ML20087C135

Comment on Proposed Rule 10CFR52 Re Proposed Design Certification Rules for GE ABWR & ABB/C-E Sys 80+ Std Plant Designs.New Process Must Greatly Reduce Financial Risks of Unwarranted & Uncontrollable Delay Characteristics

ML20087C135
Person / Time
Site:	05200001, 05200002
Issue date:	08/04/1995
From:	Bayne P NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (FORMERLY NUCLEAR MGMT &
To:	Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
FRN-60FR17924, RULE-PR-52 60FR17924, NUDOCS 9508090060
Download: ML20087C135 (23)

Text

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1. 0 KETED USHRC NU(llAR [NERGY INSTITUTE 4

'95 E -7 PS :06 F%illip Boyne OFr;CF y SECRETARY  !.*TE .. ,,,,

00CKEMG & SERVICE BRANCH August 4,1995 DOCKET NUMBER The Honorable Shirley A. Jackson PROPOSED RULE S 6a Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission DS Washington, DC 20555

Dear Chairman Jackson:

I am writing to you and Commissioner Rogers regarding a matter of great concern to the nuclear power industry, namely, the proposed design certification rules for the General Electric Advanced Boiling Water Reactor and ABB/ Combustion Engineering System 80+ Standard Plant designs. The Nuclear Energy Institute has just submitted, on behalf of the nuclear power industry, our official comments on the Notices of Proposed Rulemaking. Enclosed is the executive summary of those comments.

The designs being certified by these rules are safe and reliable, as clearly indicated by the NRC staff comprehensive technical review and Final Design Approval. It is now vital that the resulting design certification rules set forth the policies and processes that assure the goals of 10 CFR Part 52 are fully realized. The licensing process must be seen by the industry, the financial community and our economic regulators to be stable, predictable and efficient. The new process must greatly reduce the financial risks of unwarranted and uncontrollable delay characteristic of the past licensing process. If we fail to achieve this stability, the tremendous technical resources that both the NRC staff and the industry devoted to standard plant designs will have been wasted.

Our analysis of the proposed rules has identified several process-related issues of concern to potentiallicensees. These issues are significant enough to threaten the l viability of these outstanding designs and the goals of 10 CFR Part 52. We urge the l Commission to carefully consider the recommendations in the industry comments on these proposed rules to help ensure the workability of the Part 52 licensing process and the achievement ofits stated goals. The issues in the proposed rules l

that concern the industry are not required for, and would not enhance, the protection of public health and safety. Rather, they describe policies and processes l that increase the complexity and regulatory burden faced by prospective licensees l l

and ultimately discourage what Part 52 is intended to bring about . the efficient licensing and construction of a new generation of nuclear power plants. l

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e The Honorable Shirley A. Jackson August 4,1995 Page 2 l

These design certification rulemakings present the Commission with a pivotal l

opportunity to establish a workable, predictable licensing process for future nuclear power plants. The foundation provided by Part 52 and the superior plant designs put forward by the design certification applicants provide a solid base on which nuclear power can continue to flourish in this country as a safe, clean, reliable source of electricity.

We urge your personal attention as we work to resolve these important issues.

Sincerely, Phillip Bayd Enclosure c: James M. Taylor, EDO William T. Russell, NRR 4

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NTTACHMENT A l

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

OF ,

INDUSTRY COMMENTS ON PROPOSED DESIGN CERTIFICATION RULES  :

ABSTRACT The industry and the NRC can be extremely proud of the General Electric i i

' Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and ABB/ Combustion Engineering System 80+ Standard Plant (System 80+) designs that are presently the subject of the first-ever design certification rulemakings. In  :

approving the safety of these designs, the NRC staff concluded that the designs are " robust," are "an improvement over existing designs," and

" meet the Commission's safety goals by several orders of magnitude." The pending design certification rules will be cornerstones of the NRC's new nuclear plant licensing process,10 CFR Part 52. The Notices of Proposed Rulemakings (NOPRs) for these design certifications, including the referenced design control documents and other docketed materials, represent the culmination of enormous efforts and resources invested by the NRC, DOE, the design certification applicants and the broader nuclear industry to achieve resolution of literally thousands of individual safety issues. The goal of safer, more reliable nuclear plant' designs has been emphatically achieved.

