ML20087A152
| ML20087A152 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/14/1992 |
| From: | Hall D HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20086J990 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-94-380 NUDOCS 9508040203 | |
| Download: ML20087A152 (16) | |
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The Light u.s. m M
esas77483 South Texas Project Electru Generating 5:ation
.s n 8 ff?2 5?*i'. U CATIy; fHEIlf.2. E;3 IV August 14, 1992 ST-HL-AE-4169 Tile: GC3.17 Tile: D43 10 CTR 50.7 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 south Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Circumstances Surrounding Revocation of Indivijual's Access The NRC has been conducting an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the revocation of an individual's unescorted access to the South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS).
Specifically, the investigation seeks to determine whether the revocation of access constituted a violation of 10 CTR 50.7 regarding protection of individuals who report nuclear safety concerns.
The purpose of this letter is to inform you of Houston Lighting & Power Company's (HL&P) position on this matter.
As described in more detail in the attachment to this letter, the access authorization of the individual in question was properly revoked based on concerns regarding his trustworthiness and reliability which were called into question by numerous omissions of material information in the individual's access authorization paperwork, including, among others, omissions relating to previous employment and termination from previous employment.
The number and adverse nature of the omissions resulted in the HL&P Access Program Director's determination that the omissions were willful and, therefore, raised serious questions regarding the individual's reliability and trustworthiness.
Consistent with NRC regulations and guidance, the Access Program Director revoked the individual's unescorted access to the South Texas Project Protected and Vital Areas.
A recent review by ML&P confirms that the decision in this case is consistent with prior HL&P access authorization / denial decisions in similar circunstances.
A Sub idrar> of Houston Industries incorporated 3
9500040203 950206 PDR FOIA SAPORIT94-380 PDR
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Houston Lighting & Power Company South Texas Project Electric Generating Station ST-ML-AI-4169 File: G03.17, D43 10 CFR 50.7 Page 2 Pursuant to 10 CFR I :. 790(a) (6), HL&P requests that this letter and its attachments be exempt from disclosure and not be placed in the Public Document Room because it contains confidential personnel information, the disclosure of which would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
Please call me at (512) 972-8434 should you wish to discuss this matter.
. Hall Group Vice Presidene, Nuclear Attachments:
1)
Circumstances Surrounding Revocation of Individual's Access 2)
Appendix
(
'o Honton Lighting & Power Company South Texas Project Dectric Generating Stati ST-ML-AE-4169 File: G03.17, 04 3 10 CFR 50.7 Page 3 cc: WITHOUT ATTACHMENTS
- Regional Administrator, J.C. Lanier/M.B. Lee Region IV City of Austin Nuclear Regulatory Commission Electric Utility Department 611 Ryan Plaza Drive P.O. Box 1088 Suite 400 Austin, TX 78767 Arlington, TX 76011 K.J. Fiedler/M.T. Hardt
- George Dick, Project Manager City Public Service Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P.O. Box 1771 Commission San Antonio, TX 78296 Washington, DC 20555
- Rufus S. Scott
- Virginia van Cleave, Associate General Counsel Investigator, Region IV Houston Lighting & Power office of Investigations Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P.O. Box 61867 Commission Houston, TX 77208 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 INPO Records Center
- J.I. Tapia 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Senior Resident Inspector Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie P.O. Box 910 50 Bellport Lane Bay City, TX 77414 Bellport, NY 11713
- J.R. Newman, Esquire D.K. Lacker Newean & Holtzinger, P.C.
Bureau of Radiation Control 1615 L Street, NW Texas Department of Health Washington, DC 20036 1100 West 49th Street Austin, TX 78756-3189 D.E. Ward /T.M. Puckett Central Power & Light Company P.O. Box 2121 Corpus 2hristi, TX 78403 NOTE:
The above copies distributed without the Attachments, except as noted by asterisk i
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l CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING REVOCATION OF INDIVIDUAZ.'S ACCESS i
i This document describes the circumstances surrounding the j
revocation of unescorted access to the Protected Area (PA) and Vital Areas (VA) of the South Texas Project Electric Generating J
Station (STPEGS) of(Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.\\, an employee of a l
contractor engaged at STPEGS.
Mr. Saporito's access authorization j
was revoked on February 20, 1992, upon finding that there were several material omissions in his application for access authorization.
j I.
BACKGROUND
)
IMr. Saporit63was employed by Sun Technical Services (SUN) as an
' instrumentation and control (I&C) technician.
SUN is engaged to j
provide certain technical services at STPEGS.
In order to perform i
j required services at STPEGS, HL&P requires I&C technicians to obtain unescorted access to the STPEGS PA and VA, where most of j
their work is performed.
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,Mr. SaporitoJcompleted the paperwork necessary to process a request
~for access authorization on January 13, 1992.
He acknowledged by signature that "any misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission on any documentation used to process unescorted access will constitute cause for denial of access at any time."
Following an j
adjudication of certain questions relating to Mr.
Saporite's paperwork on February 6,
1992, unescorted access to STPEGS was approved on February 11, 1992, and a badge allowing unescorted j
access was issued on February 12, 1992.
On February 10, 1992, Mr. Saporito subritted a petition to the NRC pursuant to 10 CTR I 2.206, alleging certain deficiencias at the STPEGS.
