ML20092L280
ML20092L280 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | 05000172, 05000176 |
Issue date: | 09/26/1963 |
From: | Wagner H LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORP. |
To: | Case E US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
Shared Package | |
ML20092L085 | List: |
References | |
FOIA-91-233 NUDOCS 9202260228 | |
Download: ML20092L280 (38) | |
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APPENDII A TO '.ICENSE NO. R-85 TECHNICAL TECIFICATIONS FOR THE RADIATION EFFBCTS REACTOR 17 September 1963
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4 A. ErfE
- 1. PHYSICAL !K ATION on a
'Ibe site reactor which isfacility is located nominally in Davson described by the County, parallelsGeorgia,6 340 20.
minutes north latitude and 340 24 minutes north latitude, and the meridans MO OS minutes vest longitude and 840 12 minutes vest lon61tude.
2 DESCRIPTION OF CONTROLIED AREA The reactor is located within the Georgia Nuclear Laboratories, a contmiled area of mughly 10,000 acres. The nearest uncontrol-led areas are the South Perimeter Fence (8240 feet couth), the East Perireter Fence (10020 Fence feet vest . The (9)820 minimtun feet east) distance and to the the No:th West Perirete Peri-meter Fenee is lh265 feet. All land within that area is control-led by the Lockheed Plant Protection, and the nearest routinely occupied above-6round work area is about 8845 reet from the reactor. A chni.n link exclusion fence currounds the reactor Eenerally at a radius of 3600 feet. A cegment of the fence North East of the reactor is slightly closer than 3600 feet.
3 EXCIUSION AREA ACCESS CONTROL Access to the Georgia Nuclear Laboratories and to the gates in the '3600 foot chain link exclusion fence is controlled by Lock-heed Plant Protection. Lockheed Plant Protection patrols the 36 00 foot fence veekly. All personnel who enter or leave the area within the 36 00 foot fence must be identified. The reactor must either be shutdovn or icunersed with at least 4 feet of pool water above the. core center line while personnel are in transit between the operations building and the exclusion fence. Opera-tion of the RER precludes all normal activities above-Eround within the 3 600 foot fence. Personnel may enter the area within the 3600 foot fence when the RER is operating if necessary in connection with specini programs only when closely monitored and controlled by Reactor Operations and Nuclear Safety.
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- 3. BUILDDOS
- 1. REACTm EUILDDC 1
Se reactor building is of conventional constzvetion with steel I-beam coluans and built-up truss work. Biding and roofing are corrugated aluminum. The building is not heated; however, during periods when the ambient temperature is below freezing, the-reactor vill not be raised frca the pool unless beat is provided -
to prevent auxiliary piping (e.g. shield tank plumbing system)-
from freezing. Rodf mounted fans are provided to ventilate the building as necest.ary.
2 OPERATIONS BUILDIN3 The operations building is an underground concrete structure with approximately 2 feet of concre.te and 5 fe'et of earth on the roof to provide shielding. Reactor and experimenta1rrystem controls are located in this building, and during reactor operations, all personnel remain within the operations building except during shift change (see Section A-3) and when it is imperative to per- ,
form certain duties within the pedestrian. tunnel when the reactor is operating. Doors to the operations building are electrically
' locked and controlled free the reactor coneole during reactor operations. A ventilation system is pmvided which maintains.
the operations building at positive pressure differential of at levt:1 inch of water with respect to the atmosphere during reactor operations.
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C. RADIATION MONITORDO
- 1. OM30U8 AND PARTIOUTATE MONITOR Two systems are located insida reactor opentions building. One monitors airborne radioactive gaseous and particulate activity in the reactor operations building batement or main floor exhaust.
The other is capable of sampling air at several locations out-side the operations building at discretion of operator. Normally, exhaust air from reactor building is sampled:
6 Range: 10 to 10 counts / min (both instrumento)'
Gaseous Fensitivity: The system as installed is capable of detecting a gaseous activityjoncentration of 2 9 x 10 ue/ce.
Particulate The system as ihstalled is rensitivity: capable of detecting a particulate activity concen-trationof70x10-9ue/ce.
Alams: Procedurally set at twice back-ground for operation at a given power level. Alam-point is, adjustable frca 10 c/m to 1CF e/m.
Autcentic Devices: Alarm counds and reads out on reactor annunciator panel.
Decicion is then made by reactor shift supervisor and Health Physicist on duty as to required action as dictated by prevailing safety considerations.
Permissives: If the gaseous and particulate systems in the operations build-ing are not operating during reactor operations, the shift Health Physicist vill make periodic surveys for presence of Baseous and airborne parti-culate matter. .
A U
- 2. LICilID MONITOR 9 Grab samples of the primary coolant system acd reactor pool water are collected routinely and analyzed for gross beta gamca-alpha activity. A continuous fission products monitor is located on a bypass to the primary coolant loop which monitors for Iodine.
135. 'If the rate of increase exceeds a factor of tvo (2) in fiftein minutes during level operation, the resetor is shutdown pending detailed investigation as to cause'. In any event, the gross activity of the primary coolant loop vill not exceed 1 x 10-2ue/ce.
3 KlILDING MONIMRC Three camma ionizstion chambers are located in the operations building . There inotruments are the direct readout type. Ennge ic 0.01 mr/hr to 100 cr/F r.
finrme nre nNurtaMe over tbc ant) re ranc.o Sut are proccourauy ret at 7.5 nr 'br lo'r ic el vd 100 nr/Pr hich icvel. A1 Aran are rouMed . t, the henith p'7cs er re'.ctor operationn aren, Pinot Trotection UeM.qunrtere nna the coergency readout room in addi-tion to other administrative arcar. Founding of alarms is an irdiestion of trouble am? ic 1n"erticated by the Fncreeney Org'.ni-stion . One of tc-o inetritacrtr ru-t he oversble for roa.ctnr ope"atM .
h, p t:o w rv>'rTm" <pv" Approxinste loentionn < the renoto ares mor.itorica ryrten etstione, and other irfomation related, thereto, are chown in the table describing the Bemote Area Monitoring rystem etations.
