ML20091H705
| ML20091H705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1984 |
| From: | Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2NRC-4-067, 2NRC-4-67, GL-84-08, GL-84-8, NUDOCS 8406050256 | |
| Download: ML20091H705 (3) | |
Text
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- e as 2NRC-4-067 (412) 787 - 5141 Telecopy May 30, 1984 Nuclear Construction Divlelon -
Rot >4 neon PIeaa, Building 2, Suite 210 Plttelpurgh, PA 15306 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docke t No. 50 -412 Identification of Backfit Requirement Number 17 Gentlemen:
Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2's (BVPS-2) primary fire suppression system in the ~ cable spreading room is an automatic, tot al flooding, carbon pe rmanent hose s t at io ns.
dioxide system.
Backup suppression is provided by(Draft 1
SER pages 9-26 and
- The NRC staf f has informed DLC in Attachment 9-27) that this approach to fire suppres sion in the cable spr eading roan "does not meet staf f guidelines." The staf f is re<3uiring ".. the applicant to provide protection of the cable spreading room in accordance with Section C.7.c of the BTP CMEB 9.5-1."
The guidance in the BTP CMEB 9.5-1 sugges ts that the primary fire suppres sion system should be an aitomatic water system, however, gas system review guidance is provided.
The use of carbon dioxide as the primary means of fire suppression in the cable spreading room was ~ originally pr es ent ed in the BVPS-2 PSAR and was not ident ified as unacceptable by the NRC in the CP-SER.
DLC believes ~ the fire suppression system in BVPS-2's cable spr eading.
room meets the intent of the BTP-CMEB 9.5-1 guidelines and complies with the requirements of General Design Criteria 3 and 5, 10CFR50.48, and 10CFR50,
- Appendix R-(applicable to plants with OL's' prior to January 1,1979). Unless the basis for this new requirement can be demons trated as an existing regu-lation, the controls of 10CFR50.'109, GNIA 84-08, and NRC Manual Chapter 0514 identify the requirement as a backfit.
DIE requests that the-proposed requirement be submitted to NRC manage-me nt for approval, in accordance with the Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion (NRR) procedure for management of plant specific backfitting, prior to transmittal as : a licensing requirement.
DUQUESN LIGHT COMPANY By e
. f. W601ever iRW/wjs Vice President At tachment cc: Mr. H. R. Denton (w/ attachment)
Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief (w/ attachment)
Ms.' M. Ley, Project Manager (w/ attachment)
Mr. M. Licitra, Project Manager (w/ attachment)
Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector (w/ attachment) pp n0 F
cc p b eet staf# quid:l'nes. The staff will nqu+re-these--eems-te-b; arated from the main control room by 1-hour-ratad barriers, and providy s
with tomatic suppression and detection in accordance with Section C
.b of BTP CMEB S-1.
All cables enter n he control room terminate there.
No ables are routed through the control ro m from one area to another.
I re is a section of raised floor between the 'stin control board and t benchboard. All cables in:
able because cables completely the underfloor are in conduit's.(This is acce enclosed in metal conduits do not*4dd to
- e combustible leading in the area.,
l N x Ionization smoke detectors have b n insta.lyed in the control room as well as inside the individual cabinet and consoles w n the control reem.
x The applicant has pro ed an alternate shutdown system for the e;ntrol rocm.
N The alternate shu n system is reviewed in Section 9._$
this report.
\\
i air intakes for the control room's ventilation systimqre equipped O.
The outsi with oke detectors that~ alarm in the control room.
In the event lif a fire,
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smoke venting system can be manually inititated to purge smoke from, e t
cent =1 Ne, or iselsted te keep-smoke-from-enter 4*g-the-centr W recm.
Cabie Screadinn Rey
.The cable spreading room is separated from tne balance of the plant by 3-hour-fire-rated walls and floor / ceiling assemblies.
All penetrations through fire-rated barriers are fitted with 3-hour-firt-rated dampers and/or 3-hour-fire-rated penetration seals.
An alternate shutdewn system has been provided fer the cable spreading room.
The alternate shutdown system is reviewed in Section 9J of this recort.
The primary fire suppression system in the cable spreading roem is an automatic redundant total flooding carbon dioxide system.
Bactuo suopression cacability for the cable spreading room is provided by the plant fire brigade.
This does
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not meet the staff guidelines.
The staff will escuire the acclicant to provide 02/7'/84 9-26 BEAVER VA'.'.EY 2 CSER $!C
r-protection of the cable spreading room in accordance with Section C.7.c of BTP CMEB.9.5-1.
Gitch;nr ten
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The vision I and Divtsion II switchgear roems are separated from each eher and fro. other plant areas by 3-hour-fire-rated walls and floor /ceilfn, assemblies Automatic fire taction is provided by ionization smoke dete ors.
Manual
~
protection is pro ded by standpipe hose stations and porta ie extinguishers.
Floor drains have be provided in th.e switchgear rooms.
On the basis of its review, the staff conc es that the protection provi d for the switchgear room is in accordance wit. Section C.7.e of BTP CM.
9.5-1, and is, therefore, acceptable.
r' i Remote Safety-Related Panels '.
! Li
' Redundant safety-realted panels remote com the main control room will be separated by barriers having a mini a ft rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
On the basis of its review, the staff conclud - that the etection provided for remets safety-related panels meets Se tion C.7.f of B CMEB 9.5-1, and is, therefore, acceptable.
Safety-Related Battery /9eems The battery room are separated from each other and from the alance of the plant by 3-hou fire-rated barriers.
Ionization smoke detectic systems are provided in ach battery room. Hose stations and portable fire et inquishers are avai ole in the areas for manual fire suppression.
The ventila on syste s designed to maintain the hydrogen levels below 3.
Loss of v tila-tio alarms have been provided for each battery room.
On the basis of it r view, the staff concludes that the protection provided for the battery roo.
T.
esrs-4eet4er C.7 9 of ST' CMEB-975-1r-4ad4+r-therefore -aceeotable.
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