codes and standards. Thus, inspection criteria for these attributes are not, and are not required to be, contained in the SSAR.
Since such criteria are not appropriate for the SSAR (i.e., Tier 2),
such criteria are certainly nct appropriate for Tier 1 or the ITO 1
- 3) In general, acceptance criteria for these attributes will be developed as part of the generation of detailed design drawings and specifications. Thece drawings and specifications have not yet been prepared, are not necessary for the NRC to make its safety determinations for de !gn certification for the ABVR, and will not be
, prepared until necessary for construction of a specific plant. In fact, with respect to some of these attributes (rebar type and spacing), the NRC Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER) Section 3.8.4 explicitly acknowledges this fact and finds it acceptable. Thus, acceptance criteria for these attributes are not available and need not be available at the design certification stage.
- 4) Even if the applicable design drawings and specifications were available, it would not be appropriate to include this level of detail I
in Tier 1 or the ITAAC. Inclusion of this information in Tier 1 would O
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essentially transform the detailed construction inspection procedures under 10 CFR $0 Appendix B into ITAAC, would have the effect of Is elevating relatively less significant design information into a Tier 1
_d requirement, and would be inconsistent with the intent of Part 52 and the two tiered concept for design certification.
- 5) Nonconformances with design drawings and specifications governing these attributes typically are not safety significant and otton can be accepted as.is. For example, nonconformances in robar spacing usually are not safet).significant because the overall robar density will generally be sufficient to ensure the performanca af reinforced concrete walls. Similarly, deviations in concrete mix requirements usually can be demonstrated to be insignificant based upon compressive strength tests. However, if these attributes were transformed into generic ITAAC, tl.e licensee would be required either to scrap and rework the concrete installation in question, or to request a license amendment and exemption from the ITAAC. Neither course is necessary to ensure the safety of the plant, and both are unduly expensive and time. consuming.
- 5) Installation of rebrt, concrete and structural steel are governed by well established and widely understood and utilized industry codes (e.g., the codes and standards of t'ne American Concrete Institute (ACI) American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), and American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)). In the past, quality assurance (QA) programs established under Appendix 5 of 10 Cilt Part $0 have proven more than adequate to ensure the acceptability of these types of routine construction activities. Therefore, generic ITAAC are not necessary to ensure the acceptability of these types of activities, for all of the above reasons, generic l'fAAC for seismic Category I structures are not t.eeded and would be inappropriate, ponclusion The Tier 1 design description and the associated ITAAC for Ssismic Category I structuros should focus on the more important, top level design criteria.
GE is' proposing ITAAC for each ABVR Seismic Category I structure that will accomplish this purpose. Groeric ITAAC for Seismic Category I structures are neither necessary nor appropriate, and generic acceptance criteria for such structures are best addressed through the QA program.
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i CE ofsPtur-ft TS set tNet 03eqEets Deffe TM/91 Cwer suetta mee e w =t g2 .sme-t i tower letter, eeceruf peregresh in generet, the steff believes thet the pilot ITAAC tack the levet of detelt 10 Cia 52.tc1(c) ema tes to cadr6 red aperettege licerees. 19 Cfe 52.&TteMv4) asselles to erup speelf te acceptance criterie esipresrfete for lectuelen in fler i deelys estice=re for e deafen certif 6 cation. Section 52.4Tte)(vi) etates that the stAAC auet certificetten esteriet. Section52.1034c) of litt ' 19 of the Code of Federot be *sof ficient to provide renewebte escurence that, if the teste, lassnettere auf Regutetfers (to Cfs 52.103tc) reesires thet the comesseles suet be obte to ensteses are performed eruf the oce,pterze cetterie set, e pient eatch eeferenices the fleuf that *the accep*ence criterle beve been met and that, accordinely, the deelen le built eruf sitt operate la arterdance with the desire coettf 9eetten temtheels
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f acility hee been cenettuted eruf wilt operate in conferef ty with the Ateele added).* As descassed in the Deceeber 1991 E _ - en IT AAC gw4det 6mes, E
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Energy Act eruf the Caseissian*e reguletters.* the towet of detelt in the bellowes the drolpe sectificetten ETAAC derSwe direCtly fegan the certlf ted destre def tmed +
pilot f tAAC ofit eet perelt Ut* s;ommission to seke that fl+uftrug. in the tap tewet fier 1 deelyn descr6ptian eruf that the p4 tee ITAAC ocepe eruf content le f k
compettbte with th6e reystetten.
Cover tetter, third pereeraph the revise of the p8tet ITAAC hee %een restricted stare E hee not yet Informet df acueelem of generic BSAAC base new piece (Ee esd Softmere se=etessent). CE edsmitted ,- * *cerstructlerrrelated" or *seneric* ITAAC. The detelled castlegues te betleve gerwe6c/discipt4rw ITAAC have enty a lle4ted Pete to ptey.
cameente point aus severet erees emere the steff beteewee these generic rewiremente ore app 64cebte. The stoff's review hoe else beert hespered by E provided a drectlpties of the methodetegy in e4enspreshe presented to the set stoff the lect of e eritten descriptfen of the methodes egy esed to develop the earing the meet 4g en Octaner 16, 1991.. GE provided a forse4 pensettet descrfb6ng tte
,iist ITAAC. sethe tes, in e -e.h.e .ted ecomeer 1,.s. ction . 5 of thle 2 ,,eoe te the CE eseeeeert of the tie 6ted rete of the generte STAAC concept. '
Cover letter, fifth peregresde As steted la eur letter of October 23, 1991, f f Gerwret Electric does not As df M _ &arlegg the meeting en October to-tT, te5T, GE deterw6emed thet it neutd met
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admit f to comp 4ete pilot ITAAC edmittet (defined es the eine systee tYAAC, be fruitfet to anale propeo ettere of the reunin6es tTAAC witt4 f t recef.ed eeC's commmente ,
the generic ifAAC, eruf the devotesemmet methodelegy) try the eruf of 1991, these en the nine p4tet ITAAC. E received meC's commente en Decesher 9,1991. E settestee the projected staf f templetlen of the ETAAC rev4em mitt runt meet the that the revised pitete together eith selected generic 4*AAC eitt be readmitted by echeddes established in $1CT*91-161, *Scheeksles for the Advariced teacter 1/1T/92. Asownist GE/seC reach agreement in princtple en RfAAC ocese C W. futt Deviense eruf aWetary Guidance Sevielert.* Please edytee se if yee cerewt admelttet of A8wt ITAAC by merth or Aertl 1992 le feeefbte.
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- tocation la the eeC tetter, Piersari to merelett,12/5/91, *Detelled Ceseene en Pilot ITAAC Sesnittet for the Aews.* AJas:1-T-92-1
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ct effererstl 70 bec ItaAC Ctpostats tsa?yp tMf91 C9etet $1*CE* e#C C'*eTef CE Pt?P'*?E Ctf coponents, generet c<menents The nitur esengAes of ITAAC do not provide any e.aspies of generic 1TAAC mic ifAAC howe ese potenelet dredecks that eight Steit tiw eatent to eetch (1) {t.e., pipirg, eseldi*g. eosignemnt gaellf tcetion, irmervice teettg deelp they can teet teticatty be esned for the Tier 1 ITAAC enerles. This leeue is regsfrements, esteriete cessaetibility, coot 6nse, carcete, setts arti discused in Sectlen 4J ef the GE ITAAC nethodetogy fas deted Deceeter 1991.
foureetten, esjer ogsigenest eruf eschemicas components). (Pege r/13) the fot towirg ere key passeges free this esserensian. r 2
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- 1. Gl=en the $rstended stage of the tier 1 meteriet, enty e 16ef ted onset of the cormtrutlan-reteted disciptlnes can te sodreseed by the fler 1 Weste deocciptiere eruf ITAACs. This edset of carstrwtfen diecfptlees eeutd addrese k the processes that are of pertecister alpilficence to are er more of th- erstems; f er.y treet nt of .e.gr. . ten e e, t., detene of c trwtier. -eesee t e. t this mould rep 44ty eccelete the gener6c ITAAC segpe teste the comprehenefwe fort i 50 ca.weraction verificetion procederes. This to not comeletene eith the acese of the fler 1. sip certtf tcot tori meteriet.
- 2. The lowet of .elye detett sowocteted eith the deelp coettf tcotten esp 4tcetten t*SAs) dies not assport deuetessent et thle (See of foewrfcet artepterue criterle for terstrutton-releted procesees. The $5AR costeine the full ccep4eepet of cMtsente to the repstatory esquiremente and le=Amtr(et steruterwie gewentlegs I these processes tort prowidre little or se detette of compilarice cetteete; f.e.,
dare not contatet desir dromenge er specificetten that ene.td be necessery to
, dewetop generic /diecipitee ETAAC with estereise Russelcet entries, furthermore, j eeny of the cadre ered eteruterde refererired in the $3A2 deflee settendetegy rathee
- thee sosserncet studerde. This sittsetters le seat ete=ed ao e deficierry in the cert (ficotiern aseticetten tmst re-her to e direct conneserue of the bee 6e !
renecio ship meeseen earts scend 52. eeneehetese, the reeste to thet asetested l j weetf tcetion proeveares ered accepeergte criteele for ==t plant costrutlen processee e(It Je dewetepec later by t*e actwt ptet contiene llcerse applicant.
Thle recedte in there bea ng little need er eggertestery for tag ese of generic 17AAC se part of the deste certificettert procese.