The stations which constitute reactor operating permissives are shown in the table entitled Minimum Remote Area Monitoring
' System,
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REMOTE AREA MOtETGU3G SIS 2'EM STATIONS Neutron &
Distance Direction Oamma Detection Part of Baergency Station Fma From Alazu system RER RER' Functions Range-WasMr _
1 3600' 'S A 1* & 7 0.1 to 10 nr/hr Yes 0.1 to 10# mr/hr Tee 2 3600' SSW A &7 4 h 3600' SW Abl*y.&'N O.1 to 10 ar/hr Yes 6 3600' W' A 1* E 7 0.1 to 10 nr/hr Yes k
7 3600' NNW 7 0.1 to 10 ar/hr Yes A 1*7&N O.1 to 10 mr/hr Tes 8 3kOO' - ENE I 3600' ESE A 1 &7 0.1 to 10 ar/hr Yes 9
13 11,000' W Ab1 &7 0.01 to 10b ar/hr No
.(est) 16 11,000' E Ab1 &7 0.01 to 10 nr/hr No (est) 17 In RER B186 . ---- 7 0.1 to 10 mr/hr Yes k
18 725' .WSW 7 0.1to10^ar/hr No Assuming the vorst background conditions, with the RER operating at 3 Mj's the =1nt== ,
chan6e in the amount of A-41 that is practical to interpret is 3 7 x 10 ue/ccorair.
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KDG}UM RINOTE ARZA MONITORD90 BIST1H Capability Backup BaBic Argon Gama Neutrons m ,g,nn ntation x 9 1
x x 6, 13 2-4 x 8 l-x Passive 7 Dosimetry x x 7,'16, 8_
Passive Dosimetry x x 16 9
x Portable 18 Monitoring Eqpt.
x x 6, 13 4
x 9, 10 1
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- 5 ENVIRO;000 CAL MCINITORS Four vater samplers are located in the Etovah River; one each up-stream frca the reactor at the 3600 foot fence and at the Perimeter Fence; and one each dovnetrema at the 63 00 foot fence and at the Perimeter Fence. Seaples are collected on a weekly basis and a.re analyzed for gross beta-gazca-alpha activity.
In addition to the remote area monitoring system, continuous particulate air samplers are located at several strategic joints on-site as shown by the following table. Filter camples are collected veekly and analyzed for gross beta-gs:::ma-alI h a activity.
AIR SAMPLER LOCATIONS Direction Distance Free From RER RT:R
- 1. RER Demineralizer hilding Entrance SSE 140 feet
- 2. Pedestrian Tunnel Entrance WSW 750 feet C17 Meteorology Tover SE 1.6 miles 3
- h. REL Hot cell Entrance SE 1.6 miles
- 5. Post III (RER Air Intake) S 36 00 feet
- 6. RER Building (VASS System) Directly over 30-ho feet Reactor 7 Operations Building VASS Soil and vegetation samples-are collected or a quarterly basis and analyred for gross beta-gam:ns-alpha activity.
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i D. WAITf8 DI!P0eA1, Erftrf1N The REF vaste 4,ispor*1 system is designed to handle activation products senerated by RER operation. yeatures incorporated in eraliter resin beds vith decontamination the design factors inglude of 10 to 10 op; two 5000 gallon vaste decay tanks for reten-tion of vnete water with high radioactivity concentrat#.ons; and one 150,@0 gallon hold and drain tank wich may be used for decay and dilution of activity prior to release to the seePA8e tapin.
The activity levels of radioactive vsete released to the eeepage basin vill not exceed limits o}weified in 10 CFR 20 for rentricted area s. The total annual release vill not exceed 1 curie.
Radioactive vaste materiale vill not be TereAnently dis burial at the site except as provided by 10 CFR 20 304. posed of by F
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. . . . gi E. BGh0ENCY JYWYBW
- 1. Depassef 000 LIM 8 tor W
- a. A gnvity-feed beergency cooling system automatically provides coolant th2wsh the core at sa ialtial flow rete of apyzv=htaly 800 gpa if any of W following conditions exists (1) Primary coolant flor belov .8 nornal.
(2) Loss of instrumut air
.. (3) Loss of primary ptnup if staniby pup fails to re-establish noriaal flow within 5 seconis.
(4) Loos of electrical power Any of the above conditions vill also cause the reactor to scrsa. ,
- b. The eergerity cooling system consists of the following componearts:
(1) A 100,000 Eallon storage tank - located at a mean elevation of 36 feet above the reactor core (reactor in elevated con-figuration) and appmximately 340 feet from the reactor. ,
(2) A 150,000 gallon drain ard hold tank - located 18 feet below the reactor core and approximately 170 feet fzw the reactor. This tank nceives and stores W emergency coohnt after it has passed thre the core.
(3) One each mantal leolation valve in the supply and drain lines.
(4) One fail-open air-opemted flow cotrt24 valve in the supply line.
(5) Two lamliel check valves in the supply line.t.o prevent flow twa the primary loop to the stora6e tank.
(6) Two fail-oyen air operated electrically controlled dump valves in the dmin line.
Emergency flut is initir.ted when the diasp valvss are opened two one of the conditions listed in 1.a above.
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- c. reraissives (1) Inram reset penaissives - W mammi isolation valves ad the air o;erated remote flow contal valve must be full olen to reset the sena relays. ,
(2) Procedursi seraissives (a) 8 tongs tank must contain at 1Sast 60,000 gallons.
(b) Dmin and hold tank must contain less than 50,000 gallons.
(c) Dump valves to remin closed at least 5 see but no longer than 10 soc after the initiating condition exists.
- 2. DO:R013Cf IWER SISTIM
- a. Normi power is supplied to the R17 thmuch an 119 KY line feeding from the 110 KY station 1ccated in the NSL s,res.
