ML20092G440

Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1992 for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station,Unit 1

ML20092G440
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	01/31/1992
From:	Broughton T, Heysek W GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
C311-92-2027, NUDOCS 9202200128
Download: ML20092G440 (7)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _.

GPU Nuclear Corporation J Nuclear g

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Middletow n. Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number; (117) 940-8005 february 14, 1992 C311-92-2027 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit I (TMl-1)

Operating License No. DPR-50 l

Docket No. 50-289 Monthly Operating Report for January 1992 Enclosed are two copies of the January 1992 Monthly Operating Report for Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

Sincerely, g

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T.G.boughton Vice President and Director, TMI-l WGH Attachments cc: Administrator, Region i TM1 Senior Resident inspector 9202200128 920131 PDR ADOCK 05000209 R

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cru nuciear corporanon is a subsid.<iry of cenorai ruboc utses corporat on

J OPERA 110NS SujetARY h

JANUARY 1992 The unit entered the month operating at 100% power producing 868 MWo.

The cause of the high CRDM stator tenocratures that resulted in the power reduction documented in the Decem)er report was identified.

The 0-rings found i

restricting flow in the Intermediate Closed Cooling Water System (ICCS) to the control rod drive mechanisms had dislodged from the quick disconnect fittings installed during the 8R and/or 9R outages.

The o-ring material is incompatible with the HALC0 rust inhibitor used in the ICCS and results in i

o-ring swelling.

On 1/22/92, during a planned outage on.the "B" inverter, a partial EfW actuation occurred while the "B" vital bus was de-energized.. The actuated components were secured within 1 minute. This event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR $0.72 as a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> report.

The actuation was attributed to a wiring error in the HSPS cabinets.

The event is being detailed in an LER. As of this writing the HSPS has been correctly wired and successfully tested. The unit completed the month operating at 100% power.

I

[MJOR SAFETY RELATID MAINTENANCI During January, the following major safety related maintenance activity was performed:

Station Blackout Dies 31 Generator EG-Y-4 The Station Blackout Diesel Generator was removed from service to allow installation of a lubricating oil modification kit and to perform various repairs. Work accomplished included the elimination of a water leak at the jacket cooling water pump EG-P-16 seal, an air leak downstream of the air start relief valves EG-V-97A/B and an oil leak at the inspection cover beneath the governor.

The diesel generator remained out of service as of the end ofthis reporting period.

Rg. actor Vessel Control Rod Drive System The increased Control Rod Drive Mechanism stator temperatures were ultimately determined to be the result of the material incompatibility between the corrosion inhibitor, Nalco, used in the Intermediate Closed Cooling Water system and the ethylene-propylene compound o-rings (a part in the disconnect fittings). A chemical reaction caused the o-rings to swell.

The o-rings eventually dislodged causing a cooling water flow restriction at the disconnect fitting and the resultant increased stator temperatures.

l 2

C",1Dynlu The *C" inverter, which normally supplies power to the "C" vital bus, failed twice in January. A technical representative from Solid State assisted in a troubleshooting effort which identified shorted windings in a 15KVA constant voltage transformer (CVT) apparently caused by excessive heat following capacitor replacement during 9R.

Pre-service testing of the replacement CVT from the warehouse stock revealed excessive capacitance in the third harmonic i

filter capacitor band. Two of thirteen capacitors were removed from service.

Subsequent to the "C" inverter's return to service, electricians tested the third harmonic filter capacitance of the "B", "D", and *E" inverters.

As a result, two of thirteer capacitors were removed from service on the "D" and "L" inverter third harmonic filter circuits and one of thirteen capacitors was removed from service on the "D" inverter third harmonic filter circuit. A 175 amp fuse on the main DC Distribution Panel blew during return of the "B" inverter to service.

investigation revealed no discrepancies on the "B" inverter.

The 175 amp DC fuse and the inverter oscillator card were replaced l

prior to the inverter's return to service.

The old oscillator card will be tested at Solid State.

The postulated cause for the blown IK, np fuse was insufficient discharge time for the inverter capacitor bank before being re-energized resulting in an excessive current draw.

Data Acquisition System When de-energizing the *D" vital bus for "0" Inverter repairs, the Data Acquisition System (DAS) was secured.

A feedwater transient resulted when various "lCS* stations were affected by the loss of DAS.

DAS was re-energized and restored.

Since DAS was designed to preclude the possibility of affecting

~

"lCS", troubleshooting was initiated to determine how "lCS" was affected when DAS was de-energized. During troubleshooting, additional recorders were connected to various "lCS" points before the DAS was de-energized.

It was found that more than one or two points were affected with the DAS de-energized and the DAS continued to affect the "lCS' even while de-energized.

i B&W was contacted for technical assistance and guidance on additional trouble-shooting. During subsequent trouble-shooting, a common ground was installed between the ICS and DAS and several DAS input wires were disconnected.

All but two of the inputs can be reconnected during the next outage without further modification. Different input points from the "lCS" are required for i

the two remaining inputs to monitor the parameters desired.

The DAS was returned to service on completion of the trouble-shooting.

