ML20085H493

Forwards Copies of Documents Re Plant License Amend Transfer to Southern Nuclear.W/Svc List

ML20085H493
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	06/13/1995
From:	Lamberski J TROUTMANSANDERS (FORMERLY TROUTMAN, SANDERS, LOCKERMA
To:	Bloch P, Carpenter J, Murphy T Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#295-16811 93-671-01-OLA-3, 93-671-1-OLA-3, OLA-3, NUDOCS 9506210199
Download: ML20085H493 (40)

Text

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TROUTMAN SANDERS occKETED

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NATIONSBANK PLAZA jf f)*.h 600 PE ACHTREE STREET. N E SUITE S200 ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30308 2216 TELEPHONE. 404 885 3000 FACSIMILE. 404 885-3900 0FFICE OF SE m m ussasm es.33eo 00CKETlHG &

June 13,1995 BRANCH VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS i

Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Administrative Judge James H. Carpenter Administrative Judge Thomas D. Murphy Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Georgia Power)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 License Amendment (Transfer to Southern Nuclear) ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3.

Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to the Board's instructions at the June 8,1995 hearing (Tr. 8077-78), this letter forwards copies of the followir.; documents to those on the attached Service List who have not already received the documents:

1)

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Event Report No. 2-90-005, "DG 2A Start Failure," completed July 19, 1990-2)

Cooper Industries, Energy Services Group notification to NRC pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 21, dated July 19, 1990, concerning the diesel's Starting Air Admission Valve; 3)

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Special Report, Valid Diesel Generator Failores, dated August 7,1990.

i Copies of these documents are not being provided with this letter to the Licensing Board, j

NRC Staff counsel ur intervenor's counsel, all of whom were provided copies by Georgia Power counsel at tite June 8,1995 hearing.

i Very tru y yours, J

4 s

John Lamberski

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28 of 37 Sheet 1 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 a

Report:

Page 1

of W h l

EVENT REPORT h

EVENT TITLE:

DG 2A Start failure i

REPORT NUMBER:

2-90-005 DATE(S) 0F EVENT:

7-11-90 EVENT CLASSIFICATION:

B f

Names of 1

EVENT REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS Ed Korinsky scorge 1receriCt Paul Kocnery Ken stor.es cneries coursey Joe D' Art 1CO Si nature of EV NT REVIEW TEAM LEADER udN DATE COMPLETED 7-19-90 MANAGEMENT REVIEW AND APPROVAL N

PRB Review Required YES NO ()

'L / ' ?

T 7/-7(.,

PRB Chairman Meeting No./ Date wn

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P*OCEDUAE NQ.

r;EVISION pAGE NO.

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9 29 of 37

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Sheet 2 of 10 DATA SHEET 1

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Report:

Page 1 of te:A TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR EVENT REPORT NO. 2-90 -05

• PAGE 1.

REPORT NARRATIVE (PER SECTION 4.6) 2.

EVENT DATA COLLECTION.

3.

CHRONOLOGT.

4.** PERSONAL STATEMENTS.

..(Figure 2) t 5.

ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION (PER 00058-C).

6.

ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING ITEMS.

ERTL TO NUMBER EACH PAGE OF THE REPORT AND ENTER APPROP PAGE NUMBERS.

ADDITIONALLY, THE ERTL WILL ENSURE THE EVENT REPORT NUMBER APPEARS ON EACH PAGE OF THE REPORT.

INFORMATION WILL BE PRESENTED ON THE INDICATED FIGURE.

O g. c.g,. 0 5 Page 3 of M A i

e 1

UNIT STATUS Unit 2 was at 80% power at the time of the 2A diesel start failure.

Unit 1 was at 100% power.

No equipment related to the diesel test out of service.

EVENT DESCRIPTION On July 11, 1990, diesel generator 2A was being tested during a routine surveillance per procedure 14980-2.

The right air bank was isolated for the July test of the left air bank.

When the engine start button was pushed by the control room operator, the engine began to roll with starting air.

The engine rolled twice and stopped, according to the local operator in the diesel room.

The engine failed to start.

The diesel was declared inoperable and the Technical Specification action statement was initiated.

On July 5, 1990 a similar event occurred when diesel generator 1B failed to start.

The causes and corrective actions of this event are consistent with the DG 2A incident of July 11, 1990.

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TROUBLE SHOOTING The seizing of these air start valves was discovered by a " pop test" performed under the manufacturer's direction.

This test i

applies approximately 100 psi of air to the starting air valve at the engine subcover.

An audible sound can be heard on valve opening and closing, if the valve is not sticking.

All valves initially noted to be sticking were machined to a tolerance of 0.002 to 0.003 and retested with no problems found.

The engine was started and loaded to 100% and maintained until temperatures stabilized.

The " pop test" was re performed with seven air start valves still indicating problems.

One cap stud was untorqued during cap removal for inspection when we heard the piston pop open.

A few other caps were loosened with the same results.

All caps were removed on the problem cylinders and placed on a true flat surface.

Some were found to be warped and all had irregular bore surf aces.

All caps were replaced and pistons machined to approximately 0.003.

~

.:er Pag 9 5 ef as;<

2,10 C3 ROOT CAUSE:

Diesel generator 2A failures to start due to starting air valve piston seizure within its associated cap assembly appears to be the result of marginal clearance between the piston and cap.