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Ctt essemets, ge. west ceasemat Generet Electric should dewetcp .rud talude ITAAC for the eerif 6cetierr of t%e E he. asteed to ewetop desip accepe.rure criterie #9AC) for peptoms. E ebure .ust ]
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t ca iu- a <e i m t ur-t ,.i *st- ,of .-1.w .e. e c. ,s . .,ete.t. t typ+..isy w i d w esame s. , se ,o,t. <es .. e te.g.. p6 ping, caede tr.y. con &s4t, .ruf smaC syste s) eh,6.g the coeure.ed Ole tewet of deteet le est espreselee, ter t6er t. Snste.d. eartt' M6.o of pe
- l6 cense gri.se eheutd tue e certifie# design commeseece. empgary es end desegns ende be accumudlehed to occareente =&ta t%e e.6etag port 50 proces.es.
l l - 1 c ~ .. - .i se ,e m .t.ned .s., - .ori.. .. ,me.,es. .re ,ti ei o. . e.ee cet wum - it .. re,e. e to .m.e. -.,e.ied . ..ter. j m. .e, r t d w .peo ,.ed us . e.,e . ~ m., .re, u e fer et.* ., - e.. - .r.i ft .t e.6ee m ~ ,*er . C. fer es de, et ; ree+e. and .,w t prter t. f enes m.ie es,re .. the.e criteri. e se e pas,ne, ne *.ien pe= h,ee for p6pe stree. er.t h e e.e.4 d me ; eetteds should be essed test tw cenerened lice =me (COL 5 em46cerut to cousnete erer of 100 pages. th+e 4ewet of ete64 for escoces the newet of efeteel typicehty j the & sire of the ASWR . _ . 6 port of the ItaAC Weiyt gerif tretten
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core.isesd 6n f14es. I ac t iet ty. E tiellevee that it 4. espressrtete for Nr 2 ti.e.. the $3AR) to care or e -
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of tee es4pe erfterie eref erotyticet gemedetes4ee. annent enstemm.Eg er n & 4 ' e.884pt iest, the M &&cen e esmul&d tue ragsheed to ceny4y e4f9> 19 wee Celtet$e eyed l esetteedeleg4ee er pactere . 50.$p-tyse emetweetast to j=ettfy .riy else&et tere. Ctt taummsets, generet cauument N desiya ecrepterate criterte shoeld specify the criticot regeseeeerst. of the . cess and constent of DeC tyse finaC le careentir betne d'ette.*d by Ele 8C.
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est / 6 that viced to be eerified .e port .f RTAAC design eerificatien. emed, tbte eeC teaune.t te o got tel weergeetetten of the 3.C c.erset.
,,e-rten C - e. eed.d to e..f, m e.er.u .- ee c .. = we.e.s to ,,. n C fe, _f.e re +- . e. m.C e sid ,o.s.ee ;
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($3 edequecy. a6 e*6 cussed 6n your teater free a. Rogers to ernmet dated ausamt Me CDL .sisdiceret te ceref ten that tte eeut's ee4ee&c toepusee esectrums Se ! a 19, twi. t*ere . fe. estee .a.m the set.-eceeeep,*u permerem fw een sierier*ete for t*e ette w . est+.a.- *er t*e eee e. di.c= sed ea- e. u e. noe [ 4 ,, et ie. .e, .e+ ei , e. t w reed.d for = .= .t ereierd ,i.e.e woe.e se . reer* t. . d C for ee4es .e., -,-, for .i6 ei er , H
*s e sa. The praedures outt 6aed try you that future es,ue nte eheti perfere eveide gs d .tnneures. to ene eat.at cessery fer t== et.ff to eene . ee s e+y j j -
to conf are em se6 e ones cy of t*e awn sei e dess en esiedd be part of f enei e. d.eams. a of e.+c erHw6. .rie en 4,ses eened eherte be e part of tee the ITAAC eeetf 6cetion acteetates.' the ItamC for eeleess ersten .6,mcy $7,aa ree6em process. j ehmand include the & sept . ctg 54 ente efiteri. for terifyi.g the ad"WeC7 et i the eefety-feteted fteurtiens of the SSWE kneitetegt ernst etesectures (6statestteg geress. s6.iier to (23 St o.e. the eet.inee e.ly. cestw+. wer en.ty.i. setteeds chauld te eweitetd, for stof f teeiew end .perewel prter to fBe. [ l f i i 3
- tec.aten en toe eeC tetter, Peereen to e.cf tett.12/5/91, Netsfled Ceems.its en pilot ItamC gneseett.g for ate asem.= AJJg:1. r y24 1 I 3
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i M ytTPre$t3 tQ met ITAe( C'eWargty psyyg jff$fgj E erT*'le?E C"M*Fhf SieM* eer Met tt le the wtion of the apeilty esaurorue test presees estabt fened eemsee TO CFR Of f casuvate, seneret comment in the engineer 4rg disciptlee tporticulerty for structuret ord enhanicet Fort 50 as ye.oria e to cefire >het *te ee-harlit pe erie corderus with f 6ent dester, (3J desir- ef ee wels conserients Wiecus+ed in (22 ans-e!, the ttanc cateurtion t> der 10 CFe M.6T(eHvi), the purpuse of ITAAC we-ification activity essecleted eith the above tewel of ortell that we would dreeg for esfety-eeteted eyeten. le to ensure that the plant *4 insitt ord allt epeeste la accordente with the mestys essert to see is streightforwerd - to ensure *%et the approved plant dresyt
&owiese are adegastely boire fetteued es the pient le being tneitt. c ert i f icet te." The tewel of detrit te f 6eet design dromfage fe etet typicot ty centetred 6n ftASAerd le cet eggsrepriete f1r (mrtsien le e fler i 17AAC.
leogettiere sh=4d be perfereed to worify that the plant le in conferemee with the finot design drastees ord eheuto Ecostve constructten vert fleetien activities eiester to those used to ediress IE Suttetta F9-14. " Seismic Aretysts for As+#,t Safety-taleted Pip **g System.* tt But teten W14 regaired that es-tmeitt piping system instellet tees should be cesloveest w6th the pfpies orelyticet ord enseil g emesswe tens used in destyu benen tu es-tasitt attributes deviated free the deslyt, then a eerification (or es-buitt) mistysis esos issuelty peefereed to recencile the erv6et6ere and cepf tre thet the accepterre etiterte (i.e., A$st Bester and Pressure vesset Code stress tioitst were etitt setlefied. Cerstrwt'en ITAAC cin be eisiterly doveteped, although the meter of leupactlen ettelbutee to be verified in ItamC will liket y be greeter then thee ad$ressed le 11 tut tetta S t4 aJJ8:1-T-903
- Lecetten in the erC letter, Plecten to merriett, 12/5/91, Netetted consuunto en Pitet itAaC Sutzeittet for the mande.*
M etterwsts To set finaC CwuTs tisite 12/9/99 CteXef $0LeC** Det CM47 M W8$P'WTT D(t specific scesamts (1) The E certified destam cemetteente em not (tut shoutd) incturse e comunitment this causeitsent le already e part of the geeiym tescrepela, eM hee been edHed es a that ett componente in the Sten @y Ligs&d Centret System ($tCS) necessery for new Iton to the cert 6fied deelyt itees in Tab 4e 2.L4 Referewee heee been added injection of the rieutrcn seeertnrr into the reacter be ciaestf fed as Selooft to the generic te ITAAC. Category 1. The ecceptente criterie for the $LCS ctoporents should then refer to the generte ITAAC for Setemic Category 1 pip 6ng, egalpeas t, eruf agsorts. L 1 DET specific ccomments (2) There needs to be a steer cross-reference betiseen systee ITAAC and generic GE agrees, and seweret of t%e systee ITAAC howe bed references to geenerte tTAAC
!TAAC. Atte, the eyeteo ITAAC should Identify any espect of generic 31AAC assed.
that are imigme to thet system.
?
DiT opecific cceewnts (3)(c) A tertified design commitment should to Inclu&d to ensure thet the cartret Q's preposed 16er 1 esesiyt descriptime for the contret builderg senteises ed a tositd6eg to e seismic Category 1 structure. The STAAC should then refer to como4 teent. At thle flee, EE duee not bet tewe e ge welc ITAAC 9er cencrete tfte generte ITAAC for suojer strwturee, strutures le regstred er emnetd be meethge st end la propernaq Teottles paper thet ! will preeiee the tanees for these canctuolore. To easgert the eserooch propieed in the peettlen paper, eclected att+tlenet c1edret in.4&d6eg dimeneteret date sitt be eased to the esteting fler 1 eeeeriet 4D0 erut ItAAC). Of f speelite casamente (3)(b) A certified design cesemitment le needed to enowe that the o@couvertsent This caerient sitt to addressed tmr il esfteg artsettenet melt thicknees Saformotten to preneurtretten of the control tiuttoire mells and fleere sitt eithetend the the centre 4 tuttdivg meteetet eruf 2) endify4eg ITAAC FI to be e more ceeprehemotwo
- oynneic ef fecte of high-erergy teehage crecto end pipe lureeka. The check of Ce melt demerulens.