In the event of failure of norm 1 powers emrgency power is furnished by a 400 KVA diesel-electric genemtor located in the basement of the oye ntions building *
- b. The emergency power supply system supplies power to the fol. loving components nai systems which utilize no rore than % of the caIncity of the generator.
(1) All reactor contral equipment and reactor instrunen-tation (2) Doergency li6hting (3) OIerations building heating, ventilation, sai air conditioning.
(4) Primary nai seconiary cooling systems.
(5) Pla.nt air compressor (6) Ecactor buildinE doors (7) Reactor buildin6 exhaust fans (8) Reactor building crnne (9) Air tonitorin6 878 tom 3
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h0) Omr ejector pump Q.t) Diesel generator support etnipment c ., The reactor is not opent+4 unless the geneastor'is oppble.
The systems utilised in automatic opastion of the gene::stor an avutinely checked to assun opasbility, ad the diesel generator is started on a weekly basis. ;
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a F. WF1 Ff0BA05 Nomally, new fuel elemente andI ertially epent fuel elements are stored in fuel elecent stora6e racks in the bottm of the RER !
storaEe pool. The fuel element storage rack holds a stLximum of tventy fuel elemente in a 4 x 5 array. Control rods may fill two of the fuel element positions. W e rack is constructed of aluminum, and contains layers of alu:ninten clad cadmium around the outside of the fuel plate region and betveen each tier of four fuel elements.
Except for the irradiated fuel element shipping eask, this rack is the only container used for storing fuel at the REF. The calculated U-235 loading required for the fuel elements in one fuel element storage rack to achieve criticality, assuming no leabsge, is 211 Ems per element. When leakage is assumed frcan the rt'en only, a full rsch of 211 gm elements vould have a calcultated multiplica.
tion constant of 0.78.
A maximum of four core leadinge vill be stored. A core loading vill consist of a nnximum of 33 fuel elemente and four control rods.
During transfer of fuel elements to and frcxn the fuel elenent storage racks, procedural control vill restrict movement to one element at a time. Procedumi control vill also limit placement of fuel elecents outside the racks to nuclearly rafe locations and configurations in order to preclude the actembly of potentially critical arrays.
We irradi.ated fuel is removed frce the pool in a r.hielded car,k.
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t G. REACTOR ArrrLB TIME The reactor vessel is rarrtun8ed by segmented shis1A tanks approximai.nly tventy irches thick arcept for the rea:nrab34 gnadrant. The tank ocupartments can be rumately filled and anined with damineralis,ed vatar selectively. Response of the various ratelear detectors within the tanks vill be aseartained experirentally, and the effect of filling and onining the shia1A '
tanks during zwtino o;eration vi?' be detenined in adwe.
Norwally the tanks containin6 the nuclear instrumintetion vill be filled; any indication that such is not the case vill enuse an annunctation, and the reactor vill be shut acwn.
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H. REACTOR DEFION
- 1. 14 CATION The vertical center line of the rector is located approximately 4'6" the NE end of the reactor pool. Se pool is rectangular and is frce/2 11 1 ' by 19' by 361/2' deep. There is also a storage pool W ich joins the reactor lool at the EV end. An aluminum gate is provided for separation of the pools. In plan view, the stornse section re.
Bough dimensions are stem,17' sembles an un-sycnetrical letter T.
by 8') cross, 24' by 6' . The depth of both of these parts is 21' below the finished reactor building floor. Curbing fer both pools is continuous and e.:tends one foot above the finirNJ floor.
2 MECEANICAL DESIGN OF TIIE RER pRErfURE VECFEL The RER stainless steel pretsure versel is designed for 150 puig at 2000F. The minimum design and constmetion requirements of the vessel confom to the AfME Boiler and pressure Vessel Code, Section VITI,1956 Edition, and the vessel bears the official code stamp.
The pressure vessel is rupported by two steel bends velded to four equally rpaced vertical embers which rest on bearing plates bolted to the platfom, which in turn rests on top of the hydraulic lift, The reactor Pupport Fystem has been decigned to support a one.
fourth 0 side load on the reactor- and shield tank.
We design loading of the hydraulie lift is h2,000 pounds, and it is designed for a total mocent of 16,500 foot-pounds frca eccentric loading and other causec. The lift has a stroke of 30 feet and is capable of raising the reactor at a maximum rpeed of 10 feet per minute, thoes which slide on T-rails fastened to the pool valls guide.the upper end of the ram through its full travel and restrain the top of the reactor to within one inch of its nominal path.
Two parallel bleed lines, controlled by individuni solenoids which-fail open on loss of power or on improper operation of the cafety doors in the operations building, are uced to lover the reae or.
We reactor upper clonure is a flat, circular, forged pir.ce 3 feet 9 inches in diameter and 5 inches thick. This closure is_ equipped with holes to acccamodate the contml rods, the regulating rod, and the fission' chamber. It can be removed to provide access to the internals of the pressure vessel.
In addition to the opening closed by the reactor upper closure, the pressure veseel has four penetrations above the core, consisting of 6-inch instrument ports. Below the top of the core, only four penetrations exist. Wese are four 8-inch pipes which serve as tvo No new primary coolant inlets and tvo primary coolant outleth penetration vill be added to th pressure vessel or ranctor closure, fI-. -- -
. l 3 PJtR YESSEL I!fIIRMAL (GUJIURE Intemally the vessel consists principally of the inner tank, the hold-dovn plate, and the core support structure. We inner tank, Wich is >
open at the bottca and top, and otherwise has no penetration, serves as a nov guide. We hold-down plate, located above the con, covers the entire core section. Since nov through the core is down, the hydraulic loading of the hold-dovn plate is not a factor. If the reactor should be inverted, the maximin loadin6 on the hold down plate vould be less than 1 ,000 psi. The yield stress for the hold-down plate is 32,000 psi at 200[7.
We core support structure consists of a grid plate to position the various core ccuponents, a support plate which retains fuel elements, renector elements and the start-up source within the core and a coe-trol rod shock damper which consists of a amin cone, individual shos.k absorber tubes, and associated structural membere. Its function is to transmit the shock load vh'.ch the control mas impart subsequent to scram to the pressun sescel vall. As a backup to the shock drunper, a mechanical stop is velded to the bottca of the pressure vessel.
