ML20091A574
| ML20091A574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1977 |
| From: | Mayer L NORTHERN STATES POWER CO. |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9105160387 | |
| Download: ML20091A574 (18) | |
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NSRB NOMTHERH STATES POWER COMPANY MlN N E A PO LI S. MIN N E S OTA 9 540%
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gf Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief 9
Operating Reactors Branch #2 O
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Washington, DC 20555 4
Dear Mr Ziemannt g
FONTICFLIO NUCLEAR GENERATING PIANT Docket No. 263 License No. DPR-22 Redundant Reactor Building Crane The infomation contained in Enclosure (1) of this letter is in response to the request for additional information attached to your letter dated February 11, 1976.
Enclosure (2) contains a number of changes and corrections to our Noiember 22, 1976 license submittal which we have found necessary during the final design stages of the redundant trolley.
Yours very truly, cx'G.1 L 0 Mayer, PE Manager of Nuclear Support Services (Chairman-Safety Audit Comittee)
LOM/LLT/ak cc: J G Keppler G Charnoff MPCA 2204 Attn: J W Feman x
Enclosures i
9105160387 770228 PDR ADOCK 05000263 l
p PDR
a Enclosure to NSP Letter dated February 28, 1977 Responses to Request for Additional Information QUESTION 1: Your submittal states "The entire crane will be evaluated for the additional weight, load requirements and operating conditions imposed by the new trolley design". Considering the new trolley weight of 128,000 pounds compared with the old trolley weight of 62,000 pounds describe and discuss how this in-creased trolley weight has been accommodated in the unmodified portions of the system without reducing the 85 ton load rating of the crane. The discussion should include the changes in the factor of safety as well as physical modifi-cations that have been made to retain the same load rating.
RESPONSE 1: An analysis has been conducted to determine the effects of the in-creased trolley weight on the unmodified portions of the system. The critical load bearing components selected for this review are:
(a) Bridge Girder (b) Crane Girder (c) Duilding Column Analysis Assumptions 1.
The weight of the new trolley is 99,000 pounds. This revised number is based on the latest evaluation of the new trolley weight.
Analysis Method The analysis methods used in this evaluation are in accordance with the applicable governing codes delineated in Table 1.
The methods used in the evaluation are in accordance with the original design criteria for Monticello, which is keeping with the statements on page 3-8 of our November 22 submittal. The design codes and loading conditions applicable at the time of the original installation did not includc the lifted load in the seismic analysis because of the extremely low probability of both events occurring simultaneously.
Results Table 1 presents a summary of the analysis results. Included in this table are the governing load combinations, applicabic governing codes, and a comparison of the original and new factors of safety.
These results indicate that the factor of safety of all critical components of the crane system with the increased trolley weight are in excess of one.
Conclusion It can be stated in conclusion that the unmodified structural system can retain the additional trolley weight together with the 85 ton rated load without exceed-ing the allowable stress ILmits.
i 1
TABLE 1 SL?C'ARY OF FACTORS OF SAFETY GOVERNING LOAD ORIGINAL NEW COVERNING ITEM W MBINATION FACTOR OF SAFETY
- FACTOR OF SAFETY
- CODE / ALLOWABLE DL + LL + I 1.24 1.10 C.M.A.A. Specification #70 Bridge Cirder DL + E 2.66 2.16 1.6 I C.M.A.A. Specifi-s cation #70 DL + LL + I 1.19 1.07 AISC Sixth Edition Crane
?
Cirder DL + E 1.26 1.16 0.9 f s
7 i
DL + SL + I 1.67 1.54 AISC Sixth Edition Building Column DL + SL + E, 1.24 1.19 1.6 I AISC Sixth Edition I
cFactor of Safety = A11ovable Stress (Feetor of Safety Against Failure Would be Creater)
Actual Stress DL - Deal Load i
LL - Live Load I - Impact SL - Snow Load E - Safe Shutdown Earthquake s
i I
QUESTION 2:
In Section 3.3, itum C.4.b you state that subjecting the hoisting machinery and reeving to either the "two block" or " load hangup" test would be in violation of the ANSI B 30.10 standard on hooks. Justify the above statement by indicating how either of these tests violetes ANSI B 30.10.
RESPONSE 2t Section 3.3, Item C.4.b incorrectly referenced A.N.S.I. r30.10.
O.S.H.A. 1910.179, Paragraph (k) (2) should have been referenced instead. That paragraph states in part that: " Test loads shall not be more than 125% of the rated load unicas otherwise rectuamended by the manuf acturer." Both the "two-block" and
" load hangup" tests would exceed 125% of the rated load.
Industry practice is to not perform the load tests on cranes in excess of 125% of rated load.