A copy of the petition was furnished by the NRC to STPEGS l
management which received it late in the afternoon on February 11, i
1992.
The task of developing a response to the petition was i
l assigned by Mr. Donald P. Hall, Group Vice President, Nuclear of Houston Lighting & Power Company, to William J.
Jump, Manager -
l Nuclear Licensing.
Shortly after receiving the petition, Mr. Hall
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also instructed certain STPEGS managers to be sure that they took i
no action a ainst Mr. Saporito and not to inform others that
{'Mr.Saporit had filed the petition.
Mr. J.D. Sharpe, the STPEGS Maintenance anager (in whose department Mr. Saporite worked), was specifically directed to instruct his subordinates to be sure that no action was taken against Mr. Saporito, and to keep confidential i
the fact that he filed a "2.206 petition."
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II.
INVESTIGATION OF THE "2.206 PETITION" In order to investigate and prepara a response to Mr. Saporito's "2.206 petition," Mr. Jump requested personnel from the Licensing and Maintenance Departments and from HL&P's "SPEAKOUT Program" to investigate the allegations contained in the petition.
(SPEAKOUT is an HL&P " employee cencarns" program under which ML&P and contractor employees may raise safety concerns while having their identities kept confidential.)
Also, in a separate action, certain ecurity Department personnel were asked to investigate
- r. Saporito's}oncerns relating to escorted access of personnel nside the STPEGS protected areas, an activity which is under the auspices of the STPEGS Physical Security Plan.
These personnel were instructed not to disclose Mr. Saporito's identity or to discuss their investigation with other personnel.
By February 20, 1992, it became clear that the reviews being conducted by Licensing, Maintenance, SPEAKOUT and the Security personnel were not succeeding in finding specific information to either support or develop a number of the vague and general allegations in the "2.206 petition."
Accordingly, on the morning 1
cf Tabruary 20,
- 1992, Mr.
Jump requested that a
SPEAKOUT
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investigator interview Mr.
Saporito to obtain more specific information on his concerns.
The SPEAKOUT Investigator, Mr. R.
W. Cink, attempted to interview Mr. Saporito regard 6ng his safety concerns during the early afternoon on February 20, 1992.
Mr. Saporito refused to discuss his concerns with Mr. Cink unless the NRC participated in the meeting.
Mr. Saporito subsequently advised Mr. Cink that the NRC refused to participate in the meeting and that he was hesitant to discuss any safety concerns because of his perception that personnel had been terminated for raising concerns with SPEAKOUT.
Mr.
Cink offered to clear up any misconceptions Mr. Saporito had with respect to this perception.
Mr. Saporito also stated that he had filed his petition and that he could not discuss specifics involved in the petition because he did not want to interfere with an official NRC investigation.
Mr. Cink explained that the issues identified in the petition were too general to conduct an effective investigation.
Mr. Saporito) reiterated that he could not discuss the specifics because he did not want to interfere with an official NRC investigation.
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III. INVESTIGATION OF ACCURACY OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATION REQUEST A "2.206 petition" is a legal document which may lead to the modification, suspension or revocation of an NRC license. As such, a responsa generally requires the assistance of regulatory counsel.
Mr. Jump contacted counsel on February 11, 1992, and was informed that Mr. Saporito had in the past filed several such petitions (one only a few weeks earlier) relating to other nuclear facilities and that there had baan previously adjudicated cases invo'ving Mr. Saporito under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA). A copy of one such adjudication involving Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) and ATI Career Training Center (ATI) as respondents (Case Nos. 90-ERA-0027; 90-ERA-0047) was subsequently provided to Mr. Jump on February 20, 1992.
On February 20, 1992, af ter reviewing the Department of IAbor (DOL) decision in the FPL-ATI case, Mr. Jump noted that there appeared to be omissions or misstatements in Mr.
Saporito's access authorization paperwork, which he had previously examined.
These included apparent failure by Mr. Saporito to mention that he had been employed or terminated for cause by ATI, and apparent failure to mention litigation he had initiated against ATI.and FPL.
Misstatements and omissions of infor=ation in access authorization paperwork are violations of the STPEGS Access Authorization
- Program, which is required by NRC ~ regulations.
When such misstatements or omissions were identified, ML&P's ordinary
- practice, in accordance with procedures, was to have the=
investigated.by the Nuclear Security Department to deter =1ne whether the omissions / misstatements were willful and whether the new infor=ation affects the determination to grant access.
Accordingly, Mr. Jump requested Mr.
J.W.
Hinson of the STPEGS Nuclear Security Department Investigations Section to review -
Mr. Saporito's access authorization file. Mr. Hinson was furnished i
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with a copy of the DOL Administrative Law Judge's decision in the j
FPL-ATI case, but was not provided with information regarding Mr. Saporito's "2.206 petition" or any related safety concerns.
Upon reviewing the FPL-ATI decision and Mr.
Saporito's file,
{l Mr. Hinson noted obvious discrepancies.
He brought these discrepancies to the attention of Mr. Jump and the Access Program Director, Mr. Richard L.
Balcom.