This condition exists apparently due to manufacturer machining process which allow uneven bore conditions on the cap and in some cases caps with flanged surfaces which are not flat.

Secondly, the tolerances specified by the manufacturer were 0.001 to 0.003 between piston and cap.

This clearance may have been sufficient for ambient temperature but did not allow for expansion of the piston inside the cap during engine standby or operating conditions or to overcome any machining irregularities.

The event critique team determined that ineffective corrective actions exists with respect to the ability to resolve Diesel Generator start problems.

The July 11, 1990 start failure of DG 2A was the fourth occurrence of this problem.

A troubleshooting MWO had been written but not yet implemented.

The third failure of DG 2A occurred on April 20, 1990.

An event critique team was not convened after this failure contrary to the policy established as a result of the SAE event critique.

Pagg 6 ef 29 3 s

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J.p-zy u-J CORRECTIVE ACTIONS All Diesel Generator 2A air start pilot valve pistons have been verified to move freely inside the cylinder walls.

Pop tests are to be performed immediately on Diesel Generators 2B. 1A and 1B to demonstrate freedom of movement.

Any sticking conditions noted will be appropriately corrected.

Additionally, Maintenance Procedures 28714, 28713, 28575, and 28576 are being revised to include provisions for pop tests during each refueling outage.

To minimize the possibility of sticking, Engineering is assessing the gap minimum clearance distance between the piston and cylinder walls.

Any changes in the desired minimum gap clearance will be reviewed against recorded gap distances for Diesel Generator 1A, 1B, and 2B for possible replacement.

Also, changes to the minimum gap clearance will be incorporated into Maintenance Procedures 28714, 28713, 28575 and 28576.

During the next scheduled tear down of Diesel Generators 1A, 1B, and 2B, the surfaces of the air start pilot valves will be checked for machining irregularities that could lead to sticking conditions.

Replacement or reconditioning will be performed as necessary.

To correct the problem of ineffective corrective actions noted as a result of four Diesel Generator failures to start, the event critique team recommends that the policy of having event critiques for Diesel Generator failures should be continued until plant management determines that Diesel Generators are sufficiently reliable.

This policy was established as a corrective action from the 3/20/90 SAE event.

Paco 7 of 25 IV.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT Diesel Generator 2A is one of two independent power sources that provide power to class 1E busses.

During the time the 2A diesel engine was under investigation, the redundant 2B diesel generator was capable of performing its intended function The plant entered an action statement for technical specification 3.8.1.1 which requires initiating a plant shutdown if the diesel cannot be made operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Prior failures of this engine may not have been fully investigated to ensure the causes of the failures were found and corrected.

The results of this investigation indicate that there existed a manufacturing or installation eiror that resulted in deformed air start pilot valve cylinder.

The deformity revealed itself in a random pattern.

The effects of the deformity could only be observed on an engine start after the engine had been shut down from a previous run and the engine stopped with a particular combination of faulty pilot valve and crankshaft position alignment.

There were a total of 7 cylinders with questionable air start pilot valves.

On a normal attempted restart with the air start pilot valve malfunctioning, the 5 second burst of air was not adequate to start the engine rolling over.

The burst of air was adequate to change the alignment of crankshaft position and faulty pilot i

valves so that any subsequent attempt to start the engine would be successful.

Based on the availability of the redundant 2B diesel at the time the 2A diesel was declared inoperable and the fact that the 2A diesel should have started under emergency conditions, there was no adverse effect on plant safety or the health and safety of plant staff or the general public.

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30 of 37

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Sheet 3 of 10 DATA SREET 1 Event Report No

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EVENT DATA COLLECTION Report: Page 1 of W a:e 1.

EVENT DESCRIPTION EVENT DATE

'1 '

i 1 et o UNIT 2.

& u1 TIME. e z. 2. v :. r" DEFICIENCT CARD NLHBER

2. -9 0 nz. 7 (IF REQUIRED) 2.

TYPE OF EVENT A.

REACTOR TRIF

( )

F.

RADI0 ACTIVE SPILL /

R.

FORCED REDUCTION

(

)

UNCONTROLLED RELEASE

(

)

i C.

PLANT TRANSIENT

( )

G.

LIQUID INVENTORY LOSS

(

).

D.

ESFAS

( )

H.

OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENT ( v 7' E.

PERSONNEL CONTAMIN

(

)

3.

EVENT REVIEW TEAM CALLED 007:

TIME o 3co SAER INFORMED:

TIME CORPORATE DUTT MANAGER INFORMED:

TIME 4.

DATA COLLECTION ASSIGNMENT

'5 b to u i,w s 5.

DATA:

FOR REACTOR TRIPS COMPLETE 10006-C. AND GIVE A COPY '"O TE RZVIEW TEAM.

FOR ALL OTHER EVENTS. COMPLETE TEE SECTION 5 THROUGE 1 AND PERSONAL STATEMENTS.

STATEMENT ACTIVITY PERFORMED ATTACHED SHIFT PERSONNEL AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT YES.0R NA SS st> u im,% s b nw b is-m vits ulk USS E.,% r m u W

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DATA TO BE COLLECTED (SRIFT SUr' ERINTENDENT TO CRECE ITEMS)

NOTE:

RDENE TEE DISE PACE AFTER A TRIP /SI.

