ML20086C667

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Responds to Re Design Review to Determine If Failure of non-Class I (Seismic) Equipment Could Adversely Affect Performance of safety-related Equipment.Possibility Nonexistent
ML20086C667
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/1972
From: Schneider F
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Anthony Giambusso
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20086C671 List:
References
NUDOCS 8311290066
Download: ML20086C667 (2)


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Public Service Occtric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/G22-7000 50-272 50-311

- November 2, 1972 93

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3 Mr. A. Giambusso NOVg Deputy Director for Reactor Projects

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U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 6

8 Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. Gianbusso:

N O

FAILURE OF NON-CLASS I (SEISMIC) EQUIPMENT NO. 1 AND 2. UNITS.

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING' STATION In reply to your letter of September 2'6, 1972, we have reviewed the design of Salem Nuclear Generating Station to determine whether the failure of non-Claca I (seismic) equipment could adversely affect the performance of safety-related equipment.

As suggested, particular attention was given to the postulated failure of the circulating water and fire.

protection systems.

The p,op ih411.ty of impairment of s?.fety-o related systems from the f ailure of non-Class I sys-tems in the turbine bhilding area is non-exfstent.

This area does not contain any safeguard ~ operating systems.

A circulating water line failure, such as occurred at Quad-Cities Unit 1,could possibly flood the basement of the turbine building.

However, this would not affect safeguards equipment which is loca-ted in the nuclear areas.

The buildin6 structures.

are independent and are isolated below grade by a

-[ /g waterproof membrane.

Our analysis of failures in the nuclear-area shows no indication of adverse effects to safe-Ng guard systems.

Safety-related equipment located in f

the control room, relay room area, electrical equip-ment rooms, and diesel generator area are protected 9 3M

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  • ) d~7 j [b, fire protection system whose failure would j-by a CO2 not affect operation of this equipment.

We also do

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anticipate impairment of safeguard systems from

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i Mr. A. Giambusso 2

11-2-72 i

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failures resulting in liquid releases in other I

enclosed nuclear areas due to location of-equipment, control pancis, redundent control systems and totally enclosed motors.

Our study 'did, howev'er, uncover some ques-tionabic areas including a ventilation system control' panel and some open case motors.

As,a result, we will relocate the panel and provide shields to assure that no adverse effects will* result due'to impinge-ment of water.

This work will be accompli'shed in the near future consistent with-other construction activities in the affected work areas.

Very truly yours, F.

Sc netder Manager of Engineering Electric Engineering Department-e e

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