ML20090D375
| ML20090D375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1984 |
| From: | Kober R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8407180215 | |
| Download: ML20090D375 (27) | |
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g ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION e 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001 acu n w moura
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July 13, 1984 Director of Nuclear Regulation Attention:
Mr. Donnis M. Crutchfiold, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Roquest for Additional Information Masonry Wall Design, I.E.Bulletin 80-11 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Daar Mr. Crutchfield:
Enclosed are responson to your lotter dated September 21, 1983 rogarding " Masonry Wall Design."
Those responses are made to technical questions on the construction and re-evaluation critoria for the masonry walls at R. E. Ginna Nuclear Poder Plant.
Sinco the original evaluation, tho number of safety-related masonry j
walls has boon reduced through work dono for the SEP Program (soo our letter dated April 28, 1983; Attachment 1 to this submittal).
As described in the enclosure, one additional wall has boon dolotod.
Thus, this submittal only addresses the current list of 37 safety-related masonry walls.
V.ry truly yours, 4).ML R
or W. Kober i
Enclosuro 8407180215 840733 yDMADOCK00000y44 m
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9 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MASONRY WALL DESIGN, IE BULLETIN 80-11 R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 STRUCTURAL AND GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING SECTION A INTRODUCTION As stated in the cover lettor, the number of safety-related block walls has boon reduced through work done for the SEP Program.
One additional wall, number 15 in the list provided in April, 1983, has boon doloted since the wall has been removed from the plant.
In order to respond to question #3, regarding the use of the floor responso spectra method of seismic analysis, each safety-related wall has boon roanalyzed.
The critoria used in the roanalysis were the critoria listed in the Appendix A to SRP Section 3.8.4 with exceptions taken to 3(b) and 3(c).
This re-evaluation also excluded the oporating base earthquake as a loading combination.
A detailed comparison of the differences betwoon the original 80-11 critoria and the revised critoria is listed in Attachmont 2.
The three lovels of analysis are listed below:
Lovel 1 -
Safo shutdown Earthquake (0.2g SSE)
With Appendix A to SRP 3.8.4 acceptance critoria.
Lovel 2 -
Sato Shutdown Earthquako (.170 SSE)
(Sito specific SEP carthquako)
With Appendix A to SRP 3.8.4 acceptanco critoria.
Lovel 3 -
Loyol 2 analysis with the exception'that a 1.5 overstress factor for tonsion normal to the bed joint is used instead of the SRP value of 1.3 as acceptanco critoria.
To the extent required f urthur ovaluations and modifications will be comploted as stated in the ronponso to question #15.
1
r Question:
1.
The SGEB criteria (5) do not allow an increase in allowable
[
stresses for load combinations containing OBE or wind loads.
Provide justification for the 1/3 increase in allowable stress' (Reference 3, Section 3.4.2) uned for load L
combinations (normal operating conditions).
Identify the L
affected walls and include the calculated stresses for each wall.
Also explain all conservative measures (if any) used l
in the-analysis to justify the increase in allowable stresses.
Answer:
As noted in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report of August 22, 1983 concerning the Integrated Plant Safety Assessment Report, the loads and load combinations for safety-related structures at Ginna (including masonry block walls) were defined during the Systematic Evaluation Program.
These loads included the site specific spectra for the SSE case, but specifically excluded any consideration of the Operating Basis Earthquake _(OBE), reasoning that the more severe SSE case was the major safety issue.
Thus, the Ginna masonry block walls were not evaluated to the OBE conditions.
For normal wind loadings, no increase in allowable stresses was used in the evaluation of masonry wall design.
i Question:
2.
Justify the use of an allowable stress increase factor of 1.67 for load combinations containing accident pressures or SSE loads.
