ML20087P569

Forwards to a Specter Reiterating Governor Thornburgh Position Re Proposals for Restart

ML20087P569
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	12/16/1983
From:	Wright F PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:	Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 8404090173
Download: ML20087P569 (3)

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December 16, 1983 Dr. Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In view of recent events, Gov. Thornburgh asked me to share with you this reiteration of his administration's position regarding proposals for.the restart of the Unit 1 nuclear generating facility on Three Mile Island.

'. - Sincerely, f&Y Dr. Frank Wright Secretary for Policy and Planning S

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, HARRISBURG l December 15, 1983 Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senate Room 331, Russel'1 Office Building Washington, D.C. 20500 Dea.r Sen. Specter:

I want to thank you for this opportunity to reiterate Gov.

Thornburgh's views concerning the question of restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1. .

1 particularly want to note that your. interest and concern for the safety of those who live in the shadow of Three Mile Island is well-known here in central Pennsylvania, and I commend you for your continuing efforts on their behalf. .

As you know, Gov. Thornburgh repeatedly has stated that he will remain opposed to the restart of TMI Unit 1 until and unless he receives adequate assuran'c'es that it can>be operated safely, and until and unless there is a funding mechanism in j place for completing the' radiation cleanup'at TMI Unit 2.

• The governor told the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory

-Commission (NRC) last June that these conditions had not been met and that he was particularly concerned at that time about a variety of outstanding questions which ,could directly relate to the safety. issue.

He felt then, and he continues to feel, that all such.

questions, including those related to competence and integrity, -

should be resolved prior to restart, not the other way around.

In a written response dated July 14, 1983, commission Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino assured Gov. Thornburgh that the -

NRC would make no decisions regarding the restart of Unit 1 until such issues had, indeed, been addressed.

While the Governor's Office has yet to receive.any official communication from the NRC regarding a staff pla~n to reverse this order, we are aware of published reports in.which the staf f seemed to propose, .in effect, restarting Unit 1 first and. answering the outstanding questions later.

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. .- .e We were samewhat reassured by subsequent reports quoting

' Chairman Palladino as saying that no restart decision is imminent, although the staff procedural recommendation appeared in the same news accounts to be on the commission's

- agenda. The governor continues to feel that such a procedure not only would be totally inappropriate, but inconsistent with  !

the spirit of Chairman Palladino's statement of July 14.

Some progress in resolving restart issues has indeed.been made since the governor expressed his reservations of last June. GPU Nuclear signed an agreement with the commonwealth, for example, stipulating that it would not allow TMI-1 to be operated by any individuals found to have cheated on their qualifying examinations. Yet, several other'important issues remain to be resolved, particularly those relating to competence and integrity.

The governor believes that public safety must be the primary concern and principal objective of the operators and

. regulators of nuclear. power facilities. He believes the NRC should reject any proposal to separate competence and integrity issues from TMI-1 restart, but rather resolve these issues prio~r to any decision on the future of Unit 1.

Copies of the Governor's letter of June 2 and Chairman Palladin'o's response of July 14 are attached for your record.

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Dr. Frank Wright

. Secretary for Policy-

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1. i e{ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM* WON WA.SHlWG TO N. D. C. 20548 *

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July 14,1983 CHAIRatAN --

-The Honorable Richard Thornburgh

• Governor of Pennsylvania Harrisburg, PA 17120

Dear Governor Thornburgh:

-Unit This 1. responds to your letter of June 2,1983 regarding Three M In that letter you expressed your concerns with regard to three issues action with that regard youto believed restart: should be resolved before the Comis (1) the pos'sibility that THI-1 would be operated by persons found to have cheated on their qualifying examination; (2) as safely as it should; andthe possibility that the cleanup at i

(3) the possibility that the levels of operator competence and is entitled to expect. integrity at TMI may not be as high as tho ,

With regard to your first concern, you further explained that'it would b

, inappropriate for the Comission to.act on restart prior to' hearing the comonwealth's appeal on the' operator cheating issue. '

i We note the stipulation between the Comonwealth and GPU Nuclear, filed 11,1983 July and the appended Motion to Withdraw Appeal, in which the Comonw to withdraw concerning its appeal and the licensee agreed to specified conditions TMI-1.

! The Comission plans to consider the integrity of the individuals responsible for operating TMI-1 prior, to authorizing any re .

Comission is investigating the allegations ,oftheunsafe pr The Comission has decided that the' allegations of unsafe pracs at TMI-2. .

together with other allegations that the NRC is investigating, raisetices at TMI

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L The Comission does not plan to act on restart of Unit i '

satisfied safely from operated. the relevant parts of those investigations that Unit 1 can be .

Finally, the NRC staff itself has raised additional questions about management competence and integrity.

L of these matters. The staff is undertaking further re. view The parties to the TMI-1 restart proceeding will be **

provided an opportunity to coment on the resulting staff reports to the Comission before the Comission reaches a final decision on re Comission!dressed.will not make a final decision on restart until those questions-

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Comissioner Gilinsky adds: "Nothing is more importarit to a decision on whether to.pemit TMI-1 to restart than a favorable assessment of the integrity of GPU's top management. My own conclusion at this point, which is set forth at greater length in the enclosed draft separate opinion, is that there is sufficient infor-mation.in the record to conclude that the top management of the Company -- and by that I mean the Chairman of the Board of GPU, the President of GPU, and the Pres- "

ident of GPU Nuclear -- should be changed." -

Comissioners Roberts and I .believe Comiss'ioner Gilinsky's decision to be pre-mature. My responding views are also enclosed.

Sincerely

. s Nunzio J. Palladino

Enclosures:

As stated L

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- Dr. Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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I am writing because of suggestions that the time has come for your commission to authorize restart of the Unit 1 nuclear generation station at Three Mile Island.