We entire core structure is supported by a ring velded to the pressure vessel vall. We design criteria on stress for these structures are a maximum stress of 7200 psi on the core support barcket, 24h0 psi maximum stress on the support plate,1k,500 pst uaximum stress on the grid plate, and 5600 psi on the cone. The yield stress for all of these ecuponents is in excess of 25,000 psi.
- h. CONTROL ETS17J4 AND OFFRATI20 LIMITATIONS
- a. Control Rod Design The control mas are fuel and poison sections enclosed by altnin.= tubes approximately 3" square by 85" long. Each he a grapple; head at the top and a spring-loaded tip plunger at the bott<e. We fuel section contains an aiutinta strap extension at tha top which extends the length of the poison cection. The pcison section, a square alumintu tube, slides onto the strap And fits nush against the top of the fuel element assembly, We entire fuel-poison assembly fits into the control rod tube. A mechanical attachment on the fuel-poison section prevents assembly of the control rod if the fuel-poison cection is inverted. We control rod is guided and supported within the core by means of four rollers above the core and four rollers belov the core. W e lover end of the control rod fits within a scram guide tube, which also acts as the hydraulic damper during scram. W e poison section I is a square cadmium tube, 0.02 inch thick and 32-1/h inches long. It is clad with a 0.02-inch layer of aluminta on each side so that all edges are sealed. W e length provides approximately h-1/2 inches overlap at each end of the active fuel plates in the reactor, core.
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t We fuel section, which contains about 111 grens of highly enriched U 235, is similar to a standa24 fuel element; hovever, it is omaller and contains 14 plates. A mechanical stop at the bottom, and the affixed poison, position the fuel rection within the contml rod.
The upper end of the control rol tube is fitted with a lifting knob, with vbich the control drive grapple engeses by electro-magnet actuation, for lifting the control rod.
The core regulating rod is icented near the partphery of the core.
The regulating ma poison is a 30-70 cadmium silver alloy material.
The tubular poison section, which has a nminal thickness of 0.09 inch, is encloced in a tubular aluminum sheath approximately 1-1/4 inches in disceter.
- b. Drive Mechanitus The four control rods are actuated by separate mechanisme, mounted to the top head of the pressure vescel. Each control rod drive mechanirm consists of an electric motor, reduction unit, a rack and pinion, limit switches, an electro-magnet and grapple, a spring Iceded scram tube which provides an initial 5-g accelerating force to the rods when the grapple is released. We maximum drive speed is 4.5 inches per minute.
Magnets in the contml ma and a limit svitch in the hold-down -
plate indicate by an electric signal the position of the rod when fully serierced as well as engagement of the rod by the me chani sm. A seleyn, mounted on the gear reduction casting, gives a continuous position indication of the drive and also an indication of md position during normal reactor operations.
We regulating rod drive mechanirm, mounted to the top head of the vessel, serves to drive the regulating rod. We mechanita and rod nre bolted together so that the et mbination is an integral unit. We regulating rod drive mechanism is very similar to the control rod drive mechanitu; but no ceram attachment is provided. %e drive motor is designed to operate with a servo contml system or under manual control.
- c. Operating Limitations l
' (1) We minirmn be four in addition numbertoofone contml elements regulating rod.in the core shall
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(2) nectronic scram tiv.e vin be s35 miniseconds, w ts time vill te the interval from initiation of signal to magnet t release. It includes amplifier rise time and nngnet flux decay titee.
(3) ricrem time vin be less than 650 minieeconde. This time vin te the interval frca initiation of a sienni to roi seated.
(4) Conective withdraval of control rods vin be limited by interlock to the regulating n>d and one control rod. We >
maximum reactivity insertion rate shan not exceed 0.0008 Ak/kperrecond.
(5) The minimum chutdown control cargin than be 0.12 &/k.
The core loading chall te such that under no circumetances can the reactor go critieni on vithdrawal of only one rod.
(6) The maximum excess reactivity above cold elenn critical shall not exceed 0.050 &/k.
(7) Total roa vorth rhan be more than 0.160 &/h, and the vorth of any individual rod vin not deviate frce the average of the rod vorths by more than 0.005 &/h.
(8) Eegulating rod vorth chan not be greater than 0.006 &/k.
(9) During core loading operations, the four control rods vill be the first core ecuponents loaded, and vin be the inst core ccuponents removed on unicading.
5 CORE T)3ATING LIMITATIONS
- a. The core, which has an active he16ht of 24 inchee, is designed on a 3-inch modulus in a 6 x 7 array with the four corner positions cuitted. The moderator and coolant are light vater.
We reflector may be light water, or may be solid or canned alumine or berynium designed to confom to the unuced cpaces in the grid and external to the grid but within the inner tank.
- b. Puel v.aterial is uranium-aluminum alloy. We enrichment of the fuel is nominany 93% U-235 Cladding is metanurgicany londed H OO aluminum. The fuel elements are flat plate, modified MTR type, aluminum-uranium assemblies. Y,ach element contains 18 fuel lt)i
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plates having the approximate dimensions 0 060 inch thick, 2 75 inches vide, ani 24 5 inches lena. m:h fuel piste consists of a nceinni 0 000 inch thickness of uranium-aluminum alloy in a picture frams clad with a nr=M 0 020 inch thick layer of 1100 altninum. The plates an positioned in the element by alumintaa side plates so that a nominal 0108 inch vide coolant passage is pmvided be-tveen fuel plates. Each element is loaded with approxi-mately 176 ms 6 U-235 The top end of each element has a h ndling device. The bottom of each eierneut is equipIed with a positioning box about 3 inches sqtuta which fits into the grid. The overnu length of a fuel element is ocainany 33 5 inches.