PLANT COMPUTER ALARM PRINTOUT

(

)

PIANT COMPUTER EVENT LOGS

(

)

ATSI PRINTOUT

(

)

ERF C M UTER EVENT LOCS

(

)

FAULT RECORDEf. PRINTOUT

(

)

ERF COMPUTEP. TREND PRINTS

(

)

MART !tECORDERS ti.13T)

COPIES M:

NPC-OC NOTYFICATIC:: WORASYEk.I (

I Uh3 LOGS

(

)

AUE BLDG OPERATOR LOG

(

)

Tt3&INE BLDC LOG

(

)

RWO LOG

(

)

CONTROL BLDC OPERATOR LOG (

)

ELECTRICAL LOG

(

)

OUTSIDE OPERATOR LOG

(

)

UNIT CONTROL

(

)

CHEMISTRY RP MWU'5

e PROCEDumE NO.

mEvtstON pAGE NO.

VEGP 00057-C 5

31 of 37 Sheet 4 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No.S ~ ;

Report:

Page 9 of Tt.w 7.

PLANT CONDITION WHEN APPROPRIATE MAXIMUM / MINIMUM PRI-EVENT VALUE POST EVENT MODE

/

REACTOR POWER

/

I BORON CONCENTRATION

/

STEAM CENERATOR LEVTL 1*

/

Use NR or WR, 2*

/

whichever is 3*

/

indicating 4*

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/

GENERATOR OUTPUT

/

MWE PRESSURIZER LEVEL

/

8.

PLANT CONFIGURATION 8.1 0FF NORMAL STATUS OF PLANT SYSTEMS Mca pnp 2

ees

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8.2 TESTS AND SURVEILLANCES IN PROCESS 14. C %e - 2

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8.3 OTHER OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS AT THE TDE OF TEE EVENT Nns a w S ai;-

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9.

FOR ESFAS ACTUATION OR FAILURE ALTIOMATIC (

) MANUAL (

) N/A ( )

9.1 LIST CRANNEL ACTUATED / FAILED EXPLAIN SYSTEM RESPONSE 9.2 DID THE ESFAs COMPONENTS OrERATE CCTir.CTLT7 YES

(

)

NO (

)

I WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY?

YES

(

)

NO (

)

9.3 EIPLAIN ANT A3 NORMAL SYSTEM ESTAS RESPONSES.

WRY?

ii

PAOCEDuntNo.

KEVIStoN pagg wo, VEGF 00057-C 5

32 of 37 Sheet 5 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No 9.4 DESCRISE ANT OTHER MALFUNCTIONS NOTICED:

9.5 APPARENT EVENT CAUSE WAS 10.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 10.1 WHAT IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE EVE b tv-2,w:m M 7_ '6 c, - 2 n sF-5,rc Sw sci l

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90-245 10.2 WHAT SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE IN PROGRESS AS A RESULT OF T EVENTT r._ c o 2 - 9c 2 AS 10.3 WHAT FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE RECOMtEND E f 11.

LIST CORAECTIVE ACTION TAEEN FOR EACE ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE OR EQ MALFUNCTION TIAT ACCOMPANIED TE EVENT (STATE WRITRER COMPLETD, IN PROGRESS, OR PROPOSED).

12.

WERE PROCEDURES USED ADEOUATEf TES (

)

NO (

)

WET N0ft 13.

DID TEE OPERATORS AND OTHER PERSONNEL BANDLE THE EVENT CORRICTLT?

EXPLAIN.

DISCUSS CORRECTIVE ACTION TO DATE.

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33 of 37 a

Sheet 6 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No.D l

Report:

Page ] of TE b t

1 i

i l

14.

WAS AN DERCENCY PLAN EAL REACHED? DESCRIBE LEVEL INVOLVED (NOUE, ALERT, SITE AREA, GENERAL).

)

1

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i 15.

LIST LCO'S ENTERED LCO NO.

DESCRIPTION INITIALS I

2 90 i?J D6 2h f"A > c.C 2

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LIST ANY SAFETY LIMITS EXCEEDED.

TECE SPEC AND DESCRIPTION l

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COMPLETED BY:

DATA COLLECTOR

e*aOCEOUAE No.

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34 of 37 l

Sheet 7 of 10 I

DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No. 3 - eg, ~ '-

Report:

Page 12 or W w l

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CHRONOLOGY t

DATE/ TIME EVENT

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35 of 37 Sheet 8 of 10 4

DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No.

Report:

Page 1 or g INVESTIGATION QUESTIONS A.

GENERAL J

1.

DOES THE EVENT REPRESENT

.PREVIOUSLY UNFORESEEN i

ACCIDENT SEQUENCE?

YES/

2.

DOES THE FAILURE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH INTERACTION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS DEGRADE THE PEJLEORMANCE OF ANY SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT? @NO 3.

DOES THE FAILURE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH INTERACTION WITH OTHEA-SYSTEMS INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT?

YES(NO.

4 DOES,-THIS FAILURE CHALLENGE OR ACTIVATE SAFETY SYSTEMS?

YESLNO 5.

DOES THE EVENT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF TRANSIENT OCCURRENCES AND/OR REACTOR TRIPS?

YES/ {

6.

DURING THE EVENT, DID THE OPERATIONS STAFF RESPOND CORRECTLY?

YES/NO j

7.