QUESTION 31 Describe, discuss and compare the peak loads experienced in the event j
of a " load hangup" by the presently proposed hoist overload protection system relative to that which would be experienced if canpliance with items C.3.j and C.3.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.104 were attained. The discussion should include con-sideration of the elapsed time before the hoist motor was tripped, the kinetic energy stored in the system, and the load change as a function of time during a
" load hangup" event, as well as the assumed distance between load blocks when the
]
hangup occurs.
j In addition, describe the tests and time intervals between the tests which will
]
verify the calibration and functional capability of the proposed hoist overload protection system.
RESPONSE 3:
The analysis requested would be nearly impossible to perform without
)
imposing highly conservative and, therefore, unrealistic assumptions on the analysis.
1 To eliminate the possibility of a " load hangup" occurring, power to the trolley and bridge motors will be locked out during the hoisting or lowering of any critical load in the equipment hatch. This is the only area in the Reactor Duilding where the potential for " load hangup" exists.
Since the potential for " load hangup" does not exist, the overload detection system will not be called on to perform any protection functions.
Iherefore, there is no need to verify the calibration and functional capability of the system.
QUES 770N 4:
Item 35 of Section 3.0 of your submittal indicates that in the event j
of a rope failure, a velocity actuated valve is actuated to create a large pressure drop across the hydraulic cylinder, causing it to act as a dashpot to reduce the shock on the intact reeving and structure.
In this regard, provide the f ollowing:
I (1) A description of the velocity actuated valve, and how the system generates the appropriate signal causing it to be actuated; i
(2)
The test methods that will be employed to verify its functional capability; and (3)
The time inte-val between the tests that verify its functional capability.
l l
l l - -.
RESPONSE 4:
(1) The velocity actuated valve operates on the principal that the pressure drop across the device is proportional to the flow rate or velocity through it.
At a preset velocity, the pressure drop is high enough to cause a piston to move, blocking the flow. In the event of a rope failure, flow of hydraulic fluid at any rate greater than or equal to the preset value of the velocity actuated valve, will be blocked from the low resistance part of the circuit.
The fluid will only have the path afforded by the sequence valves which will offer a high resistance to flow.
j (2) The system will be tested at the manufacturer's site. It stil be mounted in a suitable fixture and the cylinder rod will be activated at a velocity above the specified velocity required for actuation. 'Ihis test will verify that the proper sized velocity actuated valve has been ut.ed and that all l
connections have been properly made.
(3) The velocity actuated valves are composed of a spring and a plug in line j
with the flow of hydraulic fluid. The desfBn is extremely simple and, j
therefore, the likelihood of failure is extremely remote.
In addition we have placed two valves in series to provide protection in the event a valve j
does fail.
Therefore, there are no pleas to periodically test the velocity actuated valves.
QUESTION St With regard to the two hydraulic cylinders which act as load equali-zers, provide the following information:
(1) The means provided to detect the loss of hydraulic fluid and alert the operator; and (2) The measures taken to preclude the losa of hydraulic fluid.
l RESPON9E 5:
(1) The load equalizer cylinders are pressurized in a closed systeto, therefore loss of hydraulic fluid will result in a decrease in the closed system pressure. An electric pressure switch, included in the system, will send a signal at a specified low pressure level.
(2)
Loss of hydraulic fluid is precluded by the manifolding of all valvin8 in blocks at each end of the cylinders, with only a single tube between manifold blocks.
QlTESTION 6:
Item C.3.p, Section 3.3 of your submittal cites infomation on pages ED-19 and 20 of AISE Standard No. 6 Specification for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranca for Steel Mill P arvice, to support the statement that the 110 per-cent horsepower limitation is r compatible with the established drive motor requirements. The factor K, on page ED-19 appears to be applicable only to AC and Adjustable Voltage Motors (Without Field Weakening). Your submittal indicates that the existing General Electric Company Maxspeed drive systems utilize direct current motors in which both the field and armature currents are varied.
Provide further clarification on how the infortnation on pages ED-19 and 20 of AISE Standard No. 6 is applicable to the Maxspeed drive systems and hence that the 110 percent horsepower limitation is not compatible with the drive requirements, i
4-
l Further, from the information in Table E.4.C.2.1 of AISE Standard No. 6, it appears that the overall friction f actor for the trolley should be 12 pounds per 1
ton rather than the 15 pounds per ton used in your item C.3.p.
This value would result in a reduction in the full load running horsepower requirements and a corresponding reduction in the 110 percent horsepcuer limiterien.
With 4
i regard to the above, provide the folicving additional informationt
)
{
(1)
Explain why the 12 pounds per ton would not be the more appropriate j
value to use in this calculation; and (2) Assuming the 12 pounds per ton is a more appropriate value, describe how it alters your conclusions.