- c. The start-up source is an antimony Eanraa emitter, placed in the center of a berylliten duxgy fuel element, and is positioned in one of the available sIsre fual element positions in the grid plate. At minintu strunsth, the source vi n provide a neutron flux of at least 15 ny at the fission chuber 1ccation.
- d. Puel content verification and other core Iarnmeter determinations vill nomany be conducted at the CER.
The following limitations vill apply, hc+evers (1) The mximin number of fuel elements in the core shall not exceed 33 (2) The mximum t!-235 content of the core shall not exceed 6.2 kg.
(3) The cors =y operate with scrne central element positiorevhich do not contain fuel elements.
Such Jositions shall (ontain either dusty elements or the source element.
(4) As coon as the CER is licensed, it vin be utilized to verify that any com utilized in the R12 vin have a negative temperature and void coefficient of reactivity. The RER vill be used to determine temperature coefficient of reactivity for cores 1 ceded prior to licensing of the CF3 (5) The mximum power icvel chan not exceed 3 mesavatts thermal.
(6) The mximua remissible heat flux shn11 not exceed 2 39 x 105 stu/hr-ft3.
/66 x
t I. NUC17AR AND PROCT,SS IlWDD00fIATION i
- 1. IEITCTOR IEATIONS Nuclear inctntment detectors with the exception of the two fission chambers are mounted in three quadrants of the upper shield tank.
Se shield tank mounted detectors are located approximately 24" from the vertical center line of the core and approxinstely 30" above the horizontal center line.
De internal ficsion counter is mounted on a drive similar to the regulating rod drive. We detector is pocitioned immediately above the core during reactor ttart-up. The detector may rubsequently be withdrawn.
The external fission counter is mounted in the removable tank rection approximately cix inches outside the precoure veccel at the core center line.
2 AVKt% TIC C0!(TROL SYF'rD4
- n. Description The servo system consists of tvo ecupent:ated ion chambers, two micrculcroameters, a cervo amplifier, and pover demand control. A recorder pemanently records the output of toth micrcuiercevoeters . Only one eccpentated ion chamber and micrceieron:xneter is utilized; the recond ret in duplicate channel, and either channel may be selected. When in use, the rervo amplifier drives the regulating rod in the direc-tion ececcary to cauce the micrcnicroam:neter output signal to nullify the signal set by the yover densnd control cir-cult. TM channel relector evitch, cervo power demand control, id autccatic-manual relector evitch are located on the c.asole.
- b. Pemissives and alama (1) The regulating rod control cannot be put in the auto-matic tr 'e unleset (a) The relay scram circuit is reset (b) The regulating rod is in the moet reactive position.
(2) The regulating rod withdraval cpeed shall not exceed h5 inches por minute regardless of the mn6nitude of the cervo error signal.
I l
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i 3 NGCLEAR IIEMBENTATICK I:
1
!: No. of i
ihnmals Detector Finx
- channel Sensitivity Designation Each b; P- v i 7 Cps /nv 2 5 to 2.5 x 105 uv
~
Start-up 2 Fission l ch==her Iag N . 1 CIC 5 x 102 to 1011 nv 2.2 x lo'Ik % [nv 2.2 x 10'I Amy[nv T.inear ?ower 2 CIC 5 x 102 to 1011 av 5 x lok to 1o 11 2.2 x 1o-1k w [nv IC or
[ % sarety 3 1 to 5 x 107 m/ar 2.2 x 1o- n % /s k O mn 1 71C F
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- j. .5 SETTIIGS FGL IlffERLOCKS, PEfMISSITES, AIABMS, AND SCRAM 3 t-
! a.. Alams, Scremis, and Pemissives Cet Interlock and or System Alam Permissive Scrust 4
Idet Rod withdrawal interlock; less than 3 eps and greater
- than 6500 eps
~
b.
j Iog & Recorder: By-pass 1CID(
- 6500 eps interlock at -
! greater than .01
\
Period " Fast Period" from re- Recorder. *ecez" n .
coi3er and signa ampli- Rod withdrawal interlock Relay sema less *>.an i
fier less than 10 sec. less than 10 sec. 5 5 sec. Fast scrum
{ $ 3 see.
l .
- .x 1
Relay scrums recorder
- . 1
~
N .) Linear Power " Linear Pov-r greater greater than 9% full than 6G1 full scale" from recorder scale.
! Trouble Monitor "Instrtament Trouble" Clear t. rouble to reset Relay scrum for abnormal for an abnonnal light from relay lights from two or som from any sigma amrpli- sigem smuplifiers or Iog '
fier N muuplifier en1. sv. on, ,
grouna ;
Safety cuannels "Nautron Flux High" Relay scrum at greater i greater than 1.1 +han 1.2 normal normal Fast scrums at greater then 1.5 noeual i
- a. Alams, Screes, azwi Pezzissives (Contimd)
Interlock And Sc2m Cet Alarm Or System Permissive .
"P. C. 'Nurperature -
Telay scrum roccader
.P. C. Temperaturs High" zweccc v sw: Inlae::ssum*me sw: IrGat: greater than W Out3mme r than 1200 . Outlet:
grustat thedL 1 9 greater than 1260 "P. C. Pressure-Iow" Isolates p.; M e Belay scrum zwecrear P. C. Pressure sv: Out3st: 3mes than zwcorder. sv: Tnlet: at s 0.5 80 poi Im3et: 3mes them less than 126 psi 122 poi
~
Outlet: less than -
90 poi .
"P. C. now-Low" Opens &arp valves at Relay scram zweceder P. C. n ow
- O.5 sv or WM sw at 3mes O*d recorder. sv
At les's than .9 than .8 normal QS -1 meergency Coolant " Graphic Panel valves open to reset Trouble" vben scram
~ Flow Yalves R116, R191, E192 closed Equi,- t Tank " Leak, Equipment Relay scrum float at Tank" noat at 3" Ersater them 6" Preemp mu-1nsure " Leek, Freemp aclay serum at 1.h" Tank" noat at 1.4" Set-up and Oper. Sv in " operate" position Sw. to reset scrum Relay screus at 3mes Motor-Generator than .9 nemmm1 voltage
~
- a. Ala21as,Cers=s,andPermissives(Continued)
Alazu Interlock sai Scrum Ccuponent Or ."a'ystem Parmissive .
