ML20087C148

Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR52 Re Std Design Certifications for Us Advanced BWR & Sys 80+ Std Designs. Endorses & Supports Positions Set Forth in NEI Comments

ML20087C148
Person / Time
Site:	05200001, 05200002
Issue date:	08/04/1995
From:	Bruschi H WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-60FR17924, RULE-PR-52 60FR17924-00005, 60FR17924-5, DPC-NR0375, DPC-NR375, NUDOCS 9508090064
Download: ML20087C148 (6)

Text

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Howard J BruscN oMNCH Genereiuareger Myanced Tectfdagy August 4,1995 DOCKET NUMBER Mr. John Hoyle PROPOSED RULE _ Ka Secretary of the Commission g gcpg United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5

Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Branch Attention:

Comments of Westinghouse Electric Corporation re: Proposed R'utes: standard De<gn Cenifications for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor and the Sys

Subject:

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80+ Standard Designs

Dear Mr. Hoyle:

Westinghouse Electric Corporation (* Westinghouse") submits the following comme f

h'U.S.

the invitation for comments on the proposed rules for Standard Design Certifications or t e j

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor and the System 80+ Standard Designs 160 Fed. Reg.17902 17924 (April 7.1995) (Docket Nos.52-001 and 52-002)]. Westinghouse has panicipated development by the Nuclear Energy Institute ("NEl") of its set forth in the NEI comments. The purpose of these Westinghouse comments is to provid Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") with additional insight into Westinghouse co cenain aspects of the proposed rules with respect to the change process, changes by des certification applicants, finality and applicable regulations.

Westinghouse has submitted to the NRC an application for Many of the determinations made in connection with the present design certification ih the ABWR and System 80+ may serve as precedent for the processes to be used in connec i

i the certification of the AP600. Accordingly Westinghouse has a substantial interest in mak ii ith that the design certifications currently undergoing rulemaking contain appropriate prov s ons w respect to such processes so that designs certified by the NRC will provide a viable option to the U. S. utility industry when future plant orders in this country are being Westinghouse underscores NEI's concerns over the significant process deficiencie design cenification rules which, if not corrected, cast su senous and significant nature which need 'to be corrected in the final rule to insure the workability of the licensing process for standardized nuclear power plants.

When the NRC added Part 52 to its regulations in 1989 to provide for the issuance of early permits, standard design certifications and cornbined construction permits a NRC declared that its action was intended to achieve "carly resolution of licensing is 0

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il 18,1989)]. However, the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants." (54 Fed. Reg.1537 ifi ation rules two of the goals of Part 52 - certain of the procedural provisions in the design cen c being proposed for the ABWR and System 80+ will have the contrary effect. In ma E

proposed design certification rules will introduce even more uncertainty than exis Commission to correct the

licensing process. Westingboose believes it is important for thedeficien Commission and by the nuclear industry.

Dere appears to be a fundamental philosophical problem with respect to certain p h

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the design certification rules. De rules reflect a reluctance to accept the discipline intended Part 52 licensing pmcess was established - that once a pmposed standard design ha and the Commission has issued a design certification rule with respect to that design. all matter resolved in connection with the i= a of that rule will be treated as resolved by tio Commi This philosophical problem accounts for the very narrow concept in the proposed d rules of what will be accorded finality and the denial of finality even to matters which are s hearing and resolution in the design certification rulemaking proceedings. He pedblem seen in the denial in the proposed rules of finality to proprietary information, safeguards inf and wadary references which are submitted to, and reviewed by, the NRC as part of it dd the design certification applications. Even under the Part 50 process, such information is acc finality. The failure of the proposed rules to provide finality to safety issues within th design unless those issues are discussed in the Design Control Documem ("DCD") o Evaluation Report ("FSER") and the failure of the proposed rules to provide finality to' iss hsigin to the adequacy of the standard designs are reflections of a philoso Dis same philosophical problem also is the underlying reason for the inappropriate in l

proposed design certification rules of " applicable regulanons" and the vague, alm i

t f the to the proposed applicable regulations. Including broadly-worded applicable regulat ons as p design cenification rules appears to be the result of an a process.

