ML20085G811

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Testing Standards for Physical Security Systems at Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities
ML20085G811
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/31/1991
From: Dwyer P
NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:
References
NUREG-1321, NUDOCS 9110280044
Download: ML20085G811 (27)
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NUREG-1321 Testing Standards for Physical Security Systems at Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities Manuscript Completed: September 1991 Date Published: October 1991 P. A. Dwyer - l l Division of Safeguards and Transportation Omcc of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission . Washington, DC 20555 e **eg n 3

ABSTRACT This NUREG is a compilation of physical security testing standards for use at fuel cycle facilities using or possessing formula quantities of stratagic special nuclear material (Category !). i t iii . - -,.... -. -..... ~.

m _ _.. _. - _ ~ _ _ _ -.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _ -. _. _ _.. u f o CONTENTS gage 1 ABSTRACT.............................................................-111 1 1. INTRODUCTION AND PURP0SE......................................... 1 2. PHYSICAL SECURITY CDMPONENT STANDARDS............................ 2 2.1 Active Inf rared Multibe am Systems......................... 2 ~, 2.2 Balanced Magnetic Switches................................. 2 2.3 Breakwire Systems.......................................... 2 2.4 Capacitance A1 arms......................................... 2 2.5 Closed Circuit Television Motion Detectors................. 2 2.6 Closed Circuit Television Resolution....................... 3 2.7 Electric-Field (E-Field) Perimeter intrusion Detection-Systems.................................................... 3 2.8 Explosives Detectors....................................... 3 t 2.9 Firearms Detectors......................................... 4 2.10 Isolation Zones............................................ 4 -i 2.11-Lighting................................................... 5 2.12 Line Supervision........................................... 5 t 2.13 Metal Detectors (Shielding)................................ 5 I 2.14'MicrowaveMotionDetectors(Interior)...................... 6 2.16 Microwave.PerimeterDetectionSystems(Exterior-Bistatic).. 6 2.16 Passive Infrared. Interior Intrusion Detectors............. 6 1 2.17 Pat-Down Searches.......................................... 7 -2.18 Perimeter Alarm Operability Testing........................ 7 1.19 Perimeter Alarm Performance Testing........................ 8 2.20_ Personnel Perimeter Barrier Systems........................ 9 2.21 Ported Coaxial Cable Systems............................... 9-2.22 Power Sources for Interior Intrusion Alarm Systems........ 10 t 2.23 Special Nuclear. Material Detectors........................ 10 - 2. 24 Veh i cl e B a r r i er s.......................................... 11 12.25 Vibration or Strain Detection Systems..................... 11 2.26 Volumetric Interior Intrusion Detection Systems........... 11-2. 2 7 X-R a y E q u i pme n t........................................... 11 3.

GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS.....................................

13 ' APPENDIX - SOURCE DOCUMENTS NOT PUBLICLY AVAILABLE.................. 15 I i t v P he v+v.-- m +--ye ,,[.,, e ,v y-> v,

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1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE This document was developed to provide a compilation of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrnission (NRC) testing standards for physical security components at NRC Category I fuel cycle facilities. Category I f acilities are those f acilities using or possessing formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. For the most part, such standards presently exist in various NUREGs and regulatory guides. (In those instances where the source of a standard is an unpublisheti NRC document, i.e., not readily available to the public, the document is included in the Appendix to this NUREG.) This NUREG presents these standards in one concise reference document. This NUREG should be of use to: (1) NRC physical security inspectors responsible for inspecting Category I fuel cycle facilitiest (2) NRC licensees that operate such facilities; and (3) NRC personnel who review Category I facility physical security plans. l -h#'1