" Safety Door Lock Reimy serem for e.;y Safety Doors door opened in-Open" any door not properly closed and locked Sezvo " Reg Rod in Limit" Permissive to switch Reg Roi at 0" and 18" Reg Rod to auto at 16" vtaen in autormtic
" Relay Sczma" Circuit Reset Pushbutton to Push " Scram" switch Relay Scram to de-energize rt3ay Circuit De-energized energize relay scram circuit scram cirrtit Dtamp Valves " Dump" when valves De-energizes P. C.
" begin to open pu=ps during eme ge cy
' dt=:p Lift Reserroir " Lift Rese2voir Opens reactor, lift Level Level Low" Isise circuit
- b. Annunciation Only Actuator Annunciator f
Fission Proiucts Recorder Sv greater hn M ftall scale System Temperature Recorder Sv gzvater mn 130 0 Prirmry Equip. Pit. Sump-WTgh noat Sv in P. E. Su:np Pit Fission Products Sump-High noat Sv in F. P. Detector stnp re:ncte station Clean-up and Waste Pit Su:sp- noat Sv in Clean-up 3 unste Pit Sump High -
operations >nding Stup-High neat Sv in Opcstions Ip" Ming Sump Pit
. 4 i
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]; b. Ancunciation OcGy (Continued)
Annunciator Actuator j .
. i
) . Continuous Darticulate Activity-High VASS - Ersater hn 2 x nor.nal hk voundL E j Continuous Gaseous Activity-R16h VAS3 - greater hn 2 x nor.nal hkt cundt i j 2htermittent Particulate Activity-High VASS - greater than 2 x normal wkpsmed t Intezulttent Gaseous Activity-E16 h VASS - greater hn 2 x norumal hochgrouma
- Graphic Panel Trouble 1ight from
- Shield +ank vindow level - abournal '
- i. Demi. stor*6e tank-h2 4 h or lov ;
- Pressurizer - water level h2gh or low i Hold and dzsin tank - hi6 h or low Coo 11n6 tower ,. low or esupty I
- Main loop pump fl or f2 - motor over1nad Decay tank, fF3 or fF'4 - hi6h
~
4 h\ Secondary coolant pressure low Pool demineralizer flov - low D Disposal pump discharge pressure - low Make-up puerp motor - overheat I
i Pool - cire. pussp motor - overheat i
} Loss of control air l Emer s w y coolant flow valves, R116, R192, j R191 - closed Dee:pocy Power Diesel Generstor Control Sw in 'bff" position f
! Ventilation System - Operations Bldg. Less than.1"'Wster differential !
! Ejector Acetssulator . Presourv Low !
4 !
1 !
2
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,. _ .. . _ _ . _ _ . _ . . _ __ _ -_ , ~ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _
l J. EXPERIMENTAL yACILITIES
- 1. EXPERIMENT LOCATIONS
- a. Withis pressure vessel i la-core expertments vill be llaited to expertmentation on reactor instrumentation, calibration, foil exposLres, and reactor checkout tests.
la-reflector experiments Will be limited to very small subsystems, components, materials, instrumentation, core rearrangements, and reactor checkout tests,
- b. External to pressure vessel Experiments conducted external to pressure vessel may la.
clude irradiation of major assemblies, systems, subsystems, components, materials, animal, biological systems, instru-mentation, and safety experiments.
- 2. EXPERIMENT LIMITATIONS
- a. Withis pressure vessel No experiment will be conducted in the core except irradia-tion of foils and sub-miniature detectors. In-reflector experiments shall be rigidly fixed to ensure positively that no movement of the experiment vill occur during reactor operation. Any such experiment shall not contain moving parts or components other than rela). or switches. No experi-meat which contains more than trace quantities of liquids or solids which are in chemically active states shall be inserted into the core or reflector. Hovable parts and/or evacuated spaces shall not introduce more than 0.0002 Ak/k. The total vorth of any expertment in the reflector region shall not ex-ceed 0.001 Ak/k, and the combined worth of all experiments in the reflector shall not exceed 0.005 ok/k.
i
- b. External to pressure vessel (1) Experiments may be pbysically mounted on test cars and reactor building structure in such a configuration as to provide a minimum clearance of at least 2 inches between the reactor structure and the expertment.
l (2) Any experiment which contains moving equipment having significant kinetic energy shall have a blast shield located between the moving equipment and the reactor.
Such blast shields shall be capable of absorbing the kinetic energy from the moving equipment or fragment thereof.
(.f<:)
(3) Test cars will not be noved in the vicinity of the reactor building by means of a 1occootive unless the reactor is lowered into the poui. Test cars and experi-meats that overhang the reactor structura vill bs equipped with an interlock to stop elevation of the lif t prior to contact.
(4) No locomotive vill intentionally be brought into the ex-clusion area when the reactor is up and operating. A derail vill be located just inside the exclusion area at the railroad gate. The derail vill be kept locked in the derail configuration at all times except when the train is passing into or out of the exclusion area. The individual who locks the gate vill always be required to lock the' derail in the proper configuration before locking the gate and vill be required to report that fact to reactor ,
operations by radio at the time he locks the derail. Reactor operations vill maletMa a log of entry and exit of the loco-motive f rcnn the exclusion fence and have each exit record the configuration of the derail when reported by the loco-motive crew. The start up procedure for the RER will include checking the entry and exit log to assure that the derail is in the proper configuration. In addition, during reactor operations the railroad switch at the cooling of f area vill be lef t in the configuration to route the locomotive frca the main line into the cooling of f area rather than to the PIR.
- c. Experiments with explosive potential Experiments involving energetic fluids or materials may be irradi-ated without prior permissica of AEC, Divistoa of Licensing and Regulation,only if all the following conditions are met:
(1) Energetic fluids or materials are within a containment structure or behind a structure capable of absorbing any pressure wave or shock wave potentially capable of being generated by such materials.