ecteptance criterlo shased spect'y the allt erzi fleer thickneeees needed to ensure that the s*essierteent presourtsetten effects are ademotely et t Igetee. F { r { r P O Lacetion in the e#C 1etter, Pierson to morriett,12/5/91, Detetted teenente ee. et tot stAAC sdesteet for the asha.e AJJs:1-r-92-4
CE ef!*0er*Ts to wet ITast Cmeetts t'*Tt? 12M/91 se! C sesef CE etsem*t ege="uf $ rte ^t* The actoptente criterle for floodeg should cteerty lauftcete meet criterte f 6tet senternet E eilt clarifF **e inteme(/eeteevent flood centeet feetwee M ttie CD Dff spacific twesents (3Ht) e,d staAC. ere necesseey for esternet f teeds ord eAet criterie ere cereesery for secwas seaterwe: A d ecime6en of fewer pipe breet f teed protectlen feeteres miti be i Internet floods. Accept =1re cetterte are #weded to enewe that the computer and mein certtret erees betens ttee steen 14eeet are edugastely protected free eksed to the design descriptign and testestpd $spthe j faAC. ptpe brecke in the seen feedesoter piptag. IMtwickel eefety systee designs Mt.orperete Weir feeteres enredad to eastert lower =6ce Off specific causerets (4Me) A certified dreir cesemitment le remeded te enewe thet tie system desip e testig en smeare eruf eelvee. $vt the eewae these erstem deote foetures are suff 6ciently configuration tweessary for lowerelce testabet Sty of safe r-related ghamps and meines eitt te eduquotety Septemented daring plant constetEtion. Mpertent to mereerie Tier 1 treeteset, t*its treeterat eilt be ecsemp4 6ehad M Mdte4&mt systee erste ereceipt 6ene erut itAaC entries. See reepwee to Cceeemt ete) ehese, most teen eet ett) eyetee (Taec 6==rtieke en lese Ctf specific casemente (4Mb) Inspectione chau4d te ceruirted during system instettetten to ensure thet eteed et cefireetten ett key t.yetes compassesets are k F4 ece; leportent 4 teen reteted to suf f icient instruseatetten eruf test carewetiens are proefded for the teetse,itity of s. feer-ret ered pu=:= and met =es esse, operation. o.orspen.t testabit ter out be 6 utissed. Tests should be eershated efter eyetee $nete4 tetten to coef fre the emrasasey Conf 6*estien of stagmee systee esa6smse flee peefere==re etit be echlemed es poet of t*e DET opeelfIc cenaments t&Mc) of tne eineemas flee terress 14*see for eefety-reteeed peus. Psecificot tv, the rest 6me grecourret6 emet teste come4tted to te C*>epter 14 et tvie $sas. E een vet tet tese Itee 1 treeesent of thfe 6eeue is meressary for ett ptemo; eedocted f fAs entries for adegancy of the einieme flees tretees lines for eefety-related smers. her eefety retered guete eitt be dec6ded en e coe+-by-case boete euf Mttened la the specifically, the adesecy of tne eintense recircutetten f?se line site eheutd be conf 6 tent teirengh tects to ereure thet 19rgeodetion ef tt viet result free truPviem4 ovetoe Tier 1 esteriet. j smes> eini-fios aceretten er testeng. The ec.epterre eff terte eheuto fautense ceru6deration of t*e ef fecte of euendettee operettrqs eruf testig henre M the sentase flee ende emer the lifetime of the pteret euf during t*4e postateted accideat scorerie es ma$reesed la eet $4.'.letin 88-04. a. aJJe;7 7 92-7
- tecetten in the set tetter, Ptereen to morrtott.12/$/91. "Detelled Comoeats eri Pitet ifAAC Soweittet for the ama.*
v 's < e, k: _ [ g i i Lt st!gr et 1Tuf C'esertr$ CA?ro 12/5/91 E ef term 9 Creeaf t? t:1XT erLC CMet A certified cesign caenitsmett is needPd te erwure the cepeCI$lar of NFMfe to M egrees this is en $s5Mrtri teC*nicet Issue, and the $5A% sheMd CerrtM S fWl t MY specific ccanems (3) r complement of caserf teents reeded to ensure tse abilf ty o8 Me to operate trwsee et t operate under et t design-besis caewfittens. A jusglfiebte dennestre len cesign tests conditions. momever, CE tellewes lepteenneetten cf these casemeteeats eheutd (e.g., ter's should be specified te verif ' W.ity of she pots to i e sik Add IncluL9 De edsressed by the CDL ticerWees' testing erd QA pr? grams. Seperw4g espun the we(ve f rcef an se anterused in design. The jus .h
.o . led in Geneels
- ctter 89 *G tMs see inwelve sfHap erwt/er field testi g. 73 tee entent th s.v -. se perf ere cerwideration of the correrns ard issues i med its setenents. Accepterre criterie s e specifi<d to edsress the porti V erty feu:iortant safety haictitew, system teste included h arAAC w ll tse v reg ree m es asett es suf ficitM to conf 6rw settsf actory aceraties of osse utvs.
eet tity of the suns to meet furetienet perfe. eny testege regairements. the intent of tMs !!AAC eetry is to provide are evervice cippfireetion thet ett tey CET specific casuments (6) { tee 1 of Table 2.1.1 states that wistet field irseettiens wilt tw cardLcted components are in ptoce. In artrition te (and eeperste free) stAAC acttwitles, more ef the f wtelled reacter pressure wese*L systee itPvf) ket tem.smeets lear tified sn $ect.cn 2.'.1 ed f 6 pse i 2.1.1. The pwpose is % ve r ify that deteited verificetter 'f e-seter rasservat eFeereisne wilt seccur 49 accordance eith 19 Cf 3 Port 79 Accerwfia S CAP esecution. These detailed 4mepectiere = fit be simed et the instelled configuratisvi c<f tiMit complies u.M the a wer9 :un and droeing confirmin5 ott esprepriate esserwteret reeMrements have been ert. M dnes cet tuetieve in Section 2.1.1 erd figure 2.1.1. et is apropriete to irrierse =deteited Jimerwiewt draw a tg of ree.te and its latervel
- coupuunents" in t*e Tier 1 ffAAC sirse this tem,qd be Sncesmof fbte with the tiered espreach F6gure 21.1 does not contain asegante es ps details to be used as acceptance criter6e in field typections. se d mensiers and steer views of to esign certificetten. 11t is noteerthy thet thfe tenet of detof t to set even fMtissed 6e ers F9sa euraattted sawser the Port 50 t ece uleg - furtter ev4dmen.e tenet Part 12 key coupsients are geven, fler 1 treet=ent asmAd be (capregriete.]
the ecceptance e-iterie shoute utitime e detallet', e.nerstenst dramirg of rewter vesset and its interrei cuitemenes ord specify these dimorelens that g reed to be verf fied. { I AJJ0:1 + 92 - 8
- Lacot'1n en the haC tetter, Pierstet te marriett, 12/$/91, acetailed Casumen's en Pilot 114AC kansit*et for the Asus.*
w j
l Cf itttprudt$ to sent its AC C9e(s,C dated 1215/91 CE Ff 5POWtt Cruen? MSCP hPC C9e4kT This is en interf ace issue amich is erktressed in Peregraph 3.9.T.1 of the SSAs and 95Et (f t specific casements (F) Provide o conesiteent to s'efferie vibrat!an prediction analysis of reacter internet s for the certified design prior se finst design emrevet, Erchestrg ($1Cr 91-1$3, pages 3-81 through 3- E3). The vibretion predwtion enetysts and the basis (last p ragresh ent y) i for spcifying instrumentetion will be o g 'rt of tote reest re of the vibrat on esseeement the bee f s used for s ecifying tretrumentation that will be iretstled for moniteeirq vibret torts charing the floor tests. program tiist will be nW4tted to (M met for review and approwet try the first eryticent. I
#o wilt reference the stenderd ASWR design erut designete De reactor erat internele es e l prot et tpe. The .netvs . and in.trw nt specnic.t sene, witch he teen es.r.d preliminarity, can te better based en an especierre with a forete reactor eAich will be tnsitt ef tes tne schecksted FCA. Acceptance criterie of Item F of Tabee 2.13 is revloed to irrtude wit;tetton enetysis tegether with vibretion seesurement testing erst temaaection.
The ens!rsee of the reacter inte-mets seider feutted consttle. ti.e., LOCA and $$E) have CET specific cosewars (2) Provide e emeerteent to perform the enetysee ef the reactor internets under been perfeemed ogether with mistyses for other operating cordttiere to eseure their (tsst sentarice only) f eut ted corditione (f. , LOCA and SSE) prior to finst design agprowet tid the ITAAC that will tw used chJrirg the copeined license pase that wilt integrity es rugstred by tre Aspf ",Fle Fd tf.5. Lews and Regu(ettore And e4 identifled in verify the ability of the (ts: tor ir ternets to withstend these leads. Paragraph 3.9.5.3.3 ef the ssAa. I:e= z ef teede 2.1.1 assures that the toentified anotynes have been perfereed togettier with other tiemosery enetyees. There is no interf ace between ITAAC erd pre;preestic <esues such ee feitability Civ. of Licensee Perf ormance The progressentic if terf ace tetween the M ASWR STAAC and the $stImbility j Assurarre Program (Chapter 19, Amendis '90 is not edecpaetely addr ^ 'ed. It essurarre, stort@ testing, eperetiene, meintenenre, etc. urtser to Cf t 50.4Tievel), the ard Quality Evattation puroome of ITAAC is to essure that the plant coglies with t%e seely1 certificatiert f is essentist that GE cteerty detineste the mejor preersonatic interf aces if 6rst paragra62) ,,e.,ame. tic issue. . euer. -etier. are meed b, eo.r _, e h es t,,e j bet.e.n .erim rem of e ,,ogree, ircier, t.,e .sf r. i technicet specificettore, licerse saurittain, etc. constetsticn, starty testing, operettore, esintenarre, ergineerire, etc. E coet ret believe that it le ecprgriete er possible to setert ITAAC bened sanon e esecond pare 6'es*) It is nrit clear how CE derived the accepterre criteria and the weeldetlan
@erttitative probabilistic threshetd derived free the Pan. Peas are not oesigreed tend do attritaJtes. We betie.e test the basis for the selection et these criterie to be.e the -mery infor. t on> to seiect partin,ter attributes for ,orification er l and attribioes sh-id be cieerty deri.ed fr .e the ,iesi.n ena he.e a to seiect .ccepiance criteri. fe, surh eitributes. As discus-d in the necee er $,9, u wii.ii,e <#er. poibie) reistionship to the e.A. =neorarukm on !!AAC, select on of erstries fc,r the fler 1 deelen descriptim wwf ITAAC is i
j I based ses ergirmaerirg jud ipannt. ! i we :1.r- ez., a tacetion in ne neC to-- - eier.on to mar-iett,12/5fet, oeteti.d Cee-ents en Pitet i AAC saetteet for te.e Aa.m.e o 6 . , . lMe
- 34 , _
~_ . w
~
m, i '
.. .S i
L J t CE RtsMarsEt to seC ITAAC etsstats **Jts 12/3/91 . g sever samcra ne creewet cc ersn et j Die. of teactor Inspections . " The pilot $1AAC for the design certification addresses ordy 1efety-related , The intent of ITAAC de to cover leportant safety and nessfety sepects of the plant, and . I - ene safeauerds censiderations. We note that for the ewfpeant taed in the steeptes there the pilot 11AAC do, in fact, ed$rese same nonsafety items. sowever, $t le not the intent f
. are else safeguards design scussiteents in the $$Aa, which are not site ; ef $1AAC to address ett commitments in the $$AR.- The if AAC are reserved for verification ' ;i specific, test witt need to be verified. for easepte, the desir description ' of Tier 1 caus6tments which ere interweed to be tapartent top towet features of the plant; ..