Nearly four years ago, I asked this commission,to postpone any decision regarding Unit 1 restart because a number of

.and seriousotherhealth, issuessafety, had yet environmental, to be resolved. operational, management I believe the commission acted poning its restart decision. in the public interest at that time by post-Nearly two and one-half years later, on Nov. 24, 1981, I repeated to this commission my. concern that any action by the NRC to allow restart of TMI Unit 1 be preceded by adequate .

assurances that this facility can be operated safely.

7 Today, more than four years after the March 28, 1979 ac'cident at the nearby TMI Unit 2 facility, I must advise you that while progress has been made, adequate safety assurances have not been fully provided with regard to Unit 1, either to me or to the people of this area. ,

My reservations are now principally focused on the poss- '

ibility, to which this Commonwealth has objected, that TMI-1 would be operated by persons found to have cheated on their -

l qualifying examinations, the possibility, raised by engineering technicians and others, that the radiation cleanup of the '

damaged TMI-Unit 2 may not be proceeding as safely as it should, and the possibility, raised last month by the NRC staff itself, that the levels of operator competence and integrity at TMI may not be as high as those which the public is entitled to expect. '

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ed, these kinds of questis  ; also could p ' ,- ,- Left unresc seriously jeoparcize the substantial progress we have made in ensuring that the Unit 2 cleanup will be adequately funded under the cost-sharing plan I advanced in 1981.

I believe, in fact, that all of these concerns bear on the.

safety assurances I have directed this Commonwealth to seek since 1979. .

A prompt, thorough and effective investigation and public

- resolution of those issues raised in the Commonwealth's appeal of August 20, 1982, and those raised by your staff and by workers at the plant itself, is -absolutely essential before this '.

commission seriously entertains any. action with regard to -

restart.

Before these issues are resolved, I would find it dis-turbing, indeed, for the commission to take action on restart.

I would find it particularly inappropriate for the commission to take such action prior to hearing this Commonwealth's appeal on the operator cheating issue.

On behalf of all who live within the shadow of Three Mile Island, all who believe that public health and safety must be the first concern of those who see a future for commercial nuclear power, and on behalf of the integrity of the commission and the regulatory process it represents, I once again urge you and your colleagues to postpone any decision on restart until these issues have been satisfactorily addressed and resolved. . .

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Dick Thor

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• Commissioner Roberts

• Commissioner Asselstine 1

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$ ,E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 l March 19, 1984 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Specter:

This responds to your letters of December 8 and 18,1983. Your letters expressed concern over the Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI-1) possibility of aevidentiary prior to further decision on the restart hearings of Three on manage-ment competence and integrity. Your letters then take issue with the length of time the TMI-1 proceeding has taken. The Comission's current views and plans regarding TMI-1 restart are set forth in the attached Notice to the Parties, which was issued on January 27, 1984. In addition, I believe it would be helpful in addressing your concerns to place the issue before the Commission in proper perspective.

The adjudicatory proceeding to determine whether TMI-1 should be allowed to restart, begun in 1979, is still underway. While there are no evidentiary hearings currently in progress, a Comission Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board is in the process of reviewing the Licensing Board's decision on the management issues and the cheating incidents. This process is termed the " merits review," and any decision by the Appeal Board will then be considered by the Comission.

The Appeal Board has concluded that sufficient information has already been provided to justify reopening the hearing record dn the subject of the Hartman allegations regarding the THI-2 leak rate falsification. The Comission stayed that decision to preserve the status quo and took review to determine whether the reopened hearing should be stayed until after the Office of Investigations completes its TMI-2 leak rate investigation. While that matter was pending before the Comission, the Department of Justice requested the NRC to postpone its investigation until after the criminal trial against Metropolitan Edison Company, and the Comission agreed to

cooperate with the Department. Since the criminal proceeding has been l recently terminated, the Comission is in the process of determining what steps should be taken next.

The question presently before the Comission on management issues is whether those issues justify continuing the immediate effectiveness of the original shutdown order prior to completion of the merits review. In resolving this question, the Conunission must decide whether it now has sufficient informa-tion to conclude that the management problems which led to the issuance of the immediately effective shutdown orders have been corrected and there is reasonable assurance that the plant can and will be operated safely. While the Comission can, as part of this review of whether or not to lift immediate effectiveness, require the temporary separation of certain individuals from nuclear operations, it cannot permanently revoke the TMI-1

i The Honorable Arlen Specter license or permanently bar individuals from working at TMI on the basis of the review of immediate effectiveness alone. The decisions the Commission can reach on the basis of this review of whether or not to lift immediate effectiveness are either to authorize restart, with any appropriate conditions, prior to completion of the merits review, or to allow the merits process to be completed prior to making a final decision.

Sincerely,

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Nunzio J. Pal adino

Enclosure:

As stated

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h, f g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W AsHIN GTON, D.C. 20655 DOCKET,ED M .h jj y* *"* ci4/ January 27, 1984 ,84 &! 27. .P4 :15 cFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  ; -

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"Z ! *. . .L. :,,;,,[(, ,-g SERVED JAN27 7934 MEMORANDUM FOR: Parties to the TMI-1 Resta Proceeding

, FROM: -Samuel J. Chilk, Secreta Q

SUBJECT:

TENTATIVE COMMISSION VI SLND PLAN FOR i RESOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT IN'JEGRITY ISSUES' PRIOR TO RESTART

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On_ October 7, 1983, the Commission' issued a Notice to the Parties setting forth "the Commission's current estimate for completing reviews of the various issues that might possibly affect the decision whether to restart TMI Unit 1." The Commis-sion stated in the Notice that, given the estimated time neces-sary to resolve those issues, it was " prepared to consider alternative approaches for dealing with the management competence and integrity issues."

The Commission subsequently had an open meeting on November 28,

. 1983 to hear from GPU on such an alternative approach, i.e.,

GPU's June 10, 1983 management organization proposal, as modified. The Commission heard from the other parties on r December 5, 1983 on GPU's proposal.

