ML20092K270

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Special Rept:On 920128,piping Penetration in 3 H Rated Fire Wall Separating a & B Diesel Generator Rooms Identified as Not Listed in Required Fire Barrier Stp.Caused by Inadvertent Ommission of Barrier from Applicable STP
ML20092K270
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 02/19/1992
From: Skolds J
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To: Ebneter S
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 9202250118
Download: ML20092K270 (2)


Text

.

South Cotoima flottnc & Goo Compony John L s

  • peinscoe SC P9M M* U + ' * *
  • itioh 348,4040 SCE&G

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February 19, 1992 Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 11 Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30323

Dear Mr. Ebneter:

SUBJECT:

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION DOCKET NO. 50/395 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-l?

SPECIAL REPORT (SPR 920001)

This Special Report is being submitted by South Carolina Electric & Gas Company pursuant to the requirements of the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) Station Administrative Procedure (SAP) 131A, Fire Eaainment/Systeml x Operability Requirements.

On January 28, 1992, during an engineering inspection of the Diesel Generator fire Service Sprinkler System, a piping penetration in a 3-hour rated fire wall separating the "A" and "B" Diesel Generator Rooms was identified as not listed in the required fire barrier Surveillance Test Procedure (SIP). The penetration was sealed, but because it was not listed in the applicable STP

(/28.027), no surveillance had been performed as required by SAP-131A. The penetration was declared inoperable and compensatory action was taken as required by procedure. ANonconformanceNotice(NCN)wasinitiated documenting the discrepancy. Disposition of the NCN directed that the penetration be inspected, reworked / repair (if required) to the original installation, and the penetration be included in the applicable STP.

Inspection of the penetration found it to be functional as is, and it was declared operable on January 31, 1992. A procedure change has been made to incorporate the penetration.

The cause of this event was the inadvertent omission of the barrier from the applicable SlP. SAP-131A Surveillance Requirement requires a visual inspection of at least 10 percent of each type of sealed penetration be performed at least once each 18 months. In the upcoming STP inspection, a 100 percent inspection of fire barriers will be performed. Each fire barrier will be verified and uniquely identified at this time. Any barrier not listed in the STP will be readily identified by the absence of a label or tag. This action will be completed by January 1994.

9202250110 920p39  ! 0 gDft ADOCK 05000395 /' .

PDR

, . Mr. 5. D. [bneter SPR 920001 Page 2 of 2

$hould you have any questions, please call at your convenience.

Very truly ours

%d lau '

John L. Skolds RJB:JLS: Icd c: 0. W. Dixon Jr.

R. R. Mahan R. J. White General Managers G. f. Wunder S. R. Hunt NRC Resident inspector J. B. Knotts Jr.

Marsh & McLennan Document Control Desk INPO Records Center AN] Library NSRC RTS (ONO 920007) file (818,05 & 816.08)

NUCL EAR l'XC[llENCE - A SumER IRAD1110H1

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