ARE TRAINING KNOWLEDGE OBJECTIVES, PERFORMANCE TASKS AND CONTROLS ADEQUATE TO PROMOTE THE PROPER PERFORMANCE OFA'HE OPERATIONS STAFF UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES?

g/NO 8.

BASED ON A COMPARISON OF THIS EVENT WITH PREVIOUS EVENT REPORTS AND/OR FSAR ANALYSES. WERE THERE ANY ABNORMAL OR DEGRADED INDICATIONS?

YES @

9.

BASED ON COMPARISON OF RELATED SIMILAR INi)USTRY AND i

IN-HOUSE EVENTS, IS THIS EVENT A REOCCURRENCE OF A PREVIOUS EVENT:

YES/NO a "

y;9,.,. f,,c g 10.

DURING THIS EVENT, DID ALL AFFECTED SYSIT,MS RESPOND AS EXPECTED 7 :YES/NO i

V 11.

DID THE INITIAL EVENT PRODUCE UNANTICIPATED SECONDARY i

EFFECTS WHICH COMPLICATED OR INCREASED THE CONSEQ'.ENLE" OF THE EVENT?

YES/N0 l

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D WoCEDULE No REvi5loN PAgg No.

VEGP 00057-C 5

36 of 37

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Sheet 9 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No.O

$)

Report:

Page 1 or re w INVESTIGATION QUESTIONS (CONT'D) 12.

BASED ON COMPARISON OF SIMILAR INDUSTRY AND IN-MOUSE EVENTS WERE PRE S COR CTI ACTIONS / IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVE?

YE 40 E h

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0:e p n.nf, # 7 N '11 ARE ANSWFRED

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13.

IF QUESTIONS 1, 2, 3, 4',

5, YES, DESCRIBE THE REASON IN DETAIL IN THE EVENT REPORT.

14 IF QUESTION 6, 7,

10, or 12 ARE ANSWERED NO, DESCRIBE THE REASON IN DETAIL IN THE EVENT REPORT.

B.

PERSONNEL ERRORS 1.

WERE JOB ENVIRONMENT CONDITIONS SUCH AS LIGHTING, VENTILATION, EXTREME TEMPERATURE OF ICAL ACCESS TO THE TASK CONTRIBUTING FACTORS?

YES 2.

WERE PROPER TOOLS AVAILABLE AND USED7

/NO

/c 3.

WERE WRITTEE-APPROVED PROCEDURE AVAILABLE AND PROPERLY FOLLOWED? @ S/NO i

4 IF THE PROCEDURE WERE FOLLOWED, WAS PR DURE COMPLIANCE A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE7 YES O

5.

WERE ADEQU INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND COMPREHENSION VERIFIED 7 YES/NO 6.

WERE THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE PROPER PHYSICAL CONDITION 7 S/NO 7

DID THE PERSONNEL INVOLVED HAVE ERRONEOUSf: IDEAS AND/O CONCEPTS ABOUT THE SYSTEM INVOLVED 7 YES/N0j i

8.

DID THE PERSONNEL INVOI.VED HAVE PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AND/OR TRAINING ON THE SYSTEM INVOLVEDT QYES/

9.

DID THE PERSONNEL RECEIVE A BRIEFING QF THE EVOLUTION PRIOR TO STARTING?

YES/NO MA md,,,

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10.

VERE COMMUNICATIONS ADEQUATE FOR THE EVO 11.

VERE COMMUNICATIONS TESTED PRIOR TO STARTING 7 YES/NO SE kr -/GfdN l

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1. f-GE No VEGP 00057-C 5

37 of 37 Sheet 10 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No.

Report:

Page 1 or h.

INVESTIGATION QUESTIONS (CONT'D) 12.

WAS SUPERVISION IN NT ADEQUATE FOR THE EVOLUTION BEING CONDUCTED 7 ES NO 13.

WERE THE PERSONNEL THAT INITIATED OR ADVERSELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT QUALIFIED TO PERFO M EEIR ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO AND DURING THE EVENT? {YES) 14 IF QUESTIONS 1, 4 OR 7 ARE ANSWERED YES, DESCRIBE IN DETAIL IN THE EVENT REPORT.

15.

IF QUESTIONS 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 OR 13 ARE ANSWERED NO, DESCRIBE IN DETAIL IN THE EVENT REPORT.

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KOCEDUAE NO mEv8SICN PAGE No.

VIGP 00057-C 5

26 of 37 Event Report No.Q C O s1=s

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y Report:

Page 16 ofN3 EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT

1. a.FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS.

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2.

DID ANY AUT TIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION?

(Describe)

t. t 3.

DID THIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES?

(Describe)

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27 of 37 Event Report No.2~. q,

Report:

Page 17 of Te 4

IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, k' HAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?

1 5.

ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING?

(Describe)

NC 6.

COMMENTS:

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FIGURE 2 (CONT'D.) EXAMPLE

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26 of 37 Event Report No.

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Report:

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18 tt EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT

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1. a.FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING,'AND AFTER THE EVENT, I

SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUI SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS.

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DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCT!

ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION?

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DID THIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES?

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4 IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN. WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?

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COMMENTS:

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For reactor trips the personnel statement for1n in Procede e 100% may be used in lieu of this form.