Mr. Balcom determined that the O discrepancies warranted an interview with Mr. Saporito to verify the accuracy of the information in his access authorization paperwork and determine whether the apparent inconsistencies and omissions could be plausibly explained.
Mr. Hinson interviewed Mr. Saporito on the same day (February 20, 1992) between approximately 1615 and 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />.
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Just prior to this interview, Mr.
R.
W.
Cink encountered Mr. Saporito by chance in the elevator lobby while Mr. saporito was on his way to Mr. Hinson's office.
In response to a question from Mr. Saporito as to the reason for the interview with Hinson, Cink told him that he did not know the purpose of Hinson's request.
In fact, Mr. Cink did not know the purpose of that interview and had not been informed that it would take place.
At Mr. Saporito's request, Mr. Cink showed him the way to Mr. Hinson's office.
Also at Mr. Saporito's
- request, Mr.
Cink witnessed, but did not participate in the interview.
Mr. Cink did not inform Mr. Hinson that Mr. saporito had raised cafety concerns.y l
During the interview, Mr. Saporite was asked to review his access authorization paperwork and to identify any omissions or discrepancies in it.
Mr.
Saporito identified a few minor i
discrepancies, but did not mention his employment with or termination by ATI.
Mr. Hinson then questioned him more closely
- on each part of the access authorization data form.
During this close questioning, Mr. saporit.o disclosed facts that were required for a complete access authorization application, but were not included in.his application:
o He had, in fact, been employed by ATI and was terminated for cause, as a consequence of which he had initiated a proceeding under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act against FPL and ATI.
o In addition, he had been employed as a full-time chief j
engineer at the Double Tree Hotel in Miami, Florida from January to April 1990.
He stated that he was terminated from the position because he offered an opinion regarding the location of a pool shower.
o He had been employed as a full time engineer at the Jupiter Hilton Hotel reporting to the Chief Engineer.
He was also terminated from this position.
U Mr. Hinson also subsequently asked Mr. Cink to witness the interview after Hr. Saporito refused to allow his interview to be videotaped -- an othervise standard practice in such matters at STP.
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Mr. Saporito also acknowledged a number of other areas in which the information he provided on the form might be inaccurate or i= properly omitted.
Based on the statements of Mr. Saporito during the interview, Mr. Hinson concluded that the information had been willfully withheld.
At the conclusion of the interview, Mr.
Saporito was informed that the information he provided would be given to the Access Program Dirac';or, who would make a decision
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regarding the continuation of his unescorted access.
He was advised to return to work the next morning and that his management would inform him of any further action.
At no time prior to, or during, the interview was Mr. Hinson informed or aware that Mr.
Saporito had met with the NRC or raised safety concerns regarding STPEGS.
Mr. Saporito did not, at any time during the interview, indicate that he had raised safety concerns, nor did he indicate that he was hungry, thirsty, tired, or needed a break from the interview.
IV.
ACCESS AUTHORIZATION ADJUDICATION Following this interview, Mr. Hinson reported the results of the interview to Mr. Balcon, the Access Program Director.
Mr. Hinson summarized the interview including both the questions he asked and Mr. Saporito's answers.
Mr. Balcom concluded that the number and j
adverse nature of the omissions indicated that the omissions were willful.
Mr.
Balcom requested Mr.
Hinson's recommendation concerning whether Mr. Saporito's access should be revoked, and was informed that revocation would be consistent with past practice.
Mr. Balcom determined on the basis of his review of the omitted information, Mr.
Hinson's advice and his description of the interview with Mr. Saporito, that access authorization should be revoked.
At the time he made this determination, Mr. Balcom was i
aware that Mr. Saporito had filed a "2.206 petition," but did not know that Mr. Saporito had met with the NRC or raised any other safety concerns.
Mr.
Jump and Mr.
Cink were present whan Mr. Balccm made the decision, but offered no advice concerning whether or not Mr. Saporito's unescorted access should be continued or revoked (Mr.
Cink was present because he had witnessed Mr. Hinson's interview with Mr. Saporito and Mr. Jump was present because Mr. Hinson could not initially locate Mr. Balcom, and contacted Mr. Jump as the person who had requested the investigation).
There was no discussion of the fact that Mr. Saporito had filed the "2.206 petition" or had otherwise raised safety concerns.
Mr. Saporito was informed of the decision to revoke his access authorization upon his return to STPEGS on the morning of February 21, 1992.
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Y.
EL&P POSITION HL&P encourages both HL&P and contractor employees to come forward i
with any safety concerns they may identify.
Employees are encouraged to bring such concerns to the attention of their i
j supervisors. HL&P also has a longstanding and recognized effective confidential employee concerns program, SPEAKOUT.
The purpose of 1
SPEAK 0UT is to investigate employee safety concerns.
The identity of persons raising concerns is protected to the extent practicable, and a response to each concern is provided when requested.
j Personnel are also informed that they are free to communicate their concerns directly to the
- NRC, and that they will not be j
discriminated or retaliated against for doing so.
This message is communicated in training sessions, in a Nuclear Group Policy (NGP)
I statement, and through on-site postings.
Hence, Mr. Saporite's,
filing of a "2.206 petition" with the NRC is an activity that is j
not only within his legal rights, but is also consistant with Company policy.