. of the contret building sentions that it is assigned te provide missile erui ' the teemining (and meh larger) tedy of casar *eents in the $$as touch me these sentlened tornedr. protection. . febte 2.13.12 et the admittet lists IIAAC te verify : in the hec Cesenc4) will be verified through th processes deriving fren 10 Cra port 50. 1
. 1
. constrwtlon of rewired radietten shielding and flood concret features, but to ifAAC changes are proposee in response to this seC _ .
does ret list $1AAC for verffying that the tuttet feelstance feature of mette .[ L. ! and doors and the penettetten resistent feature of barrters in av4C detteg '[ end eeneusts, ccanitted to in Aswa s$As section 13.6.3.6, have been batatted la att locat'ons rewired by the causitaant. ' Stellarly, the 314AC discuselen , der the reactee coeting wter system does not aantien any matkduen to verify j,
' that to portlen of this systme's pisping, vetves, and enter contret centers ,
that are rewired for performeme et its safe reacter shutdan cooling function, or to isolete those - inns free the nonsafety-related portf orm, are located curtide et the vit Jrees identified in the 5$AA. IC58, D$T sunente mi RP$ In our epinion, the mest etplaus shortcentre in the ITAAC la in the The pilot RPS ITAAC In tu$e acceptance criterte far eech inspection, test, sul aw!ysis. tthird pe**gcerA) Inspections, Testa. Analyses section. ' There is enty a verJe refererte to any ( . ections eith no description or associated acceptance criterie that would I ettom for staf f trapectlan er review. i (fourth peresreph) It is not gee'stble for the l&C acceptance criterte to be esteetiehed in the it le not tne latent of if AAC to confire desiys / telle. Insteed, the pwpcae e* staAC I J tiAAC (withwt design deteit) to the detsit eAlch won,td atteu confirestory le te conf tre thet the plast has b=en built eid =ltt apersee in accordance atth the inspect 6ms ef ter cesip certlf fretten. -certtfled
- sign. The ITAAC accepterace criterf s for the RPS ere suf ficient to confirm
[ ther the ers has been busit .e mitt oper.te so seeerde=e .ith th. 4artmed sp. ; c fif th p.r.,c.ph) th. trAAC proce.s oiit rew6e so. orsi see,es of .meiosament At e.ch st e, De eie ne.nt of th. siAAC .itt be em.ptete t a desip, certificeteen. sd.ec antir. the t the staff will verify that the recpairements of the previous etese have been desir details =114 be developed $n eteges er, secordsnee with the eestyt acceptance j auccessfully completed and the omre detof ted ec*eptorce criterie for the neet criterie (DAC) in the itAAC. GE does not believe thet met held points are necessory for , staf f will be developed ord accepted by both the stof f erus the applicent werificetten that the DAC for e particuter etese he=e been eatief ted. erut the iteensee tefera proceedire to the neat stage. ' shmaid be permitted to pres.eed eith design activities et its eens etsk penderg etC '
- werificetten of successfat completion of the DAC f ar the ete t.
i
-r 4
s I i b a
- tocatien in the seC tetter, Pierson to Merriott, 12/5/914 *Detetted Camusents en Pttot ITAAC Semittet for the ASWR.* AJJ8:14-92 ate f
i
.w ;- y. y --"r * '- 'T ;F* *3 -'- '
* * ' ' - ' '
- i-- -" * * - -
Cf ef!PcW!ff TO sRC ITAAC C994f RTS trAffD 12f$fet comf at taverf* arc (9wto? E tetecwSt
' ICSS. CST comment *- vi RPS 1t is our ' w derstanding thef the CEL will not be issued untii the necessery Surh e (Imitation is urneerranted. M buen it mey be deelreble for the dreign details te (cont) (fif th peregrese) ITAAC M4d points howe been ccepteted and eccepted by the m*C. be capleted prior to is tuerre of the COL, sezh detells are not necessary for issuance of the COL. The desigre certificettere cerunot te $34ued miess the set is able to me6e a finst safety detereinstien regardire the RPS. Dewetapnent of the destyi details is e
, comptlance issue ther can be vertfled during construtlen.
f ainth peregresh the RPS jf AAC regdres $4stettetty apre revisite to take it ecce**tetste te the pitot l'AAC inettaire measurable erd itserwebte acceptmce ulterie and wetldetten us even et a generet tewet of information... The surpose of the revisians attrieutes. miti be to provide acceptance critsrte t%et is both measuret4e end obserwebte and that witt et tow fer the devotopeene of more cheteited acceptance criterie
=Aen the tevet of design detalt is ewet table.
(seventh peregrege) E should else be erreureged te devotep, see a timely basis, the ITAACs for CE does ret believe that generic ITAAC for easttiptenere and micreprocessers are the IEC ersteem lite the m4ttptesore eruf the micreprocessors, this is worreted. E =1t t develop IYAAC for the shAtiplesing $retes. Additlenetty, erstee rueoed tocause we espect eeny sections of the RP5 ITAAC to refer te generic level ITAAC wilt tractode tests of those austtiplemors and efertprocessere vuecessery to II AAC. demonstrate everett system fmction. (seventh peregresA) we etse re4mst that E admit a more detailed desertption of their intent to E hee provided s.sh a descriptfore es part of the description of its metheepteer for refer to ITAAC for part of the verificetton activities but reder to Part 50 preparing the stAAC. (see secessier 1991 E IIAAC mesurenia.) for other aspects. sa 3 caesunts stC1, design ir the first sentence of desiyt section, charge acontret biedes* to acentrol E agrees and the charge has been incorporated.
.sescriptian (1) reds
- for more clerity.
(2) In the secord peregraft, *sinima centret ord red Inventary* f a given. This E ogrees and has incorporated the reg *sted charge. statement is confusing. Add *et ett canditiere* instead of *erinime contret red 6teventary (witch is defined to se et the peak of the senen trans6ent).* (33 It is stated th.e stCs is marumtly inittsted. But in SE tetter dated October Ibe destyi drocripe6en has been iedeted to refleit autometic SLCs saltletten for the Atws 9,1991, (tetter so. mim, so.119-91), E bee elected te outenste SLC$. The condition. menust initietten cepeettity hos boet retained to cover non-ATw$ enHttens stCS ITAAC should be corrected to state that. ehich would require SLC3 operetten. =
- tocation la the haC tetter, Pierson to metr'lett,12/5/91. "Cetsfied Casements es pt tot ITAAC hesittet for the A8WE.* AJJ8:1-7-92-St
CE #F$Poutf110 utC ITaAC Crpee sTS DATO 12/5/91 00 post of SaaNe
. wtC Crvestar Gt ef tPtedE sang conemts SLCS, desigre The desiert conditlens pressure and temperature for piping irtacerd of E does ret agree that changes in the StC3 pilot meteriet are rossired. This is because:
defreriptiert (cont) injectlan vetwes are given as 1250 psig and 575*f. Since the SLC is e. The quoted mPCF design cornfition of 15eo puis/TS0*F enty opties outboerd of the (4) cornected to the NPCF systee, $tCS else should be designed to the dual design NPCF lajection volve. trboard, the design cmdttlere are 1250 ps6s/575*f. cmditions specified in the ePCF process diesene. The dust design conditlene b. The 1250 pels design pressure is acceptabte become operation et higher values should be 1560 psig,150*f ord 1250 peig 575*f. Since the SLCS discherpe occurs cksing conditione esiich are cerwidered to be in the emergency /f outted category. piping irtx.srd of injection vetwes weiL be sabjected to e pressure higher tmder these ciretmetences, the Code permite pressures in emcees of the design wetue. then 1250 psig toring stCs m operation, design pressure of 1253 pelg is not justified. (5) A5mE Code Ctess-2 is sucHied for the SLCS pg motor. The ASME Code E egrees and has deleted the enter frais the table. Ctese-2 is not pertinent to the electric meters. (6) The design rewirement af adequate eP$N of the $tC$ pi.sgs is not in the $LC$ E hos eMed NP1m test conditlen rewirements te (TAAC entry II. 87AAC. ( T) Seperation criterie of SLCS both gaysically and electricetty free the centrol E ogrees ord has included e statesent to this ef fect in the design description. red drive systee is twt in the SLCS f fAAC. !M SLCS ecpJipment quotif 8 *tlen rossitement should be feriedad in the RfAAC. E is preperire e generic ITAAC that addressee ocpipment imaetificetten; a reference to thio $14AC has been eMed. (9) The sluplified StC1 PS. Nonet in FI;ure 2 2.6 is oversieptified. This fler 1 is reserved for top tewet deslan criterie and design features. E does not figure should at teest . Alfy certain leportant us.s. The acceptance believe that the devet of deteit in the $1AE P&tD is acepriate for tier 1. In a criterie cannot be based on en overstoptified figwe. The SSAR P8ID, eMch seperets inforest transmittet, E has receivtd on SSAA $LCS P&tp (figwe 9.3-1) earted w is a sleptified version of the erstee flew disgree, should be the accepte,ce erith the stC's proposet es to eAich elements of the $1Ag Pi!D should be lecluded in the cri teria. fler 1 P8tp. A sunseery characterisetion of the eAC's prepset le thet only airer features of the 15Aa figure should be deleted esitti ett remaining liene transcrited directly into the fler 1 P8tc. (In the cose of SLC5, the deleted e6nor featuree incitane drawing estes, went lines ord vetves, drein lines and wolves, pneuestic ewsty linee to the tank air teeder, etc.) E has revie=ed the stC's stCs earty and bellowes the proposed approach to fler 19810 content to be toe inctwiwe a d incompettbte with the intent of T6er 1. Furthermore, agreement reached on SLC5 erits be considered gereric and optled to e*her AgJt sefety rotated systees. Some of these other systsee are careiderably more cepptes then the SLC$; apptication of the etC's proposed sproach cautd cause feet dif ficuttles if a tacettan in the est setter Pierson te marriott,12/5/91, acetelted comments on Pitet :TAAC siamittet for the Aswa.* AJas:1-r-92-12
CE ff'iPoutf 5 70 etC f f AAC (tDogfeTS DAffp 1? fir 91 C'De*P'T SOLecf* WRC Creetf wT Cf ef 5PtutM applied to systems as compten on, say, the gutteer geilee System and the teacter guilding CJollte ideter System. To essist in resetution of this issue, E has propered the felteneing table eAich eti-esses in a geveric way the various t@es of informatiere incitsted en en SSAS FilS. It inctisses e recessended disposition in terna of fler 1/2 treetsent. These reccamandations are (in M's viewt opstible with the interused tiered espreach to design certificetten. Stas cceemen+s, StCS, ecceptance cr iterie (1) trufinidaat stC5 flew rates of 50 GMe per pop are prov*ded es acceptance u ogrees that the 5tts meteriet should be sodified to ref tect tue-ptsap operation et a criterfs, This criteria should te for e 13M psig essumed AfW$ p* essure and tetet flow of itPO pon. E dws not agree t%et this flew snould be et 13M pets weaset etso rewire e totet 100 CPn injection flow with both g sys ruming, pressure. Pressures in encess et 1250 psis er'ty occur for brief inttfet time during et ATuS event and are reduced below 1250 psis by the time the stCS puSe are in weretiews. (2) Ybe storage tank papebte wetume reage 6100-4800 sets should be in the E ogrees and hos made twe tweessary c%enges. ecceptance criterie. RPW e.eter inventory and gr1 shutdomet coetire system inventery should etso be giwan as acceptance criterle. ' (1) Duration of $LC pmp injection tests and relevant par and enter ITAAC f3 bas been modified to rervire ptop eperation for aut*icient time to inject tN instrumentation paresetere for annitoring darire testing s%ould be censidered entire $tt$ ters pmpebte vatteer. further detelte en test precomJree are not scrundered for ecceptance criterie eruf testire guidance. approprieta for Tier 1. (4) Critorie e*us tests should be identified for electric resistance heater M believes the curtent ITAAC #2 mill confire thet keters and contrete have beers systese capabilities with automatic operation and autoestic shutof f to provideo. In eitition, the design descriptiert tett has been etertfled. The ability of maintain the sadisse penteberare solution tevretu o between 75 ores e5*f, as ene heever, to contret setution temperatures ::** t be confirmed durirg eteetts> tests and specified in figure 9.3-3 of $1AR. plant operation and are thts not within l'4AC scope,
- 15) instruemtetion systems (to test) aAlch priwide indicatissi erst sterm in the u has modified figure 2.2.4 te lev.tude ser:tret roam feertres for tearereture and tevet.