4 RESP 0NSE 61 he references to Pages ED 19 and 20 of the A.I.S.E. Manual were to shcv a typical example of the difference between the full load running horsepower 4
and the connected horsepower of a trolley or bridge. The trolley is equipped with a General Electric Maxspeed control utilizing a D.C. motor for which a table is not available. Page ED 28 of the AI.S.E. Manual states, "T..ese appli-4 i
cations should be referred to the selected manufacturer." In this case, a j
duplicate of the original two horsepcver motor was selected so that it would 1
be ccupatible with the existing control system.
ne trolley wheels are 24" in diameter and twelve pounds per ton rolling resistance could be used according to Table E.4.c.2.1 of the A.I.S.E. Standard.
j j
The lwer rolling resistance f actor would simply reduce the accelerating power j
to 1.2 pounds pcr ton.
This would result in a theoretical acceleration of 0.01932 feet per second square by the connected horsepcuer which is much lower tnan that normally used.
Further, the 12 pound per Lcn figule in this case would indicate a full load running horsepcver requirement of 1.26 and a maximum allowable connected horse-i power of 1.386. We nearest available motor size would have been I horsepower which is 119% of the full load running horsapcuer requirement (more than 1
allowed by Regulatory Guide 1.104) providing a theoretical acceleration rate of I
0.03567 feet per second square. H is accelerating rate is still much 1cuer than that nomally used.
Limiting the connected horsepcuer of traverse drives to 1107 of tha full load running torque is not practical. he increments of available motor horsepcvers would not in most cases match the requirements. The slow acceleration rates would be inconvenient for the operator and could also cause problems due to motor overheating in most duty cycles.
i QUESTION 7:
It is stated in your report that the hoist will be provided with three holding brakes, each sized "to hold 125 percent of rated full load hoist i
motor torque at base speed" that will automatically set whenever electrical pcuer is removed. Considering the changed reeving system and rope size, for each of the spent fuel shipping casks that will be handled, demonstrate that the crane hoist will not subject the various cask trunnions and handling yok* o j
considered in your evaluation to excessive deceleration loads under the follow-ing assumptions: (1) the cask is near its upper limit of travel; (2) the cask is being lowered at its maximum speed as defined by the hoist controls; and (3) the hoist experiences a loss of power.
Accordingly, in tabular form for each cask, provide the follcuing information:
l 5-m,.
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(1) 7' t,tatic factors of safety of the cask handling yoke, the cask trunnions ud.:ne voight of cask; (2)
.4.aximum Icuer.ng speed s' defined by the hoist controls; and s3) he 'e.o 1 of dynm:.ic ;ne ers
.;tch demonstrate that the cask trunnions and i
.tng y ke ha re s1ff c
.it. design margin to preclude their f ailure due to th' sa.elerarior loads c.reated by the hoist brakes.
RESP (ISE /t Analysi. )**teptions 1.
The casxs are at their upper limit of travel.
The length of rope available for stretch during impulse, loading is 58" for NFS-4 cask and 52" for IF-300 cask.
2.
The hoist t.xperiences a loss of electrical power while it is lowering the casks at its maximum speed of 5 fpm.
3.
Weights of the casks are 52,000 lbs for the NFS-4 cask and 140,000 lbs for the IF-300 cask.
4.
Each of the 24 rope parts for the reeving is equally stressed.
5.
Only the deformation of repos is considered to absorb ene kinetic energy from the suddenly stopped casks; the strain energy absorbed by the bridge girder and trolley camponents is neglected in the analysis. There-fore, the analytical results are conservative.
Analysis Methed Using an Energy Balance approach, the kinetic energy of the cask during lowering will be coverted into strain energy of the ropes when braking occurs, thus Uk U,
)
=
where 2
WY k
the cask kinetic energy U
=
g VX2 The strain energy stored in the ropes U,
=
7~
Terms are defined by W = Cask Weight U = Energy V = cask Velocity K = Spring Constant of the Ropes X = Incremental Rope Stretch g = Gravitational Constant..........
__-__._.._m.__
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Solving energy equation (1) for incremental stretch of the ropes gives l
X = V [sk /W\\
(2)
\\
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i Zhe incremental rope force due to dynamic effect is then obtained by considering l
the force displacesnent relationship of the ropes.
i Results t
j 2he analysis results are sumnarized in the following table:
1:
4 ITEMS NFS-4 IF-300 l
j Total Force due ta Dynamic Effect 136,338 lbs 286,088 lbs I
j Static Factor of Safety of Yoke 3.0 3.0 l
Static Factor of Safety of Trunnion 5.7 3.0 Dynamic Factor of Safety of Yoke 1.14 1.47 j
{
Dynamic Factor of Safety of Trunnion 2.17 1,47 QUESTION 8: Indicate which of the two IF-300 shipping cask handitog yokes will 4
be utilized in the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. Discuss and compare the relative merits and disadvantages of the two handling yokes as their requirements i
relate to the limitations at your facility.