This is in excess of several factors permitted by the SGEB criteria (5); they are listed below by type of stress:
masonry shear in flexural members 1.3 masonry shear in unreinforced shear walls 1.3 reinforcement takes entire shear 1.5 tension normal to bed joint 1.3 tension parallel to bed joint 1.5 2
~
1 Ifanyexistingtestdatawillbebsodtojustifythis
.increaso, factor, discuss the applicability of those tests to the walls at the Ginna plant with particular emphasis on the following:
boundary conditions nature of loads size of toat walls type of masonry construction (block or mortar type, grouted or ungroutod)
~
Ths' Licens6o is also requested to indicate the number of walls.that would 'not'bo qualified if the SGEB critoria wore tn bo'.used and,to specify the porcentages of exceedance.
The Licensco is advised to explain all conservativo measures (if any) used in the analysis to justify this increaso factor.
Answer:
The increaso f actors permittod by the SGEB critoria for load combinations containing SSE loado have boon used for the current ovaluation with one excoption.
For tonsion normal to the bed joint, a t.
incroano factor of 1.5 vs. 1.3 has boon used to qualify 2 walln.- The,1.3 factor is excouded by 10%
for wall 3-17A-5 and 7% for wall 2-21.
This corresponds to increano factors of~1.43'and 1.38, based on the actual wall stroesos, rather than 1.5.
The allowable stresses identified in,/.CI 531 include a natoty tactor of 3.
Thoroforo, the use of 1.43 and 1.38 an increase factors atill providos margins of safety of 2.10 and 2.17 ter the two walls, which are judged to be acceptable for thone limited cason.
Quostion:
3.
When the responso spoetrum mothod of noismic analysis is used, the accolorations of walls on a particular floor should be based on the floor reponso spec'trum for the floor olovation.
Ilowever, as, stated in Soction 3.5.1 of Rotorenco 3, the Liconno derives all wall accolorationn f rom the ground responao spectism.
Justify the uno of the ground responno spectrum iriatoai of tho tioor responso spoetra.
Annwort The noinmic analysis of the nafoty-rointed masonry walls han hoon redono using the responno npoetrum method.
The ronponno spectrum input for thone sofnmic analysos is banod on averaging the floor rosponso spectra for the top and bottom olovationn of tho wall, if tho wall in nupportod at both locations.
If the wall in not nupported at tho top, tho floor responno opoetrum at tho bato of the wall in unod.
3
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l Question:
4.
With reference to the reinforcement in masonry walls, the ACI S31-79 Codo specifies that the minimum area of reinforceruent in a wall in either direction, vertical or horizontal, shall be 0.0007 (0.7%) times the gross cross-sectional area of the wall and that the minimum total area of steel, vertical and horizontal, shall not be less than 0.002 (0.2%) times the gross cross-soctional area.
In view of this, clarify whether the reinforced walls at this plant moot the above i
requirements.
The Licensoo is also requested to provide the type and spacing of vertical reinforcement and the total number of vertically reinforced walls.
It should be noted that the horizoatal reinforcomont is installed to satisfy the minimum reinforcement requiremont for a reinforced wall.
With roforence to the joint reinforcement, identify the number of walls qualified by the tensilo ntrength of joint reinforcement and indicate the type and spacing of the joint reinforcement.
Based on the review of oxisting codos and published literaturo, the NRC does not, at present, approve the use of joint reinforcement, as a structural olomont.
A staff l
position on this issue is being developed and will be provided to the licensoo in the futuro.
Answor Twelvo of the thirty-seven safety-related walls aro reinforced vertically.
Of this total, sovon aro reinforced with 1 43 bar on 32" contors.
The romaining five are reinforced with 2 #3 barn on 16" contors.
The joint reinforcement is DUR-0-WAL standard truss type on 8" contors or DUR-0-WALL " extra heavy" truss type on 16" contors.
To dato, the wall panoin listed as passing in the response to question 15 have all passed an unreinforced walls.
No credit was taken for oither horizontal or vertical reinforcing.
In the ovont that any of the failing panols are modified so the reinforcement can be utilized in the wall qualification, a response rogarding this quantion will be sent to the Commission.
puestion:
5.
Indicato the boundary conditions used in the analysis and verify that they renomblo the real phynical conditions.
Identify all of the mechanisms used to transfor shear and moment (if any) with particular emphasis for walin qualified by arching action.