This is evidenced by the fact that Mr. Saporito's,
statement on his access authorization request form that his employment with FPL was " terminated as a direct result of my i
participation in a N.R.C. investigation of the Turkey Point Nuclear 1
Plant" was not considered detrimental when specifically reviewed j
by the Access Program Director during the decision to grant access on February 6, 1992 2/
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Mr. Saporito's. access authorization was revoked solely because of j
i concern regarding his reliability and trustworthiness arising out i
of willful emissions of material data specifically required by I
HL&P's access authorization program.
This program is required by i
NRC regulations set forth in 10 CFR I 73.56.
As noted by the NRC, the objective of the access authorization program is "providing l
high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access (to the l
protected and vital areas) are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public including a potential to commit radiological sabotage."
l Guidelines endorsed by the NRC specifically require that "In making a determination of trustworthiness or reliability, the following l
must be considered:
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This is Mr. Saporito's characterization of the reason for the termination from FPIi employment.
As noted in a letter of j
February 20, 1992, to Mr. Saporito from the NRC Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation denying action on a 2.206 petition filed against FPL, "On June 30, 1989, the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL)
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) l issued a decision which held that FPL discharged you solely as a result of insubordination (Case Nos. 89-ERA-7/89-ERA-i 17)."
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Willful omission or falsification of material information submitted in support of employment or request for unescorted access authorization."
HL&P procedures for granting and denying access authorization follow this guideline.
As noted previously, there were numerous omissions in Mr.
Saporito's access authorization request paperwork, particularly with respect to previous employment, termination from previous employment, and involvement in litigation.
The omitted facts generally were unfavorable, or could have been considered as unfavorable to Mr. Saporito.
The employment-related omissions would very likely have led to the denial of Mr. Saporito's access authorization in the first instance if they had not been omitted.
These facts were omitted despite specific instructions to complete the forms carefully and Mr. Saporito's signature directly under the statement that "I CERTIFY THAT ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED ON THIS DATA FORM IS CORRECT, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT ANY MISSTATEMENT, MISREPRESENTATION, OR OMISSION MAY CONSTITUTE CAUSE FOR ACCESS DENIAL. "2/
Based on these numerous omissions, the Access Program Director concluded that there was a systematic pattern of deliberate omission of adverse information indicating that the omissions were
- willful, and, that these omissions reflected negatively upon l
Mr. Saporito's trustworthiness and reliability.
Accordingly, Mr. Saporito's access authorization was revoked.
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The access authorization screening affidavit similarly states, immediately above Mr. Saporito's signature, that "I understand that any misstatement, misrepresentation, or omission on any document used to process unescorted access will constitute cause for denial of access at any time. "
To confirm the information provided in the screening affidavit, applicants for access to STPEGS are personally interviewed as part of the access authorization process.
Mr. Saporito was personally interviewed by STP access processing personnel on January 13, 1992, and was specifically asked each of the questions on the Screening Affidavit orally and to provide complete details on any cases of termination of employment. Mr. Saporito attested that his only termination from employment involved Florida j
Power & Light.
He omitted his more recent terminations by other employers.
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i VI.
CONSISTENCY WITI PRIOR ACCESS AUTEORI2ATION ADJUDICATION (
A.
Backuround As previous sections demonstrate, Mr.
Saporito's access authorization was revoked because of willful omissions of fact from his access authorization request.
The revocation followed an investigation and recommendation concerning these matters by STP personnel who were not aware of his involvement in a " protected activity" (the filing of a 2.206 petition with NRC).
Hence there is no evidence that the access authorization was revoked on grounds which might constitute discrimination under Section 210 of the ERA or 10 CFR 50.7.
Nevertheless, in reviewing a claim filed by Mr. Saporito under Section 210 of the ERA, the DOL District Director found for Mr. Saporito based upon an examination of only 13 of the 715 adjudicated access authorization cases at STP from May 1989 to March 1992.V Nine of these cases involved failure to disclose information in access authorization paper work.
Of the nine cases, in only one was access denied or revoked.y Based solely.on that data the Director inferred that revocation of Mr. Saporito's access authorization was contrary to an otherwise " clear pattern" and, hence, that " discrimination... was a factor" in the revocation of his access authorization.
The DOL Director's dacision is in error.
The sample selected was statistically insignificant and biased toward cases adjudicated in 1989, a period which, for the reasons noted in Section C,
is totally non-representative.
However, since these statistics are the basis for the DOL decision and because the office of Investigations (OI) evidenced interest in comparable data, a proper i
analysis of the relevant data is essential and has recently been completed by HL&P.
V 543 cases were adjudicated betwecn January 1990-March 1992, a period commencing with the tenure of the current STPEGS Executive Management.
F HL&P's analysis of what it believaa to be the 13 cases analyzed by the DOL investigator is at variance with his conclusions.
HL&P's review found that only six involved omissions of data, and that none involved denial of access, although in two cases the access was not granted because the adjudication was not completed.
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B.
Consistency of Troatment in Comearable Cases at STP The HL&P analysis shows, beyond any question, a consistent pattern of treating generally comparable cases in a consistant manner.