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a ].0:Q (} =) ,Paca 26 of 26 AUDIT CHECKLIST CONTINUATION SHEET AUDIT # 0P09-90/31 ITEM # PAGE OF I4. TAG o a 3T i Coakni u m. Ts e A oo rro a., e s. sea g eo coucocr ec sTe o 5. 2.12 ( s. 2. /2. /.4 wea.a r41 A h. W base a D ie set Gs,aea AToA, 16 t.aA s nea%\\\\d'% M c b4. Tage,och ste o S.2. lt.. Aise. sTe o 6. 4 - Diesec G ebed'.ahd> RFL5u_. Tamweg., L skem Test.- t,uw. o b s e a.u d e Th e Aoo'r ce ue a.i O e' a e ed % c_ skoo t M e h s. En h L cah i.a s k o 4-. 2, a. we.e.e_. c_uuteA-L, ediba_ched o 1/F)z n ed doe AcAc._ u n 12/ 6 0 4 VP/t7c c d Aom an.h wAs l o'9\\q o. Ias Aoo,b ste reetceh s N h i Es Dresae Gen eraTo a., b m %e s obneroea PEO Moa_ gas DecLSa m iaa \\ \\ % B5 -C 'D 1 SSEL W~bit. 0@0'Th/4 'Leo." A\\sca3 T w No bn_ obse 1 PO Mwtu s esA6,w t 49 Bo-I. sec. r /ca S.5. " n i ese t hue %%c M a_ sk+ &mceeseiT s r." ( Nele : THE evo L A./So cbse.atael /x bw& r/ tiens fled /N tha rs= moeake eMh-discussed oA & aauias me. - ax. /3 / VT- / ) Alo p ro b k s i sto k d. 1 he' Ao o ern1. meTumeo b %i un s7 I coo-se! hm wo - cascus sed -H e sun.ve.) Ikc e w rn &a/n. Aha<,. 4' \\ o VE LL e rrs. 'TW wo, %a. eeadeo Mw,t & i> Acce Ace cw4ca, A n e: secTioa 6,,o l l4980- l) W r,e2=u ne,. SAce THE F-d/wAE 70 SMni toAS orraiourso -k -,.,w n o w o n s e~s k ed kkn Ya Gd'9es+ S 'he (set mue 10# !*i20-lh i ' m y/A& m u kJ w# jn suaei//w >.'

4' WCLE.'1 PLANT %M f ~3 1 & 2 r-nC' ENERGY SERVICES GROUP ..... _f ~ eoe e.. I t 7 - ~ ~ _. ' -----f--- _----.__. J 1.ii,' ^q July 19 1990 4.- 1 W . JH J .j s'"~~"~"- Nu c l e a r R e a c t o r R e g u l a t i on si.g]'T("T" Director of Q i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comtris s ' on : M J y ~ T '""~~ Mail Station P1-137 Washington, DC 20555 L_;._

• • "4 REPO T #154

'l-~,------- ~

Dear Sir,

In accordance with the requirements of Title 10 Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21, Energy Services Group, a Division of COOPER INDUSTRIES, hereby notifies the Commis-sion of a potential defect in a component of a DSR or DSRV Standby Diesel Generator System. There exists a potential problem with the Starting Air Admission Valve, a safety related component in the starting air system. COOPER INDUSTRIES supplied DSR and DSRV engines and/or spare parts with this potential defect to the following sitest UTILITY SITE SERIAL NO. MODEL LILCD Shoreham 74010-12 DSR-48 SERI Grand Gulf 74033-36 DSRV-16-4 GULF STATES River Bend 74039-40 DSR-48 CP&L Shearon Harris 74046-49 DSRV-16-4 DUKE Catawba 75017-20 DSRV-16-4 S0 CAL ED San Onofre 75041-42 DSRV-20-4 CEI Perry 75051-54 DSRV-16-4 TVA Bellefonte 75000-83 DSRV-16-4 WPPS - WPPSS I 77084-85 DSRV-16-4 TUSI Comanche Peak 76001-04 DSRV-16-4 GEORGIA PR Vogtle 76021-24 DSRV-16-4 ( CONSUMERS PR Midland 77001-04 DSRV-12-4 TVA Hartsville 77024-35 DSRV-16-4 SMUD Rancho Seco 81015-16 DSR-48 EN E88AtSE ENG;NE SE4vtCES '4490 Cataaa Sneet P O Sc= '837 San Leaac o CA 94577 w S,6'4'400 r = 1415) 614 74C9 a Aar*.CCEE A A ' + CCCPE A SE SSE*.* E * *

• E NTE APA'SE '+ EN TS C'vC ' ' PENN ** SLDE AiCA * * *E =CENTm'C' PACOLC3

t \\ US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report #154 7/19/90 Page 2 Georgia Power at Vogtle has recently reported four (4) inter-mittent failures to start the 2B diesel generator. In all but the last failure to start, subsequent start attempts were successful. It has been determined that the cause of the failure to start 'I was the air start piston sticking in the air start valve cap. Sticking in the piston cap can cause the air valve to stick in either the closed or open position. A valve stuck in the closed position will result in a " dead" cylinder. This will have a slight negative impact on engine start time, but the increase in starting time will not be significant and in almost all cases not noticeable. Multiple closed valves on an engine can result in a very slow engine start or failure to start. A valve stuck in the open position would most likely result in a very slow engine start or failure to start. If this were to occur on an operating engine, the engine would lose the output of the affected cylinder until normal vibrations freed the piston sufficiently for the valve to close. This could inpair the engines ability to carry rated load if the valve did not reseat. Our investigat;Sn continues to establish a course of correc-tive action. Examination of components suggests a combina-tion of root cause conditions, i.e., a close tolerance design fit between the piston and cap and the af fect of coef ficients of expansion for different materials of construction in these components. This condition may be exacerbated by possible bore distortion occurring when the cap is tightened to the valve body and cylinder head. Sticking valves may be identified by first increasing the engine temperatures to the maximum operating temperature by running it at full load for approximately a one-hour period. The valve is then manually cycled by applying a 60 psi pilot signal to the pilot input at the subcover. The valve should audibly open upon application of the pilot signal. It should audibly snap closed when the pilot signal is removed. 3 Our final recommendation for corrective action will be pub-lished no later than July 31, 1990. i T gm', ENE AGY SERvlCES G AOUP