Unfortunately, these NOPRs contain significant process deficiencies which, if not corrected with issuance of the final design certification rules, will ,

threaten the economic viability of these outstanding designs and the realization of the goals of Part 52. As observed by the Commission in their Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-95-023,"it is important that the potential COL applicants perceive the [Part 52] process to be workable from this point forward." At this point, based on the NOPRs, our perception is that the process would not be workable, would not achieve the goals of Part 52, and,in short, would not be used. It is imperative that the Commission correct the significant process deficiencies described 'i below and in Attachment B so that the goals of Part 52 can be achieved.

i These deficiencies do not involve issues of public health and safety -- they are solely process-related. Accordingly, and because the industry's ,

recommendations for correcting these deficiencies are fully consistent with the language and goals of Part 52, we strongly urge the Commission to adopt these recommendations to ensure the workability of the Part 52 licensing process and the achievement ofits stated goals. .!

Summaries of the process deficiencies of the NOPRs and associated industry recommendations are set forth below following a brief overview of the purpose and goals of Part 52 which provides important context for their consideration.

i i Attachment A - Executive Summary

Executive Summary Table of Contents  :

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.- Introduction and Overview

. The Commission Should Modify the Proposed Rules to  !

4 1 Ensure that the Goals of Part 52 Will Be Achieved.

1. The Proposed Rules Do Not Provide Sufficient Finality for Resolved Issues and Permitted Changes. 4

2. New " Applicable Regulations" Are Unnecessary and Will .

I Create the Potential for Destabilizing Backfits. 7

3. The Design Certification Rules Should Contain a Provision To Ensure that NRC Will Have a Stable and Predictable ,

Process for Making its Finding that the ITAAC Have Been Met. 10- ,

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4. The Proposed Consideration of Severe Accident and t Probabilistic Analyses in Section 50.59 Safety Evaluations Is l Unnecessary and Unduly Burdensome. 12  ;

The Design Certification Rules Should Allow the Design  :

5.

f Certification Applicant to Make 9 50.59 Like Changes After Design Certification. 15 l

6. The Substantive Provisions in the DCD Introduction Should Be Incorporated into the Design Certification Rules. 16 1 1

. Other Important Issues Addressed in Attachment B 17  :

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. - Conclusion 19  !

ii Attachment A - Executive Summary -l

Introduction and Overview In the 1980s, the NRC recognized that a new approach to the licensing and regulation of nuclear power plants was warranted to correct the problems inherent in the Part 50 licensing process - - a process costly to utilities and their rate-payers and one which had become an obstacle to new orders for nuclear power plants in this country. Under Part 50 licensing, issues decided during the construction permit stage were subject to re-review and re-litigation at the operating license stage. Furthermore, under the Part 50 process, there was too low a threshold for imposition of NRC backfits on approved plant designs during construction and operation. These flaws in the Part 50 process have been the source of substantiallicensing uncertainty and tremendous escalation in the cost of constructing and operating nuclear plants. Moreover, ,

the Part 50 process was a disincentive for the development and use of standardized advanced designs - - which both the NRC and the industry believed to hold the promise ofincreased safety, reliability and economy.

i In a major licensing reform initiative, the NRC added 10 CFR Part 52 to its regulations to provide for issuance of early site permits, certification of  :

standard designs, and issuance of combined construction permits and operating licenses (COLs). Under Part 52, safety issues are resolved prior to construction and are not open to re-review or re-litigation in subsequent proceedings. A fundamental objective of Part 52 was the establishment of a licensing process that would encourage and accord regulatory benefits for the development and use of standard plant designs.