In summary, the data show that of the 12 adjudications which clearly involved omission / falsification of employment information, nins resulted in denial of access and three resulted in granting of secess.
In each of the cases where access was granted, only one fact in the spolication was omitted or false.
In contrast, Mr. Saporito omitted at least four separate pieces of highly relevant information, including terminations from three recent positions of employment. Even in the nine denial cases, the number of and/or nature of omissions / falsifications of employment data was not as extensive as those in Mr. Saporito's case, involving, on the
- average, about two omissions.
The decision to revoke Mr.
Saporito's access was thus fully consistent with access adjudication decisions in comparable circumstances at STP.
C.
liL&P Analysis The HL&P analysis, unlike that of the DOL Area Director's, began with an evaluation of the entire population of adjudicated cases in tb peried between January 1990 and March 1992.
This spans an int e al during which the access adjudication process was essentially unchanged; during which HL&P applied NUMARC 89-01, "IndGtry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program" (August 1989);
close in time and encompassing the revocation of Mr.
Saporito's access authorization; and
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corresponding to the tenure of current STPEGS Executive Management.1/
Unlike the DOL analysis, ML&P identified the truly comparable cases
-- that is, those involving, as in Mr. Saporito's case, omissions of fact pertaining to prior employment.
HL&P believes that the two categories of caission of greatest consequence in evaluating reliability and trustworthiness are those relating to criminal history and prior employment but that the two categories are sharply distinguishable.
At the heart of the distinction between the categories is the fact that the latter almost always involves deliberate lies by the person most familiar with the
- facts, while the former is often inadvertent or explainable for reasons uniquely associated with the criminal justice system and its related records which are prepared by others, and which the affected individual may not be aware of or understand.
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The data, which is being maintained in clearly auditable for=
at the South Texas Project site, is summarized in the Appendix.
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Statistics which include cases involving the omission of criminal history data are suspect and can be misleading because they may involve events that occurred many years earlier (in some cases 10, 20, or 30 years ago) or circumstances which are confusing to people who may be unfamiliar with the criminal justice system.
People who are informed that criminal charges have been dismissed or that their cases have been disposed of by " deferred adjudication," or who are informed by their attorneys that their convictions have been expunged from the record, and those who have been temporarily detained or voluntarily present themselves at the courthouse or police station, often do not understand that they have been arrested and/or convicted, or do not recall all of the charges arising from an incident.
These factors call into question the
" willfulness" of a subsequent failure to provida details concerning criminal history.
In sharp contrast, the access authorization process, insofar as it involves prior employment, focuses primarily on relatively recent,
events (i. e., within the preceding five years).
The circumstances of termination (LL.,
for cause) are highly unlikely to be forgotten, unknown or misunderstood by the applicant.
The omissions / falsifications are much more likely to be deliberate and are therefore much clearer indicators of unreliability and/or untrustworthiness.
D.
Conclusions t
As noted above (Section B), an evaluation of comparable cases shows there is no difference between the adjudication on Mr. Saporito's access authorization and adjudications in similar cases during the relevant period.
Indeed, viewed solely on a statistical basis, Mr. Saporito's case is an outlier in only one sense -- it is the most extreme case of deliberate omission and misrepresentation of employment data encountered at the STP site during the tenure of the current Executive Management.
The analysis is important not only because it invalidates the conclusion of the dol District Director, but also because it is relevant to the thought-process of those primarily involved in the decision-making process on the revocation of Mr. Saporito's access authorization.
Considering the many factors that may affect an access authorization decision, the single compelling aspect of j
[Mr. Saporito's base was the large number of omissions of negative information concerning relatively recent employment and related terminations -- aspects of which he failed to divulge until being closely questioned in a
personal interview with the HL&P investigator.
The investigator's judgament reflected his those invol,ving material experience in comparable cases
, omissions _of damaging prior employment data.
In that context, Mr.
[Saporito'sjease, as noted above, was extreme and the recommendation regarding revocation of access authorization was well within the bounds of the investigator's experience and prior cases during the relevant period at the STP site.
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APPENDIZ A.
INTRODUCTION In order to gain unescorted access authorization at STPEGS, an evaluation of an individual's completed data form and screcaing affidavit (" application") is required.
In determining whether the information on these forms is accurate, an investigator reviews background materials including criminal history, a background report prepared by an investigative agency, and correspondence from police departments or county / state agencies, if necessary. If an J
individual discloses detrimental information on his/her application or if there appear to be discrepancies between the application and the individual's background information, EL&P initiates an evaluation (adjudication) to determine whether the individual can be considered trustworthy and reliable despite the detrimental information or discrepancies.
In addition to the above-mentioned' materials, an adjudicator may also interview the individual and consider statements made by that individual addressing any issues raised by the adjudication.
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HL&P reviewed its records of adjudications of access authorization applications between January 1, 1990, and March 31, 1992, in an effort to determine the results of adjudications in cases involving omission - or falsification of employment-related information. 1/
If such information was not disclosed on an individual's application or any of his/her prior applications, it was deter =ined to be an omission.
Minor discrepancies in information (such as insignificant inaccuracies in dates) were not treated as emissions or falsifications.
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The review required an initial screening of adjudication l
forms. These forms contain a section in which the adjudicator indicates the matter under review.