centrol roce for hIgh or lete te8Tersture, er hIgh er ten boren ConcentreTIGn IIAAC 82 Witt cOnfire that eWi pment is in piece. Civrentro*iert monitoring le wie tecet or ticpJid tevet in the toren solut iert tere. sempting and leb enetysis erud is thus not en ITAAC entry. I I
- Location in the htC tetter, Pierson to Ma 'riott,12/5/91,
- Detailed Cerenents en Pitet liAAC teltret for th3 AgWE.* gjag;1.y.pg.13
' CT Pf 5PoWMT T3 set ff AAC DDetsf1 catto 17/5N1 Guiding Principles for inclusion of Traditional Design Drawing Type Inforrnation in the Tier 1 Design Description (DD) and P&lD Type of informatiori Examp!e Proposed Treatment Comments 5
Tier 1 l Tier 2 LD PS E SS$4
- 1. Logic RWCS isolatum on SLC - t' - */
DD to deselbe imponare logic in fudmg ney wanabees and scemns: incsutag ledtla dors this type of information on ihe Tier 1 PA!D emmed Imrofve a lows 4 of detaJ boompatible enh the twed approach, especiasy lor the many AByrR erstems wish more compleshy than the relatmiy simple SLCS.
- 2. Line Sizing - */ - e' Tier 1 DD ireatenere ci pipe see as only necessary nor ihose sys. ems wewe one sir. is particulary cnicas = design basis perio, mane. to g ma swam and feedwater fines).
- 3. Materials Stainsess vs. Cartxwo *' - e' Tier t DD discussions of maeweal essues is croy rewared when H es Steet, impurny casent panicularty etnicat to design basis performance consx% ations.
- 4. Major Components */ V V Primary irners' of Time 1.
- 5. Instrumentation Temperature Elements. e' e' V Fo crhocal instrur=enes. P40 so ind caw eussenn and reiaeve loca*co Pressure Transminers, ordy: DD *m arceude more specitc into whe e pwe nom to g orpo er coao' etc. tuncnons).
- 6. CR Ind+ cation Low level Alarm. tal*e */ - V AX cmponenes4nstruments shown on simph*ed P&O assumed to hate
( Alarm /St a tus) Posnion Status, Pump some accornpanying CR tunction Ondreamon alarm. etc ) antwang4 type:afFy Oniott Staars, etc. It ed noe be shown DD er.ay include more dwaaed wo such as a par Wa, check wahre having CR status 3rdcatiort: In wwy twowned cases the Teer 1 P&O may show CR indicason {such as SLC tank Rt level alarms)
- 7. Valve / Pump MOWAOWManual. V 6' V Tier t Palos so be revesed to show maeve opmaios p e. nsOV 'Aovs)
Operator information Remmiccal, etc. Pumpa aruf waives wMh opmators that a , shown on seph6mf Ps0 aee asstmied to be remoiety operated; Manual valves assumed to be locasy operae DO em descree any special conscieraho'*s_
- 8. Desigft Cond.tions tdumacal Ratings for V - s/ DD mil specify design conomons for mape componeres indudeg Pressure / Temperature. boundaries and transition points as apswop.inte. Medog tes into en the sbnptified PatD is not cornpatible w,th Tier 1.
- 3. Component /Fiping code class. 0;abey V V 6' DD =a include ma perenene classmcat.on insormatwi for maior components Classit cation Group, seismic Categer; Oncl. piping) S.mgefed PSOs ==d only show AsME Code Ctsu info.
- tocation in the meC (etter, Pfersen to Merriott,12/3/91, " Detailed Caumente en Pflet ITAAC seAsaf ttet for the Ashe."
AJJ8:1. F 14
Cf fisPCwifs 70 WRC ff AAC C9aref$ tafFD 12/5/91 Crueggi $3,gga ter frD=ENT Cf FE!ssi sans consents, stCs testing These stC ccusents are covered ty trees (33,14), (5) above. SanB comments, 5LCS safety enslysis (1) In Section 2.2.4.o ord febte 2.2.4 Itee 3 sealsam reacter pressure is listed CE does not agree test any changes are necessary.- See response to ecceptente criterte es 1250 psig maring SLCs operettern since stes operability is regaired per . item 1 above. 10 Cf t 50.62, Afw$ resparse conditions need to be considered in the system ITAAts. In the isAn Arpendia lif Atws enetysis, the mesisam reactor pressure calculated is about 1336 pais. Correct the smalma reactor pressure to the calcuteted values 9 .en 8 in $$A2 Asperdis 15E to demonstrate SLCS factImat performente in responding to postuteted Afwl event. I (2) Rederance to the coltutettonal beses for poison cenrentrotnJ. of 850 spe, Cf interprets totis ceaseent es regmsting there be separete etries (identified in storsee ter* pspebte votiser foree 6100-6800 set, ePV meter inwomery SECT-91-1F8 es safety Anstrels veeification) eised specificet ty at confirw'ne the 1.00a106 lbs, awa shutdbe cooling system inventory .267m100 t>e should be es-twitt f acitity hos ttie paramevers used in the plet setety ensiyees. CE does ret i included as e nef ety enotysis criterie, believe such esperate entries are either roostred or recessary. Criticet p4ent pereerters witt be identified in the fruftvidest system seteriet eruf any seperate, speclet treeteent enastd be rodadent (eM potentistly ceWusire).
- tocation in the a'tc tetter, P!erson to marriott,12/5/91, "Detof ted Caesments on Pitet trAAC smittet for the A6wn." AJJ8:1-T 92 *3
, m._,, ~
mf i
- l 4
r f I h P i i
?
C1 edPONSf3 70 set 1TaAc Ctseerets talto 17/5/91 (De4WT taAltt* - met CComafer CF ef$ecust ;
' SEE cassents, AMR, design In the second peregraph, drysset t agirey costieg and oc independmt esoter The Amt system is designed te safety-reteted'eterusseds, however, drywelt sprey coo 4 leg i description (1) - ockfition modes are designated as rarsefety-related modes of eperation. graf ec irdeperusent water additten are nonsofety retetd sudes because: ,
' Clarify thy they are stessified as rense*Pty-related modes. . a. Drywett sprey has no identif f ed safety fmctices, and ,
- b. oc ledependent meter additten relates ordy to severe occid nt cerufttlers and thus is not othject te the regaireatnes associeted esith desten beefs accidents. [
The tier 1 dreigr* description hos teen modified te hety clorify thle distifaction. [ (2) Add to the third paragens* the fettowirg: "fMR will bewe provistens for this ceament egyeere te be beoed en a miniauterstanding of asWe ene system. Pssy or eethe ' '[ enintenance of the terg-term cootent recirculation and decry heet renowet oweftaut in the poet 40CA envircreernt le not port of the Ret dreign basis te4riremente
~
systems, e.g., pusp or valve overhout, in the post-LOCA envarercent and la not included in the ASW sectione 5.4.7 and 6.3. EE proposes no ITAAC changes en (inctamiing consideration of radioactivi%
- this item. .!
