ML20092P264

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Final Significant Deficiency Rept SD-54 Re Potential Hardware Interference W/Itt Grinnell Sway Struts.Initially Reported on 840316.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)
ML20092P264
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/13/1984
From: Counsil W
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To: Murley T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
F0516A, F156A, F516A, SD-54, NUDOCS 8407060119
Download: ML20092P264 (2)


Text

.

General Offices

9 H'ARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 ms

'7s a cowa=v

    • '.ou **'woa" coa" (203) 666-6911 o.

. m.,o a ec- '

g esoATHEast saucLf an gaetmov Consraerv April 13,1984 Docket No. 50-423 F0516A Dr. Thomas E. Murley Regional Administrator Region i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Dr. Murley:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Reporting of Potential Significant Deficiencies in Design and Construction:

Potential Hardware Interference with ITT Grinnell Sway Struts (SD-54)

In a March 16, 1984 telephone conversation between your Mr. T. Rebelowski and our Mr. R. E. Lefebvre, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) reported a potential significant deficiency in the construction of Millstone Unit No. 3 as required by 10CFR50.55(e).

The potential significant deficiency involves interference with sway strut hardware manufactured by ITT Grinnell Corpocation. The five degree cone of action required between the strut and rear bracket was not available due to an interference which only allowed a swing of two degrees from normal.

A field inspection indicated that the interference was due to a bent ear of the rear bracket in conjunction with a bent end of the sway strut rather than an oversize weld as originally indicated. NNECO has determined that this situation is attributed to construction damage rather than ma..ufacturing or design -

deficiencies.

Therefore, the interference is considered to be an isolated occurrence and the hardware will be replaced through the normal nonconformance and disposition procedure.

An evaluation of the pipe support indicates that the piping movements associated with the support are such that no cone of action is required for support operability. Based on this fact, NNECO concludes that if the situation had gone undetected, the safety function of the Category I system associated with the pipe support would not have been compromised. Therefore, this topic is not considered to be a significant deficiency with respect to 10CFR50.55(e).

8407060119 840413 A'

PDR ADOCK 05000423 i

f[il0 S

PDR

s

  • .s..

We consider this to be our final report closing out all items regarding SD-54. We trust that the above information satisf actorily responds to your concerns.

Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY t,92 W. G. Counsil ~

Senior Vice President cc:

Mr. R. C. DeYoung, Director Division of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Phillips Building 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 4

i P

J r

,w t