ML20093D403
| ML20093D403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/1984 |
| From: | Foster D GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-84-476-000 GN-421, PT21-84-476, PT21-84-476-000, NUDOCS 8410110232 | |
| Download: ML20093D403 (5) | |
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- Georg:a Power Company 4
Route 2 Box 299A
' Waynesboro; Georgia 30830 Telephone 404 554 9961. Ext. 3360 404 724-8114, Est,3360 A
- o. o. roste,
$e'n*e$I*Ia*nIg*e September 19, 1984 the sout"em elecmc system Vogtle Project United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement File:
- Region _II - Suite 3100 Log:
GN-421 101 Marietta Street
. Atlanta, Georgia 30302
Reference:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2, 50-424, 50-425;
' Pullman Construction Industries - Duct Support Shop Welds; Also GN-405 dated August 24, 1984.
~ Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly On June 14, 1984, Mr. R. E. Folker of Georgia Power Company notified Mr.
V.
Panciera of the USNRC of a potentially reportable _ deficiency concerning partial penetration welds in some HVAC duct supports where
-full penetration welds were. required by design.
In our letter GN-408 dated August 24, 1984,' Georgia Power Company indicated that the NRC would be notified of the results of our evaluation of this concern
'by September 21, 1984.
Georgia Power Company has concluded its evalua-tion and determined that a reportable condition could exist based on the reporting criteria of Parts 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21.
Based upon NRC guidance in NUREG-0302, Revision 1, and other NRC correspo"dence regarding duplicate reporting of significant deficiencies and substantial safety hazards, Georgia Power Company is reporting this event as a significant deficiency pursuant to the requirements of Part 10 CFR 50.55(e).
A summary of our evaluation is attached for your information.
This' letter contains no proprietary infonnation and may be' placed in the NRC's Public Document Room upon receipt.
Yours truly,
- 8. M D. O. Foster '"*
REF/D0F/tdm xc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk R. J. Kelly -
D. E. Dutton J. A. Bailey L. T. Gucwa R. E. Conway W. F. Sanders
- 0. Batum M. Malcom G. F. Head R. H. Pinson H. H. Gregory G. Bockhold J. T.'Beckham B. M. Guthrie W. T. Nickerson P. D. Rice R. A. Thomas E. D. Groover J. L. Vota C. S. McCall C. E. Belflower 8410110232 840919 gDRADOCK05000
.(
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s EVALUATION FOR A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD EVALUATION FOR A SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY Duct Support Shop Welds Initial Report:
On June 14, 1984, Mr.
R.
E.
Folker of Georgia Power Company reported a potentially significant deficiency to Mr.
V.
Panciera of the USNRC concerning the lack of full penetration welds on some HVAC duct supports.
In a subsequent letter, Georgia Power Company indicated that the USNRC would be informed of the results of the evaluation of this subject by September 21, 1984.
The duct supports were fabricated by Pullman Con-struction Industries (PCI).
Background Information:
The basic component is a rigid frame used for the support of HVAC ducts or dampers.
The frame consists of steel tube sections with material joints at the corners that are joined with full or partial penetration welds.
Failure of these supports could lead to the subsequent failure of portions of the safety-related HVAC system.
This condition was discovered during a Pullman /Kenith-Fortson (P/K-F) modification of a HVAC duct support.
The P/K-F construction personnel discovered that only partial penetration welds had been made for a joint specified on the design drawing as a full penetration weld.
The tube joint identified was a single-bevel, full penetration weld, with the intersection centerline of the tube steel piece at 135.
Similar
- discrepancies were found in support welds with intersection centerlines at 90.
Engineering Evaluation:
In order to determine the extent of the welding discrepancies, seven supports with the mitered tube steel joints were selected from the storage yard.
Ultrasonic tests were performed to determine if the referenced welds were full penetration.
These tests could indicate the existence of a full penetration weld; however, all seven supports had welds that exhibited areas of incomplete penetration.
One of the seven supports was subsequently cross-sectioned and exhibited approximately 50% penetra-tion.
It was concluded that there was not a reliable method of nondes-tructively determining the effective throat of the weld in question.
The eleven installed supports will be removed and replaced.
In addition, the supports which had not been installed will not be utilized.