't i (3) In the test peregraph of page 2 it is stated that the toes pressure partions The esord
- diversely
- hee been deleted fra the DD in order to eweld confusion. ' the of th* shutdoest ceotirg piping ere diversely interlocked esith reacter pres- esplanstion in $5A2 Section 5.4.7.1.1.F is correct.
ture. i%is is in confilet with $1A4 Section SAJ.1.lJ andch states that at% Asue due design does not empticitly meet this recpstrement for , j diversity." j- { . , y j (4) The figures 2.4.1.e,' b and c are oversispi'flod. This figure should et leest The levet of detett provided in & Rwa diegreen hee toen modified to ref tert the $LCS ! i identify certain leportant suova. The acceptenre celterie cervet be based on procedent discussed en Pese 12, Ites 9. an overeisplified fleure *he $$At P&lD edeich le a sigtified versten of the
- system flow disgram should to the acceptance triterie.
(5) In febte 2.4.1.-1, ecks the following certified design conneitsent: *tne ane Gt agrees erus the De hos been modified eccordingly, se cherwe to table 2A.1-1 has been tong tere rootirg cepecity is adegate in the event of feiture of ery etcqple ande since thle espect of the design hee streedy been resetwed as port of the etC's active or passive campanent of the Rht.* - safety review. Esisting perfereence reteted ITAAC in table 2.4.1-1 mitt confies this safety assesseent remelte welid. ,
-t t
(6) in Table 2.4.1.1, eds the fettowing certified aesleri cammitment: (e) The power requirements of he tut system eincItafire the timing of e) 11AAC regarding the esegacy of norset and energency pomer eeurces, uctsafing leed I
< electrical loads, ere cearetitr e with the des.gn of en-site emergency segerecing and timing at ti be included with those systems.
. power systems, both oc aref dc. b) eut iretrtamentation and contret etreedy praeont in et y mein centret r3ae for norest (b) The instrumentation and cor:tret recpairements of the tME system to eperatiers incitanes that necessary for eseistig in post LOCA canditione eruf 1e ,i growloe edegante instrumentat on ersi centrol in centret ret to eestat i
4200 grue and the t#e heet renwet capability of et95 stursec *F ere destgri parametere should not be categorf aed as solidetien attritastes. They streedy contatned to the Tier 1 design descriptien. E egress to reise these Items frse are fier -1 acceptance criterie and should be ctessified as sude. vedid.* 'en attributes to acceptance criterie and to inctune the time-to-rated flow of 36 secw , (3) in itee #3, e6td the following la the acceptance criterie:
- pat meet M bellowes the parameter of 20T*F is eneleges to the other LOCA-related criterie
, Eschenger ... demonstrates the capability to prevent the bulk esegresslen discussed in Iten t ebewe. In eAlch case, heet removet tapability le tee key poet torperature free escoeding 2cT*f with enty two #*e heet enchargpers out cherecteristic of the swa system emich should be measured. eeeever, in ents, heet of the three Rh4 heat eachangers. ?%e vetidation attributes for SMR heet renews'. testing for the 048 erstem caruiet be achievent prior te fust (eed and thus cannot eschenger capability eruf ttee side flow should both be Identified as be a. lieAC entry. Newever, STAAC meteriet for the GPS system k(tl be ammfified to ecceetence criterie. inctute e review of essplier documentetion to cordf ra that the heet enchansers have been destried for the espropriate best veeswet cepecity.
- Location in the esc tetter, *ierson to Merriott,12/1/91, *Deteited Comments en pilot ITAAC $simittet for the ASWE.* AJJS:1-7-92-1T
% V' ,~ F i rf SEtPOWsts 70 t?C trAsc Creestets t'Affe 12r5r91 i CmMf tf $TtCf* aM C94tt GF ef 5poett (4) In itse No. $ eM the fot Louire fra the octaptance criterie, "tMt systes shett The eDitity of the SMS system to tw(no the e Mer is celd shutdown withist M ftcurs be cepente of tringing the reecter to the cold .Aut<now, condition of tese fattowing reacter shutdown has twere amorate xf in the 15Ae. st turtlewee it is etet 212*F within M hours f attowsng reactor shutdown witt anty two of the senecassary to include this etkject in ITAAC. As discussed la the S$AR, the 24 fieet three WHR inest eacb*rgers.* Change StAAC if2 to W3 to refer to carttoirement enca tenger heat resnowet cenabstity in this mode is tammdms by cetalesment costire cooting regstreaments. regJiraments. Cetainment cooling,. es WRC correct 4y footeo, le covered tqr if AAC #3. SRKS ccrs=ents, the, testing (1) verification of actual ptsq1 WPS41 regairements fer. es procured gasps should be IIAAC #18 grevides for verificetten of ar58 for freetelled gaspe. me etterges are provided. reest red. (2) Test for scegamey of Rua gas, einteue flow, and regeired einsflow twest it AC 811 swo.6 des for emctione; testine of each swa s oep at ein, mas flee toed. This criteria saeutd be provided in addition to logic test identified in Iten 11 ITAJC will be clarified to eMress the eeC's cessent. of the ITAAC. i sans cceanents, t*R, safety In No. 2 ed the eccepterre criterie, enty the PCT is gf wen. The LOCA smaiemm See ecowe response to sioiter comment. GE bellewee the getiteeepy of itAAC properee'en enetysis (1) hydrogen generation, contable geoertry and long-term cooling. Include ett is that the ITA describe what is done in the vield with T".1 AC beoed on peramete-o five itwo of the ecceptance criterie es siten in 10 CFR $0.&6. Ensure titet espected to be measured, the meteriet presented in Chapter 11 ef the $1Aa eiewides the critical performance parameters used in the anstysis are identified as ti d terween these meeswed system performance characteristi:s and the Arteder safety acceptance criterie. criterte identified in this eisoneet. (2) tef?rente to the calcutettonet bases for sat p_sp flow 4200 sps, time te she Tier 1 c%eign description and ifAAC are leTenned to provide tap levet destys criterie rated flow 36 sec, art heet escnenger time side fleu 4200 sta, wetwett sprey and design features. The cateutetters : beses for these criterte and feetures are flow rate of 500 spe, etc., shout:r te fectumed since they are (apartant cantained in the S$AR and are et a lewet of detelt 19Lt is cet espespriete for Tier 1. safety enetysis esesptieris of ITAAC.
- tocation in the meC teeter, Pierson to merclett,12/5/91, =oetailed Ccaments on Pitet 11AAC tihef ttet for the Aha." A#$:1-7-92-16
. i.
- 3. .,; ~
i6 i f : %. l' i k , . , e ~h^ n e g -f , I CT BFSPfar5Et 10 eeC 11AAC COG (eff DAff012/ c'1 = frsesf ef $35rrf * , - eeC CapeTet Cf RESPtMT l foergenry diesat generater it is the htC wuderstanding that the ABhst ession rewires thet each of the The desim bases for ARWW rewires that any tus of the three divisions of emergercy - systes ccennants (1.e) l titree division be cepetde of sgytying sufficient AC power to satisfy minfeue diesel genereters be capable of providing power. This desim bes's rewirement dertwes ' safety-related twettens defined in the accident anstysis for the A8WR. The directly srae applicat.en of the singte active feiture criterlen to Achat. ' A statement - ifAAC should be consistent with the A8 Wit design cceamitments. serstatent witit the AIUR $5AR, Section 8.3.1.1.8, has been added to the first peregraph, [ 1.e., *...es regaired to achieve safe shutdows of the plant end/or te altigste the contecpences of a less-of-coolant occident (LDCA) in the event of a coinrident less of nornet electrical power." The ASWR has the repobility to shut down the g t ot with only one divisten sawever, this is beyorud the design bases for three divielens with e atrate active feiture. . Therefore, it is not espreywiete to state this es a fler 1 11AAC. (1.b3 the test part of this steteesest
- ether Leeds rewired by the plant design" The *other toads...* has been reytsced with the obeve. '
isetles that the three divisions can sqpty ell tende-safety and runsafety. This part of the stateswnt should te 'sterified. ,s [ t 9.c) It la not ctest det the ters " divisions
- means in the etwwe statenent. The Due to the edistl*ms noted abowe, the first sentence Of the eeCend peregregdt was capability of the stan&y AC power sqply should be ediressed .,Jrous the _ *adiacessary and hee been deleted. .&
l capability of the Attornating Cearrent Power System. The Stoney power swe4y I i is . sesyste. of th. .ite,ncing current - .ystem. ! I *?) the last sentence of the first peregrapdi of the design beefs section states E will clarify this iten by steting that RCIC does not spesect e elenif ftent tend for .p that the divisten i RC.C systee is steam-drlwen eruf therefore not dependent the diesel generatecs, for paemple, *...not dependent en the stancy ec pouer essyty + en the storier AC power swyty system. This statement is set correct. The systes." iMe been replaced with *...does not present e af rificent tend to the dieset 2C8C system is dependent en the DC system dich is Dependen* en the AC gescretor.* The purpose of the pereerech in epmstlen was te idee =tify *mejor teeds.' and sys.ee. the purpese of the sentence in tsuestion wee to emptein why givielere f of the RCtC did not represent e enjer lemi. The , entente change shamptd etisinete any confuelen. { (3) The term "ty the plant design" needs to be esp 4M! tty defined. i %e precise sepence and imfividaet timing of each dieset genereter toed is e towet of . t *talt inaspropriate for e Tier i ITAAC, eauever, the sentence hos been c erified to L' state "...s4 plying its needs in the segaence end timing spectfled in the plant deeign [
- doc,.mee s.-
(- S ' l
- l. i i
e f = Location in the eRC tetter, Pterson to marriott,12/5/91; "Detatted C oments en Pilst ITAAC stessittet for 4 AgWR.* aJJe:1 T-9219 '# d
- ,,a"
.-,-w .> Qq 4 , y uw',-fu enm-- u"'---'Y'_ E af s*Cettt$ 70 eer IYaAC Cmentets paren tM,vt Creeefgf $0Jett* Wet Cae9FWT G( o(SPOm7E Emergersy diesel generator The fif th peregraph of the design description can be irterpreted to seen tiist E has clarified ty replacing the tere "idte a with a better definitlan of the steesty ecomment s the diesel generator does not auttunaticetty stort en en accident alen>J The conditien_ the wegue tem idle hos been removed, and the tere stordy has been supsented t4) design basis should te cleerty stated to iMicate that the dieset generet r with *(f.e., rweing at eated wettese eru fregeerry but tetoeded).* mitt be started en en accident signet es ispiled in the design desr-lption in the AStat 5SAR. the desi;;n descriptien for the ItAAC isdigsteg that the dieset genererer will er:f y se to en idle stemky canditten if started by en accident signet without
- tess of of fsite power af arent. If the diesel generator le to be eFerated at idte stset ef ter en accident signet without tese of ef fsite power es port of the AtJe design, this erre mitt be considered en epen issue for the Chapter 8.0 review of the Aad $1AR.
