ML20086T327

Final Rept of Significant Const Deficiency 42-R1 Re Defect in GE Type Hma Auxiliary Relays Mfg Between 1976 & June 1981.Nonconformance Rept W3-3361 Initiated

ML20086T327
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	02/24/1984
From:	Gerrets T LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
42-R1, W3K84-0399, W3K84-399, NUDOCS 8403060258
Download: ML20086T327 (4)

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44, ou mono < s1eEn Louisiama! P O BOX* NEW POWER & LIGHT 6008 ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 36G 2345 Ur'fuYN5Ys February 24, 1984 W3K84-0399 Q-3-A35.07.42 Mr. John T. Collins Regional Administrator, Region IV b,@ <0W M %

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ![~

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012 pg

REFERENCE:

LP&L letter W3K84-0209 c'ated January 31, 1984 -

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 42-R1 "HMA Auxiliary Relays" Final Report In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No.

42-R1, "HMA Auxiliary Relays".

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

/W M d,-

T. F. Cerrets Quality Assurance Manager TFG:CNH:VBR cc: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (15 copies)

Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washicalon, D.C. 20555 BA03060258 840224 /

PDR ADOCK 05000332 S PDR (,Q lj,

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Mr. John T. Collins February 24, 1984 W3K84 0399 Page 2 cc: Mr. E. L. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. W. M. Stevenson Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 a

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FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 42 R1 "HMA AUXILIARY RELAYS" IhTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency that existed in Type HMA Auxiliary Relays as manufactured during the period from 1976 through June, 1981. The problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear P.egulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM General Electric sent a Service Advice Notice No. 721-PSM-166.1 on December 7, 1981, notifying Ebasco of a possible deficiency in Type HMA Auxiliary Relays manufactured during the period from 1976 through June, 1981.

It had been determined that the length of the uninsulated flexible leads connected to the moveable contacts of some HMA Relays exceeds the allowable dimensions and can result in reduced spacing between the leads and the coil circuit terminals. The reduced spacing introduces the possibility of circuit connection between the flexible leads of the HMA contact circuits and the adjacent coil circuit terminals.

A survey has been conducted for use of the identified Type HMA Relays and a listing of the switchgear affected has been complied:

6.9 KV-3B1 4.16 KV-3A2, 3A4, 3B2, 3B3, 3B4, and 3AB3 480V - 3A31, 3B31, and 3B32 This survey resulted in the identification of other Type HMA Relays not mentioned by G-E, but with the same problem in the following switchgear:

6.0 KV-3Al 4.16 KV-3A3

- SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Engineering evaluation indicates that a relay malfunction could result in the failure of both onsite emergency sources of AC; thus, the condition of GDC 17 of 10CFR50, Appendix A, would not be satisfied. Therefore, the present HMA Relays, if left uncorrected, could present a safety hazard.

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P SCD 42 R1 Page 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Nonconformance Report No. W3-3361 was initiated to track and document corrective action. Corrective action was taken to permit closing of the NCR and submission of a final report of SCD 42. However, the NCR was re-opened because the corrective action did not provide documentation of work performed or relays identified by site personnel (in addition to those identified by GE) .and evidence of.the " freedom of operation" check was not available.

All corrective action has been completed on all HMA Relays identified by CE Service Advice 721-PSM-166.1 and by site personnel using the same criteria.

The corrective action was performed in the sequence specified in rteps 1 through 4 of the General Electric Service Advice and the " Freedom of Operation" check was done per the requirements of step 5 as follows:

1. Remove the mounting screw from the moveable contact support at the front of the relay, then remove the top portion of the support along with the two captive coil springs.

2. Place a 5/8 inch long by 0.3 inch inside diameter piece of heat shrinkable tubing over each of the moveable contacts and slide the tubing along the contacts with flexible leads and all the way into the contact terminals. The tubing will cover the terminals and approximately 5/16 of an inch of the flexible leads.

3. Replace the moveable contacts in the contact support and position the flexible leads.in the lead slots in the support. Reassemble the contact support, springs, and mounting screw. The screw should be tightened sufficiently to compress the lockwasher under the head of the screw.

4. Shrink the tubing about the terminals and flexible leads by applying moderate heat, in the order of 105'C, from a source such as an electric air gun.

5. Check freedom of operation of the relay by depressing and then releasing the contact support assembly. The support assembly should snap back to its" originals position when it is released and there should be no indication of friction or binding.

Nonconformance Report W3-3361S/1, which was initiated to track and document corrective action has been reviewed, accepted and. closed.

-This report is submitted as the Final Report.

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