If any doubt oxists (i.e., whether simply supported or fixed-end conditions should be assumed), verify that the assumed boundary conditions will produco conservativo results.
4
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Answer:
-Details for the installed boundary fixes were submitted in
'the~ November 4, 1980 and the January 30, 1981 reports.
There are 29 -types. of boundary fixes which were installed.
The different types of boundary con'ditions used in the analysis are listed below.
Each wall fix type was designed to insure
'that the modeled boundary conditions were correct.
Boundary Type:
Fixed (This boundary type is representative of wall bases only)
Analysis Condition:
Joint translation and rotation restrained.
Actual Conditions:
Joint translation is restricted by reinforcing steel whic'h ties'the wall to a concrete slab, where applicable, and by mortar bond and friction.
Mortar bond and friction are reliable mechanisms since a net vertical compressive force exists at the. boundary due to wall dead weight.
Joint rotation is restricted'by the reinforcing
-steel.and by mortar tension s.trength.
.If' allowable mortar tension strength was exceeded at the boundary, then the boundary was considered pinned.
Only three walls were considered to have a fixed boundary'(st their base).
~
Boundary Type:
Pinned Analysis Condition:
Only joint translation restrained.
Actual Conditions:
Joint translation-is restricted by mortar bond, friction, and installed boundary modifications.
Details of the boundary modifications are shown in RG&E's response to I.E. Bulleting 80-11 report (ref. letter J.
E.
Maier, RG&E to B. H. Grier, NRC, dated 11/04/80 and 01/30/81).
The installed boundary modifications have-been engineered to provide support for seismic loads.
The majority of the walls analyzed have pinned boundary conditions.-
Boundary Type:
Free Analysis Condition:
No restraint.
Actual Conditions:
Joint translation and rotation are' unrestricted.
Examples are edges of wall panels where boundary supports have not been installed or are totally free, and-the edges of openings in walls.
No restraint by door f rames or components running through openings has been relied upon.
Arching Action:
Arching action has not been relied upon in the analyses.
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Question:
6.
Indicate how interstory drif t ef f ects, both in-plane and out-of-plane, were considered in the analysis.
- Also, indicate and justify by available test data the permissible strains used for both confined and unconfined walls.
Answer:
In-plane strain criteria used to verify the adequacy of the walls is discussed in " Recommended Guidelines for the Reassessment of Safety-Related Concrete Masonry Walls" prepared by the Owners and Engineering Informal Group on Concrete Masonry Walls, October 6, 1980.
The acceptance criteria in this reference is based upon an uncoupled system (separate treatment of in-plane and out-of-plane loads),
which is consistent with the FSAR seismic requirements for Ginna Station.
Evaluations indicate that the in-plane strains induced on the walls due to interstory drift are less than the allowables permitted in the reference in the majority of instances, regardless of whether a mechanism exists to induce the drift into the walls.
In the remaining instances, the implied strains would exceed the acceptance criteria if a positive transfer mechanism existed.
For these latter instances, a specific case-by-case review was conducted of the wall configuration with respect to the surrounding structure, displacements, and drift inducement mechanics.
From this review, it was judged that a sufficient mechanism does not exist to induce significant interstory in-plane drift.
It should be noted that the masonry walls at Ginna are not relied upon to provide horizontal shear load resistance (i.e., shear walls).
Out-of-plane interstory drift has no significant effect on the walls in that they can be considered simply supported between stories.
Question:
7.
Indicate whether-concrete block walls are stacked or running bond.
If any stack bond wall exists, provide' sample-calculations for stresses in a typical wall.
Also identify the number of stacked bond walls and their appropriate allowable stresses.
Answer:
All safety-related masonry block walls listed'in our April 28, 1983 letter to the NRC are running bond masonry walls, not stacked h^"d masonry walls.
6
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f Ouestion:-
8.
Reference 3 indicated that some brick walls were constructed at the plant.
Indicate the number of brick walls and specify the allowable stresses from appropriate codes used in the analysis.
If any increase factor were used for SSE loading case, justification should be provided.