Thus, if in any case, the adjudicator only referenced an individual's criminal history i
as the basis for the adjudication, then, notwithstanding other-omissions / falsifications pertaining to employment, the case was not treated as " employment-related."
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B.
CIJLSSIFICATION OF ADJUDICATION CASES Of 543 cases that were adjudicated between January 1, 1990 and March 31, 1992, 99 involved instances in which HL&P identified information that had been omitted or falsified by individuals on their access authorization data forms and/or screening affidavits.
Eighty-five of the 99 omission cases involved omitted or falsified infermation which pertained to an applicant's criminal history. In these cases, 84.7% (72 cases) resulted in granting access; in 15.3%
(13 cases) access authorization was denied.
Of the remaining 14 cases, 12 involved omissions or falsifications of data related to prior employment. 2/
C.
DATA PERTAINING TO EMPLOYMENT-RELATED OMISSIONS Out of the 12 cases identified by the adjudicator as being under review for reasons including omission / falsification of employment-related information, access was denied in 9 cases or 75%, while access authorization was granted in 3 cases or 25%.
Each of the 3
cases in which access was granted involved only 1
omission / falsification, and access was denied in every case where there was more than 1 omission / falsification.
The following chart further summarizes the relevant data pertaining to the cases involving omissions or falsifications regarding prior employ =ent.
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The other two cases involved emissions or falsifications of infor=ation about fitness for duty and education.
Both these cases resulted in denial of access authorization.
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DATA ON CASES AB:rUDICATED FOR ONISSIONS/ FALSIFICATION 5 0F EMPLOYMENT-RELATED IMPORMATION Case No.
No. of omissions Disposition 90-0486 2
' Deny */
91-1025 1
Grant 91-0729 1 **/
Deny 91-0753 3 **/
Deny 91-0772 2
Deny 91-0858 1
Deny 91-1006 1
Grant 91-1084 3
Deny 91-1174 1
Deny 91-1193 1
., Grant 91-1205 1 *,.*/
Deny 92-1271 ***/
4 Deny Total Cases 12 Total Granted 3
Total Denied 9
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Termination action was taken by the Human Resources department.
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In addition, this individual omitted information relating to his criminal history.
- / This casa number is assigned to Mr. saporito.
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ATTACINENT 2 The Light.
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File No. : G03.12 10CFR50.7 g sy.C N Mr. J.
L. Milhoan Regional Administrator, Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 South Texas Project Units ) and 2 Docket Nos. STN 53-498, STN 50-499 STP EmDlovee Concerns Procram s
Dear Mr. Milhoan:
As I have discussed with you in the past, one of my highest priorities since coming to the South Texas Project has been to assure that there is an environment at South Texas which encourages employees to bring forth their concerns and that those concerns are received by management in a positive way that recognizes employees who bring forth concerns as contributors to our overall vision and mission for the station.
My management team and I have sought to assure that environment through a number of methods including:
)
video tapes provided to all employees and their families, ongoing group and one-on-one meetings with employees, sensitivity training j
for supervisors and enhanced training for new supervisors, employee bulletins, and climate assessments. An additional action that I took last August was to commission an independent review of our j
employee concerns program called Speakout.
The review was completed in November and your staff has been provided with copies of the report.
Specifically, I asked the independent consultants who conducted the review to compare the Speakout Program with the attributes of the best programs in the f <~O 't 7 7 ^ 3 7 7 g f h~bh f
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1 Page 2 ST-HL-AE-4665 1
l country and to interview site personnel to gain insights into how the program was perceived by the workforce. The independent review provided corroboration of our earlier climate assessment that the overwhelming majority of the workforce would raise nuclear safety or quality concerns through one of the mechanisms available to them, and identified some areas where improvement could be made.
These included improving workforce confidence in the program, clarifying the scope of the program, and clarifying the role of the evaluators / investigators in the program.
Af ter careful consideration of the independent review, I decided to make a number of the recommended changes on an expedited basis. I felt that timely action was important in order to demonstrate responsiveness to the feedback that we received from our employees, and to build on the momentum created by the intensive communications and training programs outlined above. Specifically, I an implementing or have implemented the following actions:
To address workforce confidence:
1 1)
The manager of the program now reports directly to me.
Additionally, I expect to hire, in the very near future, a contract manager to run the program for the next 18 to 24 months to emphasize the i
independence of the program.
2)
An ombudsman or employee advocate function has been i
I added to the program to provide the specific champion for the employees and to assure that their concerns are properly addressed.
This function also provides a single point of contact for the employee, should they need help in raising.their concern or desire further assurance-of confidentiality.
To address the scope of the program:
1)
The program has been refocused on nuclear safety and quality issues while providing other functions and avenues to address employee concerns not directly related to safety or quality.
To emphasize this change, the name of the program has been changed to the Nuclear Safety and Quality Concerns Program (NSQP).
Page 3.
f ST-HL-AE-4665 2) dther organizations, such as Human Resources and Industrial Safety will be responsible for handling employee concerns not directly related to nuclear safety and quality.
l 3)
To assure that employee concerns, of any kind, are properly handled, an umbrella program document has been developed to clearly define how concerns are to be handled, the interface between the different functions that deal with employee concerns, and to clearly define the employee advocate function.