The commission has also provided the parties an opportunity to comment on staff's response to the GPU proposal, and as a separate matter, an opportunity to comment on a list of integrity issues in the TMI-1 restart proceeding.

The Commission has decided to inform the parties to the restart proceeding of its current views on certain critical management integrity issues and the Commission's plans for reaching a final restart decision. These views and plan are those of a Commission majority. The additional views of Chairman Palladino and Commissioner Bernthal and the separate views of Commissioners Gilinsky and Asselstine are attached.

The Commission emphasizes that this memorandum is provided only to keep the parties informed. It is not a restart decision and does not authorize restart. As explained further below, these current views and plans are subject to change, based on consideration of parties' comments on the list of integrity issues and other matters, and on any other important new

information.

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2 Current Views i

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The Commission has tentatively concluded that, in principle, temporary separation from nuclear operation of some GPU '

employees and other actions, including those proposed by the licensee, can serve as an interim solution to the management integrity issues raised by the "open items," pending resolution of those items.' In this regard, the Commission presently believes that the only ongoing investigation which may require r l

further resolution before a decision on the management issues is the Unit 1 leak rate investigation. The Commission intends to obtain additional information regarding that matter before making a restart decision.

.( With regard to specific individuals, the Commission's view, based on currently available information, is that neither 4

Chairman of the Board William Kuhns nor President of GPU Herman Diechamp will have to be temporarily or permanently separated from nuclear operations prior to restart. The Commission may, however, require restrictions beyond those. proposed by the licensee. This may include requiring that certain additional individuals be separated from nuclear operations pending completion of the ongoing NRC investigations of integrity issues or of the TMI-2 leak rate criminal trial.

Plan for Restart Decision i

After reviewing further information concerning the TMI-1 leak rate matter and the parties' comments both on the list of integrity issues and on staff's response to the GPU proposal,

'(' the Commission will issue a tentative draft decision on the management issues for comment by the parties. After reviewing the parties' comments on the draft decision, the Commission will l

then issue a final decision on management issues. The Commission believes that this process provides the possibility for reaching a decision on whether to lift the immediate effectiveness of the original chotdown orders.

The Commission's process for making a decision on the management issues will not affect the ongoing Appeal Board merits review of those issues, or affect the other ongoing investigations. Those investigations will continue and any individuals involved in wrongdoing will be subject to possible enforcement proceedings, as appropriate. The Commission's decision will prescribe the l

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' conditions that will apply for any individuals who are to be

, _spparated from nuclear operations.

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The Commission still has under consideration resolution of 'th'e' ~-

hardware issues in the TMI-1 restart proceeding,'nd a whether or not the license amendment concerning the steam generator repair involves a "significant hazards consideration." Those issues are being addressed separately. ,

Given present planning, the Commission intends to follow th'is , ,

approach and hopes to-i.ssue a decision on whether to lift the - ,

immediate effectiveness [of the 1979 shutdown orders by June,

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• ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN PALLADINO t

. I VOTED FOR TODAY'S ACTION BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT OFFERS A REASONABLE APPROACH TO MAKING THAT LONG-DELAYED DECISION ON i

WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW RESTART.

WHEN THE COMMISSION MAKES THAT DECISION, WHICH I HOPE WILL

BE BY JUNE 1984, IT WILL BE CALLED UPON TO JUDGE THE COMPETENCE AND INTEGRITY OF THE MANAGEMENT OF TMI, UNIT 1.

L A QUESTION WE ADDRESSED IN TODAY'S ACTION IS WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY TO AWAIT THE COMPLETION OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL- AGAINST METROPOLITAN EDISON BEFORE WE ATTEMPT TO REACH A JUDGMENT ON COMPETENCY AND INTEGRITY. .I.BELIEVE. .,

THAT A JUDGMENT CAN BE REACHED BEFORE COMPLETION OF THE i TRIAL IF CERTAIN GPU EMPLOYEES ARE TEMPORAP.ILY SEPARATED

-FROM NUCLEAR OPERATIONS AT TMI-1 DURING THE TRIAL. WE WILL DESIGNATE THOSE. PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE CONDITIONS FOR THEIR

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SEPARATION, IF WE'MAKE A DECISION TO ALLOW RESTART.

I WE ALSO ADDRESSED TODAY WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEPARATE THE MOST SENIOR MANAGEMENT OF GPU, THE CHAIRMAN AND THE PRESIDENT OF GPU, IN ORDER TO MAKE A DECISION ON

.WHETHER OR.NOT TO ALLOW RESTART. MY VIEW IS THAT THE PENDENCY OF THE OPEN~ ITEMS INCLUDING THE CRIMINAL TRIAL'

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- SEPARATION FROM NUCLEAR OPERATIONS. THE DECISION IS YET TO '

BE l'ADE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE TMI-1 ORGANIZATION POSSESSES

-THE REQUISITE MANAGEMENT COMPETENCE AND INTEGRITY TO OPERATE THE PLANT.

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COMMISS10f1ER BERf1 THAL'S ADDITIONAL VIEWS It is evident from the Commission's memorandum to the parties, and I am sure from public representations of several Members of the Comis-sion, that the central question addressed in this memorandum is the fitness for further duty, so to speak, of certain high-level management individuals, who have been in their positions of responsibility through-

'out the troubled history of the Three Mile Island facility. I should

,- add that, beyond these two individuals, no clear difference between my i

position and that of.any of my colleagues on the Comission has yet been defined.

While one may question the , judgment of the governing board of licensee in permitting such an issue to distract for so long from the real questions of licensee preparedness and competence to resume opera-tion of the' undamaged TMI-1 reactor, the responsibility of the NRC must go beyond opinions and perceptions. The NRC must not lose sight of its

'- fundamental responsibilities and obligations. It must provide first and foremost fur the public health and safety by' evaluating competence and, l{

to the extent that it touches on public health and safety, integrity of

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L' licensee management. Second, it must consider the rights of the

. licensee and the public that licensee serves. In the matter of Messrs.

