ML20085H491

Ro:On 911003,failure to Perform Required Surveillance of Limiting Safety Sys Setting of Loss of Secondary Coolant Pump Power Discovered.Trip Check on Loss of Pump Power Incorporated Into Q-1 Quarterly Scram Checks

ML20085H491
Person / Time
Site:	05000083
Issue date:	10/16/1991
From:	Vernetson W FLORIDA, UNIV. OF, GAINESVILLE, FL
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20085H497	List: ML20085H491 ML20085H507
References
NUDOCS 9110280290
Download: ML20085H491 (3)

Text

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NUCl. EAR ENGINEERING SCIENCES DEPARTMENT

, a Nuclear Reactor Facility University of Florida .

1. 0 t u.v4%*. I secto. euciossumiec . l m mn 3,r .mm.un.w..uno ,, .

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October 16,1991 Failure To Perform Required - _

Surveillance or LSSS on Loss  :

of Secondary Coolsat Pump Power J Final 14-Day Report i Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Attention: Regional Administrator, Regitm 11 Re: University of Florida Training Reactor

- Facilitp License: R-50, Docket No. 50-83 Gentlemen:

- Pursuant to the reporting requirements of paragraph 6,52(g) of the UFTR Techmcal Specifications, a descriptio: af a potential violation of the Technical Specifications was teporteJ by telephone /telecopy (Attachment I) on 3 October 1991 and a final 14-day written report is submitted with this letter to include- occurrence scenario, NRC notification,

. evaluation af consequences, conective action and current status, The potentially p:omptij ,

,  : reportable occurrence involved the failure to perform required surveillance of the Limiting-Safety Systs Setting on loss of secondan coolant pump power.

l~ Scenario l  :

! Nc!!owing SRO Licensing thandnations administered on Tuesday afternoon (written) and

. ah day Wednesday (Practical and Walkthrough) on 1-2 October 1991, Examiner Patrick Isaac L raised a quest. ion about whether a loss of pump power on secondary deep we'l cooling would cause a trip as required b Tech Specs - primarily because both SRO canJidates seemed unknowledgeable on this point. This question caused us to evaluate whether the requisite surveillance in Table 3.2 of the Tech Specs had been being performed properly; that is, whether loss of secondary coolant weil pump power causes a trip and whether it has been -

l the subject of operchility tests at the required quarterly interyc.ls. A check on October 3, 1991 did verify that a Ic s of power will implement the usual secondary coolant tsip on a L 2,econd delay but whether this was derived fromJow flow or loss of pump power remained

- to be determined by further investigation.

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Nuclear Repilatory Commis3 Ion Page 2 October 16,199l it was decided to report this event in NRC Region 1( as a potemial Tech Spec violation although the feeling of UITR Staff was that it is not a violadon since the intent of the Tech -

Specs to check both trips was considered to be mct by the check of the seconday coolant low flow trip on the daily checkout. Nevcctheless, reactor managemo.t agreed that the i exact operation of the trip should be verified and checked with nn update of the Quarterly Scram Checks 01 Suryc;llance implemented as necessary, s

Until this point the daily checkout was the only check on the secondary cooling trip where l the loss of flow /luss of pump power were checked ru one check; this check stil! seems valid

/ since a loss of pump power necessarily gives a loss of flow also. Nevertheless, the trip checks on the primary coolant rystem do involve separa:e LOW FLOW and Loss of Primary =

Coolcnt Pump Power checks on the OJ Quarterly Scram Checks so the deciueo was made

~

to implement separate checks on the secondar) Dow/ pump power simply to i nsure the most -

restrictive interpretation m :he Tech Spec surveillance requirernents are met. .

MRCMalificalion '

NRC Region li wa, informed of the status of the investigati on at this toir:t per a telephone conversation on 5 October 1991 with Mn Bill Klein and Mr. Doug Collins relative to test for operabil!ty on el e loss of secondary coolant weil pump power. 'Ihe situation was coafirmed in a following telecopy (Attachiaent 1)ll' bey were told oi the question as te i whether we have bcea meeting the Tech Spec 7.urveillance requirements an lots of secondary coolant well pump power per Section .L2.2(2) and that this point was raised as a result of questions fmm NRC License Examiner Patrick Isaac on 2 October 1991.

Mr. Kicin and Mr. Collins were told our current feeling is that the existirq surmillance has been adequate. Nevertheless,'ve were scheduling a inceting of our Reactor Safety Review Subcommittee lhecutive Comminee prior to operation of the reactor and pinned to report [

cn the statrs of our deteriainations within the iequisite two weeks for violetions of the Tah "

Specs per Section 6,6.2(3)(g? Since we are now consideren to meet surveillance requiremen;s, per the te',t on 3 0:tober 1951, they agreed we conid restart upon RSR$

Executive Committee approva). 1 he sittation was f liscussed with Mr. Ciaig Hassett of 3 '

Region 11 in a separate phone call on 4 October 1991 and he agreed Mth how it w:s being addressed.

Ev_alnation/ Effective Action [

l ate on 3 October 1991, examinations of RPS diagrams showed that less of pump power alone shoulo cause the reqaisite trip independent oiloss of secondary (low. On the morning o of 7 October 1991, this trip on loss of secondary cooiing pump power akme w,s verified by turning on city water - 75 gpm, adjusting the wide range drawer test signal abave t kW and ~

ihen turning off the deep well pump while still on deep well cooling trip iogic and no !ar.s of flaw. Since the trip occurred as required by loss of secondary pump power alone, tN lll o ,,, l 3 '

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Nucleaf Regulatory Commission Page 3 October 16,1991 I

UFI 81 is now demonstrated to meet fully the surveillance requirements in Table 3,2 of the

- UFTR Technical Specifications when subjected to the most restrictive interpretation.- This check of the trip on loss of secondary coolant pump power alone will be incorporated into

• l the: veillance data sheet for the Q 1 Quarterly Scram Checks prior to next performing the 0-1 scram checks. it will be delineated to allow using city water to bypass the LOW FLOW 4

7econdcry trip of, if city water does not exceed the 60 gpm trip point, then the LOW FLOW L. trip will be bypassed by clectrical shunt as with the primary coolant pump to test the trip

, , on loss of secondary pump power.

ll .CunntLS1Muk/.CDniciluntcc.S

~ The Reactor Safety Review Subcommittee (RSRS) Executive Committee met hte on October 7,1991 to review this event (Attachment II). ' The Committee essentiauy agreed

wnh actions to date and with the staff evaluadon that the intent of the Technical Specifications was probably beinp met by the existing trip check performed as part of the

. Daily Checkout. The Executive Committee also agreed that the separate trip check on loss of secondary coolant pump posver should be incorporated into the 01 Quarterly Scrum Checks us planned, agreed that the UFI'R is now in full compliance with the Technical Specifications and appioved the return of the UITR to normal operations. Reactor ,

Management and the RSRS Executive Committee agreed there has been no compromise to reactor safety in the occurrence, nor to the health and safety of ;ae public. Other than  :

revising the 0-1 Scram Check form and considering the event in the next regular RSRS meeting, this occutrence is now considered closed. ,

if further informat!ou is needed, please advise.

Sincerely, j_

? ')

p.[/ 4 _

William G. Vernetson j Director, Nuclear Facilities w IT]hr Ls.~ ,_LG-hh\

. 7 oiary PulNic- Oate cc: R. Piciullo

' Reactor Safety Review Subcommittee Document Centrol Desk

[ Attachments (I k 11) 7 1

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