To address the roles of the evaluators / investigators:
1)
Wrongdoing and similar type investigations are now being handled by an investigatory group outside of j
NSQP.
2)
The evaluation methodology within NSQP has been changed to eliminate
" law enforcement" type techniques such as tape recording interviews, and affirmation statements.
3)
The advocate function has been clearly separated from the evaluator function to assure that there is no confusion on the employees' part as to the role of the individual they are dealing with.
I have also instituted other changes such as enhanced training, development of performance
- measures, additional planned effectiveness
- reviews, etc.
which are designed to provide additional enhancement to the Nuclear Safety and Quality Concerns i
Program and the overall way that South Texas handles employee concerns.
Your staff recently inspected the South Texas employee con'cern At the time of the inspection, we were in the transition program.
created by my decision to proceed with the implementation of the changes to the program which I felt could not wait. The inspection team found both strengths and weaknesses in the program th'ey observed.
Attached to this letter are responses and actions we have taken to address observations made by the inspection team.
A separate attachment addresses the additional actions we plan to take to enhance the program and the scheduled dates for those actions.
We recognize, as Chairman Selin did recently in his testimony before a U.S. Senate subcommittee, that employee concern programs vary widely throughout the nuclear industry, and that many plants operate very successfully with several dif ferent kinds of programs.
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Page 4 ST-HL-AE-4665 We also recognize, as we believe you and your staff do, that the real key to success is not the form of the program, but rather the employees' confidence in the program and the overall environment in which employee concerns are addressed.
In making these changes at South Texas, we have tried to adapt what works well at other facilities to the specifics of our site in order to build the proper environment that assures
- t. hat employee concerns are addressed in a manner that builds confidence in the overall process and in the station's management.
As with any change, there will be a period of time before the overall effectiveness of these changes can be properly measured and put into perspective.
Our action plan, mentioned above, provides the time frames for those assessments.
In the mean time, my management team and I are dedicated to continuing to provide the proper environment for the raising and addressing of employee Concerns.
If you have any questions on this issue, please feel free to contact me or Joe Sheppard (512-972-8757) sincerely, w r'~~ em l
W.
T.
Cottle Group Vice President, Nuclear c:
J. M. Taylor Attachments:
1.
Responses to NRC Inspection Team Observations i
2.
Employee Concern Program Enhancement Schedule 3.
OPGP03-ZA-0504, Employee Concerns Program f
4.
NGP-130, Reporting Safety-Related Concerns and Problems l
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ST-HL-AE-4665 Houston Lighting & Power Company South Texas Project Electric Generating Station File No.: G03.12 Page 5 c:
Rufus S. Scott Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Associate General Counsel Houston Lighting & Power Company 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011 P. O. Box 61867 Houston, TX 77208 Lawrence E. Kokajko Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Institute of Nuclear Power Washington, DC 20555 13H15 Operations - Records Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957 David P. Loveless Sr. Resident Inspector c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie 50 Bellport Lane P. O.
Box 910 Bay City, TX 77404-910 Bellport, NY 11713 D.
K.
Lacker J. R. Newman, Esquire Bureau of Radiation Control Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., STE 1000 Texas Department of Health 1615 L Street, N.W.
1100 West 49th Street Washington, DC 20036 Austin, TX 78756-3189 K. J. Fiedler/M. T. Hardt U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
City Public Service Attn:
Document Control Desk P.
O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296 Washington, D.
C.
20555 J. C. Lanier/M.
B. Lee City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 G. E. Vaughn/7. M. Puckett Central Power and Light Company P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 l
RESPONSES TO NRC INSPECTION T'au OBSERVATIONS 1.
Additional cuidance on protqqtion of concernee identity should be orovided Procedures used by the employee concerns program are under revision to more completely describe the specific methods to be used to protect the identify of those who request that their concerns be handled on a confidential basis.
These revisions are scheduled to be complete by January 15, 1994.
2.
Policy on raisino concerns /contactina NRC should be clarified Nuclear Group Policy 130 has been changed to emphasize that employees with concerns are free to contact the Nuclear Safety and Quality concerns Program ("NSQP") or the NRC at any time.
This revised policy was approved on December 23, 1993 and is attached for your information.
3.
Comolete closura of multiple concerns s$ould be assured Routine tracking at:d coordination of concerns until the investigations are concluded is normally adequate.
Additional assurance vill be provided by the assessments and the oversight group.
4.
Interviewer trainina should be enhanced j
The 1994 Human Resources Development Plan includes provisions and a budget for providing formal training on interview techniques to NSQP personnel responsible for receiving and evaluating employee concerns.
This training is expected to be completed during 1994.
Training will focus on how to establish a good rapport with concernees, ensure that all pertinent information relating to a particular concern is elicited, and provide satisfactory feedback to the concernee on the progress and results of evaluation of the concern.
The investigative group outside of NSQP will complete 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> of fornal classroom training on investigative principles and techniques by January 13, 1994.
5.
Site exit interview process should be more effective Procedural changes have been made which require an interviewer from the Nuclear Safety and Quality Concerns Program to participate in the exit process for each person concluding a term of employment at the STP site.