As stated in the Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPRs) for design i certification of the ABWR and System 80+ standard designs, work has been f underway for years to develop design certification rules that will further the l l

l 1 Attachment A - Executive Summary

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Commission's goals for Part 52. Specifically, the NOPRs state that design i certification rules seek to achieve (1) the early resolution of safety issue.s, (2) enhanced safety and reliability of future nuclear power plants, (3) a more predictable and stable licensing process, and (4) standardization of future plants. It should be noted that these goals apply more broadly to the whole of the Part 52 licensing process, not just to design certification.

l Subsequent to the promulgation of Part 52, Congress underscored and reinforced the basic objectives and principles of Part 52 in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT). This legislation provides an explicit statutory basis for the licensing process embodied in Part 52 and confirms important aspects of the Commission's licensing authority. Subsequent to the EPACT, the NRC amended Part 52 to bring it into conformance with the specific provisions of .

the legislation.

In describing the legislative approach to the new licensing process, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee cited testimony underscoring that the previous (Part 50) licensing process,

... with its lack of pre-construction finality and enormous costs associated with resolving design issues after construction was complete, stood as an obstacle to the development and use of pre-approved standard designs.

The report of the Senate Committee concluded that " requiring resolution of I all important safety issues and establishing the licensing criteria against which the plant will be judged in the combined license before construction begins will have several major benefits." These benefits of the new licensing l process were described as early resolution of safety issues, enhancement of 2 Attachment A Executive Summary I

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certainty in the licensing process and the provision of objective standards for j regulators to decide if a plant is safe to operate. Senator Bennett Johnston, j who introduced the nuclear licensing provisions of the legislation, emphasized in Senate hearings that "[t]he whole idea (of the new licensing process) is to resolve all safety issues before construction begins." Thus, ,

Congress recognized that early resolution of safety issues and licensing predictability are essential to successful implementation of the new licensing process. .

I The industry is deeply committed to the goals of Part 52, and we believe that the extent to which they are collectively achieved will determine the i effectiveness of the new licensing process and the realization of the U.S.  ;

Nuclear Industry's Strategic Plan for Building New Nuclear Power Plants. l l

These goals provide an essential underpinning for the continuance of nuclear . l t

i power as a viable generating option in the future energy marketplace.

i As the NRC's safety reviews confirm, the ABWR and System 80+ standard designs referenced in the proposed rules provide for substantially safer plants ,

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and therefore accomplish one of the Commission's goals for Part 52. The 1 resolution of many complex safety issues associated with the standard plants has resulted in demonstrably improved designs that build upon over 30 years  :

of experience in nuclear plant design and operation. Each of the standard l designs contains numerous safety improvements, including features to prevent and mitigate severe accidents. One measure of the enhanced safety inherent in the standard designs is that each satisfies the Commission's safety goal policy by a large margin.

The NOPRs also reflect resolution of certain equally challenging Part 52 process issues, such as the level of detail required for design certification 3 Attachment A - Executive Summary

applications; the two-tier approach; and the definition of required inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria (ITAAC). However, as described below and in our detailed comments in Attachment B, there are significant process-related areas where the NOPRs, ifleft unaltered, would threaten the economic viability of standardized designs, thus undermining their potential for future use and frustrating the achievement of the stated goals of Part 52.

The Conunission Should Modify the Proposed Rules i to Ensure that the Goals of Part 52 Will Be Achieved.

1. The Proposed Rules Do Not Provide Sufficient Finality for Resolved Issues and Permitted Changes.

A principal purpose of Part 52 was to create a more stable and predictable regulatory environment by resolving safety issues during design certification such that these issues are not subject to re-review or re-litigation in later licensing proceedings. In other words, safety issues associated with the standard designs are to be resolved with " finality." In this regard, Section 52.63 states that "the Commission shall treat as resolved those matters resolved in connection with the issuance or renewal of a design certification."

In contrast with the goals of Part 32 and the encompassing language in Section 52.G3, the proposed rules provide that only those nuclear safety issues associated with information in the Final Safety Evaluation Report (FSER) or Design Control Document (DCD) have finality. While these two documents contain an extensive amount of design information, there is significant additional design information that was resolved during the NRC staffs 4 Attachment A - Executive Summary

extensive safety reviews that is not encompassed by these documents. We strongly believe that this additional design information - - and all matters within the scope of the standard designs - - must also be accorded finality by design certification rulemaking, consistent with the Part 52 goals of early issue resolution and licensing predictability and stability.

