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Category:DEFICIENCY REPORTS (PER 10CFR50.55E & PART 21)
MONTHYEARML17264A9381997-07-10010 July 1997 Deficiency Rept Re Potential Safety Hazard Associated w/FM-Alco 251 Engin,High Pressure Fuel tube-catalog: 4401031-2 in Which Dual Failure Mode Exists.Caused by Incorrect Forming Process ML20094C8971995-11-0101 November 1995 Part 21 Rept Re Valves Being Supplied W/Bushings Made of Babbitt Graphalloy Instead of Graphite.Corrective Actions: Ring-O-Valve Spa Supplied Replacement Nickel Graphalloy Bushings BECO-LTR-94-118, Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Trip Units During pre-installation Testing & Prior to Final Acceptance.Corrected Breakers Returned to Plant by GE1994-10-31031 October 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Trip Units During pre-installation Testing & Prior to Final Acceptance.Corrected Breakers Returned to Plant by GE ML20073K9091994-10-0707 October 1994 Initial Part 21 Notification Re Spare Breakers Sent to GE for Overhaul & Upgrade to Quality Q BECO-LTR-94-079, Part 21 Rept Re Degraded Diaphragms Found in Asco Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves in Hydraulic Control Units1994-07-15015 July 1994 Part 21 Rept Re Degraded Diaphragms Found in Asco Scram Solenoid Pilot Valves in Hydraulic Control Units ML20069M6571994-06-20020 June 1994 Part 21 Rept Notification Re Degraded Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve Diaphragms Supplied by Ge.Although Fuel Integrity Assured & No Radioactive Release Would Occur,Mcpr Safety Limit Would Be Exceeded During Above Postulated Transient ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20118B4391992-09-11011 September 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Degradation in Abb Type 27N Undervoltage Relays Used in Electrical Switchgear.Recommends That Users Review Applications Requiring Exposures Greater than 1E03 Rads TID W/Time Delay Function Option BECO-91-096, Part 21 Rept Re Trip Latch Roller Interference on GE AK-50 Type Breakers Resulting in Failure of Automatic Transfer Scheme.Initially Reported on 910724.Breakers Modified to Prevent Clevis Pin Interference.Ge Notification Encl1991-07-26026 July 1991 Part 21 Rept Re Trip Latch Roller Interference on GE AK-50 Type Breakers Resulting in Failure of Automatic Transfer Scheme.Initially Reported on 910724.Breakers Modified to Prevent Clevis Pin Interference.Ge Notification Encl ML20155B2221988-09-27027 September 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Notification of Possible Failure of Parts Shipped to Company Under Nonstd Operating Conditions. Engineering Evaluation of Condition Initiated by Plant Supplied W/Parts ML20153G0111988-05-0606 May 1988 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in Bussman Buss KTK-R Fuse Blocks W/Part Numbers 2078,2079 & 2080.Purchasing Records Reviewed to Identify If Any Parts Were Actually Used or Shipped to Customers.Results Listed BECO-87-090, Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Loose &/Or Missing Bolts in Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) Support Frames of CRD Sys. Initially Reported on 870529.HCU Will Be Restored to Original Design & Bolts Inspected1987-05-30030 May 1987 Part 21 & Deficiency Rept Re Loose &/Or Missing Bolts in Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) Support Frames of CRD Sys. Initially Reported on 870529.HCU Will Be Restored to Original Design & Bolts Inspected BECO-87-014, Part 21 Rept Re Potential Failure of Standby Gas Treatment Sys (SGTS) Humidity Control Subsystem.Initially Reported on 870123.Caused by Bechtel Corp Design Error.Sys Will Be Verified as Operable Prior to Conducting Operations1987-01-26026 January 1987 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Failure of Standby Gas Treatment Sys (SGTS) Humidity Control Subsystem.Initially Reported on 870123.Caused by Bechtel Corp Design Error.Sys Will Be Verified as Operable Prior to Conducting Operations ML20214V9801986-11-0303 November 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Reels 01,02,09,10 & 15 Containing Nonconforming Matl.Initially Reported on 861029.Util Advised to Withdraw Reels from Svc.Evaluation of Cause Proceeding BECO-86-069, Part 21 Rept Re Ges RHR Min Flow Protection Logic Not Meeting Single Failure Design Criteria.Initially Reported on 860519.GES Performing Analysis.Final Rept Will Be Submitted Upon Completion of Corrective Actions1986-05-23023 May 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Ges RHR Min Flow Protection Logic Not Meeting Single Failure Design Criteria.Initially Reported on 860519.GES Performing Analysis.Final Rept Will Be Submitted Upon Completion of Corrective Actions ML20154K3611986-03-0505 March 1986 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Wiring Defect in Fabricated Primer Chamber Assemblies for Standby Liquid Control Valves. Initially Reported on 860214.Listed Corrective Actions Will Be Completed by 860328 ML20140A5281985-12-19019 December 