ML20094B818
| ML20094B818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1984 |
| From: | Hukill H GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 5211-84-2192, NUDOCS 8408070238 | |
| Download: ML20094B818 (9) | |
Text
F 4
GPU Nuclear Corporation Nggigf Post Office Box 480 Route 441 South Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 64 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
August 2, 1984 5 '>.11-8 4-219 2 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: John F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stolz:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I, (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Supplement to Technical Specification Change Request No. 135, Rev.1 The attached analysis provides supplemental justification for Technical Specification Change Request No. 135 Rev. 1 (GPUN letter 5211-84-2175, July 11,1984) as discussed with C. Nichols and D. DiIanni of your staff. This analysis is consistent with and provides further details of the safety evaluation provided with TSCR 135 Rev. 1, and demonstrates the explosion resistance of the TMI-1 Waste Gas Holdup System under worst case conditions.
Sincerely,
. D.
- tkill, 8408070238 840802 Director, TMI-1 PDR ADOCK 05000209 P
PDR l
Enclosure cc:
J. Van Vliet D. Dilanni T.'Gerusky J. H. Kopp J. E. Minnich
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The explosion resistance of the TMI-1 WGHS is based upon the magnitude of
- the pressure pulse resulting from ignition of worst case H / air mixtures 2
regardless of whether detonation or deflagration occurs. The pressure pulse o
is defined in terms of.the multiplication factor F where:
p = Pmax P
where P is the pressure of the system in psia before ignition of a H / air 2
mixture and Pmax is the-maximum pressure resulting from the ignition event.
- The experimental data ~(see Table 1. Table 2 and Table 3) show that F = Pmax
=5 P
is.a conservative value for the worst case waste gas system H /afr 2
mixtures. Furthermore these data are consistent with the theoretically derived (NUREG/CR-2726, section 2.3.2, figure 2-10; EPRI/NP-2955, section 5,
- page 5-9 and 5-10, figure 5-21) combustion Pmax/P factors where the lower, relative.to theory, experimental values are due to heat loss which is not taken into account in the theoretical treatment. The experimental data and theoritical comparison in Figure 2-19 of NUREG/CR 2726, Figure 1.2-1 of EPRI/NP-3476 and Figure 5-21 of EPRI/NP-2955 substantiate this approach.
Considering the extent of conservatism and consistency of the experimental
- data with theory, the use of 5.0 for the worst case of H2 % -level mixtures
- feasible is deemed appropriate for the waste gas system tank analysis.
Two worst case scenarios, for introducing H2 into the waste gas system, are addressed as follows:
1)-LH2 degassing of water transferred to tanks venting to the waste gas system L
-2)
H2 venting of the makeup tank to the waste gas decay. tank
-The'.fc11owing analysis was used to determine the highest H2 content in air
>rixture possible for these scenarios:
I.
.H2 via degassing
-The quantity (V ) of H2 resulting from transferring 11050 ft3 d
(i.e. the equivalent of one reactor coolant bleed tank water volume) of reactor coolant water at 70 F containing 40 scc /kg of dissolved H2 is:
Vd ='40 sec/kg X 0.001 kg/g X.998 g/cc X 11050 ft3
'C
= 441 scf Now the minimum gas volume of the waste gas system upstream of the
. compressors is_3806 ft3 therefore the resultant H2 concentration would be 441 scf x -100 = 11.6%
.3806 ftJ DOC ID 0048u
r:
7, II..H2 via Makeup Tank Venting The quantity (Vu) of H2 resulting from venting the makeup tank
.to the decay tank is-cqmprised of H2 from changing the makeup tank-gas space (205 ftJ) pressure from 35 to 18 psig (V ):
2 P1 Vi=P2 V2 (35-18) 205 = 14.7 V2 V2 = 237 scf
-and H2se i
(Vd ) of the water in the makeup tank
.'(395 ft ) gass ngdue to the 35 to 18 psig pressure change (i.e.
d dissolved H2 content will go from 38.5 sec/kg at 35 psig to 20.0
- scc /kg at 18 psig):
~
Vd =;(38.5 - 20.0) sec/kg X 0.001 kg/g X.998 g/cc X 395 ft3
= 7 scf so-Vu " V2+Vd = 237 + 7 = 244 scf The highest-H2 concentration would result for transfer of this 244 scf of H2 to a decay tank containing air at 0 psig (1125 ft3 of air):
244 244 X'100 = 17.8%
1125 + 244 1369
'Although 17.8% is the highest H2 concentration achievable, this would not present the worst case combustion effects. The pressure pulse is the product of the multiplication factor'and the initial operating pressure. The highest operating pressure achievable in a decay tank with a combustible H2 mixture (5%) containing 244 scf of H is:
2 14.7(1369 X 17.8 )= P (1125) 5.0 P = 63.7 psia-(basis of ** in Table 3)
~ The hoop stress equation used for the present tank analysis is
.PFD 2t DOC ID 0048u
y_
where o is the stress in psia P is the tank pressure prior to ignition in psia F is the pressure pulse factor equal to Pmax/P D is the component diameter in inches t is the tank wall thickness in inches In order to demonstrate the combustion pressure pulse capabilities of the tanks and pipes, rearrange this equation to analyze for Fu (pressure pulse factor which will result in a stress equal to the materials ultimate stress value)
Fu "
PD which can then be compared to the F=5.0 value. Table 4 shows the equation parameters and resultant analysis. Clearly the tanks and pipes will survive combustion pressure pulses of H / air mixture having the above stated worst 2
case H2 contents.