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2. PHYSICAL SECURITY COMPONENT STANDARDS 2.1 Active Infrared Multibeam Systems l STANDARD: An infrared multibeam perimeter detection system should be capable of detecting an individual weighing a minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing between the transmitters and receivers whether the . individual is walking, running, jumping, crawling, or rolling. The system should be able to operate, as above, with a factor of 20 (;,3 decibels)insertionlossduetoatmosphericattenuation(e.g., fog) at a maximum range of 80 meters (260 feet). ) (Source: NUREG 1328 "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Fuel Fabrication j Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic i Special Nuclear Material.") 1 2.2 ' Balanced Magnetic Switches STANDARDS. Balanced magnetic switches should be tested by measuring to ensure that the switch and magnet are. mounted with the proper space gap between them as recommended by the manufacturer's specifications. l L The switch should be installed such that the introduction of an externalmagnetwillnotmaintainabalancedfield(noalarm)as the unit on which the switch is mounted is opened. (Source: NUREG/CR5722,"InteriorIntrusionDetectionSystems.") 2.3 Breakwire Systems-STANDARD: To test for proper operation, the wire used in a breakwire system should not be larger than 24 American wire gauge wire, should not exceed 4 pounds in tensile strength, and should be capable of carrying a current-of 60 milliamperes with a temperature rise of not more than l' C. - l (Source: NUREG 0320. " Interior Intrusion Alarm Systems.") 2.4 Capacitance Alarms STANDARD: A capacitance alarm should be capable of detecting human touch by a person wearing gloves and-isolated from ground. (Source: NUREG/CR5722,"InteriorIntrusionDetectionSystems.") 2.5 Closed-Circuit Televnion Motion Detectors . 5TANDARDs.A closed-circuit television motion detector should be tested with a low profile target, such as a crawler, and with a high-velocity 4 2 ,,.,,,,_.;._._,..,_,._.-.m._.,,_. m... ,m..,,._,.,_,,

f target, such as a fast runner. Tests should be conducted under the lowest contrast lighting conditions expected, such as at night under artificial light. If any detection areas are partially covered by a shadow, testing should be performed within the shadow. All of the aforementioned tests should produce an alarm. (Source: NUREG/CR 5722, " Interior Intrusion Detection Systems.") 2.6 Closed Circuit Television Resolution STANDARD: A closed-circuit television system used for assessment purposes should be capable of discerning human presence within its field of view. This may be confirned through actual movement of an individual within the field of view or through the ability to discriminate between a one foot high circle, square, and triangle placed anywhere within the area of assessment. (Source: NUREG/CR 5721, " Video Systems for Alarm Assessnent.") 2.7 Electric-Field (E-Field) Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems STANDARD: An E-Field perimeter intrusion detection system should be capable of detecting an individual weighing a minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) whether the individual is crawling or rolling under the lower wire or stepping or jumping between wires. (Source: NUREG 1328, "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material.") 2.8 Explosives Detectors STANDARD: For either operational or performance testing of explosives detectors (hand-held or portal), the test sar;ple should consist of one-eighth of a stick of nitrated dynamite, tte wrapper from a stick of dynamite, 2 to 3 grams of double base shotgun or pistol powder, or 30cc of para-nitrotoluene (PNT) vapor. Any of the first three samples should be contained in a jar with iid. Either a glass or polycarbonate jar may be used to contain the test sample, although polycarbonate is preferred because of its non-breakable characteristics. An example of a poly-carbonate jar is an unbreakable peanut butter jar. The lid of the jar should be removed before conducting the test. If a syringe is used to inject 30cc of PNT vapor into the detector, it should be injected directly into the detector's intake. Under operational testing, the detector should detect any of the test samples three times out'of three trials. Performance testing should be conducted any time the device fails operational testing, is moved, adjusted, or at least quarterly (approximately once every 90 days). The detector should detect the test sample 30 out of 30 trials (or, if a failure to detect occurs, 39 out of 40, or 48 out of 50). 3 1

(Sources: NUP.EG 1329 " Entry / Exit Control at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material" and Sandia National Laboratories project FIN iL1388, " Security inspection Test Kit.") 2.9 Firearms Detectors STANDARD: With respect to operational testing, firearms ddectors should be capable of detecting a.22 caliber Triumph (or equivalent) held horizontally at the waist three out of three trials. If the detector fails to detect on any of the three trials, corrective action should be taken and documented. Operational testing should be conducted at the beginning of each shift, when the unit is turned off, or when the unit is maintained. Performance testing should be conducted any I time the device fails operational testing, is moved, adjusted, or at leastquarterly(approximatelyonceevery90 days). The.25 caliber l Best (or equivalent) and the.22 caliber Triuraph (or equivalent) should be used as test weapons. The equipment should detect 24 out of 28 trials for each weapon in seven different orientations four times each for a total of 48 alarms out of 56 trials for the two test weapons. The seven orientations are:

1) shoulder height, gun barrel horizontal and parallel to movement: 2) shoulder height, gun.

barrel horizontal and perpendicular to movement: 3) shoulder height, gun barrel down 4) waist height, gun barrel horizontal and parallel to movement; 5) waist height, gun barrel horizontal and perpendicular to movement: 6) waist height, gun b6erul downs and

7) at ankle, gun barrel down. Test weapons should be rendered safe by removing the firing pin or encasing in p % c.

Tests should be conducted using a " clean tester." (Source: NUREG-1329, " Entry / Exit Control at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material.") 2.10 Isolation Zones STANDARD: For a double barrier s/ stem, the clear zone between barriers should be a minimum of twenty (20) feet. Isolation zones should be maintained adjacent to the outer and inner physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area. Zones should be large enough to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of the PA t,arriers. Lighting levels in all isolation zones should meet the 0.2 footcandle requirement of 10 CFR 73.46. (Sources: NUREG-1330, " Personnel and Vehicle Barriers at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material" and NRC Inspection Procedure 81921,_ Issue date: 02/19/91.) 4

2.11 Lighting STANDARD: Isolation rones and all exterior areas within the protected area must be maintained at a lighting level of not less than 0.2 footcandles measured horizontally at ground level. (Source: 10 CFR 73.46(c)(4).) 2,12 Line Supervision STANDARD: Direct current supervisory techniques employing percentage change detection, regardless of how narrow the limits are specified, are easily compronitsed and should not be used. A form of line super-vision should be used that will not be compromised by any of the following means: (1 the substitution of resistance, voltage, or current, O' the substitution of equipment of the same design and manufacturer, (3 reintroduction by playback of signals previously recorded onto the conrnunication path, and (4) the synthesizing of signals externally a the introduction of these synthesized signals onto the path. (Source: NUREG 1328, "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Feel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material.") 2.13 Metal Detectors (Shielding) STANDARD: Metal detection equipment should undergo operational testing at the beginning of each shif t, wher, the unit is turned off or when the unit is maintained. Operational testing for the metal detection system used to search for concealed, shielded strategic special nuclear material should be capable of detecting a minimum of 100 grams of metal (shielding) concealed anywhere on an individual three times out of three trials. Performance testing should be conducted any time the device fails operational testing, is moved, adjusted, or a least quarterly (approximately once every 90 days). The equipment should detect 30 out of 30 trials for the test sample (i.e., 3 different locations 10 times each). The locations ares (1) shoulder, (2) waist, and (3) ankle. If a f ailure occurs, 39 out of 40 trials, or 48 out of 50 trials are also accer, table performance levels. Tests should be conducted using a " clean" tester. (Sources t l' KEG-1329, " Entry / Exit Control at fuel Fabrication Facili-ties Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special NuclearMaterial.") 1 5

2.14 Microwave Motio, Detectors (Interior) STANDARD: The detector should be checked for proper mounting, typically 2 to 3 meters (6.5 to 10 feet) above the floor and at least 2 meters (6.5 feet) from fluorescent lighting. In addition, the detector should be " walk tested" to assure proper positioning and detection capability. The target person should have a height of 1.5 + 0.3 meters (5 + 1 feet) and a weight of 59 + 5 kilograms (130 + 10 pounds) and should walk with arms folded over the chest at a rate of approximately 12 centimeters /second(5 inches /second). Five walk paths should o? used. Each walk path should be tested twice, in opposite directions. The five walk paths are:

1) parallel to the direction the sensor is aimed
2) perpendicular to the direction the sensor is aimed: 3) angled +45' from the direction the sensor is aimed: 4) angled -45" from the direction the sensor is aimed; and 5) radial to the sensor.