As an example of the inadequacy of the NOPR provision on issue resolution, the sufficiency of the standard designs, i.e., the lack of need for additional safety features, would not be among the matters " resolved in connection with" design certification. Likewise, the NOPRs would not accord finality to information contained in the applicant's Standard Safety Analysis Report (SSAR) that is not also contained in the design control documents to be incorporated by reference in the design certification rules. This would fail to provide finality for extensively reviewed and approved proprietary and safeguards information in the SSARs (which is subject to public comment and hearing as part of the rulemaking process) as well as requirements that are contained in codes, standards, topical reports and other documents referenced in the DCDs.

I In the extreme, the NOPR's limited view of finality would leave open the door to later challenge of the adequacy of the standard designs - - an untenable 1

situation that Part 52 is intended to preclude. For example, a claim could be made in a combined license proceeding that an additional design feature not previously considered by the NRC, e.g., an additional containment barrier, was necessary and that a time consuming, costly, formal evaluation was warranted.

At the very least, the NOPRs' too narrow characterization ofissue resolution would cause a substantial amount of design information previously approved f by the NRC staff to be subject to re-review and re litigation - - in direct conflict with the original intent of Part 52 to alleviate the uncertainty associated with the need to consider such matters a second time.

5 Attachment A - Executive Summary

To ensure the viability of the Part 52 licensing process, finality must be provided to a substantially broader scope of matters than those described in the proposed rules. Finality must be accorded to all matters within the scope of the approved designs, i.e.. only site specific matters should be open to consideration by the NRC staff or third parties in a license proceeding. We think it is self evident that the following must be considered resolved within the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4) in any subsequent proceeding:

. allissues related to the adequacy of the standard design;

. all matters resolved on the rulemaking docket, including all matters discussed in the applicant's SSAR or raised in the design certification rulemaking proceeding In addition, we believe that issue resolution and finality accorded through design certification rulemaking, as described above, is undiminished by changes made in accordance with the change processes specified in the design certification rules. This includes changes made in accordance with the 50.59-like process that is incorporated in Section 52.63(b) and Section 8(b)(5) of the NOPRs. However, under the proposed rules, changes made via the f 50.59-like process would not be final and would be subject to an opportunity for hearing.

Such a hearing right would mark a significant departure from existing practice under Section 50.59 - - which the Commission endorsed as a model for the analogous " 50.59-like" process under Part 52 - - and should not be provided.

In summary, the Commission should clearly state in the final design certification rules that the broader scope of matters described above, as well as changes made in accordance with the change processes specified in the design certification rules, shall be considered resolved within the meaning of 52.63(a)(4) in all subsequent licensing proceedings.

G Attachment A - Executive Summary

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2. New " Applicable Regulations" Are Unnecessary and Will Create the Potential for Destabilizing Backfits. >

SECY-90-016 and SECY 93-087 identified a number of NRC positions on severe accident and other technical issues that are not embodied in current >

NRC regulations. The design certification applicants voluntarily agreed to 3 provide design features corresponding to these positions. Nevertheless, the .

NOPRs propose that the design certification rules designate more than a dozen of these severe accident and technical positions as " applicable regulations" - - to give them a status similar to the Commission's regulations in Part 50. The stated purpose for the proposalis to identify standards for the issuance and renewal of the design certifications, control changes to the DCD, and to provide 1 a means for NRC to impose backfits on the design certifications and future licensees. As discussed below, these additional" applicable regulations:"

e are unnecessary for the purposes identified by the staff; ,

e are duplicative of requirements stated in the design certifications; e are, in some cases, directed at the operational programs oflicense  ;

applicants, which are clearly beyond the scope of the standard design  ;

certifications;  ;

e add undue complexity and uncertainty to an already intricate licensing process; and most importantly, e create the potential for destabilizing backfits Moreover, the " applicable regulations" are not justifiable on a stand alone basis and do not meet required statutory and regulatory criteria. i l

There is simply no need for creating a free-standing c' ollection of" applicable regulations" to address the NRC's positions. Each of the NRC positions is addressed in the DCD in a manner that has been approved by the NRC staff.