1985 Part 21 Rept Forwarding Ltr Sent to Customers Re Check Valves Missing Lock Welds on Hinge Supports or Hinge Support Capscrews,Per 851121 Request.List of Customers Receiving Ltr Also Encl ML20210G9921985-08-13013 August 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Failure of Isolated Worm Shaft Gear When Certain Critical Speeds Combined W/Repetitive Transfer of Actuator Clutch Mechanism from Manual (Handwheel) to Motor Drive Mode.Two Possible Solutions Noted ML20127E3111985-06-19019 June 1985 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Separation of Aluminum Nameplate from Hevi-Duty Type Sbw or Szo Transformers in Nelson Electric Class 1,035-volt Motor Control Ctrs,W/Potential Short Circuit.Initially Reported on 850618 BECO-84-105, Part 21 Rept Re Twisted Shielded Pair Cable in Nutherm Intl, Inc Analog Trip Cabinets C2228A1,C2228A2,C2229B1 & C2229B2. Initially Reported on 840713.Caused by Poor Workmanship. Cables Exhibiting Defects Replaced1984-07-13013 July 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Twisted Shielded Pair Cable in Nutherm Intl, Inc Analog Trip Cabinets C2228A1,C2228A2,C2229B1 & C2229B2. Initially Reported on 840713.Caused by Poor Workmanship. Cables Exhibiting Defects Replaced ML20093L2021984-07-11011 July 1984 Part 21 Rept Re Delivery of Nicked Insulation on Individual Conductors,Resulting from Jacket Stripping of Rockbestos Firewall III Single Pair Shielded Cable by Nuthern.Affected Cabinets Replaced 1997-07-10
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217E3021999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Station.With ML20212C2921999-09-16016 September 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Request for Relief from ASME Code Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216F3511999-09-0808 September 1999 ISI Summary Rept for Refuel Outage 12 at Pnps ML20216E6881999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20210R3401999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20209C4731999-07-0707 July 1999 Addendum to SE on Proposed Transfer of Operating License & Matls License from Boston Edison Co to Entergy Nuclear Generation Co ML20209H8251999-07-0101 July 1999 Provides Commission with Evaluation of & Recommendations for Improvement in Processes Used in Staff Review & Approval of Applications for Transfer of Operating Licenses of TMI-1 & Pilgrim Station ML20209E6191999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196H2451999-06-29029 June 1999 SER Denying Licensee Proposed Alternative in Relief Request PRR-13,rev 2.Staff Determined That Proposed Alternative Provides Insufficient Info to Determine Adequacy of Scope of Implementation ML20209A8901999-06-28028 June 1999 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to Use Code Case N-573 for Remainder of 10-year Interval Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20209B9861999-06-23023 June 1999 Rev 13A to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station COLR for Cycle 13 ML20217N9061999-06-21021 June 1999 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Period of 970422-990621 ML20195K3431999-06-15015 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Licensee Request to Use Guidance of GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water System Piping for Plant ML20195G8231999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Pnps.With ML20207E7471999-05-27027 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Granting Request Re Reduction of IGSCC Insp of Category D Welds Due to Implementation of HWC to License DPR-35 ML20206M1971999-05-11011 May 1999 SER Accepting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in ASME Code Class 3 Salt Svc Water Piping at Plant ML20206J6611999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20205L0221999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20207J5471999-03-0909 March 1999 Training Simulator,1999 4-Yr Certification Rept ML20207F9401999-03-0101 March 1999 Long Term Program Semi-Annual Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20207H5451999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20196E2151998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Boston Edison & Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K Rept.With ML20206Q2741998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20197J3591998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20195C9951998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20154K0721998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20153D3901998-09-22022 September 1998 Safety Evaluation Granting 970707 Request to Use Guidance in GL 90-05 to Repair Flaws in ASME Class 3 Salt Svc Water Sys Piping for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20197C5011998-09-0404 September 1998 Rev 12C,Pages 4 & 5 to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Colr ML20197C5471998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 12C to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Colr