t5) ' Fort of deste caussiteent 3 rewires that needs be eWied in proper the Acceptance Criterte sepow t, "...ard sessmces les leads" hee tusen repieced alth, secpence; but, the ecceptance criterte and coupliance essessment precedares * ....rus prcserly segaances its tones ip accordance with the plant serJunece d'egree." related to oesters ccessiteent 3 de not address er rowdre that proper sognerse Also, the desip censuitment seynent, * ...regAred try the plant desig's,* has tseen repieced be enomstrated. Acceptance criterie erud creptiance essessment procockares with, *...specified in the plant design docweents.* for each design comuniteent shou 4d be cons'* tent with the design casunitment. (O The casesiteent f> deperder s alth no interecreettiens between reckmdent M witt anodify the denlys descriptian to clarify this itse. The seed "autaaetic* bee divisiers cuntainen les the third pa egrese of the proposed design descriptien teen acued in the fourth peregraph of the Desip Descriptian, se stated in the Asw ssAs is not corelatent witn the ASW design cerumitut in Section S.3.1.1.8.1 of section 8.3.1.1.8.1. the ssAA. The deeign description for two If tACs should be ceneistent witn the design description fo ttie ASW 11Af tefere it la sent to the eeC for technicet evetation. t?) Certified desipi comuniteent 2 (i.e. each dieset generator is capable of the Tier 1 design description ITAACs are beine genereted er based @an the infermetion in atteintag rated f.egaarcy and wettese withina 20 eeceses af ter receipt of e ette Aed 5sA3 The fler 1 dessen descetetten mitt be modified to eeke it c<meistent mite start slymet) has not been inchaje3 in the design description for the $14AC certified desf gn casumitment #2, i.e., a>w 20 seconds tro t%e fourth peregrese). but is included an the destgre description for the AJAt $5A3 By ediet documerit are ITAACs teifg genereted? tS) The design description geswideo with the !TAAC is *not conststent erith the eaC cesseitsunt needs to be more specific. The GE intent is to make the deaf en design description provided in the ASW SSAR. eescriptian consistent with the $1At; If specific inconsletenctee con be identified. E wilt tese espropriate actlan.
- Location sa the unc tetter, Piersen to marriott,12/5/91, "Cetailed Comments en Pitet If AAC SJaittet for the A4.st.' AJJ8:1-2-92 20
$f etsposists To mec 31 Asc comMFurs catr0 t?;*/91 - CrseWuY Smerf* eer Ctso1sf E afsecutf Eawserry dieset generator the certified design ceaun6teer.t enster 6 is tot corristent with the A8WR Et betleves that carwfitiaru dich trip er denene the dieset generator he.* safety 4 comuments (cont.) causiteents skacumented in the ASWR 5$As. The ABWB $$AR comuniteent is that lepticetions, and their ereurjetiens should be confirmed as port sf the fler 1 IT AAC, (9) the devices that anonitor the coruff tions of the dieset gereresor (i.e., Nowever, specific identification of areuscletor points wanad be teingcopriate et this perfere a fwet'on that is not reiptred for the dieset generator to tewet becesse of dependerre en the speelfic diesel design. E etill believes the for acconplish its safety fwetions and are part of she diesst generetar tv categories are the $est eey to specify such tests for 14ee 1. essociation ath-t is not isolated tram the diese" esnerefor)) shell be designed to meet those criterie riecessary to answa that these aewices that sonttor the conditica ef the dieset gererefor do ret degrade the dietet generater below on acceptabte (evel. An esplicit statement e to meet the necessary criteris is to ensure that there devices do not degrade the diesel generator below en ecceptable tevet is currently considered as en open iss-* in coremitecnc. The four categories presented relate to protection of ensipa nt. ' f>e staf.' feels that these categories are inappropriate as certified fler 1 desipt cassnitments. (10) 0-sign criterte defirmed in ;EEE Standard 308-1980 ergeor, for the most port, M confires that the As.st Emergency Sieset Cenerators cceply =tth et t the previsione of to be presented et the appropriate levet to be considered tier 1 des @ IEEE 308-1980, section 6.2.4, for the "s:entby Power sawty.* The STAAC interpretes criterie. The staf f thus intends to use these criterie es the primary these prowlsions es f attows: 1) Description lifAAC Design Description (ICD), Ben guldetines for review of ITAACs for corpleteness. .iustification should be peregresM; 2) Twstion (IDO, 2nd peregregel; 3) Capability 1109, 3rd peregresN; 4) providud for each dif ference. Indeponence (100, 3rd ard 9th pereeragest; S) Aveitabit tty (Ino, 4th ord 5th peregraphsi; 3) Cepecity t' J, 4th peregrasm3; 73 Erergy teore we !!DD, 6th peregraph3.
- Locat 6cn in the mec letter. Pierson me-rlott,12/5/91, Detallad Carments on Pilot ItaAC Stemittet for the AeWE.e AJasd-T 92-21
cF pf spalesFS to o#C IT Ast CrossteTS DaffD 1?r5/91 CY PYte9 tty CCDe*f of SCfRCF
- het CCDuMkT The CD 6hould identi8y att heet loads the system is designed to servic , elerg lebtes have teen added to the DD identify'ne entsign=ct dich rceives trw flow daring the
$Pt3 cceemente en SCW. First trite the assisaJs heat toed empected for each division and the corditten sad r worimas plant operating ord enerperary modes. 04vistenst asengreenes are inciased. page, peregraph 2 knich the anaisus beat load is espectert. The DD should else identify ehe RCW Identification of the 83 desde beels corwition hea else been eMed to the D0. ets=Jicet definition of the best tom $s in the euttiple beet eschargers and merating divisien that each heet toed is on, sedes is provided in f ee4e 9.2 La, b erd c of the saWR S$at. LE does not cet teve this la wt of neteit is omrepriate for Tier 1 and hos not been included in either the D0 ec !! AAC. It *may be espected t*st mi.or we. 4etters in th6s information will occur given es-built date ord as a result of system betencing. $Jth wortetiers will be etteptable and inclusion of such inf ormation in fier 1 would ce=cesserit y prohitit a licersee from accepting such wartettons under 10 Cte 52.63 (b) 2. The 00 and accompanying figures should cteerly identify the seisms
- erd GE ogrees and the DD hoe been modotted to provide thie ifdorestion.
3 quotity gro@ etessificatiore grow ctessificatires of the system, it should else specif y emich parts of the system ere safety-retsted ord which are not. The DD s%cutd identify the specific location of the owiperet ord heet tom $s. The esistirg 00 identifies the tasilding en enich ecpaigment ed heat toede see located. 4 In erMition, the DD shout.$ identify ett irm*rumentation as weit es In ackfitta , the fler t mots.-let for each of the tuildings of tt incluoe geeerst arrangement dromings shouire mejor espeipsent torations, Irwlw$irg RCW itana. EE doce fet indicators, eterns, erd controls tocated in the control reas, remote sNutekmen believe the RCW SD rerpstres any endifications with respect to erydpment l oc at i ons. fne penet, ard lacet ty. DO has been modified to include a brief ownery of me!er contret team tvutrumente and contrets. Sette shutdinat system considerations ulti be erHreesed in the DO for timet s ys t em. (f tem 2.2.6 ef the proposed AgWE IIAAC tist.) Let ei instrussentation inf ermet ton is not appropriets for Tier 1 treeteent and has not been edtted to the atu metectoi. bing various candttiere (normet, the totJes ed*4th have been exte<* to the De expt ein system operetf an dJring verimas amuses 5 The 00 shasid esplein system opers < storstry) es mes t es darire h*gh of operation. Design feerures ord acerating precedsres that address teekege ed LOSP, LOCA, LOSP/LOCA, hot shutd.aA. no radiation and high teatege cordith, reestien ore not wiewed as fier 1 meteriet. Tier 1 is reserved for top teve4 system dee'en cerditiers. The RCW DO identif te, the 6 System parameters should be specified, swh es design pressure, desipi ptsap design pressure, toeperatu r e, flew and heed, ard the beet escenper cepecifies. GE temperature, normal creratire prese:sre, neanet operatire temperature, piJup flow rates and afsat, and heet eschenger cepecities. believes more cceprehensive dsfinition of design carditions should remain (9 fier 2 erd no changes are prcposed. poreet operating press,sree ord tweraturee are eserotierel 'msiderations that are not appropriate ente:es for fler 1. Pr:tection of the system from the ef fects of fire, flooding, sprey, Jet These issues will be eMressed, es egrepriate, in other system er gereric IT4AC. For 7 ispiegement, pipe feitures, and components should te addressed. esemple, consideretions of building flonderg will be cowered in the tYaACs for the control and ree rter but tding. AJJ8:1-7-92-22
- Location in the sat let ter, Pierson to aere iott,12/5/9*, acetalted Cossments an ?!!st 11AAC $dtmittet for the ASWR.*
__ ~ CE etSMwtf 510 set 118 AC Ctwetets caffe 1?/5/91 CaseMf et $rwege art Cepequi CE ff!Pturtt $ Pts ccuenents on RCW. Second figure 2.11.3 shout 1 clearly identife ett compments Instruments and beat le the entent CE bellewee it is esgregriete to include details in fler 1, these issues p.ge (Tecte 2.11.133 toads in the system ard their loce ssonsi in ecMitten, the seismic and are scHressed in responce to the ebewe iteen identified es Perogeoph 2 er=* 3. leportant item 1 cpastity gro@ etessif fretione should te specified. Finalty, the tigure RCW contal room instrumente ere shown on Figure 2.11.3. should identif y emich portions of the system are safety-related and nAlch are rot. Itse 1 Inspection precedures should be rewtewed. The purpose et ITAAC is te confirm that the pteret hea twen tyd tt ord gitt opeaste in accordance with the design tertification. Review of proreeree is e function that is sw8ermed in accocconce we'% the GA program towner 10 Cf t Port SO Aspendis e, and le not emrgriete for inctasion in the If AAC. Consegantly, Cf prvosee no c%enge in reepwee to this etw. Item 2 Inspection and test precockses should te revleued to ersure that they can See response to the above item. 17AAC 82 covers in&Perusmate 89d separetion of the hCW adegastely demonstrate system independence. divisions. , stem 3 opera tionet modes should te identified and test procedres should te redewed ' he new tabtes diactseed above provide 66dormation en the operationet modes, t aistlaw to erzure that hydraulle demords con be met in each mode. ITAAC #3 covers liydroutic rerformance of tSe systius. me other chemsee ere proposed. a item 6 Stardste LOCA, LOSP, LOCA/LOSP, and high teoksee corditions. Isotation time ITAAC e5 includes provistare for testing eienAeted LOCA/LOSP canditions. ITAAC $4 t emits should also be identif ted, inctwies provisiere for testieg isoletten of essentia* free newesentist equipment. Isolation time tiette ore not criticet, and CE mee not believe that this tevet of setsit in omrepriete for Tier 1. Assuming "high tenaege* seere felture of the noneesentist j portions of the s e too, testing described in ITAAC $4 will confirm recessary feeletion mitt occur. Item 5 Tests should be ccrrAzted with dif'erent cabinetters of pg and heet f alsting ifAAC #5 simAetes systeer performarre for LOCA/10EP ceruff tlere with eit enchangers init'elly rwsming. Therd should be corubcted for LOCA, LOSP, erd cost >ination of eCE gwpe end heet eschengers in each division inittet ty curedng. GE see 10CA/LOSP. Pump stort erst wolve oge ang times c%ould be specified as wett es not believe any changes in 11AAC e5 ore required. GE does not believe test details on dieset toedi g times. pump start time ord s be orening times are appropriete for fler 1. I Dieset toeding times are ediressed in the IT AAC for the storsty AC power ogply system. Arkh tionet itses Test should ensee ther any two divisions een edecpaetely handle system or GE e"rees that lieAC e3 should be modified to clarify divisional capability. Secewe the best loads. IT AAC anJet be complete prior to fuel toes, it will not be pessible er feestete to dir+ctly test the system's ability to hardte the types of heat tess that a are generated aJrieg operation. *nstead, as discussed in IT AAC #3, systeer hidreu' Ec tests will be condxted to confire that the RCW hos suf ficient water flow to heruste 4%e heat toedt, Testing during git arst stortgs ard opprette= witt confire adeqtsete therest gerferenace "M the system.