(2) Such u.aterial shall be limited to such amounts that if the contain: rent in (1) above were to fail, there would not be suf ficient material present to geanate shock or pressure waves capable of violating the integrity of the pressure vessel, its supporting structure, or the cooling lines. The configuration of such experiments shall be such that potential shock or pressure waves shall not be l directed toward the reactor or such that potential mis-sites directed toward the reactor shall not contain suf-ficient kinetic energy to penetrate the pressure vessel.
l (3) la no case, however, shall material having a potential of audden release of chemical emergy in excess of 0.1 lb. of
4 4
TNT te placed closer than one foot to the reactor pressure vessel. All amougte at other distances may be detemined on the basis of R* geometric attenuation eubject to the further limitation that the total potential lateral loading of the pressure vessel support structure shall not exceed the allovable design loading.
(4) 7te lockheed Georgia Ccapany-Beactor. Safety Cosnittee unanimously concurs with the acceptability of the level of hazard involved. Any other experiment which contains energetic fluide or materials shs11 not be irradiated untti l a written description of the experiment and a hazards .
analysis has been submitted to the ADC, Division of Licens.
ing and Regulation, for evaluation and written authorization has been obtained from the ADC as a change to these technical specifications.
s i
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t Il 3
K. REACTOR C001Ayr trnmet
- 1. !*8CRIPfION W PRIMRT AND E20000ARY 000LDO ErHTf58 Se primary cooling systaa inc1 wies 8" and 12" stainless steel l yiping, pumps, a pressuriter, domineralisers, valves, and the ,
priury heat exchaa6ers. At normany rated conditions the systes '
provides demineralized vatar ooohnt to the reactor at the rate of approximately 32o0 gym.
We primary system is housed in a pit adjacent to the reactor building, and two main underground pipe linee connect the primry pit to the reactor. Beso are rigid pipes with evivel and ban joints, which anov the reactor to nove a vertical distance of 30 feet.
Urat removal is provided by two counter flov heat exchangers connected in series. Wer.s exchangers transfer heat fmm the primary to the secondary cooling eyotes, which is connected
- o cooling tovers.
From the heat exchangers, primary coohnt flove to the intake side of the circulating ptarps, wh.ich are connected in parallel, vith one running and one os. a standby basis. Each pump is povered by a 200-horsepovar, splash proof, etor. De primary pump produces only enough head to maintain circulation, so a pressuriter is used to maintain system pressure. W e pressuriter, which is connected into the reactor inlet line, maintains the desired pressure at the reactor outlet. If electric power fails, a valve separating the pressuriter from the primary system vin close.
'em demineralizers are used to maintain purity in the primsry coohnt and the pool vater. De demineraliters are manifolded so that either one may be used for primary coolant and the other for pool vater, or both asy be used together for either purpose.
All surface in contact with the primary coolant vin be of aluminua and stainless eteel with the exception of the pump danings and large valves. Wese items vin be of cast iron or steel. Rare are tvo precsure relief valves in~staned in the prinsry cooling system to prevent overprescurizing.
- Y'
're-- - - - --- " - - ' *- *--P- *
- 2. FRIMARY 0001Alff BYSTrH LDetATIONS
- a. Core inlet temperature shall not exceed 130 0F
- b. Core temperature rise shall not exceed 10 0F at 3 NW
- c. Coohnt system pressure shall not exceed 150 peig
- d. Core outlet preocure shall be greater than 90 psig
- e. Normal coolant flow rate during reactor operation sM11 he 3200 gra.
- f. Core pressure drop shall not exceed 50 peig across points of detection (actual core pressure amp is lees than 2 peig)
- g. Coolant resistitity shall be greater thrtn 500,000 ohms
- h. Coolant pH shall be greater than 6.0 and less than 7 5
- 1. Radioactivity of coolant chall not exceed 1 x 10-2 uc/ce.
- j. When the reador upper closure is removed and the flange is belov the surface, the pool vnter resistivity shall be greater than 500,000 ohms.
3 TECONIARY STETD4 LIMITATIONS
- a. Radioactivityshallnotexceed1x10*5ue/cc
- b. The primary rystem pressure in the heat exchanger shall be at least 30 ps18 greater than the secordary system pressure.
0 jdl.
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l
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L. AIMDrIBRATIVE AMD 20CIDURAL BAF30l8JW8
- 1. ADGNIsmATIVE OlGANIZAT3DN AND STAFYING
- a. Organisation the organization which operates the RER is responsib3m
- exclusively for maintenance, calibration, opention and safety of the reactors at GNL including the nacte mechanical systems, zwactor cont 291s and instrumentation system, cooling systes and associated controls, and other related systems. This organization is also respcesib3m for pWcuring additional fuel elementa as needed, and for safe storage of both unused and spent fuel elements. The organitation has no erlerimental program responsibility, and o;erates more as a service organization. She hector oIerations organization is a group within a larger argnai-zation which also includes the health physics and nuclear safety functions. ' Ibis inrger organisation niso has no experimental program responsibility. The organisation reports to the Nuclear Laboratory Division Manager, and is parallel to the experimental progrrans organizations, which also report to the Nuclear Laboratory Division Manager.
The Nuclear Laboratory Division Manager reporta to the chie.' Nuclear Engireer, vho appoints the Beactor Safety Committee and monitors this ecmittee's activities.
- b. Reactor Operations Staffing At least four men ecuprise each RER operations shift, One of the four men shall be a senior reactor oyerator.
Each shift vill perform all necessary reactor opentions.
and maintenance functions.
Dttring nomal level operation of the }ER, tvo Iersons shall ruoain in the control room at all times. During oIeratio'ns which could involve changes in core reactivity vhen the RER is shutocrim, the nucicar control inttrumentation shall be continuously in operation, attended, and observed.