e U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report #154 7/19/90 Page 3 A copy of this letter will be forwarded to all of the affected sites referenced in Paragraph 2 of this letter as indicated by the carbon copy list. Our evaluation of this matter was concluded on July 18, 1990. t Sincerely, n ,,J ae Bruce C. Guntrum Manager, Quality Assurance BCGre; cc: see attached t ENE AGY SEAvtCES GROUP t.

'[, J

• 0CFR21 Report #154 1

I I cc -~ i 4 Gulf States Utilities i P.O. Bot-220 St. Francisville,JLA 70775 [ Attention Director, Nuclear Licensing i i l Carolina Power and Light Company [ Harris Nuclear Proj ec t P.O. Bo;t'165 l New Hill. NC 27562 Attention: Mr. C.S. Hinnant -Plant General Manager [ Carolina Power and Light Company Harris Nuclear Proj ec t t P.O. Bou 1551 i Raleigh. NC 27eOO I Attentico: P.A. Watson Sr. Vice President Carolina Power end Light Company Harris Nuclear PrcJ ec t l P.O. Bon lo5 l New Hill. NC 27560 l A t ten ticn : Mr. P.B. .'an Me t r e i Manager. Technical Support I Carolin, Power end Light Company Shearson Harris Nuclear Plant j P.O. Box lo5 New Hill. NC 27562 l Attention: Mr. George Forehand Manager, CA/OC r Dut e Power Company i P.O. Box 33189 Charlotte, NC 29240 Attention: W.T. Robertson, Jr. V.P. Procurement. Services & Materials l Southern California Edison P.O. Bot 130 D4E r San Clemente. CA SOe72 ~ A t ten t ion : 0.4 Menacer i t ,, ENEAGY SE8MCES GmOUP

p t t ; 7 10CFR21 Report #154 cca r Tennessee Valley Authority 400 W. Summit Hill Drive WT10 C126 H-K Knoxville, TN 37902-1499 Attentions R.C. Weir Sacramento Municipal Utility District 14440 Twin Cities Road I Herald. CA 95609 Attention: Mr. Donald R. Ferguson Nuclear Engineering Manager M.S. 208-6 l Georcia Power Company Plant Vogtle f P.O. Box 1600 Waynesboro. GA 30830 Attention: Mr. G. Bockhold. Jr. l Plent Manager i Svstem Energy Pescurces P.O. Bo:: 75e Port Gibson. MS. 79150 I Attenticn: C.R. Hutchinson i General Manager. SERI System Energy Rescurces P.O. Gee 429 I Pc r t G'bson. M5 34150 A t ten tion : Fred Titus. Director Nuclear Plant Engineering I Sve teen Energy Resources P.O. Box 31995 Echelon One 1040 Echelon Parkway Jackson. MS 09286-1995 A t '.en tion : Mr. T.H. Cloninger V.P. Nuclear Engineering and Support Lcng Island Lighting Company Shereham Nuclear Power Station North Ccuntry Road Wading River, tTr 11701 Ati ention: Manraer. Nuclear Ocerations Support Department i l i ,; ENEAGY SERVICES GAOUP . - - =.

J AJ l l 10CFR21-Report #154 l cc ? 'I Texas Utilities Electric j Skyway Tcwer 400 North Oliver Street L.B. 91 Dallas. TX 75201 ] Attention: Mr. W.J. Cahill Executive Vice President ? Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry Nuclear Power Plant l P.O. Box 97 Perry, OH 44081 i Attention: A. Kaplan Vice President, Nuclear Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company c/o Ferry Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 97 Perry. CH 44001 Attentions Mr. E. Riley Director. Nuclear Quality Assurance Department Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company c'o Ferry Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Bon C7 Perry. OH 44081 4ttentions fir. S. hensicki Director. Ferry Plant Technical Department Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP SN 152B Chatanooga, TN 37402 Attention: Mr. T.W. Over11d Manager, Nuclear Experience Review Program Tennessee Valley Authority i WT10 B-77 H-K 400 W. Summit Hill Drive Mnonville, TN 07902 Attention: Tim Chan ] i Washinoton Public Power Supply System i P.O. Son 4o0 R2chland. WA 90052 Attention: Mr. L.C. Oakes Mankger. WNP-1 Engineering l i ENERGY SEPMCES GR(XJP et.x.n. ; [

1 'o. " p p V0ET11 b 7 C,' UWit 1 & 2 ! CCW i ROUTING ACTION ENERGY SUMCES GROUP 5 cooeu tGM 5UPPORT ,h,, flNSVC