7 Attachment A - Executive Summary l

The design certification applicants are not requesting that any of these provisions in Tier 1 or Tier 2 be modified. Thus, there is no need to establish

" applicable regulations" for these positions in order to ensure that the standard designs conform with these positions. In essence, the NRC staff proposal for

" applicable regulations" singles out and penalizes the advanced reactor designs for incorporating, consistent with utility requirements and Commission guidance, features that provide increased margins of safety. As a matter of regulatory policy, it would be incongruous and inappropriate to encumber plants - - that are acknowledged to provide important safety enhancements in relation to existing reactor designs - - with an additional layer of" applicable ,

regulations."

Furthermore, as integral requirements of the design certifications, the design provisions in the DCD become part of an " applicable regulation" - - the design certification rule itself- - for all of the purposes identified by the staff, namely, (1) they will govern issuance of the design certification rule, (2) they will constitute " applicable regulations" in the sense that a licensee may be compelled by the NRC to comply with these provisions, and (3) they will comprise part of the regulatory base for making design certification renewal determinations. .

Additionally, because all of these technical positions are implemented in whole or part by provisions in Tier 1, as well as Tier 2, these technical positions need not be designated as " applicable regulations" to ensure that sufficient controls ,

will exist to prevent an applicant or licensee from deviating from the NRC's l technical positions.

In addition to being unnecessary and inappropriate as discussed above, our

- most acute concern with the staff proposalis that these " applicable regulations" could be used in the future by the NRC staff to impose 8 Attachment A - Executive Summary

unwarranted backfits on applicants and licensees. Under Part 52, the NRC  !

cannot make a generic or plant-specific change in Tier 1 or Tier 2 unless the  !

I change is necessary for the adequate protection of public health and safety or  :

" compliance with the Commission's regulations applicable and in effect at the j time the certification was issued." By designating certain technical positions i

as " applicable regulations," the proposed rules would create the potential for

" compliance" backfits in Tier 1 and Tier 2, e.g., to reflect changes in the NRC staffinterpretations of these technical positions or in the body of knowledge on j a particular severe accident phenomenon.

The potential for backfits based on noncompliance with " applicable regulations" is especially troublesome for two reasons. First, the staff has j intentionally used " broadly stated" language in drafting the proposed

" applicable regulations," making them particularly susceptible to new and l diverse interpretations. And second, many of the proposed " applicable ,

regulations" address severe accident issues about which new information and analysis techniques are continuously being developed through various research programs. Licensing uncertainty is created by the potential that the NRC staff may, based on new information on a particular severe accident phenomenon, at 1 some future time conclude that the codified standard designs are no longer in strict compliance with an " applicable regulation."

As discussed in Section II of Attachment B, none of these industry comments should be construed to suggest that the flawed concept of " applicable regulations" can be fixed by changes to their wording. Because the proposed f

" applicable regulations" are unnecessary and would give rise to the potential j for unwarranted and destabilizing backfits, the Commission should not include

" applicable regulations" in the final design certification rules. ,

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3. The Design Certification Rules Should Contain a Provision To Ensure that NRC Will Have a Stable )

and Predictable Process for Making its Finding i that the ITAAC Have Been Met. l

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t As required by Part 52, each of the proposed design certification rules contains inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) for use )

in determining that a plant has been built in conformance with the certified design. As stated in Part 52, these design certification ITAAC, together with associated site-specific ITAAC in the combined license (COL), must be sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that a plant has been constructed and will be operated in conformity with the license, the Atomic Energy Act and the Commission's rules and regulations. Satisfaction ofITAAC acceptance criteria provides the sole basis for the Commission finding required by Section 52.103(g).

i As described in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Report on the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT), the purpose of the new licensing process, and ITAAC in particular, is to " enhance certainty for the utility building the plant by spelling out before construction begins what conditions the completed plant must satisfy in order to operate." The same Committee Report further describes this purpose as to " provide NRC regulators objective safety standards (i.e., acceptance criteria) with which to measure the i

constructed plant in deciding whether the plant is safe to operate."

Similarly, as the NRC staff stated in SECY 91 178,"[t]he benefits to the early designation of these [ITAAC] verification requirements include an up-front agreement to requirements and acceptance criteria" for the constructed plant. .