Answer:
The list of safety-related masonry block walls provided to the'NRC in the April. 28,~1983 letter to Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield contains 1 wall which consists of brick.
This wall, 971-2M, is composed of 4" interlocking lead bricks.
The wall, 2 '-3" wide at the base and 5 '-4" high, was analyzed taking no credit for the interlocking effect of the brick.
It.has been. determined that the steel framing network surrounding the wall can adequately restrain the wall in one direction during an earthquake..
It has also been determined that wall failure in the other direction will not affect any safety-related equipment.
In conclusion, wall 971-2M is not dependent on any masonry. brick allowable stresses, but is, however, seismically acceptable.
Question:
9.
With reference to Section 3.2.5 of Reference 3, the Licensee indicated that accident pressure and associated temperature loads are considered only inside containment when applicable.
Provide a sample calculation (and any explanations necessary i
to make it understandable) illustrating the analysis procedures in this case.
-Answer:
-There are no safety-related masonry walls subject to pressure or temperature differentials; therefore, no analysis to consider the effect of these loads is required.
Question:-
' 10.
In Section 3.5.1 of Reference 3, the Licensee indicated that the computed stresses are increased 5%_to account for higher
-modes of vibration.
Justify by sample calculation that 5% is an appropriate percentage for multimode effects.
7 m
Answer:
The masonry walls have been reevaluated since the initial response indicated in the question.
This reevaluation has taken into account the combined effects of all modes of vibration up to 33 HZ, which corresponds to the rigid range of the floor response spectra.
For walls whose frequencies are greater than 33 HZ, the floor response accelerations of 33 HZ have been~used for the analysis.
Question:
11.
Provide sample calculations (with explanations necessary to make the calculations understandable) for:
a single-wythe wall analysis a multi-wythe wall analysis a brick wall analysis
-Answer:
There.are no multi-wythe or brick masonry walls at Ginna which fall under the scope of this evaluation.
The computer program SAP. 4 was used to determine the stress in single-wythe walls.
Wall geometry, boundary support-conditions, material and physical properties; attachment loads, and response spectra information were input into the St.P 4-program.
The program then performed static and dynamic analyses to determine stresses in the walls for the-various loads in the scope of the program.
The stresses determined by the SAP 4 program were then
~
compared to allowable stresses using-a special purpose post-processor program designed to combine stresses obtained from the static and dynamic analyses of the SAP 4 and compare the resultant stresses against allowable valves.
Attachment 3_provides sample calculations.
Question:
- 1:2.
According to Attachment 3 of Reference 3, only 84 walls were identified as safety-related; however, in a-meeting at the NRC on January 20, 1983_with regard to the use of the non-linear analysis technique (arching theory), the Licensee identified 101 walls qualified by arching theory.
Explain this discrepancy.
y-8 A
Answer:
The initial IE 80-11 November 4, 1980 submittal listed 84 safety-related masonry walls.
This number corresponded to 101-panels, a panel being a division isolated for engineering analysis.
Since the 1980 submittal, the number of safety-related walls has been reduced to 37.
The 37 walls now correspond to 56 panels.
RG&E has been involved with technical meetings on arching action as a potentia _1_ method for qualifying block walls, however, no wall qualifications have relied on any non-linear analysis techniques, including arching.
Question:
13.
Indicate how the uncertainties due to variations in mass, materials, and sections properties were accounted for in the analysis.
Answer:
The response spectra used in the seismic-analysis of the masonry walls were broadened by 15% to account for uncertainties in the analytical model compared with the physical structure.
Question:
14.
Indicate whether collar joint strength has been used in the analysis.
If so, provide and justify the allowable stresses of the collar joint.
Answer:
~
There are no multi-wythe masonry walls within the scope of this evaluation; therefore, it is not necessary to use collar joint strength to qualify any walls.
Question:
15.
Confirm whether all modifications have been completed and the-modified walls are.in compliance with the SGEB criteria..
Answer:
All modifications to walls, based on analysis to the original criteria, were completed at the time of the report.