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Kuhns and Dieckamp, there is currently no evidence, bearing adversely on L their integrity or competence which would dictate their removal from L-l: their present positions. Should any such new evidence come to light, as i

" a result of ongoing investigations and proceedings, however, the 3 Commission always has remedies at its disposal.

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Indeed, at least half of my dissenting colleagues have clearly

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stated many times for the public record their judgment on Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp even before the criminal indictments now lying against licensee (not against Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp), had ever been handed down by the Department of Justice. Therefore, the question of the outstanding indictment against licensee, was and is apparently not the underlying issue.

Rather, the issue has frequently been represented as responsibility of the comander for the actions' of his subordinates. I do not believe that it is the province of the NRC to make such judgments, in the absence of reasonable evidence and based only on such facile metaphors, inappropriately presented in the context of martial discipline and analogy.

The responsibility of the Commission is simple and straightforward.

It is to ask and answer the single question: Can the current personnel of the reorganized General Public Utilities nuclear division be expected to operate TMI-1 consistent with the NRC's standards and regulations providing for the public health and safety.. .

Indeed, it would be highly in' consistent and incongruous if the f

Comission now, in considering this single question, were to require removal:of Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp on the grounds of the NRC's public h

l health and safety responsibilities, while it has', to my knowledge, never even seriously considered such action with respect to the continued

[ operation of the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant, a plant that is presently licensed.to generate electiicity, under the same senior j f management personnel.in question here.today, and un der t eh same NRC th at l is responsible for meeting the requirements of law and judgments in i

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.- 3 protection of public health and safety for TMI-1. I, for one, would be hard pressed to argue that high-level GPU management, should be remov'de or quarantined from the TMI-1 operations, but not from those at Oyster Creek. Moreover, I believe that the Comission has, by its very inaction over the last several years in respect to the operation at Oyster Creek, already agreed with the premise of my decision today.

Integrity is the most important and valuable personal trait any of us possesses. It is, in my judgment, unwise and unjust for anyone,

. especially those who are in positions of public trust, to impugn the

'- integrity of any individual without substantial evidence that his or her integrity has been compromised. Nor is there any evidence that these two individuals are incompetent or otherwise unfit to perform their responsibilities as executives of General Public Utilities, without somehow rendering the operation of either Oyster Creek or Three Mile Island Unit-1 unsafe.

In sumary, the Comission has a duty to the public served by licensee, and to licensee to determine whether the hardware and person-nel of GPU and specifically of TMI-1 are qualified, competent, and

.. prepared to allow the plant to resume operations, consistent with the Comission's responsibility to protect public health and safety. With respect to the top-level management of GPU, it is high time that the Comission spoke to that issue. This action today does so. It.does not address in detail, nor have I yet reached a conclusion on any of the other outstanding personnel, hardware, and procedural issues related to

'TMI-1 restart.

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SEPARATE VIEWS OF COli?ilSSIONER GILINSKY TMI-l RESTART - PJWAGEMENT INTEGRITY ISSUES It goes without saying that I do not agree with the three Commissioners who have embraced GPU's proposal for dealing with the management integrity' issue--the critical issue in this case in view of the numerous instances of wrongdoing by

. the Company. The Commission majority has, in effect,

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brushed aside this central question. The majority's approach would leave in place the Chairman of the Board of Dire'ctors and the President of the Company, the two chief executive officers who have been in direct control of the l operations of GPU and its subordinate companies since before the accident.- The three Commissioners have argued that j these individuals were and are removed from day-to-day

-operations and that they have not been shown to be involved l[ personally and directly in the wrongdoing committed by GPU.

Nor would the majority hold them accountable for GPU's grudging response to instances of cheating and lying by its staff.. This is sharply at odds with NRC's tenet that the actions and example of the top utility managers are key to safe plant operatipn."

l There is an altogether unseemly contrast between the C Commission's solicitude for the persons at the top of the corporate pyramid and its microscopic examination o'f, and v v v - -, p , - , em ..,-- . , - - - . .- ,, w-.-- ----- . - , , . - - . . - - - - - . - - .,-

handwringing over, the lapses of minor actorc in the TMI accident. (It is impossible to adequately convey this upside down view without quoting from the transcripts of closed Commission meetings. I can only hope they will be released before- long. ) In reality, persons at the working level by and'large do what is expected of them. The climate for rightdoing or wrongdoing is set by those at the top.

The Commission majority has also brushed aside the criminal 7

i indictment of the Company that operated the TMI plant and which is still headed by the same chief executive officer.

The majority argues that that Company, Metropolitan Edison, ,

! has been replaced as licensee by GPU Nuclear, but this is little more than a paper change. The majority also argues that since no criminal indictments have been brought against individuals, there is nothing for the Commission to take -

into account in its restart decision. While-the possibility I

j has been raised that several GPU empl'dyees may be "qua'rantined" pending the outcome of the criminal trial, it is clear that the Commission majority has decided that no outcome of the trial can affect their decision since no individual verdicts will be rendered. This ignores the fact that the criminal indictment of the entire Company is a far i more serious matter than would be individual indictments of L

operators or supervisors, and that such an indictment weighs j pore heavily against the Company's management.

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The Commissioners'. split over this decision involves far core than a different interpretation of the facts; it

amounts to a vastly different view of the responsibilities of this agency in assuring that nuclear power plants are operated by competent and trustworthy organizations. The majority has Adopted the narrouest interpretation of those responsibilities. What the NRC should have learned from its experience with Three Mile Island and other problem plants is that timid regulation is'to no one's advantage; in the 7

i'- long run, not even that of the utilities.