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10 Attachment A - Executive Summary

The purpose and intent ofITAAC is thus clearly established by Part 52, the EPACT and various Commission papers. However, the manner in which the NRC staffis to verify that ITAAC are met is not specified. While we recognize that the details of an ITAAC implementation process will be the subject of future discussion, the nature of the NRC verification oflicensee ITAAC determinations has recently become a significant industry concern based on SECY-94-294, " Construction Inspection and ITAAC Verification,"

and preliminary discussions with the NRC staff. In particular, these interactions have raised industry concerns that, in determining whether ITAAC have been satisfied, the NRC staff contemplates broad-ranging evaluations of quality assurance activities, e.g., adequacy ofinstallation, training and test procedures, adequacy of procurement documentation, etc.

NRC verification of these and other important process and program activities will be via traditional inspection and enforcement oflicensee quality assurance program implementation. Such broad-ranging evaluations would be inappropriate in the ITAAC context because they would be contrary to the purpose ofITAAC and to the focus of the acceptance criteria on the end-products and results of construction.

Because of the potential for impact on construction plans and schedules and the scope of the post-construction hearing, effective and timely ITAAC verification is as critical to the overall process as the precise delineation of ITAAC in these design certification rules. Accordingly, we recommend that the Commission use the opportunity presented by these design certification rules to define the nature of the NRC verification oflicensee ITAAC l l

determinations, consistent with the established purpose ofITAAC.

11 Attachment A - Executive Summary

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' Doing so will: ,

' clarify.the Commission intent with respect to ITAAC verification, .!

consistent with the objective of establishing up front the acceptance l

'- criteria to be met by the constructed plant, l p e - establish a basis for development of a focused, effective and workable b ITAAC implementation process, e instill industry,' investor and public confidence in the practical implementation ofITAAC and thus in the predictability and cost-effectiveness of the new licensing process Specifically, we urge the Commission to include provisions within the design -

certification rules to clearly specify that compliance with ITAAC shall be determined by verifying that the required inspections, tests, and analyses have I

been performed, and that, based solely on the successful completion thereof, the corresponding acceptance criteria have been satisfied. This would provide focus and stability to the ITAAC process without diminishing the NRC's 1

Part 50 inspection and enforcement authority as it relates to evaluation of quality assurance activities, including effective identification and correction of deficiencies.

4. The Proposed Consideration ~ of Severe Accide' nt and Probabilistic Analyses in Section 50.59 Safety Evaluations Is Unnecessary and Unduly Burdensome.

Under 10 CFR 50.59, a licensee may make changes in its safety analysis report (SAR) without prior NRC approval unless the change involves a change in the technical specifications or an unreviewed safety question (gi, an increase in -

probability or consequences of an accident evaluated in the SAR).

Traditionally for Part 50 plants, 5 50.59 evaluations have applied only to evaluations of design basis accidents.

12 Attachment A - Executive Summary.

However, the Design Control Documents (DCDs) for the standard plants contain requirements for severe accident features and associated deterministic and probabilistic analyses. The Commission has directed that the 50.59-like process preserve severe accident insights, and the industry has fully supported this direction.

Unfortunately, the 50.59-like change process in the proposed rules is far in excess of what is needed and appropriate for accomplishing the Commission's objective. The NOPRs prescribe an evaluation scope that is unnecessarily broad and would be enormously burdensome on applicants and licensees. The proposal would require that 50.59 safety evaluations consider pil of the extensive severe accident analyses and PRA results contained in Chapter 19 of the DCDs when determining whether the change constitutes an unreviewed safety question. Furthermore, the proposed rules provide that a change in the severe accident evaluations or PRA results in Chapter 19 would constitute an unreviewed safety question if the change would increase

- - even insignificantly - - the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a severe accident evaluated in Chapter 19. Section 8(b)(5) of the proposed rules contains only one limited exception: that changes to Section 19E of Tier 2 for the ABWR and to Section 19.11 for the System 80+ (including ,

associated appendices) would constitute an unreviewed safety question only if there is a " substantial increase" in the probability or consequences of the severe accidents evaluated in the section.