(Source: NUREG/CR 5722, " Interior Intrusion Detection Systems.") 2,15 Microwave Perimeter Delection Systems (Exterior-Bistatic) STANDARD: Typically, a long range bistatic microwave detection system should be installed to operate effectively in a range not more than 100 meters (approximately 325 feet). Each unit should be mounted rigidly at a distence above the ground so that incident and reflected signals combine positively, typically 60 centimeters (24 inches) for 100 meters (325 feet). To prevent passage under the beam, perturbations of-the ground should be leveled, ditches filled, and obstructions removed so that the area between transmitter and receiver is clear of obstructions and free of rises or depressions of a height oc depth greater than 10 centimeters (4 inches). To preclude jumping over a microwave beam from atop a chain link security fence, a fence with an overall height of 2.4 meters (8 feet) will necessitate a minimum of 2.4 meters (8 feet) between the fence and the center of the beam. A microwave perimeter detection system should be capable of detecting an intruder weighing a minimum of 35 kilograms (77 pounds) passing anywhere between the transmitter and receiver, including the area dire.tly in front of either transmitter and receiver, whether walking, runniag, jumping, crawling, or rolling. (Source: NUREG-1328, "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Fuel Fabrication Facilitiet Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material.") 2.16 passive Infrared Interior Intrusion Detectors STANDARD: The observer should visually test to ensure that incandescent lamps are not located within 0.6 meters (2 feet) of a detector's head. The detector should be " walk tested" to assure proper positioning and detection capability. The target person performing the walk 6

test should have a height of 1.5 + 0.3 meters (5 + 1 feet) and a weight of $9 + 5 kilograms (130 t 10 pouiids) and should walk with arms folded over tiie chest at a rate of _ approximately 12 centimeters /second (5 inches /second). Five walk paths should be usod. Each walk path should be tested twice, in opposite directions. The five walk paths are:

1) parallel to the direction the sensor is aimed: 2) perpendicular to the direction the sensor is aimed: 3) angled 445' from the direction the sensor is aimed: 4) angled -45' from the direction the sensor is aimed; and 5) radial to the sensor.

(Source: NUREG/CR 5722, ' Interior Intrusion Detection Systems.") 2.17 Pat-Down Searches STANDARD: A pat-down search should be conducted by searching the following areas:

1) shoulders to wrists, inside and outside of armsg 2) under-arm areas down torso +o ankles: 3) insides, fronts, and backs of legs 4) back torso from shoulders to back of pelvis and 5) front lower rib cage to pelvis.

(Source: NUREG-1329, " Entry / Exit Control at fuel Fabrication facilities Using or Possessing formula Quantities of Strategic SpecialNuclearMaterial.") 2.16 Perimeter Alarm Operability Testing $TANDARD: The perimeter alarm system should be operability tested in all ~ sepents at least once every seven days in the following manner. 4. Testing may be conducted during routine patrols by members of the licensee's security force. The testing should be conducted by crossing the segment of the isolation zone where the detection system is located or by climbing the fence to which the system is attached to cause the system to alarm. Before the test, the i individual making the test should notify the alarm stations that a test is about to be conducted. The detection system in all segments of the isolation zone should be walk-tested in a different,. preferably random, order every seven days and the testing should be conducted throughout the week, rather than all tests being conducted on the same-day. The testing should result in 100 percent detection on all segments each ueven days. If the perimeter alarm system fails to detect an intrusion on one or more segments, corrective actions should be taken and documented. (Source: NUREG-1328, "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Spe:ial Nuclear Material.") 7

2,19 Perineter Alarm Performance Testing STANDARD: At least annually 3 as well as after each inoperative state, and after any repairs, the perimeter intrusion alarm system should be tested against the des,gn stimulus for proper detection probability, i.e., performance tasted. A sanple testing method for denonstrating compliance with NRC-recommended detection probability and confidence levels follows: 1) Determine the most vulnerable area of each segnent, and determine the method of approach most likely to penetrate that segment,i.e., walking, running, jumping, crawling, rolling,or climbing. This determination will, in most cases, be sensor and location dependent. 2) Test all segments using a combination of all the applicable penetration approaches at the most vulnerable area a total of 30 times. All 30 tests must have resulted in successful detections of ti.e intrusion to have at least a 90 percent probability of detection, with 95 percent confidence. If the minimum number of successful detections is not achieved, the system should be

checked, if no problems with the system are discovered, ten more tests should be made and if the minimum number of successful detections is achieved for the new number of tests (given in the following table), in this case, 39 out of 40, the testing can be ended for this segment.