• fs t

July 31,1990 0PERATION5 l MAINTENANCE HPEHEMISTRY 7 GEORGIA POWER COMPAN MP l Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. ENG SUPPORT Plant Manager TECH 5UPPORT Plant Vogtle 7" A*"O P. O. Box 1600 jS Waynesboro, GA 30830 DM EcVRITY ) i

Subject:

10CFR21 REPORT ? :. ;.7, \\ STARTING AIR VG y ouE l I I

Dear Mr. Bockhold:

As previously re orted: " Georgia Power Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, has recent reported four (4 intermittent failures to start the 28 diesel In al but the last failu)re to start, subsequent start attempt generator. successful. It has been determined that the cause of the failure to start was the air start piston sticking in the air start valve cap. Sticking in the piston cap can cause the air valve to stick in either the closed or open position. A valve stuck in the closed position will result in a " dead" cylinder. This will have a slight negative impact on engme start time, but the increase in starting time will not be significant and in almost all cases, not noticeable. Multiple closed valves on an engine can result in a very slow engine : tart or failure to start. A valve stuck in the o xn position would most likely result in a very slow engine start or failure to start. If tais were to occur on an operating engine, the engine would lose the output of the affected cylinder until normal vibrations freed the piston sufficiently for the valve to close. This could impair the engines ability to carry rated load if the valve did not rescat. Our investigation continues to establish a course of corrective action. Examination of components suggests a combination of root cause conditions, (i.e., a close tolerance design fit htween the piston and cap and the affect of coefficients of expansion for different materials of construction in these components. This condition may be exacerbated b possible bore distortion occurring when the cap is tightened to the valve body and hnder head." As stated in the subject re rt, recommendations for corrective action was to be develo xd by July 31,1 The following information furnishes recommended l action ay the customers: t.NTEAPAISE ENGINE SEAV:CES .1490 Ca:aea S:reet 8 O Ben '837 san weard'O. CA 94577 4'5 6'4 7400 Fan (4'5) 614.7409 lax' ' CCBE A A A' COCPE A BESSEVE A*

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e t l l 10CFR21REPORTNO.154 \\ STARTINGADWALVES July 31,1990 Pagelho A. Recommended CustomerAction For Valves In Service: I 1. Examine site operating history for occurrence of unexplained failures to start of diesel generators. i Yes No Failures --) Defer further action I 4 until next scheduled outage. i 2. With engine not operating, test function of air start valves by applying a 100 PSI pneumatic signal to the subcover tubing connection and listen for audible actuation, both opening and closing, of the air start valve at keepwarm or operating tem xrature. (Note: 100 PSI closely replicates operating ~ conditions as c etermined by actual testing conducted at VEGP.) 1 No Actuation Yes, Valve Works --) Defer further 4 action until next scheduled outage. 3. Confirm failure of air start valve actuation borosco se examination through injector bore while re eatin test outlined b Item 2. Note: elect to proceed dire ly to gem 4; that depends on site specificCus documentation and procedure requirements. No Visual Actuation Yes, Valve Works --) Defer further i 4 action until next scheduled outage. 4. Remove air start valve ca p and piston only. Do not disturb valve body or intake rocker assembly. This way it will not be necessary to reset valve lash or perform hot retorque of air start capscrews. Measure cap bore and iston diameter with components at room tem xrature and at least at 30 ntervals around the circumference of the parts. Nominal clearance required is.002" to .003". Measure Clearance Clearance is correct --) Fault lies Is Insuf5cient within the valve assembly; replace air start 4 valve assembly. 5. Mount piston in a suitable lathe and land down the outside diameter to obtain a nominal clearance of.002" to.003" at room temperature. Use emery paper only. Do not attempt to turn dow O.D. with lathe tooling. Retest valve at keepwarm temperature after rework. Test Fails Test OK --) Work concluded. 4 i 1 ENERGY sEmvlCEs Group

0 .4 0 10CFR21 REPORTNO.154 STARTINGAIRVALVES July 31,1990 Page 7hree 6. Replace valve, document findings and return the defective valve to Enterprise for exammation. B. Recommended Action For Valves In Inventory Or During A Scheduled Outage: 1. Perform steps 4 and 5 above. Enterprise is proceeding with a plan of physical testin,g to identify what contributions machming practices, both past and present, have on this problem as well as testing for service induced factors. Those test results will provide the long term preventative action which may include material and/or dimensional optimization. The recommendations contained within this letter are offered as action which can be implemented immediately, if required, to ensure against occurrence of valve malfunction. Test results and final recommendation will be provided as they become available. Sincerely, r- ;- John Manno Nuclear Marketing Manager JM/sc l j Jmor3104 ENERGY sERvtCEs GROUP e.....

r 4* Ge: r) a Powei Comcamy 333 P4stom Ace e v Arama Geo'O a 30308 '/- Tetonow 404 526 3$95 Ma ' tg Add'est 40inve eess Cemer Par =*ay Post Cm.ce Boe 1295 8.rm ngmam Atata'ra 35201 Telephow 205 6681581 August 7, 1990 W. G. Hairston, lit Sencot V<t 9*ts;tm Nuclear Ope abons ELV-01995 0535 Docket No. 50-424 50-425 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 ] Gentlemen: V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT SPECIAL REPORT VALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURES In accordance with the requirements of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications, Sections 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.8.2, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed Special Report concerning three valid diesel generator failures. Sincerely, id. k Y W. G. Hairston,.Ill WGH,III/NJS/gm