ML20151W8231998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.With ML20237E2251998-08-26026 August 1998 Suppl & Revs to SE for Amend 173 for Pigrim Nuclear Power Station ML20237A9941998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20236U8201998-07-13013 July 1998 Rev 12B to Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station COLR (Cycle 12) ML20236P0151998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20249A3741998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.W/Undated Ltr ML20247H2081998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20207B7601998-03-31031 March 1998 Final Rept, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Site-Specific Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedenss Prompt Alert & Notification System Quality Assurance Verification, Prepared for FEMA ML20216G3911998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J3741998-03-19019 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Evaluate Elevated Tailpipe Temp on Safety Relief Valve SRV 203-3B ML20248L2241998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Station ML20202G5251998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20236M8511997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Rept for Boston Edison & Securities & Exchange Commission Form 10-K Rept ML20198L7701997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20203D6101997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20202D5761997-11-0808 November 1997 1997 Evaluated Exercise BECO-LTR-97-111, Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station1997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20217D6431997-10-0101 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Granting Request for Approval to Repair Flaws in Accordance W/Gl 90-05 for ASME Class 3 SSW Piping for Pilgrim ML20217H5621997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20216J4131997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML20210J3321997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jul 1997 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 1999-09-08
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GENERAL INFORMATION or OTHER EVENT NUMBER: 29535 LICENSEE: GENERAL ELECTRIC NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/01/95 CITY: SAN JOSE REGION: 4 NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:22 [ET]
COUNTY: STATE: CA EVENT DATE: 11/01/95 LICENSE #: AGREEMENT: Y EVENT TIME: 00:00[PST]
DOCKET: LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/01/95 NOTIFICATIONS NRC NOTIFIED BY: NOEL SHIRLEY HQ OPS OFFICER: JOSEPH SEBROSKY VERN HODGE NRR EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE 10 CFR SECTION:
CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH EVENT TEXT GENERAL ELECTRIC IS ISSUING A PART 21 REPORT DUE TO IMPROPER VALVE PACKING MATERIAL USED IN VALVES THAT WERE SUPPLIED TO THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.
GE NUCLEAR ENERGY (GE-NE) BOUGHT FROM RING-O VALVE spa OF ITALY, AND PROVIDED TO THE BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PILGRIM PLANT, FOUR GATE VALVES INTENDED FOR SAFETY RELATED APPLICATIONS (TWO IN THE HPCI SYSTEM AND TWO IN THE RWCU SYSTEM). AS PART OF THE VALVE DELIVERY IMPROPER VALVE PACKING BUSHINGS WERE SUPPLIED WHICH CONTAINED BABBITT, A LEAD BEARING ALLOY WHICH IS KNOWN TO CAUSE EMBRITTLEMENT IN STAINLESS STEEL. THIS DID NOT MEET THE GE-NE VALVE SPECIFICATION.
THE IMPROPER MATERIAL WAS IDENTIFIED DURING THE INSTALLATION PERIOD AND THE BUSHINGS WERE REPLACED WITH BUSHINGS CONTAINING AN ACCEPTABLE MATERIAL. THE VALVES WERE NOT YET PLACED INTO NUCLEAR SERVICE AT THE TIME OF DISCOVERY.
GE-NE HAS EVALUATED THE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMPROPER BUSHING MATERIAL IN ALL FOUR VALVES AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT FOR THE VALVES IN THE HPCI SYSTEM, A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONCERN DID NOT EXIST. HOWEVER GE-NE ENGINEERING HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONCLUSIVELY RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT i THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING THIS MATERIAL IN THE RWCU SYSTEM WOULD l NOT RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY CONCERN AND HAS THEREFORE ELECTED TO l REPORT THIS UNDER 10CRF21. GE-NE HAS NOT SUPPLIED THIS VALVE TO ANY OTHER '
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TO DATE.
i 9511030028 951101 DR ADOCK05000g3 l
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i l I
i November 1,1995 i
9546nrc. doc MFN-#248-95 Document Control Desk j ll Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
10CFR Part 21, Reportable Condition, improper Valve Packing Bushing 7
Material '
This letter is to inform the NRC of a reportable defect per 10 CFR Part 21, as reported to I
! Mr. Joe Sebrosky the duty officer in the NRC's emergency operations center by !
. N.C. Shirley for M.A. Smith, Manager, Safety Evaluations Project, on October November 1,1995.
