ML20093P074
| ML20093P074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1984 |
| From: | Humphreys L, Laney R, Witzig W GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20093P064 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8411060121 | |
| Download: ML20093P074 (8) | |
Text
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4 NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE REPORT NO. 1 to the GPU NUCLEAR BOARD OF DIRECTORS October 15, 1984 b'
APPROVE 8 %/
R. V.
Laney f.
.,a L. L. Humphreys V
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CONTENTS I.
SUMMARY
II.
TMI-l A.
Root Causes of February 29, 1984 NRC Notice of Violation B.
TMI-1/TMI-2 Interactions in Emergency Plans and Procedures C.
Training D.
Operations III.
OYSTER CREEK A.
Operator Requalification Training Program B.
Operations C.
Maintenance i
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I.
SUMMARY
Committee activities between the date of its formation, February 23, 1984, and the present were conducted in two
. phases.
During Phase I a staff was interviewed and hired through contract with the NUS Corporation, and a plan of activities was developed.
A seven-man staff, reporting to the Committee, is now functioning at the TMI-l and Oyster Creek stations.
In Phase II, beginning July 1, the Committee began overviews of training, operations, and maintenance.
Special evaluations were conducted of events leading to the NRC's February 29, 1984 Notice of Violation at TMI-1; possible impact of TMI-2 on TMI-1 under emergency conditions; and procedures for readiness to restart at TMI-1 and Oyster Creek.
The results of these evaluations are discussed in this report.
In the course of its evaluations the Committee made several observations which are also reported herein for use by GPU Nuclear management.
The Committee and staff observed no non-compliances.
Safety attitudes and practices are satisfactory. - -
4 II.
TMI-l A.
Root Causes of February 29, 1984 NRC Notice of Violation at TMI-l The Committee was interested in two technical specifica-4 tion violations related to maintaining containment integrity:
(1) a non-automatic containment isolation valve (IA-V20) was not closed; and (2) another~ non-automatic containment isola-tion valve (FS-V405) was not closed and the open-ended con-nection downstream was not capped.
An earlier check of con-tainment integrity had erroneously indicated these valves to be closed as required.
i i
The March 30 response by GPU Nuclear to the Notice of i
Violation attributes the valve problems to personnel error.
Neither the operator nor the engineer who checked valve IA-V20 recognized that the backed-out stem bushing nut was blocking complete closure.
In the case of FS-V405, the op-erator did not properly reclose the valve and install its
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cap following local leak rate testing.
l The Committee agrees with management's finding of per-7 sonnel error.
The Committee. also agrees with the remedial actions, including increased emphasis on procedure adher-ence and changes in the Containment Integrity Checklist to require an examination for obstructions that could prevent full closure.
We note that, after the problem was discovered, twenty days passed before repairs to IA-V20 were completed.
This time appears too long; the Committee therefore recom-mends a review of repair priorities used for safety related components.
Despite the failures noted above, in each case a second-ary boundary valve was closed and no actual physical violation of containment occurred.
B.
TMI-1/TMI-2 Interactions in Emergency Plans and Procedures The Committee conducted an overview of TMI-1/TMI-2 in-teractions to determine if emergency plans and procedures adequately provide for the safety of Unit 1 in the event of t !
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an incident at Unit 2, and to review physical interties be-tween Unit 1 and Unit 2 to determine if any of them might pose a threat to Unit 1.
The Committee finds that Emergency Plans and Procedures are adequate for handling emergencies within each unit's domain.
Numerous emergency exercises have demonstrated that the procedures of each unit are understood and implemented.
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The Committee notes that the Unit 1 Control Room is desig-nated as the backup Technical Support Center for Unit 2.
We believe that this designation is questionable and should t
be reviewed by management.
A review of physical interties between Unit 1 and Unit 2 reveals that there are several liquid radwaste valves which must be maintained closed in order to assure plant-to-plant separation.
Surveillance procedures for verifying these valve positions -- visual check for pulled fuses and L
disconnection of actuating air lines -- are inconclusive in that they do not confirm actual valve positions.
The Committee concludes that the valve designs preclude obtain-ing positive assurance of valve closure.
We therefore recom-mend that management consider some means of positive separa-tion, for instance by blank flanges or removable spool pieces.
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C.
TMI-l Training During the week of September 10,.1984, the Committee staff conducted an overview of TMI-l operator training pro-i grams, including simulator activities.
The programs were l
found to be competent and thorough.
There were no observa-tions of safety significance.
Training evaluation continues, with focus on safety and compliance.
D.
TMI-l Operations l
The Committee's operations overview concentrated on assessment of safety attitudes and procedure compliance in i
I operations and on readiness for restart.
Initial observa-tions indicate that the operations staff conducts itself in o
a professional manner and shows a positive attitude toward safe operation and adherence to procedures.
Daily planning meetings were observed to be brief and efficiently con-ducted.
Excellent plant cleanliness is another positive indicator of a sound operating approach.
The Committee staff evaluated the TMI-l Readiness to Restart Program, focusing on adequacy of program coverage and the process of execution.
No safety or ccmpliance is-sues were identified.
The process provides reasonable assurance that prerequisites will be identified and com-pleted.
The Committee believes that preparations for restart are satisfactory.
Operations evaluation continues with particular atten-tion to safety and compliance.
9 I
e,
O III.
OYSTER CREEK A.
Oyster Creek Operator Requalification Training Program The Committee and its staff conducted an overview of the licensed operator requalification program to assess improvements being made.
We note that both immediate and long-term action plans are underway to strengthen the re-qualification program.
The immediate need has been met by implementing an Accelerated Requalification Program, reexam-ination, and oral boards for those individuals who had prob-lems on earlier requalification examinations.
These efforts have been successful in all applicable cases.
There is a commitment to provide training review mater-ial on plant systems, procedures, nuclear theory, thermal hydraulics, heat transfer, and fluid flow for future requal-ification programs.
Requalification training of all licensed reactor operators has been raised to the highest priority by Plant Operations.
The Committee and its staff observed no items of non-compliance or safety significance.
The Committee notes that the current five shift rota-tion makes it difficult to complete all training require-ments.
We endorse the management's plan to implement six shift rotation.
B.
Oyster Creek Operations The Committee and its staff have made a preliminary assessment of compliance with safety procedures and safety attitudes in the Operations Department, and have evaluated the Restart Certification Program.
Adherence to safety procedures by operators is observed to be satisfactory.
Knowledge and professionalism are evid-ent.
No non-compliances or safety related observations were made.
-s-l
The Restart Certification Program is comprehensive in scope, with appropriate attention being accorded those areas of plant operation which are related to restart.
The member-ship of the Restart Readiness Committee includes all essen-tial areas of management and technical expertise.
Operations evaluation continues with focus on safety and compliance.
C.
Oyster Creek Maintenance The Committee and its staff have made a preliminary overview of maintenance activities.
We found no non-compliances and have no safety related observations.
In the course of this review we find that the present Important to Safety (ITS) list, which designates ITS sys-tems without further breakdown, is inadequate to support efficient maintenance activities.
Its use may lead to in-consistent or incorrect classifications.
The Committee endorses present activities to prepare and implement a component level ITS data base plan for Oyster Creek and TMI-1.
Review of procedures concerning post maintenance test-ing indicates that they do not consistently specify if a test is or is not required after maintenance.
As a conse-quence, the decision to test is left to the discretion of the supervisor after maintenance is completed.
It is sug-gested that Oyster Creek management review this matter.
Maintenance overview for safety and compliance continues. -.
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