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l DISSENTING VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE ,

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' I do not agree with the majority's decision to proceed with a plan that would allow the restart of THI Unit 1 prior to the completion of five NRC investiga-tions relating to the integrity of the licensee's management. Stripped to its )

essentials, the majofity's. decision amounts to an acceptance with few, if any, modifications of the GPU proposal for restarting TMI-1 before completion of the management integrity investigations. As the NRC staff has recognized, this

. approach will permit the restart of TMI-1 before the Comission has the infor-mation needed to reach a final conclusion on whether the present management of  :

the GPU Nuclear Corporation has the proper character to operate the plant safely. Although there are conditions under which I could approve restart of THI-1 in advance of the completion of the management integrity investigations, those conditions are not met by the majority's plan.

Last year, the NRC renewed or began five investigations bearing directly on the ir.tegrity.of GPU management. These investigations covered: (1) the Hartman allegations that leak rate tests. for TMI Unit 2 w'e're falsified; (2) information on possible leak rate test falsification for TMI Unit 1; (3)the ,

Parks, Gischel, King allegations that GPU management or others attempted to intimidate or harass individuals who questioned whether procedural requirements relating to the. clean-up of TMI-2 were being followed; (4) GPU involvement in a material false statement violation for failure to provide copies of internal GPU reports, including the RHR'and BETA reports, to the NRC; and (5) GPU management involvement in modifications to the draft Keaten report. The first

.of,tfeseitems--thefalsificationofleakratetestsatTMIUnit2--isalsothe S

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subject of the first. criminal indictment of a utility for violating NRC safety requirements in the history of the commercial nuclear power program.

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In the case of the TMI-2 leak rate falsification issue, the agency already possesses sufficient information to lead senior members of the NRC staff to conclude that such test falsifications likely did occur, but we do not have access to the infornation developed by the Department of Justice investigation that served as the basis for the criminal indictment of the utility. As the Department of Justice has recognized, 'the infonnation supporting the indictment

(-

- may well be of value to the NRC in evaluating the significance of the leak rate test falsification issue for present TMI-1 management. Given the Justice Department!'s request' that we not interview some 43 individuals who were involved with the operation of TMI-2 at the time of the suspect leak rate tests, it is clear th' ta our investigation of the TMI-2 leak rate falsification issue cannot be completed until after the conclusion of the criminal trial. It 1

also appears likely that this Department of Justice request will limit our ability to complete the TMI-1 leak rate investigation, the Parks, Gischel, King g investigation and the investigation of the Keatenereport as well. In the case

" of the TMI-1 leak rate investigation, in' particular, the NRC Office of Investigations staff responsible for conducting the investigation have concluded that the TMI-1 leak rate falsification issue cannot be resolved l

without interviewing a number of individuals on the Justice Department list.

This means that investigations'of the TMI-1 operators will likely continue

, beyond the June 1984 date targeted by the majority for restart of TMI-1. Quite I

apart from the management integrity issue,'the NRC staff has expressed- safety I

.. concerns about the operation of TMI-1 with operators who are under the stress

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- of a continuing NRC investigation.

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The GPU plan embraced by the majority attempts to deal with the problem of the incomplete investigations by: (1) preventing those who were assigned to regular duty as TMI-2 licensed operators at the time of the accident from serving on TMI-1 licensed operators; (2) providing some additional internal GPU oversight of TMI-1 operations; and (3) requiring the resignation of Robert Arnold as President and a Director of the GPU Nuclear Corporation. However, even the NRC staff acknowledges that the GPU plan leaves in place at least seven or eight individuals'in the GPU-TMI-1 organization who are potentially involved in the areas under investigation, including persons in responsible

'k- high-level management positions in the Company. As the staff notes in its comments on the GPU plan:

If restart is approved prior to completion of the various inves-tigations, the possibility exists that subsequent investigations or court proceedings will produce negative information bearing direct-ly on persons in responsible management positions. This might require further reorganization [of the licensee's organization] or shutdown [of the plant] . . .

The majority's endorsement of the GPU plan amounts to an assumption either that the investigations when eventually completed will, find no wrongdoing by the k, TMI-1 organization other than the former TMI-2 operators, or that any wrong-doing will reflect only on a few individuals and will not call into question the overall management integrity of the TMI-1 organization. At the present time, the information available to the Commission simply does not support such an optimistic assumption. Indeed, as the NRC staff notes, there is every possibility that the investigations will lead to the opposite result. Given this state of affairs, I cannot support the majority's restart plan or the wishful . thinking that underlies it.

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As I mentioned at the outset, there are conditions under which I could support restart of TMI-1 prior to the completion of the criminal proceedings and th'e-

.NRC investigations. One acceptable option would be to bring in an outside organization, with an established record of competence and integrity in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants, to manage the operation of TMI-1.

A second option would be the removal, until the completion of the NRC inves-tigations and any subsequent hearings that may be required, of the remaining individuals in the GPU TMI-1 organization who are potentially involved in the matters under investigation. Like Commissioner Gilinsky, I would pay particular attention to those individuals in responsible management positions.

In the years since the Three Mile Island accident, the Commission has repeatedly stressed the critical role of management in the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It is most unfortunate that, when put to the test, the Commission has -failed to sustain this principle with its actions.

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION , , , ,

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f. ; WASHIN GTON. D.C. 20555 ,

'; '+$ \*' # February 13, 1984

""** '84 FE 13 P4:19

_ OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CI?. . .hT'

";Eis?!"a50-7JLies%r .

""nie" SERVED FEB 141984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Parties to the TMI-1 Restart Proceeding FROM: William L. C1 ments ng Chief, Docketing and Service Branch

SUBJECT:

REVISED VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL ON MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY

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On January 27, 1984, the Secretary to the Comission issued a Memorandum-( . entitled " TENTATIVE COMMISSION VIEWS AND PLAN FOR RESOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY ISSUES PRIOR TO RESTART". Attached to that Memorandum were the views of Chairman Palladino and Comissioners Gilinsky, Asselstine and Bernthal. Comissioner Bernthal has since revised his Additional Views; they are attached for your infomation.

