ML20086R773
| ML20086R773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1984 |
| From: | Boyer V PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8403010144 | |
| Download: ML20086R773 (9) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHI A. PA.19101 FEB 161984 V. 3. EO Y ER 3R. VICE PRESIDENT MUCI.E AR POWE H Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Docket Nos. 50-352 Licensing Branch No. 2 50-353 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1&2 Electrical Cable and Cable Tray
Reference:
Letter from V. S. Boyer to A. Schwencer dated November 23, 1983.
File:
GOVT l-1 (NRC)
Dear Mr. Schwencer:
The attached FPER pages contain information to close Limerick SER open issue fifteen.
The information concained in the attachment indicates several changes from the information provided by the reference letter.
Specifically, the number of fire areas which have high concentrations'of cables has changed.
Fire areas 22 and 23, the Cable Spreading Rooms, have been addcd to the list.
Fire areas 2 and 7 have been deleted.
Our initial review of these two areas indicated that they contained higher than normal raceway concentrations.
Upon further detailed review of the as-built raceway configurations, it was determined that they do not meet the criteria given in the attachment.
Therefore, fire areas 2 and 7 do not qualify as high cable concentration areas.
The information contained in these draft FPER page changes will be incorporated into the FPER in Revision 5 scheduled for March 1984.
Sincerely,
-JLP/gra/021084845 Attachment Copy to:
See Attached Service List 8403010144 E40216 PDR ADOCK 05000352
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b' cc Judge Tawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure)
Judge, Peter A. Morris (w/o errJc::are)
Judge Richard F. Cole (w/o enclosure)
Troy E. Ccnner, Jr., Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
J
~Mr. Frank R. Ibmano (w/o enclosure)
Mr.= Robert L.' Anthony (w/o enclosure)
Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/o enclosure)
Ms. Phyllis Zitzer (w/o enclosure)
Charles W. Elliott, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
, Zori G.~ Ferkin, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Mr. '1hamas Gerusky (w/o enclosure)
~
Director, Pennsylvania Bnergency Managenent Agency (w/o erclosure)
Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/o enclosure)
Argus Inve, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Mr.-Joseph H.: White, III (w/o enclosure)
David Wersan, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.
(u/o enclosure)
Martha W. Bush, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Soence W. Perry, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
Jay M.. Gutierrez, Esq.
(w/o enclosure)
. Atanie Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure)
Atanic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure)
Docket and Service Section (w/o enclosure)
James Wiggins.
(w/o enclosure) c:
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LG5 FPER CMEB 9.5-1 ammaans
_________. _____C550_fa5-3.GUIDEL185-________.____
.1 TEN _IfDa_
C91N160tf 65.
Only metallic tubing should be used for conduit.
C.5.e ( il NC See Section 3.I.2.
(
Than-eall metallic tubing shonald not be used.
86.
Flexible meta 111c tubing should only be used in C.S.e (1)
C Flex able saetallic tubin g used at short lertqthe to connect components to equipement.
raceway connectaons to comaonents as l
11mited to 5 feet An !=natta.
l 97.
3ther receways should te made of noncombustible C.5.e (la C
Gutter-type raceways aae ot all-metal materials.
constructaon.
s 98.
Redundant safety-related cable systems outside C.S.e (2)
AC See sectaou 3.I.2.
t he cable spreading room should be separated f rom each other and from ostential fire exposure hasarde in no aatety-related areas by 3ehour ftre barriers.
39.
These cable trays shawid bs= provided with con-C. 5. e (2)
NC See Sectaon J.1.2.
l tinuoas line-type heat detectors.
90.
Oables should be designed to allow wettirus down C. S.c ( 2)
C Cable insulatinq nystems anclude with fire suppression water without electrical proprietary tackettaq matetaals faulting.
designed for wetting.
l l
31.
RedunSant safety-related cable trays outside the C.S.e (2)
C l
cable spreading room should be accessible for manual fire f ight ing.
Manual hoes stations and partable hand extinguishers should be provided.