If no problems with the system can be discovered and the minimum numbei of successful aetections is not achieved after one more test of ten intrusions, the system would need to be upgraded to increase the detection probabilities to the required level. If problems with the system are discovered, the system should be repaired and 30 new tests performed. If there are 30 successful detections, testing can be ended. 3) The penetration approach most difficult to detect should be attempted more frequently if an equal number of tests per approach is not possible. 4) The order in which the segnents are tested should be random. 1his will protect against the possibility that environmental effects and other unknown f actors that may affect the test results (detection or non-detection) always favor or handicap the same segment or method of approach. Random testing can be accomplished by using a random numbers table to assign the order in which the segments will be tested. 5) Maintain records of the rr ults of all tests performed. Included in these records enould be the segment number, date, time, and relevant environmental conditions when tests were performed. 8

Detection festing Total No. Minimum No. of Maximum No. of of Tests Successful Detections Failures to Detect 30 30 0 40 39 i 50 48 2 60 57 3 70 67 3 80 76 4 90 85 5 100 95 5 110 104 6 120 114 6 (Source: NUREG-1328 "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Mater ial.") 2.20 Personnel Perimeter Barrier Systems STANDARD: A personnel perimeter barrier system should have a design goal of delaying an adversary for 5 seconds after the exterior alarm protecting it has initiated an alarm. By definition, a perimeter barrier system means fences constructed of No.11 American wire gauge or heavier wire fabric, topped by three stands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30* and 45' from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping. (Sources: NUREG-1330 " Personnel and Vehiclo Barriers at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Posse. sing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material." Also, 10 LFR 73.2.) E.21 Ported Coaxial Cable Systems $TANDARD: The dete", tion system should be restricted to zones of 100 meters (325 feet) or less to facilitate assessment. The two lines of the system are generally Duried approximately 18 centimeters (seven inches) deep and 1 to 3 meters (3 to 10 feet) apart. To prevent an individual from avaiding detection by. jumping over the detection field, a chain link aturity fence with an overall height of 2.4 meters (8 feet) will necessitate a sainimum r,f 2.4 meters (8 feet) between the fence and 9

i ~ the center of the detection zone. A ported coaxial cable perimeter detectior, system should be capable of detecting an intruder weighing a minimum of 35 kilograns (77 pounds) passing between the transmitter and receiver wires, whether the individual is walking,- running, jumping, crawling, or rolling. The electromagnetic field should be modulated, and the receiver should be frequency selective to decrease susceptibility to receiver " capture." (Source: NUREG-1328, "Use of Parimeter Alarms at Fuel fabrication Facilities Using or Fossessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special nuclear Material.") 2.22 Power Sources for Inter or Intrusion Alarm Systems d STANDARD: Alarms required pursuant to 10 CFR 73.46(e) must remain operable from independent power sources in the event of loss of normal power. Switchover to standby power must be automatic and must not cause false alarms on annunciator modules. The system should be tested to ensure that:

1) the emergency battery, when fully charged, is capable of maintainingfulloperation_ofthesystemfor24 hours at 0" C(32 F);
2) an indication exists for system primary power failure;
3) Nicad batteries are constant current charged and never fully discharged;
4) all other batteries are arranged so that they are fully charged at all times when primary power is available; and
5) chargers have sufficient capacity to recharge betteries from a fully discharged state to more than 90% of capscity in 12 hours.