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. COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL'S ADDITIONAL VIEWS It is evident from the Comission's memorandum to the parties, and I am sure from public representations of several Members of the Commis-sion, that the central question addressed in this memorandum is the fitness for further. duty, so to speak, of certain high-level management individuals, who have been in their positions of responsibility through-I should

. out the troubled history of the Three Mile Island facility.

add that, beyond these two individuals, no clear difference between my position and that of any of my colleagues on the Comission has yet been defined.

While one may question the judgment of the governing board of licensee in permitting such an issue to distract for so long from the real questions of licensee preparedness and competence to resume opera-tion of the undamaged TMI-1 reactor, the responsibility of the NRC must .

The NRC must not lose sight of its go beyond opinions and perceptions.

It must provide first and l fundamental responsibilities and oblig'ation's.

l foremost for the public health and safety by, evaluating competence and,

[f integrity of in

. to the extent that it touches on public health and safety, licensee management. Second,"it must consider the rights of the In the matter of Messrs.

f licensee and the public that licensee serves.

l Kuhns and.Dieckamp, there is currently no evidence bearing adversely on their integrity or competence, which would dictate their removal from I

! Should any such new evidence come to light as l

their p_ resent positions.

a result of further investigations and proceedings, however, the II Commission always has remedies at its disposal.

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.; g At least half of my dissenting colleagues have clearly stated many times for the public record their judgment on Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp,c even before the indictment now lying against licensee (not against Mr.

Kuhns and Dieckamp), had ever been handed down by the Department of Justice. Therefore, the question of the outstanding indictment against licensee was.and is apparently not the underlying issue.

Rather, the issue has frequently been represented as responsibility

.of the commander for.the actions of his subordinates. I do not believe that it is the province of the NRC to make such judgments in the absence

(- of reasonable evidence, and based only on such facile metaphors and representations, as though the analogy and language of martial discipline were appropriate to this matter.

The responsibility of the Commission in this case is simple and straightforward. It is to ask and answer the single question: Can the current personnel of the reorganized General Public Utilities nuclear division be expected to operate TMI-1 consistent with the NRC's standards and regulations providing for the public health and safety.

Indeed, it would be highly inconsistent,and incongruous if the

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Connission now, in considering this single question, were to require removal of Mr. Kuhns and Dieckamp on the grounds of the NRC's public

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health and. safety responsibilities, while it has, to my knowledge, never even seriously considered such action with respect to the continued operation of the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant, a plant that is permitted to generate electricity today, under the same senior management personnel in question here today, and under the same'NRC that

. is responsible here today for meeting the requirements of law and judgments in protection of public health and safety for TMI-1. I, for

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3 one, would be hard pressed to argue that high-level GPU management should be removed or quarantined from the TMI-1 operations, but not from-those at Oyster Creek. Indeed, I believe that the entire Comission has, by their very inaction over the last several years in respect to the operation at Oyster Creek, already agreed with the premise of my decision today..

Integrity is the most important and valuable personal trait any of us possesses. It is, in my judgment, unwise and unjust for anyone, especially those who are in posi.tions of public trust, to impugn the

( integrity of any individual without substantial evidence that his or her integrity has been compromised. Nor is there any evidence that these two . individuals are incompetent or otherwise unfit to perfom their responsibilities as executives of General Public Utilities, or that their continuing to do so would somehow render the operation of either Oyster Creek or Three Mile Island Unit-1 unsafe.

In sumary, the Comission has a duty to the public served by licensee, and to licensee to determine whether the hardware and person-nel of GPU and specifically of TMI-1 are qualified, competent, and i( *g prepared to allow the plant to resume operations, consistent with the

' Comission's responsibility to protect public health and safety. With respect to the top-level management of GPU, it is high time that 'the.

Comission spoke to that issue. This~ action today does so. It does not address in detail, nor have I yet reached a conclusion on any of the other outstanding personnel, hardware, and procedural issues related to

-TMI-1 restart. ,

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E UNITED STATES

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f NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 N COMMISSIO o.***

CHAIRMAN March 19, 1984 Go'tornor of PennsylvaniaThe urgh Honorable Richard Th Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17109

Dear Governor Thornburgh:

I am writing to respond to yo Dr. the statement of your ur andWright letter positi  ;

present of January 24, 1984, in a letter dated December 16onto us by as transmitted Island,Unit your position regarding, 1983.

1 (TMI-1). the restartThese lettersof Th ree Mile restart which are onset was issued forth Januarys and 27plans inregarding theThe TMI-1 Commissi ,

3 Parties is not Commission's intended position attached on erest to b TheNotice

, 1984 Notice to tothethe , Parties i was issued only to keep the a full art.

partiexplanation of the views and pla'ns discussedes inAsthe N in the Notice stated based on consideration integrity issues and other of parti informed, and the curre,nt it new information. otice are subject to change es' comments matters, and onon theother list of , .

any import ant for completing the cleanupYour letter suggests that a

for restart of TMI-1. ofwe TMI-2 should be a prerequisitish m

maintainedprotection of public While health believe and that adequat e e

the cleanup,. the Commission is concernedsafety is currently being We because do not believe restart of TMI-1 of unc , however,about the slow pace of funding will help resolve tho ertainties aboutthat holding up the the legal authority to conditiaddition, se funding problems.THI-2 In the Commission cleanup solution for the cleanup of TMI ncluded2 that it doeson a not have  !

on .

restart of TMI-1 funding Nevertheless, we continue to help bring about a safe and e examine alternative

' review issue. what can be done when xpeditious we that would cleanup,s consideration of new aIn recent Congressional testiaddress the TMI-1 cleanup.lity possibi of obtacleanup of West Valley.pproaches, or the  !

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,e ng superfund financing for TMI 2I would -

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2 Commissioner Asselstine does not believe that the Commission should request additional legislation, such as legislation similar to the West Valley Demonstration Act, to provide large-scale Federal funding for the cleanup of TF1I-2. In his view, any legislative proposals of that type should come from other Federal agencies that have more direct responsibilities for such initiatives. Commissioner Asselstine also believes that the likelihood of favorable Congressional action on a Federal funding program for the TMI-2 cleanup is not high.