Similarly, the philosophical problem is behind an unwillingness in the proposed r utilize the long-s:anding NRC regulasory practices under Section 50.59 without the int new concept which would define an "unreviewed safety question" in relationship t has previously reviewed and approved the issue. %is radical departure from prio procedure will have the effect of prohibiting vinually all changes to the standa d

prior NRC approval, thereby destroying the applicability of the Section 50.59 p plants.

in short, the processes contained in the proposed desgn certification rules turn the

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NRC Pan 52 licensing process from one of early identification and resolution of s more stable, predictable licensing process to one which undermines standardizatio l.

discourage the type of commitments necessary for the development, appmval an 1

final designs. Westinghouse believes it is necessary for the Comnussion to go back t h

i d pted review the rulemaking record underlying Pan 52 and the Commission determmations w en t a Part 52 and to impose discipline in such a manner that the f

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the standardization process. In the Westinghouse view, the battle for standardization, an i

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ality the future of nuclear power in the United Scares, will ultimately be won or lost not on y on t e 254M.00M WM 2

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(of the designs which are being proposed, but on the quality of the designs and which can either enhance or destroy the' utility of the des t

proposed design cenification miemakmgs represents a defeat for s]

With this fundamental philosophical problem in mind, Westinghouse h i

comments to specific aspects of the proposed design cenification rules, e

Change Process The notices of proposed rulemaking ("NOPR") p l

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change involves an issue that the NRC staff has not previously approved" o i

h 1791217913). T ese inconsissent with the resolution of an issue in the FSER (see 60 Fed. Reg. at d 10 provisions are contrary to the provisions of NRC regulations in 10 C CFR Section 50.59 and should be deleted from the final rule.

.l priorNRC approval Section 50.59, which is incorporated by referenc i

i d in terms of change to the plant technical specifications. An "unreviewed safety questio f

tion in tenns of the impact of the change on safety. The NOPR, by defining an unreviewed sa e whether a maner has previously been approved or resolved by the NRC, wou NRC practice and procedures dating back to the 1960's No reason depanure, which would fundamentally alter the way the NRC implem iiS tion 50.59 proposed new standard cannot be justified on a safety basis, s'mce the cune h

os d requite NRC approval for any change which adverse establish a new critenon or different criterion. How ide an 11,1995 t allay our accurate explanation of the current practice under S i

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warranted and will adversely affect the usefulness of the certified designs.

The change process contained in the proposed k

i Tier 1, a change changes in Tier 2 without prior NRC approval unless the change involves a c d

in technical specifications or an unreviewed safety question. Howeve ii ik rules would require consideration of changes in the severe accident risk a bd e and evaluations. As discussed in the NEI comments, this requirement would b is neither necessary nor desirable. In seeking to apply Section 50.5 id nd PRA probabilistic evaluations the rules would go far beyond the goal of p i

' insights and would require evaluations on maners not important to d not impose this j

systems having no safety-related function. Westingh di l ss

' attractive as an alternative for providing power in the future.

by Desirn Certificeian Aeolicanti CP k

The proposed design certification rules would not permit a design c bX2) and the changes to Tier 2 using the Section 50.59 - like change process. (Sectio h

s under a proposed design cenification rules allow a COL ap ill contain m.omsw 3

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l i d all information necessary for the NRC to reach a final conclusion on all safety q licants after with the design, additional design work will be performed In i h believes there will be the course of performing this detailed design development, West ng ouse h occasions when potential improvements in Tier 2 of i

li ant should be under a 50.59-like process, Westinghouse believes that a design certificat on app c li ation. Such allowed to make such changes until a design has been referenced in the first license h

h ges authorization will benefit standardization and will promote regulatory efficiency b l because l

would become requirements for all plants that reference the design certification. Con li ld end when the the ability to make such 50.59-like changes by the design of standaniization by allowing such a process.

Finality in adopting Part 52, the NRC was concerned with finality -- that is, with the p d if too achievement of enhanced safety which' standardization n.akes possible would be f frequent changes to either a certified design or the plants referencing Section 32.63(a)(4) thus states that them shall be t d

during the design certincation were not to be rereviewed by the NRC or rel h the licensing proceedings. The concept of finality was critical to achieving sthbili Part 50 Part 52 licensing process. Reteview and relitigation Part 52 process.

i The proposed design certification rules, however, represent a retrea ld result in design information the design certification process, As cunently written, the NOPR woui ss being reviewed by the NRC staff and resolved as part of the design review and certificat Such a subject to rereview and relitigation on a plant-specific basis during licensi di f

result is directly contrary to the purpose of Part $2, undermines the regulatory foun standardization and is unacceptable.