This will provide an opportunity for those individuals to express any concerns about nuclear safety or quality.
The NSQP interviewers will utilize a structured set of questions designed to elicit any concerns that the individual who is
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6.
Professional and orivate environment for receivina concerns should be assured j.
The location of the NSQP interview offices has been changed to the Central Processing facility so that it is more accessible to potential concernees and less obvious to other site personnel that the NSQP interview offices are being j
visited.
The layout of these offices will assure privacy for those who bring forward concerns.
In addition, NSQP interviewers and support staff will receive training and instructions on interfacing with concernees in a professional, courteous and helpful manner, as well as on the necessity to assure that concerns are being handled confidentially and that this confidentiality is perceived by concernees.
Trainina on the Penlovee Concerns Proaram orocedures should 7.
be orovided to those implementina the oroaras An overall program description and procedure for the employee concerns program has been developed and was l
approved on December 31, 1993.
This procedure describes the function of each of the subgroups within the Employee Concerns Program; provides guidance on how the activities of those groups should be coordinated; and includes specific l
guidance on such matters as definitions, protection of confidentiality, and means for responding to concernees.
This proceduce is attached for your information.
Instructions for use by each of the subprograms which comprise the Employee Concerns Program are under development and are expected to be finalized by January 15, 1994.
Training on the overall procedure and the subgroup instructions will be performed during the first quarter of 1994.
l Paolovee confidence in the concerns oroarams needs to be 8.
imoroved Several steps have been taken or are underway to improve employee confidence in STP concern programs.
These include:
a.
Establishment of the NSQP with an independent program manager reporting directly to the Group Vice President, Nuclear.
b.
Addition of the Concerns Coordinator position to act as an advocate for concernees.
c.
Establishment of a rewards program for those who bring forward, especially significant or hard-to-detect i
issues.
l d.
Separation of the interviewer / advocate function from the evaluation function for employee concerns.
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e.
Di'scentinuance of the use of " law enforcement" investigation techniques, except in cases where those techniques are clearly warranted.
f.
Transfer of investigations of wrongdoing, falsifi-cation, and discrimination to the Access Authorization, Investigation Division.
g.
Discontinuance of the use of tape recordings and affirmation statements, except in certain investigations performed by the Access Authorization Investigation Division.
h.
Enhanced procedures and training for employee concerns program personnel (see Item 4), including training regarding preservation of concernee confidentiality.
i.
Establishment of an oversight group to assure the adequacy of concern evaluations and response to concernees (see Item 3 and 11).
HL&P will be conducting follow-up evaluations to gauge the effectiveness of these actions.
An internal evaluation will be conducted in April and May 1994; an external evaluation will occur July-August 1994.
9.
Definitions of nuclear safety concerns should be provided This definition has been broadened in procedures to include discrimination, harassment or intimidation because an individual has brought forward a safety concern 10.
Definitions of Discrimination. HarLosment or Intimidation should be orovided Employee concern program procedures have been revised to include clear definitions of discrimination, harassment, intimidation, wrongdoing, falsification and other terms.used in the procedure.
11.
Feedback Jetters to employees should be more detailed In order to assure that responses to concernees are sufficiently detailed and responsive to explain the basis for the results of evaluation of concerns, an oversight panel has been established to review the evaluation of concerr.s and response.
This should improve the quality of responses provided to concernees.
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12.
Resoonses to all concernees whose identity is known should be assured j
Procedures are being established to require that concernees be provided with a response unless the concernee specifically requests not to receive a response.
Certified mail will be used to provide assurance that the concernee
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receives the feedback letter.
13.
Physical location of,poncerns Proaram Offices should facilitate employee access The NSQP interviewer office has been relocated to the Central Processing Facility (CPF).
Because all employees must routinely travel to the CPF for drug testing, badging, etc., this is considered a location conducive to use by employees.
Also, because of the amount of employee traffic to the CPF, those who visit it in order to speak to NSQP personnel will not " stand out."
This change will make visits to the NSQP office more convenient and secure.
14.
Simole Easy methods for raisina concerns should be available A Concerns Coordinator position has been established to affirmatively assist employees in bringing forward their concerns and assure that concerns are addressed by the correct organization.
The concerns coordinator will act as an advocate for the concernee to assure that concerns are completely and fairly evaluated and appropriate feedback is provided to the cencernee.
The availability of the Concerns Coordinator as a single point of contact is being prominently communicated to employees through training, site postings, and other means of communication.
The availability of the concerns coordinator provides a simple, easy to understand avenue for raising concerns with minimal effort on the part of concernees.
Attached for your information is the revised overall employee concerns program procedure, which reflects a number of these changes.
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ATTACHMENT 2 EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM ENHANCEMENT SCHEDULE 1.
Initial communications of program changes - Complete 2.
Development of umbrella program description / procedure -
Complete 3.
Development of sub-program instructions - In-progress; Final 01/15/94 4.
Additional communications to station personnel - First Quarter 1994 5.
Modify General Employee Training - First Quarter 1994 6.
Modify Supervisory Training - First Quarter 1994 7.
Implement performance measurement system - First Quarter 1994 8.
Initial program effectiveness assessments Internal (April-May 199,)
External (July-August 1994)
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