ML20092F289

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Amends 198 & 139 to Licenses DPR-57 & NPF-5,respectively, Revising TS SR 3.6.4.1.3 & 3.6.4.1.4 for Secondary Containment Drawdown.Revision Reduces SR Acceptance Criteria to Listed Amount
ML20092F289
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 09/11/1995
From: Berkow H
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20092F293 List:
References
NUDOCS 9509180113
Download: ML20092F289 (7)


Text

i naug ye UNITED STATES I

's g

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

WASHINGTON, D.C. 206 @ 0001 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY 0GLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON. GEORGIA DOCKET N0, 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 198 License No. DPR-57 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The ag'ication for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated June 6,1995, and supplemented August 9, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic EnerCy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; J

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and.

E.

'The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commiss. ion's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9509180113 950911 PDR ADOCK 05000321 p

PDR n

2.

Accordingly, the license 1:: hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

~

DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as fo11cws:

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.198

, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

F TH NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 64 -

rbert N. Berkow, Director l

roject Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes Date of Issuance:

September 11, 1995 l

4 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 198 4

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 4

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Paaes Insert Paaes 3.6-38 3.6-38 l

B 3.6-76 B 3.6-76 i

B 3.6-79 8 3.6-79 B 3.6-88 8 3.6-88 4

j i

u i

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS '(continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i

SR 3.6.4.1.3


NOTE-------------------

The number of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem (s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

Verify required SGT subsystem (s) will 18 months on a draw down the secondary containment to STAGGERED TEST 2 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in BASIS l

s 120 seconds.

i SR 3.6.4.1.4


NOTE-------------------

i The number of SGT subsystem (s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

l Verify required SGT subsystem (s) can 18 months on a maintain 2 0.20 inch of vacuum water STAGGERED TEST l

gauge in the secondary containment for BASIS i

I hour at a flow rate s 4000 cfm for each i

subsystem.

l HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-38 Amendment No 198

4 Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES APPLICABLE Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC SAFETY ANALYSES Dolicy Statement (Ref. 4).

(continued) i LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary i

containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment.

For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to 1

ensure that the required vacuum (0.20 inch of vacuum) can be l

established and maintained.

The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration 1

of doors, hatches, refueling floor plugs, SCIVs, and available flow paths to SGT Systems.

The required boundary i

encompasses the zones which can be postulated to contain fission products from accidents required to be considered for the condition of each unit, and furthermore, must include zones not isolated from the SGT subsystems being credited for meeting LCO 3.6.4.3.

Allowed configurations, associated SGT subsystem requirements, and associated SCIV requirements are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3).

i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment (the reactor building zone and potentially the refueling floor zone).

Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the i

LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.

Therefore, maintaining i

secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control voluue, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during OPDRVs, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(Note, moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-76 Amendment No 198-i i

i

~.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 1

BASES 3

l SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 J

REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Unit I and Unit 2 SGT Systems exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through j

appropriate treatment equipment. To ensure that all fission i

products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the appropriate SGT System (s) will rapidly establish and mairtain a negative pressure in the secondary containment.

l l

This is confirmed by demonstrating that the required SGT subsystem (s) will draw down the secondary containment to 2 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in s 120 seconds.

This l

i cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary i

is not intact.

SR 3.6.4.1.4 eemonstrates that the required "1

SGT subsystem (s) can maintain a 0.20 inch of vacuum water l

gauge for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at a flow rate s 4000 cfm for each SGT subsystem.

The I hour test period allows secondary I

containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state i

conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure i

secondary containment boundary integrity.

Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test.

The 4

number of SGT subsystems and the required combinations are dependent on the configuration of the secondary containment I

and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref.

3). The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies i

that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LC0 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

j Operating experience has shown these components usually pass j

the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

1 REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Section 14.4.3.

l

'2.

FSAR, Section 14.4.4.

t 3.

Technical Requirements Manual.

4.

NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

d HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-79 Amendment No 198 i

i

11 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 1

BASES BACKGROUND maintained at a negative pressure when the system is in (continued) operation, to conservatively ensure zero exfiltration of air from the building when exposed to winds as high as 31 mph.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to < 70% (Refs. 2 and 3).

The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling.

The charcoal adsorbers remove gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter coVects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

4 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems automatically start and operate in response to actuation signals indicative of I

conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system.

Following initiation, all required charcoal filter train fans start. Upon verification that the required subsystems are operating, the redundant required subsystem is normally shut down.

1 APPLICABLE The design basis for the Unit 1 and Unic 2 SGT Systems is to SAFETY ANALYSES mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Refs. 2 and 3).

For all events analyzed, the SGT Systems are shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

i 1

LCO Following a DBA, a minimum number of SGT subsystems are required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LCO requirements for OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of the minimum number of SGT subsystems in the event of a single active failure.

The required number of SGT subsystems is dependent on the (continued)

HATCH UNIT I B 3.6-88 Amendment Nos 198

auo uq$$

UNITED STATES ge NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E

E WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666 4001

\\

/

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OP DALTON. GEORGIA DOCKET N0. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 AMEN 0 MENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.