GE Nuclear Energy (GE-NE) bought from Ring-O valve spa of Italy, and provided to the 130ston Edison Company Pilgrim Plant, four gate valves intended for safety related j applications (two in the HPCI system and two in the RWCU system). As part of the valve ,
delivery improper vale packing bushings were supplied which contained Babbitt, a lead bearing alloy which is known to cause embritdement in stainless steel. This did not meet the GE-NE valve specification. The improper bushing material was identified during the i installation period, and the bushings were replaced with bushings containing an
- acceptable material. The valves were not yet placed into nuclear service at the time of discovery. GE NE has evaluated the cafety significance of the improper bushing material
- in all four valves and has concluded 1 hat, for the valves in the HPCI system, a significant safety concern did not exist. Howevgr, GE NE Engineering has not been able to conclusively rule out the possibility that the potential consequencesof having this material in service in the RWCU systkm would not result in a substantial safety concern,
] and has therefore elected to report tbis under 10CFR21. GE-NE has not supplied this valve to any other nuclear power plant to date. Ringo Valve spa ofItaly has implemented internal measures to assure strict compliance with GE-NE specifications requirements in all future orders of ! hese valves.
Very truly yours, M. A. Smith, Manager Safety Evaluations ProjectQ 3 0 0 2 ] ,
M/t 187, (408) 925-10]9
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Attachment cc: G. C. Cwalina (NRC-NRR/ DISP / PSIB)
C. R. Shockley (GE-NE)
PRC File 1
1 l
l l
t ATTACHMENT ,
REPORTABLE CONDITION (i) Name and address of the indisidualinforming the Commission:
M.A. Smith, Manager, Safety Evaluations Project, GE Nuclear Energy,175 Curtner i
Avenuc, SanJose, CA 95125 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such ;
facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains defect: ;
GE-NE supplied two gate valve s, designed and manufactured by Ring-O Valve spa ofItaly, to the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. These valves were intended to function as inboard and outboard containment isolation valves in the Reactor j Water Cleanup (RWCU) syste n effluent line.
(iii) Identification of the firm cons tructing the facility or supplying the basic componentwhich fails to con 1 ply or contains the defect:
GE Nuclear Energy, SanJose, California (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
The RWCU inboard and outboard containmentisolation valves are normally open and are closed upon receipt o'f an isolation signal to conserve reactor coolant and to isolate the containment to .:ontrol release of radioactivity to the atmosphere.
The GE valve specification required that non-metallic materials comply with trace material control requirement; and also requires the bushings, which are in contact with the valve stem, to be made of graphite. The valves were supplied with bushings made of Babbitt Graphalloy, which is a 50% graphite matrix that is impregnated with roughly 50% Babbitt, a lead bearing alloy. The Graphalloy bushing is a 50% graphite mttrix that is impregnated with roughly 50% Babbitt, a lead bearing alloy. This Lead alloy has a melting temperature of approximately ;
400 *F, whereas the actual setvice l temperature is expected to be close to 550 *F.
Under thse conditions the l ead alloy could attack the grain boundaries of the neighboring ferrous parts and result in embrittlement and cracking, For a normally open valve, the valve disc is continually buffeted by flow induced vibration. Since the stem is chnnected to the disc, the stem is also afTected by this ,
vibration. Should an embri}tled stem crack, the crevice would become a stress ;
concentration point. Such drevice could propagate under continuous vibration, t
C# M A')M7M7 NtiTrinM 7c) LJH94 : / A e{ TA Any
l and the stem could fracture due to fatigue cycles. The valve stem connects the valve actuator to the disc. If the stem is fractured, the actuator would no longer be j capable of either opening or closing the disc. The disc would begin to drop into :
the flow stream, however it might not fall to the fully closed position as the !
differential pressure across tbe disc might induce a friction force that is greater than the weight of the disc.
l Since a partially closed disc might not reduce the flow through rA e vaive by a noticeable, amount a fractured stem might not be detected under normal plant operation. Although this sequence of events is highly unlikely, especially with the i existing leak detection system sensitivity and the low probability of the RWCU pipe break, a decision was still mac e to report this under 10CFR21.
(v) Date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
October XXXX 1995 I
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to comply, the number and locations off all ! uch components in use at, supplied for, or being j supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this l l
part:
Pilgrim Nuclear Plant (vii) The corrective action which lias been,is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:
Upon discovery of the incorrect bushing material installation, Ring-O Valve spa supplied replacement Nickel Graphalloy bushings; these were approved and installed by GE-NE prior to placing the valves into nuclear service. In additon, Ring-O Valve spa of Italy has impicmented a policy to identify specific and detailed ordering data includjng a " Nuclear Plant Application" statement incorporating media and design temperature and pressure information for parts ordered for application and dse in valves being supplied for use in nuclear plant applications. l (viii) Any advice related to the defqct or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been,is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensecs:
Since the subject valves were ordered solely for the Pilgrim Station, and since Ring-O Valve spa of Italy has changed their ordering policy, there is no planned communication to otherlicensees.
l S/S'd A933N3 80313rN 39 LJe95:40 S6, 10 AON