As stated in the safety evaluation for TSCR 135 Rev. 1, the largest feasible volumes of hydrogen were assumed to be introduced into the waste gas system for both types of transfer. Three key conservative assumptions were made:
'100% air, instead of the operationally realistic nitrogen, is taken as the dilutent gas; no credit is taken for pressure relief via safety devices which is not realistic for the type conditions found for the worst cases in the analysis and no credit is given for corrective action which would normally occur as a result of the H /02 alarm set points. This analysis 2
demonstrates that the existing system design and the proposed specification (TSCR 135 Rev 1) assure an equivalent level of protection against the release of radiation from the TMI-1 WGHS as the existing technical specifications.
DOC ID 0048u
=_
~
TABLE 1 from Table D-1 (page D-6) EPRI Report: Hydrogen Combustion and Control
- Studies in Intermediate Scale, EPRI NP-2953, Final Report, June 1983 H2 % Vol Pi (psia)
Pmax(psia)
Pmax/Pt 5
18.4 26.5 1.4 7.5 19.0 53.2 2.8 10.7 21.2 68.7 3.2 10.7 20.2 69.0 3.4 7.5 19.1 59.3 3.1 7.5 19.4 58.7 3.0 7.5 20.7 52.3 2.5 10.7 20.9 69.0 3.3 test vessel length
= 17' = 2.4
~7 test vessel diameter 7
DOC ID 0048u L
r TABLE 2 i
From Table 2 (page.30) of L. W. Carlson, R. M. Knight and J. O. Henrie, Flame and Detonation Initiation and Propagation in Various Hydrogen - Air Mixtures, with and without Water Spray, Atomics International Report AI-73-29, May 11, 1973 H2 % Vol Pi (psia)
Pmax (psia)
Pmax/Pj 12 14.7 28.9 2.0 12 22.0 54 2.5 12 29.4 64 2.2 16 14.7 48.8 3.3 16 22.0 70 3.2 16 29.4 85 2.9 11 13.8 18.2 1.3 test vessel length
= 40'
= 30 test vessel diameter 1.3' DOC ID 0048u
p TABLE 3 From Table 5-1 (page 5-18) and 5-2 (page 5-20) EPRI Report: Intermediate-Scale Combustion-Studies of Hydrogen-Air-Steam Mixtures, EPRI NP-2955, Final Report, June 1984 H2 % Vol Pi (psia)
Pmax(psia)
Pmax/P1 5'
14.2 16.1 1.13 5.5 14.2 17.7 1.25 5
14.2 15.7 1.11 5
14.2 15.4 1.09 5
14.2 15.2 1.07 6
14.2 18.1 1.28 5.5 14.2 29.4 2.07 7
14.2 32.3 2.28 7-14.2 37.6 2.65 6.2 14.2 21.0 1.48 6
14.2 26.8 1.89 6
14.2 23.6 1.66 8
14.2 35.4 2.49 8
14.2 32.5 2.29 8
14.2 19.7 1.39 8
14.2 41.3 2.91
'7 14.2 30.2 2.13 7
14.2 20.7 1.46 7
14.2 34.8 2.45 10-14.2 45.4 3.20 14 14.2 56.3 3.96 11 14.2 46.8 3.30 8
14.2 40.3 2.84 8.5 14.2 37.0 2.61 7
14.2 35.2 2.48 5.7 14.2 25.1 1.77 8.4 14.2 39.6 2.79 10 14.2 51.9 3.65 5
14.2 15.7 1.11 6
14.2 39.6 2.79 8.5 14.2 37.0 2.61 8.5 14.2 47.9 3.37 7.5 14.2 17.1 1.20 5.5 14.2 17.0 1.20 15.0 14.2 58.1 4.09 20.0 14.2 70.8 4.99 10.0 14.2 45.4 3.20 11.0 14.2 45.5 3.20 DOC ID 0048u
r1
~
-TABLE 3 Cont'd 10.0 14.2 37.3 2.63 10.0 14.2 35.7 2.51 10.0 14.2 30.5 2.15
- 16.0 14.2 56.7 3.99 21.0 14.2 60.8 4.28 15.6-114.2 51.2 3.61 20.0 14.2 70.2 4.94 22.2 14.2 57.7 4.06 10.0 14.2 44.7 3.15 1
[,
Y DOC ID 0048u
~
.+
TABLE 4 WASTE GAS SYSTEM MAJOR COMP 0NENT ANALYSIS d(in)
L (in) t (in) c.,(psia) P (psia)
Fu Misc. Waste
'~
Storage Tanks 165.75 286.5 0.375 75,000 16.5*
20.6
- RC Bleed Tanks 240.8 540.63 0.40 75,000 16.5*
15.1 Delay Tank 96 136 0.375 55,000 16.5*
26.0 Decay Tank 120 212.75 0.813 55,000 63.7**
11.7 94.7***
7.87 1.61(11/2")
.145 70,000 16.5*
764 Schedule 40 3.068(3")
.216 70,000 16.5*
597 carbon steel pipe
' Schedule 40 1.61(1 1/2")
.145 75,000 94.7***
143 SS. steel pipe
- compressor operation initiated at this pressure, is the basis for this prior to ignition pressure
- highest combustible mixture pressure resulting from makeup tank venting
- - operational -limit for tank pressurization DOC ID 0048u
-