9
Of the current 56 safety-related panels, the modifications installed under the original re-evaluation criteria result in 29 panels meeting the SGEB criteria.
For the remaining 27 wall panels, RG&E will use the following evaluation methods to determine wall qualification requirements:
(1)
At present, a wall is considered safety-related if equipment is located within one full wall height of the base of the wall.
RG&E will investigate the justifi-cation of using less than one full wall height, if applicable, on a wall-by-wall basis.
If it is concluded that the collapse mechanism is such that the equipment is not hit, no further evaluation is required.
(2)
If a wall failure can impact safety-related equipment, additional analyses will be performed to determine if in fact the equipment is actually damaged and inoperable.
If the equipment can withstand the wall impact and remain operable, no modification will be performed.
(3)
Modifications to protect safety-related equipment potentially' impacted by wall failure will be designed and installed so that wall failure has no safety consequences.
(4)
Wall modifications will be designed and installed such that the wall will meet the re-evaluation criteria.
Question:
16.
Explain how earthquake motions in three directions are treated in the analysis. -Indicate whether any walls are subject ~to in-plane loading.
If so, provide a sample calculation illustrating how the well is qualified with respect to the SGEB criteria.
Answer:
Three directions of earthquake were considered in the analysis by evaluating walls for both vertical plus out-of-plane and vertical plus in-plane load combinations.
The vertical plus out-of-plane load combination was found to be the limiting load case in the analysis.
All walls in the plant are subjected to in-plane loading, and as stated above, this load combination was evaluated.
Sample calculations for an in-plane eva.'
_on are provided in of this report.
Question:
17.
Explain and justify how cracked and uncracked moment of inertia was calculated.
10
Answer:
A cracked section analysis was performed on one wall panel.
Due to the minimum reinforcing available in the evaluated
' panel, rua significant benefit was gained f rom the cracked section analysis.
No walls, to date, have been qualified using cracked'section analysis.
Uncracked moments of inertia were calculated using conventional mechanics taking into account the cellular configuration on the masonry units.
Question:
18.
In Attachment 4 of Reference 3, the Licensee provided the test data for the compressive strength of concrete masonry walls.
Provide the basis for selecting those five specimens for testing and indicate whether they represent the variety of material construction in all buildings.
Since no detailed records relating to the masonry block walls construction were
' maintained, justify the strength of the mortar used in the analysis.
Answer:
The Intermediate Building _at Ginna.contains the majority of safety-related block walls ~ listed in our April 2 8','
1 9 8 3 submittal.
These walls are all unreinforced.
Three concrete masonry units were removed from this building; two 12" hollow blocks and one 8" hollow block.
Twelve inch wide hollow block constitute approximately 55% of the 37 safety-related walls at Ginna and 8" hollow blocks constitute approximately 45%.
Two concrete blocks were removed from the control building where the majority of reinforced walls exist.
The basis for selecting samples was representation of the greatest number of similar wall thicknesses and block configurations (i.e.,
hollow unreinforced or hollow reinforced).
A specification, SP-5360, which controlled all the masonry work for the turbine, auxiliary and intermediate buildings, was reviewed this specification required mortar in accordance with ASTM C270-64T, Type N.
Based on the controlling construction specification for masonry wall work, the strength of the mortar has been jusitifed for reanalysis.
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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
- 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649 XHN E MAIER ftLt. oht v.c. prne.nt anta coor m 546 2700 April 28, 1983 i
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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield, Chief i
Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
SEP Topics II-2.A, III-2, III-4.A, and III-7.B
" Structural Reanalysis Program" - Block Walls
Dear Mr. Crutchfield :
In our April 22, 1983 submittal, " Structural Reanalysis Program for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant", RG&E provided our recommendations for structural elements which should be considered for upgrade to withstand tornado effects.
The basis for selection of these structures is noted as those which are required to assure:
o the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, o
the capability to shut the reactor down and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and o
the capability to prevent accidents which could result in offsite exposure in excess of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
Based upon the safe shutdown scenario discussed in Section 3.5 of the April 22 report, the attached list indicates those walls that RG&E currently considers safety-related and whose integrity must be maintained to assure safe shutdown.