Q.n-line Leak SeiLio.g On-Line. leak sealing tasks performed included sealing a packing leak on a 3/4" globe valve on the "C" Main Steam piping (no tag number) and re-injecting a bonnet leak on valve MS-V-2A, 3

i t

OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO.

50-289 DATE Tebruary 14. 1992 COMPLETED BY W G HEYSEK OPERATING STATUS TELEPilONE (717) 948-8191

1. UNIT NAME:

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 NOTES

2. REPORTING PERIOD:

JANUARY 1992

3. LICENSED THERHAL POWERI 2568

4. NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS HWe):

871

5. DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MWe):

819

6. MAXIMUN DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MWe):

856

7. HAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe):

800 8.

IT CHANGES OCCUR IN (ITEMS 3-7) SINCE LAST REPORT, GIVE REASONSs

9. POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED, IF ANY (NET HWe):

10. REASONS FOR RESTRICTIONS, IF ANY THIS HONTH YR-TO-DATE CUMMULATIVE

11. llOURS IN REPORTING PERIOD (HRS) 744.0 744.0 152665.0

12. NUHDER OF HOURS REACTOR WAS CRITICAL (HRS) 744.0 744.0 77475.0

13. REACTOR RESERVE SHUTDOWN llOURS

(!!RS )

0.0 0.0 2245.6

14. IlOURS GENERATOR ON-LINE (HRS) 744.0 744.0 76400.2

15. UNIT RESERVE SHUTDOWN llOURS (HRS) 0.0 0.0 0.0

16. GROSS THERMAL ENEPGY GENERATED (HWH) 1908127 1908127 185777172

17. GROSS ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATED (HWH) 639441 639441 62633700

18. NET ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATED (HWH) 603692 603692 58761017

19. UNIT SERVICE FACTOR (t) 200.0 100.0 50.0 30.-UNIT AVAILABILITY FACTOR

(%)

100.0 100.0 50.0

21. UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR (USING HDC NET) 100.4 100.4 49.0

82. UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR (USING DER NET) 99.1 99.1 47.0

23. UNIT FORCED OUTAGE RATE

(%)

0.0 0.0 44.3 UNIT FORCED OUTAGE HOURS (HRS) 0.0 0.0 60648.7

24. SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEET 6 HONTHS (TYPE, DATE AND DURATION OF EACH):

25. IF SHUT DOWN AT END OF REPORT PERIOD, ESTIMATED DATE OF STARTUP 4

AVERAGE DA1LY UNIT POWER LEVEL i

1 DOCKET No.80-289 UNIT THI-1 DATE february 14. 1992 COMPLETED BY W G HEYSEK i

TELEPHONE (717) 948-8191 l

HONTH:

JANUARY i

DAY AVERA1E DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-NET)

(MWe-NET) 1 815 17 811 2

814 18 813 3

810 19 811 4

808_

20 809

-5 810 21 812 6

812 22 811 7

812 23 010 8

813 24 811 9

812 25 814 10 810 26 813 11 812 27 813 12 012 28 812 13 810 29 811 14 807 30 810 15 813 31 810

-16 814 5

tTNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS DOCKET NO.

50-289 UNIT NAME TMI-1 REPORT MONTH January 1992 DATE february 14, 1992 COMPLETED BY W. G. Heysek Tiltr2P90NE (717) 948-8191 Method of Licensee Systes :o g enent Cause & Corrective

1. 0-Cote Type' Duration meesorf Shutting Event Code Code Acti m to (Mours)

cow, Report 8 Prevent Securrence teact #

NONE 1

l T

4 i

4 i

.i 1

2 3

4 F Forced Reesm Method Exhibit G - Instructions for j

5 Scheduled A-Eq.ripment Failure (Explain) 1-nanuet preperatim of Cate Entry Sheets 8-maintenance or Test 2-#anuel Scree for Licensee Event report (LER) r C-Refueling 3-Autenstic Screar File (EREG441)

D-Regulatory testrictim 4-Other (Emptein)

Ehator Training & Licensing Emandnatim 5 Exhibit 1 same soure.

F-A *inistrative G-Operational Errer (Emptein) 6 Actuelty used emhibits F & !! EXEE C161 E-Other (Emplain) 6 4

f

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BEfUEllNG INf0RMA110UEQE11 1.

Name of facility:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 2.

Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown:

September 17,1993(10R) 3.

Scheduled date for restart following current refueling: NA 4.

Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? NA If answer is yes, in general, what will these be?

If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

If no such review has taken place, when is it scheduled?

5.

Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information:

None planned.

6.

Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g. new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures:

GPU Nuclear has installed four Westinghouse Lead Test Assemblies during the reload of the THI-1 core for cycle 9 operation.

Westinghouse fuel technology will be utilized to the extent possible.

7.

The nH r of fuel assemblies (a) in the core, and (b) in the spent fuel stora

,,ool:

(a) 177 (b) 521 8.

The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies:

The present licensed capacity is 752.

Planning to increase licensed capacity through fuel pool reracking is in progress.

9.

The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity:

The 9R (1991) refueling discharge was the last to allow full core off-load capacity (177 fuel assemblies).

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