139 License No. NPF-5 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 (the facility) Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by the Georgia Power Company, acting for itself, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the licensees), dated June 6, 1995, and supplemented August 9, 1995, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I-t i

B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.

139, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days from the date of issuance.

F0R THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

/

I v

! er ert N. Ber ow, Director H

Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Technical Specification Changes i

Date of Issuance:

September 11, 1995 1

j s

b I

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.139 FAClilTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET N0. 50-366 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Paaes Insert Paaes 3.6-40 3.6-40 B 3.6-83 8 3.6-83 8 3.6-86 B 3.6-86 8 3.6-95 B 3.6-95 4

3

4 Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -(continued) 2 SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.3


NOTE-------------------

The nu:nber of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem (s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and i

shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

i i

Verify required SGT subsystem (s) will 18 months on a draw down the secondary containment to STAGGERED TEST a: 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in BASIS l

s.120 seconds.

1 i

L SR 3.6.4.1.4


NOTE-------------------

The number of SGT subsystem (s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LC0 3.6.4.3, " Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

Verify required SGT subsystem (s) can 18 months on a maintain 2: 0.20 inch of vacuum water STAGGERED TEST l

gauge in the secondary containment for BASIS 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at a flow rate s 4000 cfm for each subsystem.

4 4

l HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-40 Amendment No. 139

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 BASES i

APPLICABLE Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC SAFETY ANALYSIS Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

(continued) 4 LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume

)

into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary

)

j containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and processed prior to release to the environment.

For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum (0.20 inch of vacuum) can be l

established and maintained.

The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of doors, hatches, refueling floor plugs, SCIVs, and i

available flow paths to SGT Systems.

The required boundary encompasses the zones which can be postulated to contain fission products from accidents required to be considered 1

l for the condition of each unit, and furthermore, must include zones not isolated from the SGT subsystems being credited for meeting LCO 3.6.4.3.

Allowed configurations, associated SGT subsystem requirements, and associated SCIV requirements are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3).

i APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary t

i containment (the reactor building zone and potentially the refueling floor zone). Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES.

Therefore, maintaining

. secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can l

be postulated, such as during OPDRVs, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

(Note, moving i

irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-83 Amendment No 139

i V

i Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 l

BASES i

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Unit I and Unit 2 SGT Systems exhausts the secondary containment atmosphere to the environment through 4

1 appropriate treatment equipment.

To ensure that all fission products are treated, SR 3.6.4.1.3 verifies that the appropriate SGT System (s) will rapidly establish and maintain a negative pressure in the secondary containment.

l This is confirmed by demonstrating that the required SGT subsystem (s) will draw down the secondary containment to 2 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in s 120 seconds. This l

I cannot be accomplished if the secondary containment boundary is not intact. SR 3.6.4.1.4 demonstrates that the required SGT subsystem (s) can maintain a 0.20 inch of vacuum water l

gauge for I hour at a flow rate s 4000 cfm for each SGT 4

subsystem.

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> test period allows secondary containment to be in thermal equilibrium at steady state l

conditions. Therefore, these two tests are used to ensure i

secondary containment boundary integrity.

Since these SRs are secondary containment tests, they need not be performed with each SGT subsystem. The SGT subsystems are tested on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, however, to ensure that in addition to the requirements of LCO 3.6.4.3, each SGT subsystem or combination of subsystems will perform this test.

The i

number of SGT subsystems and the required combinations are dependent on the configuration of the secondary containment and are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual 3

(Ref. 3).

The Note to SR 3.6.4.1.3 and SR 3.6.4.1.4 specifies that the number of required SGT subsystems be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, " Standby l

Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency.

Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1.

FSAR, Section 15.1.39.

2.

FSAR, Section 15.1.41.

3.

Technical Requirements Manual.

4.

NRC No.93-102, " Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4 HATCH UNIT 2 8 3.6-86 Amendment No 139 4

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 BASES BACKGROUND maintained at a negative pressure when the system is in (continued) operation, to conservatively ensure zero exfiltration of air from the building when exposed to winds as high as 31 mph.

The demister is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity of the airstream to < 70% (Refs. 2 and 3).

The prefilter removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protect', the charcoal from fouling.

The charcoal adsorbers remose gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The Unit I and Unit 2 SGT Systems automatically start and operate in response to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident that could require operation of the system.

Following initiation, all required charcoal filter train fans start.

Upon verification that the required subsystems are operating, the redundant required subsystem is normally shut down.-

APPLICABLE The design basis for the Unit I and Unit 2 SGT Systems is to SAFETY ANALYSES mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Refs. 2, 3, 4, and 5).

For all events analyzed, the SGT Systems are shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy 4

l Statement (Ref. 7).

LC0 Following a DBA, a minimum number of SGT subsystems are required to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process

' gaseous releases. Meeting the LC0 requirements for OPERABLE subsystems ensures operation of the minimum number of SGT subsystems in the event of a single active failure.

The required number of SGT subsystems is dependent on the l

(continued) l HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-95 Amendment No 139 l

l