The pmposed design cenification rules introduce substantial uncettam h

licensing process. Perhaps most egregious, there is no clear statemen designs being certified meet the applicable standards of the Atomic ii to certify the regulations, determinations required to be made und i t d with the design in though the NRC must reach a final conclusion on all safety i l that any design li certification nile state that the design satisfies relevant Commission regu at ons fh blic', Inherent in required reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the health and safe f

this finding must be a determination that no additional or altemative eature have been resolved.

mandated is a statement that all nuclear <afety issues associated with the design The rules as proposed would pmvide no fma f

and is considered by the NRC in the design certification rulemaking procee d also provide no issue would not be accorded finality under the proposed rules. The rules as propos dockets of finality to material contained in the voluminous safety analysis reports m. owma, 4

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the miemakings unless such material also is discussed in. the DCD or PSER. Moreovel rules afford no finality to changes made to Tier 2 iri accordance with the 50 59 - like changes which are subject to review by the NRC a ff in its review of which appears in secondary references, all of which were considered by the NRC s j

backward from -

l the designs. Hus, with respect to finality the proposed rules represe j

the type of certainty and sta less stability and certainty than the Part 50 licensing process.

Durmg discussions leading to the adoption of Part 52, Wesringhouse sough i

certified either by license or rule. Westinghouse was concemed that design ce ld be accorded in would not accord the proponent of a certified design the type of pmtection that wou connection with licensing of the design. De thtust of the NRC response in rejecting the Westinghouse position and permining design centsfication only by rulemaking wa i

j certification process was intended to place the design certification proponent in t h

d rules i

though there had been a license granted for the design. He finality provisions in t e p i

l are contrary to these assurances provided at the time of the adoption of Part 52!

had been by license and not by rulemaking, finality would have been accorded i

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application and design, including all aspects of the SAR. the results of the lice i

to the design, proprietary information, safeguards information, and secondary ref addition to the problems discussed by NEI in its comments on the inadequate fi certified design Westinghouse believes that the fmality provisions are contrary to l

NRC when it decided to allow design certification only by rulemaking.

t Anolicabis Reeulations f

j Westinghouse stmngly opposes the ute of the design-specific r.]

j regulations." In comments dated June Grant Standard Design Certification for Evolutionary Light Water Reactor Desig l

58664 - (November 3,1993)J, Westinghouse, in responding to the NRC's reql

" acceptability of using design specific rulernaking rather than gerwric rulem issues whose resolution exceeds current requirements " stated that adoption h

significantly and adversely affect design certification.

destroy the goal of Part 52 to establish a predictable, stable licensing proc i'h es by the NEI comments, the proposed " applicable regulations" are unnecessary either to r licensees or for any of the other reasons asserted by the NRC staff.

The broadly-worded language contained in the applicable regulations propo System 80+ only make this more of a concern. Phrases contained in the p hi es,"

regulations" such as "shall be minimized," "to the extent practical," "use of ad

" demonstration of adequate defense," "must facilitate," " reduce the potential for," and significant" are so vague and general that they allow for an endless vanety o b kfits. Dur, the throughout the life of the design and an endless opportunity for destabilising ac proposed " applicable regulations" result in a less stable, less predictable lice Finally, Westinghouse believes that not only is the concept of applic li bl design certification, but that the process by which the NRC pwMs to adopt the a t

f law, regulations in the current rulemaking is flawed and does not comport with the incWding the Administrative Procedure Act.

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cc 400'39ed 7e101 ae Reauest to Panicipate in Hearings The NOPR provides that an interested party may re i

these submitted by August 7,1995. Although Westinghouse do h

right to participate in such a hearing.

Westinghouse would desire to be heard on that ponion of the NOPR up h in these a requestor's request for hearing, would use reasons and would rely on argumen h

j comments and the NEI comments. As the design certification applicant for the AP60 is acquainted with the substantive and procedural content and provisions affect i

possesses the requisite technical capabihty to understand the factual m on any issue for which a hearing is requested and possesses a detailed urde hearing procedures.

Conclusion Design certificanons and combined licenses represcar the' future of the nu d in die proposed the final design cenification rules contain the significant process deficiencies foun ill rules, the type of commitments necessary for fumre nuclear power plant develo be discouraged. Accordingly, Wesunghouse urges the NRC to take into consideration contained in this letter, together with the NEI and other nuclear industry comments, the final design cenification rules for the ABWR and System Sh Westinghouse thanks the NRC for the opponunity to comment on the NOPR funher interaction with the NRC as the design cettifications progress.

Very truly yours, vek'

)

H. J.

schi cc:

Chairman Jackson Commissioner Rogers J. Taylor, EDO K. Cyr, General Counsel 2541 A t!04 45 nje)

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