- c. Reactor Safety Cccuittee A-Reactor Safety Ccruittee is established zeporting to the Chief h:3 car Enginocr. The Ccrraittee, which meets at least quarterly, is ccaposed of the following or their Ocasaittee approved alternatest
- s ',
Reactor Systerns Division Msnager, Chainaan Reactor Operations and Nuclear Tafety Dept.
Manager, Cec.
Nuclear Laboratory Division Ksreger Renctor Operations Group Engineer Health physics Group Engineer At least two scientists / engineers not in the operating line organization.
Consultants as required in the judgement of the Ccemittee.
A quonun vill concist of all the personnel listed with the exception of conruitants. Actions of the Ccmittee require unanimous concurrence.
The Ccenittee reviews and approves proposed reactor modifi-cation; periodically reviews reactor oper 'on procedures and revisions thereto as well as procedures involving emergency operation; and all new types of reactor experiments proposed for the RER.
A ONL Fubecomittee of_ the Reactor Cafety Cccetttee, which meets at lenet monthly, is eceposed of the following or their Ccmittee approved alternates:
Reactor Cperations and !!uelear rafety Dept.
Manager, Chairman and recretary Reactor Operations Group Engineer Health Physics Group Engineer Conruitants as required in the judgement of the Cubecomittee.
A quorum vill consist of all the personnel listed with the exception of concultants. Actions of the rubecmittee require unanianous concurrence.
'Ihis Pubecmittee aerures that the operating organizations are carrying out mandatec of the full Ocmittee; approves repetition of previoucly approved experiments; and nssists the full Cemittee by providing preliminary review of material being prepared for consideration by the full Ccmittee.
2 QUALIFICATIONS OF CUPERVISORY FERSO!MEL Qualifications for cupervisory personnel vithin the reactor operating organization are established by the next higher level of cupervision and approved by the Huelear Laboratory Division Manager.
. ** a- ,
i 3 MODIFICATICat OF CFERATINJ PROCEIURR8 Proposed changes in reactor operating procedures are developed by the reactor operating organizatico, and must be approved by the Dubcattaittee of the Reactor Dafety Ccannittee prior to use.
Both the operating orEanization and the revieving organizations shan ascertain that au proposed revisions to procedures do not reduce the level of safety of reactor operations,
- b. APPROVAL OF EXPERD4EffrS Tor each new type of experiment utilizing the RER, the Reactor r4fety Ocmittee shan review, evaluate and appmve the experi-mental system if acceptable from the standpoint of reactor '
safety. Experiments which are escentially repetitions of previously approved experiments shan be revieved by the Dub-ccmittee of the Reactor f.afety Ccmittee, and may be approved by the rubecenittee if no increase in the level of potential hazard has occurred since review by the entire Reactor rafety Ccm ittee.
5 IMERGENCT PROCEIURES l
Detailed emer6ency plans and procedures, covering all classes
- of potential GNL incidents, are prepared and published in the GNL PherEency Manual. The Ibergency Manual is reviewed and approved by the Reactor Safety Ccmittee, and un revisions to the manuni are approved by the Ccenittee at its first regular meeting fonoving preparation of such revisions. Dry
[
ntns are held at least quarterly.
- 6. GENERAL M'ERATI!U PRINCIPLES
- a. Access to radiation areas
- Detailed procedures for controlling access to potentinny dangerous nreas have been develcped by the Lockheed Plant Protection in conjunction with principles establiched by the Health Physics and Reactor Operations organization.
Enforcement is acecmplished by the Lockheed P1 Ant Protection.
- b. Investigation of incidents Unplanned shutdowns vin be investigated by reactor l operations at the time of the shutdown, and win be reported to the Reactor Tafety Ccmittee and Dubeceittee for reviev. An events involving the RER vhich
)
.. ~ . 1 cculd to classed as ircidents vill te investigated by Reactor Operations, the Reactor Safety Ccussitt+e, and other t Lockheed ccessittees if appropriate,
- c. Fuel element manipulation Detailed p>medures have been developed for operations invoiring fuel handling. All rueh operations are conducted .
under the direct gereonal su;ervision of a Senice Resotor Operator, and are conducted only vben specified nuclear ,
instrumentation and controls are operating and being monitored (Section I-4).
- d. Routine maintenance Routine preventive maintenance is acccuplished on reactor -
systems and on conventional plant equiInent on a scheduled basis. Health Physics portable instrumentation is calibrated on a scheduled basis.
- e. personnel dosimetry policy All Ierconnel at GE are issued teta-gama sensitive fihn i badges. Fersonnel who work at the REF and other key ,
Iersonnel are iccued film tedges sensitive to both beta-gemna and neutron. personnel who work in known radiation fields are issued self-reading dosimeters for the duration of the particular vork nasignment, j
- f. Health Physics survei.11ance Health Physics surveillance is continuously provided during reactor oIeration,
- g. Safety and D:ercency System Tests
{
Safety systeso and energency alarm systems are tested as a +
part of the pre-operational check which is acccuplished each day that the RER 10 cgerated.
- h. Radiation Safety Principles
'Jhe general policy for all operations involving potential radiation exposure shall be avoidance of all unnecessary exposures, and maintaining unnvoidabbe ex;osures at the lowest level possibim consistent with operations to be performed.
. . .- -. . ~
s 4
- 1. Operattag Procedures Detatted operating procedures have been prepared covering start-up, approach to power, routine operation at level power, conduct of reactor expertments, maintenance, refuel-tag, shatdown, and emergencies. Compliance with operattag procedures is required to assure checkout and proper opera-tion of all safety systems associated with reactor operation.
Generally, every step of each procedure associated with the reactor and related systems requires the initials of the person performing the step. Deviation from procedure is permitted only if it is necessary to frnediately correct or prevent an unsafe condition.
- j. Operations when facility is shut down Nuclear control instnmentation will be in operation and will be attended and observed at all times during operations which could involve changes la core reactivity when the facility is shut dows. All operations wt.ich could involve changes in core reactivity when the fac.11ty is shut dovi will be carried out only under the d', rect and personal super-vision of a licensed senior reactor operator.
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