Specifically, RG&E stated that the block walls whose failure could damage required main steam and feedwater line components in the intermediate building, and those which would affect the spent fuel assemblies, should be considered for upgrading.
No other block walls potentially exposed to tornado effects are considered as safety-related.
Several other block walls are located such that tornadoes could not cause any structural damage, and thus were not evaluated in the April 22 report.
However, using the same safety design basis, the following additional walls are considered safety-related:
'2 2
5
. c o
Control building walls which could damage vital equipment in'the battery room, relay room, and air handling room;
- and, o
Walls which are internal to containment, as listed in our response to I.E.
Bulletin 80-11, submitted by
. letter of November 4, 1980.
Very truly yours,
$ 8 G
J.
E. Maier
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Yl SAFETY-RELATED MASONEY WALLS
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~RG&E DWG. AND IDENTIFICATION
- 1 Control 33013-971 1C
.2 Control' 33013-971 2C 3
Control 33013-971 3C 4 '.
Control 33013-971 4C 5~
Control 33013-971 SC L
6
. Control
.33013-971 6C
' Control 33013-972 1C
'7 8
-Control
'33013-972 2C 9
- Control 33013-972 3C 10-
-Control'
-33013-972 4C 11 Control 33013-972 5C 12
. Control 33013-972 6C fl3
-Control-33013-973 3C 14 Control' 33013-973 4C Control' 33013-973 SC (TR 15 WM ' HAS 6EGJ 16.-
' Auxiliary 33013-973 16A
' REabvE9) 17
' Auxiliary 33013-973 17A-118.
" Containment 33013-971 1M 19.
' Containment
-33013-971 2M 20 '
Containment
-33013-971 3M R21 Containment-33013-972 1M 22 Containment 33013-973
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-23 Contaimsent' 33013-973 2M
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.24 In termediate 33013-972' 11
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' Intermediate 33013-972 2I 26 Intermediate.
33013-972 3I 27' Intermediate 33013-972 4I 28-Inte rmediate 33013-972 SI
'29 Intermediate 33013-972 61 30
= In te rm'ed ia te 33013-972 71 131 Intermediate 33013-972 BI 32-
- Intbrmediate.
33013-972 91 33' Intermediate 33013-972 10I 34 Intermediate 33013-972-ll!
.35 Intermediate 33013-972 12I 36
~ Intermedia te 33013-973 Part of 11 37 Intermediate 33013-973 llI(P) 38.
Intermediate 33013-973 91(P)-
- Referpnced drawings were1 submitted as part of-the I.E.
Bulletin 80-11-Response-submitted November 4, 1980.
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ORIGINAL 80-11 CRITERIA AND THE REVISED CRITERIA (1)
The floor response spectra method of seismic analysis has been used in the revised criteria.
(2)
The OBE loading case is not addressed in the current criteria, therefore, eliminating the use of the 1.33 overstress factor.
. (3)
The 1.67 allowable overstress value has been replaced by the overstress factors listed in 3 (d) of Appendix A to the SRP Section 3.8.4.
Two-exceptions to this criteria have been made and are described in the answer to question 2.
(4)
The damping valve for the SSE case was increased from 5%'to 7% to be consistent with Appendix A to the SRP Section 3.8.4.
(5)* For Level 2 analyses, a site specific ground acceleration of
.17g for the safe shutdown earthquake was utilized.
The floor response spectra have been generated by directly ratioing the.20g SSE acceleration floor response spectra developed for the piping seismic upgrade.
(6)
In the revised criteria interstory drift effects are included in the analysis as required by SRP 3.84 Appendix A item 4f.
(7)
In addition to evaluating walls for attachment loads of either 15 PSF or 5 PSP, the revised criteria allows a
. reduction in attachment load if it can be justified as representative of the actual field condition.
(8)
A value for the compressive strength of masonry, Fm',
has been calculated based on the compressive strength of tested blocks for-the new criteria.
The original seismic criteria did not have any floor response spectra.
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