(Sources: 10 CFR 73.46(e)(6). Also, NUREG/CR 5722, " Interior IntrusionDetectionSystems.") 2.23 Special Nuclear Material Detectors STANDARD: Special nuclear material detection equipment should be capable of detecting plutonium, uranium-233, or uraaium enriched to 90 percent in the uraniwn-235 isotope. (Source: NUREG-1329, " Entry / Exit Control at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Spccial Nuclear Materibl.") 10

.y_ 2.24 Vehicle Barriers 1 STANDARD: Vehicle barriers should provide complete perimeter coverage and be_ protected by the required perimeter intrusion alarm system. TO be effective against the desigri basis threat vehicle, the following criteria should be met (1) Cables one cable of one inch diameter instal. led 30 inches above grade; two cables of J/4 inch diameter-at 24 inches and 32 inches above grade or equivalent; (2) Bollards: 8 inch diameter, 36 inches above grade, 100 foot spacing with cable, 5 foot on center without cable, 4 feet in ground, or equivalent. In addition, gate barriers should fail in a closed position. (Source: Memo dated Much 21,1991 f ron, Sherr to W. Cline,

SUBJECT:

UPGRADF CONSTRUCTION APPROVAL.) 2.25 Vibration or Strap Detection Systems STANDARD: Vibratica or strain detection systems used for fence protectico sho91o detect an intruder weighing a minimum of 35 kilograms (17 pounds) httempting to climb the fence. The system should also detect any attempt to cut the fence or lift the fence fabric more than 15 centimeters (6 inches) above grade. (Source: NUREG-1328, "Use of Perimeter Alarms at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material.") '~ terior Intrusion Detection Systems 2.26 Volumetric .n STANDARD: The detector should be " walk tested" to ansure proper positioning and detection capability. The target person performing the walk test should have a height of 1.5 + 0.3 meters (5 + 1 feet) and a weight of 59 2 5 kilograms (130 1 10 pouHds) and should walk with arms folded over the chest at a rate of approximately 12 centimeters /second (5 inches /second). Five walk paths should be used._ Each walk path should be tested twice, in opposite directions. The tive walk paths

1) parallel to the direction the sensor is aimed; 2) perpendicular are:

to the direction the sensor is aimed; 3) angled +45" from the direction the sensor is aimed; 4) angled -45* from the direction the sensor is aimed; and 5) radial to the sensor. (Source: NUREG/CR 5722, " Interior Intrusion Detection Systems.") 2.27 X-Ray Equipment STANDARD: X-ray equipment should undergo operativ.ai testing at the beginning of each shift, when the unit is turned off or maintained. The detector should be capable of detecting a 24 American wire gauge wire f 11

viewed under step 5 of a step wedge constructed in accordance with American Society of. Testing and Materials (ASTM) Standard 792-82, " Standard Practice for Design and Use of lonizit.g Radiation Equipment for the Detection of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas" for three out of three trials. Copies of this standard are'available from ASTH, 1916 Race Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. Performance testing for X-ray detectors is not considered necessary if operational testing is conducted as described above. (Source: NUREG-1329, " Entry / Exit Control at Fuel Fabrication Facilities Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material.") l 12

1

3. ' GLOSSARY OF SELECTED TERMS-BISTATIC: When used in conjunction with an active microwave detector, this term means that the transmitter and receiver are located in separate units or i

" heads." CLEAN TESTER: This term means an individual performing operational or performance testing of explosives or metal detecting equipment who is devoid of metal or explosives other than a test sample or test weapon. CRAWLING:- This term means entering and leaving a zone of detectic9 by lying prone to the ground, perpendicular to the zone of detection with a low profile, at an approximate velocity of 0.03 meter (1 inch) per second. JUMPING: This term means leaping from a height above the zone of detection to a point at ground level across the zone of protection, e.g., standing on the fence and attempting to leap across the zone of detection. OPERABILITY TESTING: This term means testing performed at least once every seven days to ensure system operation. PERFORMANCE TESTING: This term means testing conducted at least quarterly, after each inoperative state, or after repairs to ensure maintenance of proper equipment performance. ROLLING: This term means entering and leaving the zone of detection prone to the ground with a low profile, parallel to the zone of detection, and rolling slowly at an approximate velocity of 0.03 meter (1 inch) per second. RUN!!ING: This term means entering and leaving the zone of detection at an approximate velocity of 5 meters'(16 feet) per second. WALKING: This term means entering and leaving the zone of detection with a normal stride, i.e., two 30 inch steps per second. I 13 m n v.. ..y.,.,. -. 9 ,_,m

= I" APPENDIX SOURCE DOCUMENTS NOT PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 15 . ~-

