ML20093J576

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Forwards Draft FSAR Pages,Expanding Discussion of Conformance to Reg Guide 1.118 & Reflecting Guidance of IE Info Notice 84-37 Re Use of Lifted Leads & Jumpers During Maint or Surveillance Testing
ML20093J576
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/25/1984
From: Kemper J
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
IEIN-84-37, OL, NUDOCS 8407300189
Download: ML20093J576 (6)


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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 JOHNS.KEMPER JUL 2 51984 v,m..'""'

$neensa seene ano massanC66 Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Docket Nos.:

50-352 Licensing Branch No. 2 50-353 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Camlission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Use 6f Lifted Leads and Jumpers durina Maintenance or Surveillance Terti%

Refarence:

IE Information Notice No. 84-37

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File:

GOVf 1-1 (NRC)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

The reference IE Notice provided guidance on the use of lifted leads and junpers during maintenance or surveillance testing.

The attached draft FSAR pages ermnd the discussion of Limerick's conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.118, and reflect the guidance of

-IEN 84-37. These draft FSAR pages will be incorporated into the FSAR via Revision 35 which will be submitted in August, 1984.

Sincerely, DFC/gra/07198403 cc: See Attached Service List 99l 8407300189 840725

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gDRADOCK 05000352

/

PDR k.-

s

.9' cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/ enclosure)

Judge Richard F. Cole-(w/ enclosure)

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq..

(w/ enclosure)

Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Robert L. Anthony (w/ enclosure)

Charles W. Elliot, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Zori G. Ferkin, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/ enclosure)

Director, Penna. Emergency (w/ enclosure)

Management Agency Angus R, Love, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

David Wersan Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Spence W. Perry, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Jay M. Gutierrez, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Atomic Safety & Licensing (w/ enclosure)

Appeal Board Atomic Safety & Licensing (w/ enclosure)

Board Panel Docket & Service Section (w/ enclosure)

Martha W. Bush, Esq.

(w/ enclosure)

Mr. James Wiggins (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Timothy R. S. Campbell (w/ enclosure)

Ms. Phyllis Zitzer (w/ enclosure)

Judge Peter A. Morris (w/ enclosure)

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lsk 4 LGS FSAR OUESTION 421.36 I""9)

The FSAR information which discusses conformance to Regulatory Guide 1.118 and IEEE 338 is insufficient.

Further discussion is required.

As a minimum, provide the following information:

a)

Section 7.1.2.5.26 of the FSAR states that the removal of i

fuses and other equipment not hard-wired into the protection system will be used only for the purpose of deactivating I&C circuits.

Identify where procedures require such operation.

Provide further discussion to describe how the Limerick procedures for the protection systems conform to Regulatory l

Guide 1.118 (Rev. 1) Position C.6 guidelines.

Identify and provide justification for any exceptions.

b)

Discuss response time testing, including sensors, for the NSSS and BOP supplied instruments and systems in relation to the guidance provided in R.G.

1.118 and IEEE 338, Section 6.3.4.

Include in your discussion the effects of thermo wells, restrictions', orifices, or other interfaces with the process variable and the sensor or instrument in relation to the overall response.

c)

Provide examples and descriptions of typical response time tests for RPS and ESF systems.

DRAFT

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Evaluation of the systems to be surveillance tested has determined that the actions required will include opening of circuit breakers.

This action is required in a limited number of The circuit breakers will be opened during monthly cases.

testing but will also bring up an out-of-service alarm that will not clear with the breaker open.

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  • LJed Sensor response time testing for pressure and differential pressure (level) sensors for the reactor protection system will be performed using a precise hydraulic pressure signal as the i

input.

Response of the sensor output and the-final actuation device will be measured.

Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing; response time will be measured from the input of the first electronic component in the channel.

Except for the MSIVs, individual sensor response times and logic system response times are not required for isolation systems because the signal delay (sensor-response) is concurrent with the 13-second diesel startup.

(Refer to GE Standard Technical Specification 3/4.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation) 421.36-1 Rev. 23, 08/83

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2" DRAFT su m LGS FSAR Examples of typical time tests for RPS and ESF systems cannot be provided because no response time procedures are written at this time.

INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION This specification ensures the effectiveness of the instrumenta' tion used to mitigate the consequences of accidents by prescribing the operability trip setpoints and response times for isolation of the reactor systems.

When necessary, one channel may be inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required surveillance.

Some of the trip settings may have tolerances explicitly stated where both the high and low values are critical and may have a. substantial effect on safety.

The setpoints of other instrumentation, where only the high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the system involved.

Except for the MSIVs,'the safety analysis does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected.

For de operated valves, a 3-second delay is assumed before the valve starts to move.

For ac operated valves, it is assumed that the ac power supply is lost and is' restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators.

In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve starts.to move.

In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the de operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay (sensor response) is concurrent with the 13-second diesel startup.

The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in each case, which in turn determines the valve speed in conjunction with the 13-second delay.

It follows that checking the valve speede and the 13-second time for emargency power establishment will establish the response time for the isolation functions.

However, to enhance overall system reliability and to monitor instrument channel j

response time trends, the isolation actuation instrumentation response time shall be measured and recorded as a part of the I

j isolation system response time.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control.

This specification provides the operability requirements, trip setpoints, and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection.

Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more than one system at the same time.

1 Rev. 23, 08/83 421.36 2

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