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92.
Safety-related cable trays of a single division C. S.e ( 2) unle trsys'ste not. 9eser aly p
t raa t are separated f rom redundant divisions wath automatic supa,ression system prsverage.
by a 3-hsur fire barrier and are accessible b
Fare areas that conta an s.afet.yMilated f or manunt firefighting should be protected cable trays are provade p tT tage from the effects of a potentist expcoure detectaon capahality. -
fire by providing automatic water suppression.
All cable trays a accessable for j manual tare (pehl. tug.
Fare-
! caused dampedi to a single train of sategt prciated components will notgws an adverse et t ect on tJae seg11tv en s-
_ _ - + e t --_ x.
J 93.
Saf ety-related cable trays that. are not acces-C.5.e (2)
NA Saf ety-related cable trays are not rible f or manual fire fight ing arould ta pro-routed through arede that ar e an-tected by an automatic water system.
accessible f or akanual tare t iWating.
94 Saf ety-related cable trays that are not separated C.5.e (21 g6 See Sectaon J.4.2 and item 92 ate)ve.
l f ree redeu dant divisions by 3-hour tite barriers shaald be protected ly automatic water uupermo-sion syrtems.
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C0tffb81GQW 136.
stairwelle shca 1S be designed to einimize smoke C.5.f (65 C
Stair toinece are prooided with self-p infiltration auring a fare, closang doore, whicks wati miptaine smoke int 11tration during a tire.
107.
Where tota l floading aae eatinguishing systems are C.5.f (71 C
See section 3.1.2.
used, ventilation dampers should L.a controlled in accordance with ItFPA 12 and 18FPA 12A.
L190t1RC.1Gfn_C9euCALG41190 108.
D red pelf-contained lighting units with individual C.5.q (Il C
See item 23 of Section 3.2.2.
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'r hour bettery power suppites should be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for a: cess and egrees routes to and from all fire areas.
139.
Sealed-beam bettery p3wered portable hand lights C.5.q (2)
WC Portable ligiate will be provided.
i should be provided for emerquncy use.
110.
Fixed emergency communicatione independent of thw C.S.q (3)
AC See Section 3.1 2.
the normal plant communication system should tx installed at preselected stations.
Itt.
A portable radio communications aveten should be C.S.q (4)
WC See Section 3.1.2.
provided for use by the fire brie e and other operations personnel required to,hieve safe plant shutiown.
h tt_DettGt190 112.
Detection systems should be provided for all C.6.a (1)
AC See Section 3.1.2.
l areas that contain or present a fire exposure to safety-related cautonent.
133.
Fire detection syntene shoiald comply neit h the C.6.a (2)
AC Tlae fire and awke detection erstem re:pairement s of class A syntemn as defined in NFPA 72D and Class I circuite as defined in to partially class A and part.aally NFPA 70.
Class B. as described in Section J.12.
(Class A and Ciaes B systems arse detined in the 1975 editaon vt NFPA 72D.)
114.
Fire de*tectors should te selected and installed C.6.a (33 C
See Se": tion 2.12.
l in accordance with NFPA 72E.
115.
Testing af pulsed line-type heat detectors C.6.a (3)
HA Pulsed line-tyre detectore ar e saot should demonst rat e that the frequenclea used will used in the plent.
not af teet the actuation of protective relave in other plant sy st ems.
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E&Es.ariaate Trainlag 22.
Requiremente for training of fire briga49 meshere..
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See Sectaca 3.J.2
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23.
Emergency lighting units with at least an S-hour J
bettery power supply shall be provided in all areas
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needed f ar operation of safe ohnstdoun equipment and
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in access and egre,eo ranates thereto.
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443&51sta:at&yg Ggangg&g 24.
Ettabilehnent of administrative controle to R
WC minimise f Are hasarde.
&&teEast&Yt.Aed.Ded&Ested.8thstdesm_Gesahility 25.