- Location in the ett tetter, Pierson tu 4e-riott,12/$/91, "Detet ted Cumments en Pilot RfAAC Sdroittet for the A8WR.* A!J8:1 F 92-23 F
s Cf effPCWef t tti pC f t AAC CtpoortT5 CatfD t?M/91 creeget trumCE* e pJ Cf Pf5Poe4 Ad$itionst trees testa should ensure that each divist n can haruite the manima heet needs en ' see etwee rescerse to divisionat and he:t Road testles. that division., Anfitionet items Tests should ensure that each etvision con harmfte the manieum heet teacts e.. See abooe ressorse to sivisionst erus heet toed testing. that division. Circulating water system The CD should specify system flem rate, conte c system P&fDs, and provide a As stated in the steff torpeiromeres meemrersim of patruerv 15,197t, the Cameissien hos - cesign description. 'suosterMive description of the mater tes fitt armd went sAystem. in - apprewed a seeded sproach to the tevet of detelt of informatiert needed for eesige Peregraph 1 aortien, the DD should Identify the censmser pit towet nAlch initletee certification; i.e., the towet of deteit' will very *pending teen a system's relatiership system isoletten. to safety. The ASWE CWS enes cet serve er sisport any endety functiset erut has no se+ety desian tesis. Secause the informatier= identified is* the eeC coaswet has ne retetsonship to safety, Gt does not believe that it is appropriate for instazion 6 Tier 1. s.esevee, Et agrees to add a simplif ted PEID casqperehte to the R$At PRIO. It le noteuerthy that - the CWs esas selected by GE es a pilot itAAC enesote precieety because it is e non-safety systee and escutd thus regresentattwo cf the less detetted and of the graded treeteene epectetsm. Peregregri 2 TN D0 should idactify the maximas system temperature and hc= tt is See teepense to Casaret 1 in ene first peregrere. saintained es melt as the sterne, traficators, and contrets amich are teceted in the contret room and tocetty. P resrega 3 finst ty, the De smtd emptein the various system stortiq. Intertecks erus see aeopcese to Casamat 1 la the first ps egress. smarce of puep bearing tubriceting and seat meter, I Circulating esoter system include rewired isoletion times. The (1AAC incitairs previsions for verifying the feeletten fwetten. The isoletten timme teete 2.10.2L lten 1 for the teetettan wet es are not crittent and ere not merenriete for Tiec 1 + Jitional items t Prew6de fle= diescam amich identifies systes mw , instruments eruf tee 9esperse to Cesserrats 1. As discussed in the deelen deactlpteen, CWs is designed and their locations, and spmsity gren, etessifications. caroteucted in accordance with skatity Erene 9 sencificetlaw The eisplified PAN. ehc=rs ans}er compt..ents. 2 fesure through construction records that the system is built to Guellty Grete See tesponse to Cconnerat 1 in the first peregraph. D specifications. 3 Ensure through tests that re@! red flow cepecities are met. See aesponse to Conruvit 1 in the first peregresWt. i & Ensure through visunt lespectimme that the systes camparents arvi their See Response to Camuset 1 in the first twregress. tacettore are in accordance with the flew diegree. j e tocet te,, :n th. ==C ietter, Pierson marriets, 32nni, -oetasted C ment. en altet stAAC samattet for the Agn.- Aue:s-r.n-26 i i CE afspoetf 5 TO NRC 17AAC C(eeuf ft$ OsTfD 12Mf91 "Aasruf $aerP W#C 09eTitt CF #FS*ceSF Contret Nilding flooMng design description ' . Deregraph 1 The Design Description (00) should identify ett potentist inte6 at floodire In the OD, E will identify the type of cesign teetures used to centret mtenttei floods. hazards on e floor-by-f teor basis and discias features to protect safety- The De how irrtudes a s.suseery of the flood onetysis presented in the $$as; e rotated systems and agalpnent frts these hogards. comprehensive regWitteet of this esterlat in fler 1 is not believed asyropriete. 2 Yhe 00 could identify internet fleading herords dee to erstes fattures in CE of tt describe tA sdent features aimed et protecting the centret tnaitding frem this adjacent buildings dich have consean access areas to the contret buildire. type of flood hazards i.e., watertight doors instelled below internet flood levet. 3 The 00 should detalt the desipi of the contret butiding roof and how the The 00 witt te modified to include e cassettaent to preide roofs desipwd to preveat design prever ts excessive mater weight an the rcef dJe to precipitotien, pooling of large ammunts of water. i f ebt e 2.19.12. Itee 2, Peregraph 1 All wetertight doors should be identified on f f oures 2.15.12e through figures atti be endified to show metertight doors. 2.15.12g. 2 Att mejor piping identified es a potentist floodice hesord should be Thie deteited type of information is deactassed in the $$As $eCTISR 3.4.1.1.2.2. M Identified on figure 2.15.12e through 2.15.12s. believes this tewet of detelt is not egyrapriate for Tier 1. 3 visuet inspection should be cormizted to eerify that flood protection $1nce these feeturee are to be added to the figures, t%le recp;est le now setistled by features such as watertight doors are in ptoce es specified in figures I1 AAC F1 ef f able 2.T$.12. 2.15.12e through 2.1$.12s. 4 Visuet irsper*iarm should be condzted to ensure that primary flood herards Confirmation that an admpaste flords heterda enotyeis hoe performed to e dnelm issus , were property identified in DO and figures. that eheutd be acHressed ear 6ng the $$As design review process. The intent of ITAAC is to conf'ru that the as-tasitt f acitity conferas to the certified design; no DO or ItAAC charges are proposed in response to thi. SSC comment.
- tocation in the mac tetter, Pierson to nerriott,12/$/91, Metailed Causeents on Pitet ITAAC 3dmittet for *he AgC.* AJJ$:1-7-92-25
Cf Pf tschsts to set 174t* Cam (w?s carts 1?i$f91 CfWef WT t'1Rcf
- met Cooeraf u etserest Informel Ccessents on Proposed GE stseeery of mRC caements: We intent of the proposed E seretic le liAAC mee that le be att-lutmive and oness Generic 10 ITAAC ett forertent safety erpsipsent (sechanicet and electr6ced erud the fut{ rarge of he main thrut of the htt's causents is to modify the gener6e te etAAC te envirmeeeget corditions espected in the plant (free hereh to mind). GE irtieves e address ontw Ene omtificetten of electrical eq:sisuunt es ce4 *ed *sr le 10 compreevnstve ewrosch 4s asyrepriate erw' hos st ashtly soeifled the oeC*e tenemmet to Cf 8 $0.49 In er'.*s t ian, the 15 8 iners is endifies to sdentify tbst t$e reteln this 8vit scope.
preferred me@e s' wertfytrc efication is e 100 per cent audit sf cuellfication 4 .es GE tiellewes identifiestion in Tier 1 of a agrefer ed method of werifyire the gatificetten..." is tes iv.reelse eruf preposes to knee the ITAAC en the - "einistas... suit t..." sproach idsetified ty the mRC to t' air reseents. The inesis te tble respmee is the ssidersterufW thet ITAAC are earnstory are it aseutd tse Wtete to ifwiude
- preferred methods" or recemmendettare.
I' I
- Lacett a to the eat lette.. Pierson to marriett,12/5/91, meteiled Ccommme en pitet s AAC kamittet for the AsWE.= AJJe:1 7 92-M
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