ML20091M865
| ML20091M865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1984 |
| From: | Farrar D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20091M830 | List: |
| References | |
| 8702N, NUDOCS 8406120133 | |
| Download: ML20091M865 (3) | |
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/ ona First Nationit Plata, Chicago, lihnois I,
C' Addrtss Riply to: Post Offica Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 May 30, 1984 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt - Region III Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Supplemental Response to Inspection Report Nos. 50-373/84-05 & 50-374/84-05 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 References (9):
C. E. Norelius letter to Cordell Reed dated April 18, 1984.
(b):
D.L. Farrar letter to J. G. Keppler dated May 18, 1984.
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter and its attachments supplement the response to the inspection report transmitted by Reference (a).
The Commonwealth Edison Company response to the Notice of Violation was provided in Reference (b).
During a ' subsequent telephone conversation with Mr. S. Stasek of your staff, I was informed that the response was incomplete.
This supplement contains the additional information requested.
The time available to submit this supplement was the subject of a telecon with Mr.
N. Chrissotimos on May-24, 1984.
If you have any_further questions on this matter, please direct them to this office.
Very truly yours, hM W-M 4*e D. L. Farrar Director of Nuclear Licensing 1m cc:
NRC Resident Inspector - LSCS
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Attachment 8406120133 840607 PDR ADOCK 05000373~
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.y l-Io ATTACHMENT l'
L Commonwealth Edison Company LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Response to Additional Items of Concern Item l~
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Items (8 and C) in paragraph 4.F.1 of Reference (a) describe two concerns associated with miswiring of the CRD Directional Control Valve solenoids. : Station management did not expect these solenoid amphenol p^"
Econnectors to become interchanged between different CRD HCU's, based on
-specific. actions that had been taken to prevent such.an occurrence.
The l
solenoid cables had been previously tie wrapped in a manner such that a cable could only reach its corresponding solenoid.
Additionally, adjacent CRD's are not usually removed from or returned to service at the
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same' time.
In this case several CRD's were being removed for maintenance, and each'one'had an array of surrounding CRD's 0.0.S.
Also, some of the tie wraps had been removed or broken in the course of maintenance and operation, which allowed several_ cables to hang with more than normal slack.
The. combination of these two factors contributed significantly to the' crossing of the solenoid connector leads.
The station has conducted training for all licensed operators on this event.
Equipment Attendants will tne trained on this. event during OJT session 84-5 module 4, which starts on June 25, 1984.
The Shift Supervisors have also been advised.of the station's policy concerning en-masse clearing of large outages.
This practice has been discontinued.
Training on both of these topics.will be provided to all new Equipment Attendants.
Color coding of the CRD Directional Control Valve solenoids
.and cables willibe completed as soon as acceptable materials are available.
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. ATTACHMENT LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Response to Additional Items of Concern Item 2 Missing the CRITICAL DATE on this Tech Spec surveillances was due in part to a misunderstanding of CRITICAL DATES and how they are calculated.
When a CRITICAL DATE and DUE DATE were specified to be the same day some people thought the computer program to be in error.
The Surveillance Coordinators of the respective departments have been reinstructed on this program.
Also some people tended to look at only the DUE DATES and did not check CRITICAL DATES until the DUE DATE was past.
A letter to Department Heads and users of the surveillance schedule from the Procedure Manager dated April 24, 1984 re-emphasized the importance of meeting the DUE DATES, and checking CRITICAL DATES at the same time.
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also restated the purpose of the schedule; to serve as a tool for planning work loads so that manpower and equipment problems are not a cause for missed surveillances.
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