(
j RESPONSE 8: Northern States Power Company will use the " redundant IF-300 cask yoke".
The non-redundant yoke will not be used. Drawings of the redundant yoke are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
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Enclosure (2) to I
NSP Letter Dated February 28, 1977 Changes and Corrections to Design Report for Redundant Reactor Building Crane PaRen 2-3 -- Items 4 and 6 should be revised to reflect the information contained in our Response 1 in Enclosure (1).
Pages 2-8 -- Section 2.3.2 gives the new trolley weight as 128,000 lbs.
This figure should be revised to 99,000 lbs based on the final design inf o rmation.
l Pages 2-10 -- Change new trolley weight shown in Table 2-1 from 128,000 lbs
]
to 99,000 lbs.
PaRen 2-11 -- Change the interior fleet angle shown in Table 2-1 from 1.50 to 2020'.
The maximum fleet angle had to be increased to obtain the necessary maximum hook height.
AISE Standard No. 6, Page MD-16, Paragraph M.4.E states, "The maximum allowable flect angle shall be 2.50 or approximately 1/2 inch per foot i
in frequently worked positions." The AISE specification is recognized as the most conservative of standards.
The rope inspection, replacement, and maintenance criteria of ANS1 B30.2.0-1967 are used at Monticello; and, therefore, any additional rope wear due to the increased fleet angle would be detected sell in advance of any rope failure.
Pages 2-12 -- Delete the sentence concerning dynamic braking under the
" Motor" section of 2.3.2.3.
This was included in the report because it was thought this feature was incorporated in the existing crane control system.
Further investigations of the control system indicated that it was not present, j
Paragraph C.3.M of Regulatory Guide 1.104 requires one power control braking system and two mechanical holding brakes. The regenerative braking system provides the power control braking system and there are three mechanical holding brakes on the new trolley.
Pages 2-13 -- The discussion ot. holding brakes at the top of this page indicates that all three holding brakes will set simultaneously. One of the brakes will set immediately and the other two will be sequenced by the addition of a diode and resister in the solenoid circuit which retards the decay of the solenoid magnetic field. The time interval in between each brake application will be 0.5 seconds.
Pages 2-16 and 2-17 -- Additions and deletions to Table 2-2 have been made as shown in the attached revised Table 2-2.
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Pages 3-6 -- Paragraph 3.2 states " load combinations for normal operation j
are dead load (including the new trolley) plus rated load (85 tons) plus i
i 15% vertical impact and 5% coincident lateral load."
)
Impact loading is limited to girder calculations. This was the intent of i
j the above as evidenced by the statement " including the trolley." The wording, however, indicates that impact loading was included in the factors j
of safety listed in Table 3-1.
1 j
The C.M.A.A.-70 Specification allows a maximum working stress in girders 1
]
of 17,600 pounds per square inch for A.S.T.M. A-36 steel in order to reduce j
the dead weight of cranes. This stress level is slightly less than one-i half of the yield strength of the material. The same specification limits l
all other components to a maximum normal working stress level of less than j
one-fifth of the ultimate strength of the material which is 12,000 pounds per square inch in the case of A-36 steel, and impact is not added to these j
components because of the moro conservative stress levels.
I The factors of safety listed in Table 3-1 do not include impact.
Impact is, however, included in the structural analysis for the girder shown in Response 1 of Enclosure (1).
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Component Inspection, Testing, and Certification Requirements
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temperature.
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NHC DISTRIBUTION rcm PART 00 DOCKET MATERIAL F ROM:
DAlt or oocuutN1 TO:
Northern States Power Company 2/28/77 Minneap lis, Minnesota oAtt ne ctivr o Nr. Dennis L. Ziemann L. O. Mayer 3/3/77 gfgtvTon O Not onit t o enon iNevT F onu Nuuor n or coeits stetivto D oniciN AL 16vNc L Af.SIM E o One signed copy Mkor v tNCLoSunt O( SC RIP t loN Ltr. re our 2/11/76 ltr. and their 11/22/77 itr....trans the following:
Encl. 1 - Consists of response to request for additional information regarding Redundant Reactor Building Crane....
Encl. 2 - Changes and Corrections to Design Report for Redundant Reactor Building Crane....
PLANT NAME:
ACKNOWLEDGED Monticello (1-P)
(14 P)
DO NOT REMOVE SA FE'1Y FOR ACT ION /lNFORM ATION pMP0 3/4/77 RJL I ASSIGNED AD:
ASSIGNED E ;
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Snaider PROJEC_TjiAIM_GER L_
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PROJECT MANAGEMENT REACTOR SAFETY OPERATING T C11 CAMMILL f
EISEN1iUT STEPP BOYD ROSS P. COLLINS NOVAK
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