Instead of applying the G 50.59-like process to all of Chapter 19, we propose that, (1) the process be applied only to those sections that identify features that contribute significantly to the mitigation or prevention of a particular accident sequence or event scenario (i.e., Section 19.8 for the ABWR and Section 19.15 for the System 80+), and (2) changes should constitute 13 Attachment A - Executive Summary

unreviewed safety questions only if they would result in a substantial increase in the probability or consequences of a severe accident. This .

alternative approach would effectively preserve severe accident insights in the standard designs, consistent with Commission guidance, while not requiring that undue emphasis and resources be applied to matters oflittle or no safety significance.

The Commission should reject the NOPRs' excessive proposal for consideration of severe accident and PRA information in the 50.59-like process. For one thing, the stated purpose of the NOPR proposalis to maintain the resolution of(Le., regulate) severe accident issues on par with design basis issues. The proposal disregards the significant differences between severe accident and design basis analyses in terms of their inherent safety significance and uncertainties. The Commission has consistently rejected the notion that such regulation over severe accident matters is necessary and should do so once again.

i More importantly, the proposal to consider ajlof Chapter 19 would drastically increase the burden on licensees with respect to 50.59 safety evaluations - - while providing no commensurate improvement in safety.

The excessive and life-long regulatory burden inherent in the NOPR proposal would effectively single out and penalize applicants and licensees for referencing a standard design that has evaluated severe accidents. At a time when the NRC and most other Federal agencies are trying to reduce regulatory burdens that have little or no benefit to safety, it would be totally inconsistent to burden applicants and licensees with a requirement to perform safety evaluations for changes that have little or no potential for affecting safety. l 1

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5. The Design Certification Rules Should Allow the Design Certification Applicant to Make f 50.59-Like Changes After Design Certification.

In the several-year period which may pass before the first license application is submitted for a standard design, the detailed designs will be developed by or with the cooperation of the design certification applicants. As a result of detailed design development, including the incorporation of relevant operating experience and technological advances, design changes are likely to be identified. We believe there would be substantial benefits to standardization, economy, and regulatory efficiency if the design certification rules were to include a process by which the design certification applicant could make generic j 50.59-like changes to Tier 2 of the DCD after the design certification rule is approved and before the first license application referencing the rule is filed. It should be emphasized that the envisioned process could be used for making generic Tier 2 changes only after a safety evaluation concludes that the change would not involve an unreviewed safety question, and thus would not be adverse to safety.

Revising the proposed rules to provide for such changes by the desig.1 certification applicant would have several important benefits. First, it would promote the goal of standardization because such changes would be generic and, therefore, applicable to all license applicants and licensees that reference the design certification. Second, the process would be economical, since only one S 50.59 change for all plants (rather than a 50.59 change for each plant) would have to be processed. Finally, this process would also ease the administrative burden on the NRC because the NRC would have to review a qualifying change only once, rather than repetitively for each license application.

15 Attachment A - Executive Summary

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6. The Substantive Provisions in the DCD Introduction  !

Should Be Incorporated into the Design Certification j

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Rules.

The introductory section of the DCD contains numerous substantive provisions reflecting resolution ofissues related to the future use of the DCD by (

applicants and licensees. Unfortunately, and for reasons unstated, the NOPRs do not propose that the DCD Introduction be incorporated by reference into the design certification rules. Instead, the Statements of Considerations (SOC) for ,

I L the NOPRs imprecisely paraphrase certain of the substantive provisions, while ignoring others, and relegating the entire DCD Introduction to the status of explanatory information subservient to the SOC. 1 I

It is not clear why the NOPRs propose to accord no legal status to the DCD Introductions. The industry devoted extensive resources to interactions with the NRC (including Office of General Counsel) staffin late 1993 and 1994  ;

aimed at documenting clear, precisely worded resolutions of the remaining f substantive issues associated with the DCD (e.g., the relationship between Tiers 1 and 2, the status of proprietary information, applicability ofITAAC, etc.). These resources were spent based on the mutual understanding and expectation that the DCD Introductions would be made part of the design certification rules along with the rest of the DCD, as indicated by the following NRC staff guidance provided to each applicant dated August 26,1993: >

