ML20086E385

AO 75-02:on 750108,personnel Discovered That Carbon Filter Beds Changed on Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train a Instead of Planned Train B.Carbon Beds in Train B Replaced

ML20086E385
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	01/09/1975
From:	Riley B VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
AO-75-02, AO-75-2, VYV-3511, NUDOCS 8312070076
Download: ML20086E385 (5)

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VERMONT YANKElc NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION . .

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Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region I $.};m.' .4 E United States Atomic Energy Commission ig a , . .

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REFERENCE:

Operating License DPR-28 4M'# ) ..'

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Docket No. 50-271 P Abnormal Occurrence No. AO-75-02 (2411our Report) Y .J ';. , !

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Dear Sirs i :V;;;_

E As defined by Technical Specifications for the Vermont Yankee

- Nuclear Power Station, Section 6.7, we are reporting the following j;['.4 y.f,jf,.' 0 '

Abnormal Occurrence as A0-75-02 and confirtaing our telephones conversation  %. ;. :. ..

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with your office. (.3/ ~. ,. ' _ .

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I bn January 6,1975, the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) 5$M.~

_ train was tasSed out of service to allow maintenanco personnel to change M . :.

[ out the carbon filter beds.- *Ihis work was completed on January 6; however, at approximately 1000 on January 8, it was discovered that the E

= carbon filter bede had been accidently changed on the SBGTS ' A' trair.

E on January 6. For the period of titsa (approximately 51/2 hours) that . _ _

i it took to replace tbs carbon beds on Janusry 6, neither SBGTS train was

[ fully operable as required by Technical Specifications 3.7.B.

A halogenated hydrocarbon test was started itmoediately on train 'A' E . after it was discovered that the wrong carbon bede had been replaced.

E This test which is required by Technical Specifications 4.7.B.2.c was =

k successfully completed by 1125 on Jar.uary 8. The carbon beds in SLGTS train 'B' were then replaced and a successful halogonated hydrocarbon test was performed, making both trains fully operable.

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vgMMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPCMATI Directorate of Regulatory Operations Jcnuary 9, 1975 Pass 2 The plant was operating at full power for the duration of this incident with an average stack release rate of approximately 325 pC1/sec.

Very truly yourd, bb.

Bradford W Riley Plant Superintendent WWDd .

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M)s V ERMONT Y ANKEE N UCLEAR POW ER CO141'014 ATION .

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SEVENTY SEVEN GROVC STRCCT .

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P. O. DOX 157 VcRNON. VcRf40NT 05354 January 9, 1975

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REFERENCE:

Operating License DPR-28 Docket No. 50-271 Abnormal Occurrence No. A0-75-02 (24 Hour Report)

Dear Sir:

As defined by Tcchnical Specificatiens for the Uement Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Section 6.7, we are reporting the following Abnormal Occurrence as AO-75-02 and confirming our telephone conversation with your office.

On January 6, 1975, the 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) train was tagged out of service to allow maintenance personnel to change out the carbon filter beds. This work was completed on January 6; however, at approximately 1000 on January 8, it was discovered that the carbon filter beds had been accidently changed on the SBGTS 'A' train on January 6. For the period of time (approximately 5 1/2 hours) that it took to replace the carbon beds on January 6, neither SBGTS train was fully operable as required by Technical Specifications 3.7.B.

A halogenated hydrocarbon test was started immediately on train 'A' after it was discovered that the wrong carbon beds had been replaced.

This test which is required by Technical Specifications 4.7.B.2.c was successfully completed by 1125 on January 8. The carbon beds in SBGTS train 'B' were then replaced and a successful halogenated hydrocarbon test was perforned, making both trains fully operable.

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9 ABNORI!AL OdCURKD;CE REPORT y \D?

4 Report Number: 50-271/75-02 O January 16, 1975 h%

9 Report Date:

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Occurrence Date: January 8, 1975

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Facility: Vermont Yankee, Vernon, Vermont kj' p 4

g Identification of Occurrence a

Inoperability of the Standby ,asG Treatment System.

A Conditions Prior to Occurrence Steady state operation at full power with an average stack release rate of approximately 325 pCi/sec.

Description of Occurrence on January 6, 1975,'the "B" Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) was tagged out of service to allow maintenance personnel to change out the carbon filter beds. This work was completed and the tags were removed in approximately 5 1/2 hours. However, at approximately 1000 on January 8, it was discovered by plant personnel that the carbon filter beds had been accidentally changed m tha RECTS "A" train on January 6, and not the intended SBGTS "B" train. For the period of time that it took to replace the carbon beds on January 6, neither SBGTS train was fully operable as required by Technical Specifications Section 3.7.B.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence The apparent cause of this occurrence was due to the maintenance personnel involved mistaking the SBGTS "A" train for the "B" train.

Analysis of Occurrence The maintenance man working on the SBGTS assumed incorrectly that he was working on the right train without making a positive identification.

..There were.no personnel' injuries or exposures and there were no-

. radioactive materials released as a result of this' incident. -

There was nothing to prevent ~.he "A" SBGTS train from starting if it had received a signal to do so. It was, therefore, available to insure secondary containment in the event that the normal reactor building ventilation was lost. The full filtering capability of the SBGTS would not have been available during the period of ti=e that it took to replace the charcoal filters; however, the Hepa filter portion remained operable. . /~ #

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COPY SNP EGION

Corrective Activu A halogenated hydrocarbon test was started immediately on train "A" aftet it was discovered that the wrong beds had been replaced. This test which is required by Technical Specifications 4.7.B.2.c was successfully comp 3cted by 1125 on January 8. The enrbon beds in SBGTS train "B" were then replaced and a successful halogenated hydrocarbon test was performed, making both trains fully operable.

Both SBGTS trains were marked.witt, identifying letters to prevent this incident fron happening again. In addition, a program is underway to better identify other equipment in the plant as necessary in an attecpt to prevent a similar cccurrence. It is anticipated that this program will be completed by >breh 1, 1975.

Failure Data Not Applicable e

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Bradford W. Riley Plant Superintende WPM /khd e

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