In order to evaluate the safety implications of the lack of full weld penetration, the engineering drawings were reviewed and a list of fabri-cated HVAC supports with similar joint configurations was compiled (see
Duct Support Shop Welds Page Two Tabl e. 1).
It was determined that a limited number (11) of supports were installed with the questionable weld penetration.
It was also determined that 30 supports were to use this joint configuration.
Since the destructive examinations indicated that the amount of partial penetration could not be reliably determined, a conservative assumption was made that the partial penetration welds would fail during an assumed operating basis earthquake or other event.
This assumed failure mode could have resulted in the control room emergency ventilation air condi-tioning system and other portions of this essential HVAC system not being available to perform their safety-related function as discussed in the Final Safety Analysis Report.
Review of QA Program:
A full-scope audit of the Pullman Construction Industries quality assurance program was conducted by Bechtel Power Corporation's Procurement Supplier Quality Department on August 22-24, 1984.
The audit concluded that a significant quality program breakdown had not occurred.
==
Conclusion:==
If these weld discrepancies had not been corrected, the potential failure of safety-related HVAC systems and components requiring the operation of these systems could have occurred and could have adversely affected the future safe operation of the plant.
It has also been concluded that these discrepancies in the construction of a structure and system will require extensive redesign and repair to meet the criteria and bases stated in the safety analysis report.
These discrepancies could also represent a substantial safety hazard due to the possibility of major degradation of essential safety-related equipment such that a required safety function could not be performed.
Based. upon NRC guidance in NUREG-0302, Revision 1 and other correspon-dence, Georgia Power Company is reporting this condition under the reporting requirements of Part 10 CFR 50.55(e).
[
Corrective Action:
(1)
The PCI shop procedure will be revised to assure proper fit-up and application of backup bars.
(2)
A Bechtel Power Corporation welding engineer and a supplier quality representative will assist in the preparation of a physical standard for acceptance.
The physical standard will be used to assure compliance with the design drawings and purchase specification requirements.
Fit-up and welding of the physical standard will be checked by the sectioning of the modt.1 to verify full weld penetration.
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.t Duct Support Shop Welds
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(3)
Three. supports were refabricated on site to facilitate the turnover b'ttery. room from Construction to Operations.
These J
.. of the a
f supports will be examined using NDE methods approved by AWS. to assure full penetration welds were obtained.
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TABLE 1
,HVAC SUPPORTS WITH SIMILAR JOINT CONFIGURATIONS AND AFFECTED SYSTEMS Support System No.
No.
Title Installed DS-All 2103-240 1531 Control Building Control Room HVAC No 0S-2118116-183 1533 Control Building Levels A, B,1 & 2 Normal HVAC No DS-2111107-65 1 531 Control Building Control Room HVAC No 0S-211B116-189 1533 Control Building Levels A, B,1 & 2 Normal HVAC No DS-All 2104-194 1537 Control Building Locker & Toilet Exhaust Yes
'DS-Alll107-63 1531 Control Building Control Room HVAC No DS-A081106-40 1551 Auxiliary Building Outside Air Supply & Normal HVAC No DS-All4115-31 1533 Control Building Levels A, B,1 & 2 Normal HVAC Yes DS-All4115-13 1 531 Control Building Control Room HVAC Yes DS-All4115-81 1531 Control Building Control Room HVAC Yes DS-A081106-41 1551 Auxiliary Building Outside Air Supply & Normal HVAC No DS-211 A102-148 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC Yes
. DS-211 A102-139 1539 Control Buildir.] Cable Spreading Room HVAC Yes DS-211 A102-126 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC' Yes DS-211 A102-121 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC Yes DS-211 A102-110 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC Yes DS-211 A102-109 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC Yes DS-211 A102-108 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC Yes DS-211 A102-107 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-106 1539 Control Buihing Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-103
-1539 Control Builuing Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-102 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-105 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-104 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No
- DS-211 A102-36 1 539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-35 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No DS-211 A102-34 1539 Control Building Cable Spreading Room HVAC No
- DS-2118103-256 1533 Control Building Levels A, B,1 & 2 Normal HVAC No DS-All 2119-57 1537 Control Building Locker & Toilet Exhaust No DS All2119-41 1533 Control Building Levels A, B,1 & 2 Normal HVAC No
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