The staff believes that the DCD should be a self contained document and should not rely on the DCR's [ Design Certification Rules'] i Statements of Consideration to serve this purpose. It is not expected  !

that future users of the DCD be required to research the Statements of Consideration to gain an understanding of the purpose of the DCD and its role in future licensing actions, j 16 Attachment A - Executive Summary 1

Given the extensive interactions (including NRC approval of the language for the DCD Introductions), the clear understanding that DCD Introductions would be included in design certification rules, and the importance of clear, binding resolution of the issues in question, the proposalin the NOPRs is, to say the least, inappropriate. We request that the Commission accord the substantive provisions of the DCD Introductions the status of rulemaking requirements, preferably by incorporating the DCD Introductions by reference in the design certification rules for the respective design certifications.

Other Irnnortant Issues Addressed in Attachment B Imnlementation of the Chamre Process -Industry recommendations are provided on four additionalissues arising from the NOPR related to implementation of the Part 52 change process.

.Section III.H of the NOPR SupplementalInformation incorrectly states that prior NRC staff approvalis required for a departure from Tier 2 information via the 9 50.59-like process "if the change involves issues that the NRC staff has not previously approved" or "if changes were made to the  ;

DCD that violated the [NRC's] resolutions without NRC approval." These statements are inconsistent with Section 52.63, proposed Section 8(b)(5)(i),  !

Section 50.59 and long-standing NRC practice. l

. Exemptions should not be required for changes to technical specifications or changes to Tier 2* information that do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

. Quarterly reporting of Section 50.59 changes during construction is unnecessary and overly burdensome.

. Contrary to statements in the NOPR, Section 52.63(b)(2) provides the basis for the Tier 2 change process, and this section should not be deleted in a possible future amendment to Part 52.

l 17 Attachment A - Executive Summary

Expiration of Tier 2* Restrictions - We request that Tier 2* change restrictions (i.e., the requirement for prior NRC staff approval for changes involving information designated Tier 2* in the DCDs) expire when the plant first goes into full power operation. Tier 2* restrictions are not needed after the plant is completed because Tier 2* information pertains to methodologies for completing the plant design.

Control of Chansres to Technical Specifications - Operation of future plants must be governed by a single, integrated set of technical specifications that are controlled by the single process provided by 10 CFR 50.90. Operators must not be faced with separate standard plant and site-specific technical specifications that are controlled by differing change mechanisms.

ITAAC Annlicability Under Part 50 - We request that the Commission reject the NOPR proposal that ITAAC be required under Part 50 licensing because ITAAC are unique to Part 52 and because Part 50 has other means for accomplishing the purpose ofITAAC.

Important Clarifications - We request that the final design certification rules clarify certain other important issues.

. Potentially misleading statements in the NOPRs regarding the status of references in the DCD should be clarified

. Misleading statements in the NOPRs regarding PRA information required to be submitted with COL applications should be corrected

• Other clarifications 18 Attachment A - Executive Summary

e 1

) Conclusion l

L Each of the perceived NOPR flaws discussed in this Executive Summary is l described in more detail in Attachment B, along with a discussion of how each of the NOPR proposals in question is inconsistent with the Commission's goals for Part 52. Specific recommendations and proposed rule language for correcting the NOPR process deficiencies consistent with the  !

goals of Part 52 are also provided. ,

i I

In closing, we must emphasize that use of design certification rules and Part 52 is not mandatory. If potential purchasers of new electrical power plants do not perceive that the design certification rules will accomplish the goals of Part 52, they simply will not consider the nuclear option to meet their needs. In such an event, all of the industry's and NRC's efforts will have amounted to nothing more than a costly exercise. Because the disputed NOPR proposals do not involve issues of public health and safety, and because the industry's recommendations and proposals are fully consistent with the language and goals of Part 52 and the Energy Policy Act, we urge the Commission to carefully consider these comments and adopt the recommendations herein to ensure the workability and viability of the Part 52 licensing process.

19 Attachment A Executive Summary

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