The ohnatdown capability perovided for a specific L.1 C
fire area shall he able to acaleve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditione in tre reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and saintain hot ehestdown canditions, achieve cold e.lutdoesn conditione esithia 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereatter.
26.
Diaring the poettire ohnstdoesn, the reactor coolant L.1 C
system procesc varishlee shall be maintained asith-in those predicted for a lose cf nearmal ac power, and the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected.
27.
Performance goals for the ebutdoesi functions.
L.2 C
Iisa avetens and m ate re11ea en for bot abutdoese and ccid shut.dossa As the event of a fire haven seen selected 4.0 as to ensure tsaat the listed goals are acateved.
28.
The alternative shutdossa ca;7 ability shall he L.3 NA As discumeed in item 20,, the addAtAos independent of the specific fire arose.
of alternative or dedAcated shastecesr.
capabiirty le not sweeded to ensure that hot shutdonna can &e achAaved.
29.
The ohnstdoesn capability shall accosmodate postfire L.3 c
All systems and componente reAA=4 on conditions where offelte power is available and for hot sautdous and cold w_=td m uhere offeito posser is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
An the event 01 a 14re are capamaa of beAng pansered 14cm the anaAte posser supplies, i.e.,
too station natteraea and standby dieseA-ges. orators.
3-76 RhV.
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,ror* nuous line-type heat 6etectors are not prov in cable j
trays.
e detectors of the ionization or
.oto-electric type, are located i eas through which safet lated cable trayn are routed.
This met f detection has een selected in lieu of products of combustion will line-type heat detectors ause 1
be detected by the smoke dote s earlier than the heat from a '
faulted cable would be de ed b-at detectors.
This conclusion is based est observation t show that a sestained overe on power cables begins ucing copious quantitiesj smoke shortly after the overcurrent dition is initta This smoke production occurs well in advan of the ti that the cable jacketing reaches ignition temperatur Item 94 I M BTP Guideline Io other areas where it may not be possible because of other overriding design features necessary for reasons of nuclear safety to separate redundant safety-related cable systems by 3-hour-rated fire barriers, cable trays should be protected by an automatic water system with open-head deluge or open directional spray nozzles arranged so that adequate water coverage is provided for each cabla tray.
Sech cable trays should also be protected from the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur.
LGS Desion l
In areas that contain redundant divisions of safety-related cable trays that are not separated by 3-hour fire barriers, those specific trays that contain cables needed for safe shutdown are provided with separation by means of distance or by Jesser-rated fire barriers (minimum 1-hour rating) and provided wich automatic water suppression.
Where separation alone is deemed sufficient to. ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of fire, due to los combustible loading in the area, automatic water suppression to protect the cable trays is not provided.
Item 96 BTP Guidel'ne Electric cable roastruction should, as a minimum, pass the flame test in the current IEEE Std 383.
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In lieu M line type heat detectors, Limerick has provided stoke detectorsin areas t (icnization or photo-electric type)The detectors are located throughout the plant as discussed in trays are routed.
The location of early warning
, h FPER section 2.12 and as listed in FPER Table A-1.srcke detectors was Where the intent is to protect c21e trays and car;cnents frcm a specific hazard, the detectors are installed closer to the hazard in a position engineer.
The where the detector will readily intercept the products of ccribustion.
ionization and photoelectric detectors provide the preferrable means to detect The thermally 6th an incipient cable tray fire and an exposure fire hazard.ferred method of detecting cable h
' actuatec line-type heat detectors are not t e pre tray fires because they will rat initiate an alarm until the fire is beyond the
'Ihis position is supported by studies perfomed at Sandia Iaboratories, (brREG/CR-0488) " Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection, Fire retection".
incipient stage.
Table.Irof the report states that ionization or photoelectric detectors are theThe detection of choice for the hazards and rocm gecret:y in Nuclear Power Plants.
which have a delayed res;cnse time are not best suited for slow such as cable tray fires.
%erefore, the smoke and fire detectors presently installed provide the preferred means of early detection of a cable tray fire or an exposure fire, p=w p
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