ML20087C289

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Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR52, Design Certification for Standardized Advanced Reactors & Sys 80+
ML20087C289
Person / Time
Site: 05200001, 05200002
Issue date: 08/02/1995
From: Kingsley O
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: Hoyle J
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-60FR17902, RULE-PR-52 60FR17902-00003, 60FR17902-3, NUDOCS 9508090125
Download: ML20087C289 (4)


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PROPOSED RULE N 6R August 2, 1995 beFRM909 Mr. John C. Hoyle, Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC) - REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING 10 CFR PART 52 DESIGN CERTIFICATION FOR STANDARDIZED ADVANCED REACTORS TVA is pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the proposed design certification rules for the two evolutionary Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) designs: General Electric's Advanced Boiling Water Reactor and ABB-CE's System 80+. Given the similarity of the two proposed rules and the programmatic nature of our comments, we have elected to provide a single response to the two Notices of Public Rulemaking. The comments that are contained in this letter are equally applicable to both proposed rules noticed in the Federal Register on April 7,1995 (60FR17902-17947).

As a member of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), TVA strongly endorses its specific comments on these proposed rules. In addition, we note the importance of achieving a mutually agreeable resolution of these comments to the future of nuclear energy in this country.

For several years, TVA has been a leading supporter of the industry effort to develop a new generation of nuclear power plant designs. We have done so because we believe that having the option to build new nuclear generating stations in the future is an important contributor to assuring the long-term competitiveness of the United States in a global market. We have found the cooperative efrorts between the nuclear industry and the NRC, particularly as reflected in 10 CFR Part 52, to be very encouraging. Passage of the 1992 National Energy Policy, which endorsed the concepts embodied in 10 CFR Part 52, provided further encouragement by demonstrating the country's commitment to developing a viable nuclear option.

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s John C. Hoyle Page 2 August 2, 1995 We have also been encouraged by the NRC's issuance of Final Design Approvals for both of the evolutionary ALWR designs. The issuance of these documents represents the culmination i

of many years of hard work on the part of the industry and the NRC to produce ALWR designs that are technically sound from a safety perspective. Both the industry and the NRC can be proud of what has been accomplished through this process: more robust designs with improved levels of safety, simultaneously achieving higher levels of performance and lower costs than the previous generation ornuclear units.

This progress, however, is now threatened by many of the provisions contained in the proposed Design Certification rules. The future nuclear industry can only remain viable if the promise of 10 CFR Part 52 to resolve regulatory issues early and with fmality is achieved.

Several provisions in the proposed Design Certification rules are contrary to this essential measure for success. A number of the comments submitted by NEI directly address this concern, but we wish to emphasize the following specifically.

Differences in the levels of safety significance of design information are recognized in o

the establishment of tier I and tier 2 material. Tier 1 establishes a higher standard of control on the most important aspects of plant design, including substantial barriers to l

changing designs in these areas. Changes to tier 2 are permitted through a 10 CFR Part 50.59-like process, recognizing the lower relative level of safety significance for these design aspects. The proposed rules, however, would eliminate finality of regulatory approval for design changes, even if those changes were implemented in a manner fully consistent with the approved change proc'ess. This poses an unacceptable level of risk to anyone who may be constructing or operating an ALWR by introducing the potential for hearings and intervention regarding minor

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design changes and exceeds the level of control that exists on today's operating units.

Design finality must be retained by changes that are made in a manner consistent with j

the requirements established in the rule.

i While the rule establishes finality for those issues specifically addressed in the mie, it o

fails to preclude the introduction of new issues in the future. It is essential that the design certification rule not only conclude that the design is acceptable relative to the review that is documented, but also that the review itself was entirely sufficient to establish design acceptability. Failure to establish this level of cor.ridence in the mle itself presents the potential for introducing new issues at any point in the future, seriously degrading the value of the certification rule in achieving finality.

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Mr. John C. Hoyle Page 3 August 2, 1995 The proposed rules introduce several " applicable regulations" which are inconsistent o

with the primary purpose of design certification. Design certification is intended to establish the acceptability of the design. The applicable regulations, on the other hand, establish t!o criteria by which the acceptability is to bejudged. The certification itself, by establishing acceptability of the design, obviates the need for such new criteria.

Furthermore, the indefinite terms used in the proposed " applicable regulations" effectively precludes finality in these areas by opening the possibility for differing interpretations of the requirements in the future. This opens the potential for regulatory-driven backfit requirements without the corresponding requirement to determine that such changes are essential to achieving required levels of safety.

The ALWR designs being certified through these rules incorporate a number of o

features responding to postulated severe accidents. It is important, however, that the rules not impose requirements related to severe accidents that are inconsistent with the risk that these event:; pose. Particularly troubling is the requirement that all aspects of the severe accident analysis be considered in making 10 CFR 50.59-like changes throughout plant life. This is an onerous requirement that fails to consider the relative value of such efTorts on overall risk.

Each of the above issues is discussed in detail in the NEI comments along with others of equal importance. They are listed here to illustrate areas in which the proposed design certification rules introduce programmatic aspects that are contrary to the promise of 10 CFR Part 52 and the National Energy Policy Act. TVA has invested considerable effort and money in the development of the ALWR over the past years. Certifying these designs is an important milestone to providing a nuclear energy option in the United States. Design certification, however, will only have value if the rule fully embodies the principles of 10 CFR Part 52. The current proposal contains a number of factors inconsistent with this goal that seriously compromise its value and may bring continuation of the domestic ALWR effort into question.

We strongly urge the NRC to work with the industry in resolving comments on the proposed rule so that the certification milestone advances the progress toward the improved nuclear option that both the industry and the NRC have been so diligently pursuing.

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o-Mr. John C. Hoyle Page 4 August 2, 1995 t

i cc: Mr. Charlie Brinkman ABB/ Combustion Engineering 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 94304 Mr. Joe Quirk General Electric Company Bldg. J, Room 1090 MC 782 175 Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Mr. W. H. Rasin Nuclear Energy Institute 1776 i Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Ron Simard Nuclear Energy Institute 17761 Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006-3708 i

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