Furthermore, he is concerned that a Commission legislative proposal for Federal funding of the cleanup would serve as a disincentive to obtaining the additional voluntary financial commitments-that are an essential part of your plan for funding the cleanup.

The Commission agrees that issues of management competence and integrity should be resolved prior to a decision on restart, and is trying to do so. The adjudicatory proceeding to determine whether TMI-1 should be allowed to restart, begun in 1979, is still underway. While there are no evidentiary hearings currently in progress, the Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board is in the process of reviewing the Licensing Board's decision on the management issues and the cheating incidents. This process is termed the " merits review," and any decision by the Appeal Board will then be considered by the Commission.

The question presently before the Commission on management

. issues is whether those issues justify continuing the immediate effectiveness of the original shutdown orders prior

.to completion of the merits review. In resolving this t question, the Commission must decide whether it now has t

sufficient information to conclude that the management problems which led to the issuance of the immediately effective shutdown orders have been corrected and there is l

reasonable assurance that the plant can and will be operated safely.

While the Commission can, as part of this review of whether or not to. lift immediate effectiveness, require the temporary separation of certain individuals from nuclear operations, it l cannot permanently revoke the TMI-1 license or permanently bar l ' individuals from working at TMI on the basis of the review of immediate effectiveness alone. The decisions the Commission

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can reach on'the basis of this review of whether or not to L lift immediate effectiveness are either to authorize restart, with any appropriate conditions, prior to completion of the merits review, or to allow the merits process to be completed prior to making a final decision.

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3 As indicated in the attached Notice to.the Parties, our purpose is not to separate competence and integrity issues from the restart decision but rather to resolve them. A decision-on restart, when it is finally made, will be accom-panied by an explanation of the manner in which the Commission took account of the issues of integrity and competence, as well as hardware.

Sincerely,

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-Nunzio J. alladino

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Attachment:

As stated l

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ARLEN SPECTER COMMf7Crs:

.. wh JUDICIARY APPROPRfATl1lN1

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'21Cnifeb Sfales Senafe W ASHINGTON. D.C. 10$10 Dacamhar 8, 1983 h Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino -- --

01 airman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory (bninission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am very much cancerned by the report that the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Comissian has rewm=:ded that Diree Mile Island Unit 1 be authorized to operate ct 25% power with comencement as early as January 1984. Any such action would be unjustified and contrary to appropriate assurances to safety which the public has a right to expect. ,

ht authorization would contradict assurances which I have received frm the Comissicn's General Counsel who responded on November 23, 1983 to my earlier letters stating that "'Ihe Comissian intends to assure the questions about GPU's

- management cmpetence and integrity are adequately resolved prior to making a decision on restart."

As yoa know, I had written an voly 29 and November 17, 1983, urging that the Comission give assurances that there be no restart of M-1 until the record was reopened and adjudicatory hearings held an unresolved management issues, including the Hartman allegations and other issues enumerated in NUREG 1020, the material

. false statements concerning operator cheating, and General Public Utilities' failure to adhere to NRC quality assurance requirenents in the course of the clean-up of DII-2.

In the absence of hearings on this state of the record and in light of the recent indictment of Met Ed for criminal misconduct in its operation of M, as well as the nore then seven angoing investigations by the NRC Office of Investigations into M management integrity issues, how can the Comission even consider authorizing i the restart of M Unit 1 with so many unresolved questians about the integrity and w e tency of the corporate managers?

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I am also very nuch concerned about the operaticn of the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission'itself _an this inportant matter. h se issues have been pending for a l protracted period of time and really should have been resolved lang ago. Frcm all l points of view, including management at GPU, there should be a cmpletion of the investigation so that wrongdoing would be exposed or exoneration would be presented, whatever is warranted by the facts. I have been involved in many emplex investiga-tions and know that these matters can be concluded at a much faster pace. Would you please let me know when you anticipate concluding the inquiries an the issues raised?-

'Ibe acciaant and its aftermath have caused great erosian of public confidence in the NFC as well as GPU.- 'Ihis confidence can be restored and doubts surrounding GPU management cmpetence and integrity resolved only through evidentiary hearings.

'Ihese hearings must be held praptly before a decision on restart is considered.

Sin ~ ly, D

Q Uh J f>f d & C .

Arlen S m.

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'.'.of.. 'o UNITED STATES P o N'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g E WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 l C

....R.o$ November 23, 1983 l

The Honorable Arlen Specter ,

United States Senate

! Washington, D.C. 20510 ,

Dear Senator Specter:

~

Thank you for your letter of November'17, 1983 concerning the restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1. We have also provided a.

copy of that letter to the parties to the restart proceeding.

In your letter you point to several recent developments and 1 urge the Commission to reopen the record and hold hearings on

• the management competence and integrity of General Public Utilities (GPU). The Commission intends to assure that the questions abo't u GPU's competence and integrity are adequately-resolved prior to making any decision on restart. We will outline the steps currently underway below.

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l On August 31, 1983 the Appeal Board reopened the management *

! record for further fofmal evidentiary hearings on the so-called Hartman allegations. On October 7, 1983 the l

Commission took limited review of that decision and requested the views of the parties on whether it should stay the hearing until after the Office of Investigations has completed its l

! investigation. The Commission also requested comments on whether the other~pending investigations

• relating to GPU management competence and integrity should be completed before any action by the Board on the issues raised in those

allegations. The Commission stayed the reopened hearings to preserve the status quo until it further addressed the matter.

The. Commission has recently received the parties' comments on that issue. The Commission is in the process of evaluating L-those comments, and, after doing~so, will decide whether the investigations should be completed prior to holding any

-hearings.on these matters.

The . Commission also stated. in an October 7 Notice to the Parties that it is willing~to consider alternative substantive approaches to the management issues in its restart decision.