Enclosure:

Special Report 1-90-05 xt: Georoia Power Comoany Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. Mr. P. D. Rushton Mr. R. M. Odom NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reculatory Commission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, licensing Project Manager, NRR ' Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident inspector, Vogtle

'b, 4 ENCLOSURE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPECIAL REPORT l-90-05 VALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURES i \\ A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.1.1.3. This specification requires that all diesel generator (DG) failures, valid or non-valid, be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to TS 6.8.2. B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 7-11-90, Diesel Generator (DG) 2A was being tested during a routine surveillance per procedure 14980-2, " Diesel Generator Operability Test". i The right air start bank was isolated to allow testing of the left air start bank. The engine start button was pushed by the control room l operator and the engine began to roll with starting air. According to the local operator in the diesel room, the engine rolled twice and stopped. The DG was declared inoperable and the TS action statement was initiated. The DG was unavailable for emergency operation for a period of 67 hours and 49 minutes. During the review of this event, it was determined that similar events had occurred on 4-12-90 and 7-5-90. These previous similar events had not been recognized as failures and therefore had not been reported as such. These events are described as follows: On 4-12-90, operators conducted a TS surveillance test of DG 2A per procedure 14980-2. The manual start button was pushed, but no start occurred. Operators decided that the pushbutton had not been depressed long enough and made another attempt which resulted in a successful start. On 7-5-90, a similar incident occurred on DG IB, and a successful start again resulted on the second attempt. Neither DG was considered to be unavailable for emergency operation as a result of these two events. C. CAUSE OF EVENT i An investigation into the 7-11-90 event by utility and vendor personnel found that the starting air valve pistons could stick in their cap assemblies due to inadequate manufacturing tolerances. This condition was apparently the result of the initial manufacturing process which left insufficient clearances between some of the pistons and caps. A failure to start would occur only after the engine had been shut down from a previous run and the engine stopped with a particular alignment of faulty air start valves and crankshaft position. .sev --,r -y,.-.-..-.-m -.,--.--.,-.---w,.,. y

s Q \\ ENCLOSURE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPECIAL REPORT l-90-05 VALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURES On a non emergency manual start with the air start pilot valves malfunctioning, the initial burst of air was not adequate to start the engine. The burst of air was adequate to change the alignment of the crankshaft with respect to the faulty air start pilot valves so that any subsequent attempt to start the engine could be successful. This problem is now believed to have been the cause of the DG failures on 1-24-90 and 1-25-90, which were reported to the Commission on 2-19-90 as Special Report 2-90-02. On 7-19-90, the manufacturer of the valves submitted a 10 CFR 21 report to the Commission as a result of the above findings. The failure of the DG operators to recognize the initial start attempts of 4-12-90 and 7-5-90 as DG failures is partially attributed to limitations of the simulator computer. The simulator requires operators to hold the DG manual start pushbutton in order to have the proper control signals annunciate, creating the misconception that the pushbutton must remain depressed for a given period of time in order for a DG start to occur. D. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The sixteen starting air valves on each of the four DG's were tested and polished where necessary to provide adequate clearance between the j

pistons and caps.

2. The appropriate maintenance procedures will be revised by the next refueling outages to require testing of the starting air valves to demonstrate freedom of movement following DG overhaul.

3. During shift briefings, operators were advised that the DG should start when the manual pushbutton is depressed, any failure to manually start is a reportable event, and such information should be relayed to the appropriate personnel so that a report can be initiated.

4. Operator training will be enhanced during the next training cycle to advise personnel that a DG start should occur without having to continue depressing the manual start pushbutton.

5. The DG IB and 2A test frequency is currently once per 7 days in accordance with TS Table 4.8-1.

This frequency will be continued until 7 consecutive valid tests are completed with no more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tests and/or no more than 4 valid failures in the last 100 valid tests. Up to and including the 7-5-90 valid failure, there have been a total of 6 valid failures in 79 valid tests of DGlB. Up to and including the 7-11-90 valid failure, there have been a total of 5 valid failures in 43 valid tests of DG2A.

r 00CKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD '95 JUN 14 P3:43 In the Matter of GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ) Docket Nos. 50-424-OL%fSFICE OF SECRETARY cial. ) 50-4DSOffA45G & SERVICE ) BRANCH (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, ) Re: License Amendment Units 1 and 2) ) (Transfer to Southern ) Nuclear) ) ) ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3 ) l SERVICE LIST Administrative Judge Stewart D. Ebneter Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Regional Administrator Atomic Safety and Licensing Board USNRC, Region 11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 Washington, D.C. 20555 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303 Administrative Judge James H. Carpenter Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 933 Green Point Drive Commission Oyster Point Washington, D.C. 20555 Sunset Beach, NC 28468 Attn: Docketing and Services Branch Administrative Judge Charles Barth, Esq. James H. Carpenter Mitzi Young, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 One White Flint North Stop 15B18 Rockville, MD 20555 Administrative Judge Thomas D. Murphy Director, Environmental Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Protection Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Depart. of Natural Resources Washington, D.C. 20555 205 Butler Street. Suite 1252 Michael D. Kohn, Esq. Atlanta, GA 30334 Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, P.C. 517 Florida Avenue, N.W. Office of Commission Appellate Washington, D.C 20001 Adjudication One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852}}