To that end the Commission scheduled the November 28 meeting

' to hear from GPU, to be followed by a meeting on December 5, 1983 to hear from the other parties. After hearing from the

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parties the Commission hopes to provide further guidance to the parties on the method of resolmtion of the management competence and integrity issues.

Sincerely,

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• 4 Herzel . E. Plaine. '

General Counsel r; .

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VETERMet* APPAlRE ETTI: led Mddss M984d4 w e am..o.a.smo Deoster 18, 1983

. 5:c.16.r.ic Palladino Chai2ran, Nuclear Regulate:y Ccmission 1717 11 S*:reet, !#i Weahirgton, D.C. 20355

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Dear chaiman Palladino:

Bassi on the tasticory fmn a haaring which I conductai last Friday, h6 16, 1963, I an writinir to urge the NBC to hold WM.ly the necessary haarings to r resolve the oestaniing issaes rega: ding 'IMI, At that hearing, scxre twenty-five witnesses testiffsi representing citirens' gn;ups, the 1GC, CPU, state senators, the state Chadbar of Caana ce, ceurdy acrroissioners ani rayers.

7Ihat hearirg disclosei:

1) anortcus 1mblic wenxy about the Isotmnanistion of the tec staff to restart 'INI unit 1 before peniing ingairies on safety and cxrnpany actrpetency and integrity are concludad:

2) substantial concern by @U and n.tclear industry preponents about the future of nuclear anargy-in light of the long delays in resolving the 'IMI retters

3) serious questions absut the cxxqpetency of the 100 to perfom its Congunssional Mandata as erMM in the applicable Faiaral Statutes.

As the reooci unfoldal, there have been a nultiplicity of prosselings involviry the NIC ktself, the tGC Office of Investigation, tha NRC Special Ingd.ry Croup, the Atanic Safety and Licensing Tward, the Atxznic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board arzl the Special Master.

A significant part of the hearing focuset on why the mI investigatiott has nc$

been concludai since a3:nost five years have elapsed since the incident of March 2Bi i 1979. Mr. Denton of the IE staff testified:

"It is inexplicable why it had taken five years to.get here.k It is totally unamat*.Able, as mildly as I can p.it it, to have no rational *)us-1 fica-tion for the intolerable delay.

A rajor cutstanding gaesticn has been the opntinuation of Mr Fahns and $ g Dieckarp in CRPs man -= L When I spoke to them last Tuesday, Deceber 13, 1983, I tes astoniahad to find that no one frem the IE had emer gaastfbnpi either of thma abcut their knowledge of or involvment in falsifistion of reoards, cyw.ah cheatina or other allegations.cf w:Un;Jdoing. In the intervening two days until tha hearity of Deostbar 16, 1983, there was finally exne lirited gaesticnibg of Mr. Fuhns ani th Dieckmqp by 1GC representatives. It certainly is a curious osincidence that no one questions 1 those GEU officials for trore than fcur years and eight conths, but did so in the tse days batWeen their appearances at e office and my hearing. I am not sug-gesting in any Mty that either Mr. Fahns or Mr. Diockarp were involved in any wrong-doing; kut I do believe they, as well as all intarosted parties, were antitled to have that matter resolved at an early date.

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Cr. the basis of this recnid, it is rf judg:nent that the NPO is 5.tilty of non-feesaner., in failing to act avgly to discharge its stabt:::ry duties an the 'I.w !

ir 'acnt. "diis is the rcet invertant issue in the history of the nelear 1.9.un=y which the 100 is chargad with regvJ.athy, a-d it is and has been entitled to prie:.i'.y treaCNtnt.

W @ of central Pennsylvarla, the p.iblic generally, the c epeny, the

% a.-d the G.,..se are antitle* to ana,ers cr. the 'ac incidsf whi6 ha.-

been perdi.g for al.' mart five years, h UZ' theuld cortplete the hearirg prooter, and let the chipi fell whars they iay to tha*. those at fault will be ousted d tha in. .L esone:ruted.

3 At Pridsf's hearing, your counsel confinnad that the IGC itself cattid h:dd the necesr,ef hearirgs ard rerder the releva:tb judgnents. I urge that the Irr itself h:4d aud hearings ard make tiose judgments under an appropriately tight ti.W.ie .

S yo Arlen AS/ag 4

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f cO M M O N W E ALT H OF P C N N Te V LVA N I A Orrect or Tsc GovcRNon hARRISFURG 14 JM 26 gg mg THE GOVCRNOR bftfc 4 yl/ .

January 24, 1984 BRANCH

Dr. Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Commonwealth is in receipt of NRC staff's re-sponse to GPU's. management proposal and I want to take this opportunity to reiterate my views concerning the question of restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1.

As you know, I have repeatedly stated that I will remain opposed.to,the restart of TMI. Unit 1 until and unless I. receive adequate assurances that Unit 1 can be g

operated. safely, and until and unless there is a funding mechanism in place for completing the radiation cleanup at TMI Unit 2.

In my letter to you of June 2, 1983, I expressed my. view that a variety of questions, including those related to management competence and* integrity, should be, resolved prior to restart, not the other way around..

In your written response dated July 14,.1983, you provided assurances that the NRC would make no decisions regarding the-restart of Unit 1 until such issues had, indeed, been addressed.

I believe that the NRC staff's recommendation, which would permit the conditional restart of TMI-l

! in the face of unresolved issues related to competence and integrity, would be inappropriate and inconsistent with the spirit of your statement of~ July 14.

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.- -g Dr. Nunzio Palladino Page two .

Public safety must be the primary concern and principal objective of the operators and regulators of nuclear power facilities. In the interest of public safety, the NRC should reject any proposal to separate comp,etence and integrity issues from TMI-l restart, . but rather resolve these issues prior to any decision on the future of Unit 1.

S',cere y yours, ck T rn rgh.

Govern r e

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