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SECURITY INSPECTION TEST KIT stems: e AnekstNgttelTape Measure e Pocket Tool eBinoculars e Potted Test Weapons wfHartms eClosed Circuit Tekvision(CCiv) e Simukted Explosive Teet Taryet Shapee sempie eLkpht Meter w/TrQod e Simukted Gun eMiniRashlkht e Step We4pe wjExtre Piete e MiniRecorder w) Microphone e Stop Watch e Opeque Teet Object INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE (Selected items) (NOTE: The following test criteria describe general levels of performance that s 4 designed to meet 10 CFR 73.45 and 73.46 rhould be capable of achieving. Indvidual . plans should be reviewed to determine If faRure to meet Chese performance levels constitutes norxemplWinos, While fallure to meet these performance levels may not constRule non compliance, k may be hdcedve of the need for conodive action or ma.htenance. Further, when transporting this kk on commerdal miraraft, the kk must be ' checked , Le., not handcenied onto the sjraaft by the ineq=*v and the weapons must be dedor CCTV TARGET SHAPES: (1) Determine area's) within the protomed area where CCW assessment capability may be spostionable. (2)da. piastic nut and wingeut, assemble each of the three shapes (the drde, are, and triengle) the same f are color, either while or black. (3) Stand shapes rent to each other and view via ,(4) to discem human presenos is approximately equivaient e m abery io asc*nina e between%the twget shapes on h CCW monhor. SIMULATED EXPLOSIVE TEST SAMPLE: The test sample uses para-nftrotcLene h a wax paraffin solution. Two syringee are provided One is a spare and should be kept sealed to vertfy feCure of the other syringe (The two eytinoes are Any person who uses the test sample should read M Material guaranteed for a period of one year.)in the Idt. The sample should be at room temperature for the Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) provided test. For ill Model g5 units only, the soledor switch should be in the A poeftfon for testing. PORTAL UNIT TEST: (1) Condud trial entry wthout sample to assure 'no e@WA' signal is received. (2) Wh;le outalde the portal, remove cap from syringe and draw plunger back to 80 cc mark. (3) Enter portal and depress plunger 10 the 30 cc mark dreaty into intaka- (4) Replace cap. SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES PROJECT FIN #L1388, " SECURITY INSPECTION TEST KIT" 17 1

HAND-HEL.D UNIT TEST: (1) Condud triel 6st without emplosive sample 2 assure "no sxploshes's received. (2) Renme and drew plunger to the 80 cc mark. Deprws to the 30 cc mwk dirocey vidnity of deedor nozzle. (4) wore swo w w umpu m m piastio rm eno pr=wed. LIGHT METER: (1) Follow instrudions printed on noter for calibration and testing. (2) Dmach roedout and conned to meter using cord. (3) Atta$ meter to trdipod. 4) Take reeeng AR extedor erom wein v. praeded wea are required a be . mo.a sooenness OPAQUE TEST OBJECT: The or en ot+ed is to iset = x4 y operwor's monitoring absties. The um obied be coverVy placedin a handoarried-prior to acerch. The objed wil appear on the x-rey monitor as an redangular shape which the operssor should queston by conducting a visual (hands-on) seerd; STEP WEDGE The wedge is used e m.: m opw. sons o.oebney or x-rey equipmert u is in m kn wan two bue piens, one with m manded conngursion pw ASTM 7s2 and one whh wtros embedded in random ordw. When viewed on m x ray monitor, the wire gauge AWG 24 should be visible under step 5 of the wedge. If there is some esor about who is actually being vwed, the alumano base piam wah wires in rendom may be used. STOP WATCH: The stop==* may be used io memure run or noement m deedian rwe menne and, once !6 sued, certain pnysioel fitness standards et Category I fuel cyde ladiaties. POTTED TEST WEAPONS: The two he weepp (.38 cal. Ammican deningw and.25 od. EXCAM) we inunded 2 Pdmeded whenioomed anywhwe on m . The veau hwnus may b.Twnn an ovat test of metal % in 3 out of 3 passe,and should alther gun to enach the gun to en anido; belt loop; or, when used with opuonal vekro length, m bus ce w w.iet. SIMULATED GUN: The simulated gun is hciuded to test whi,er.co in vehlde and x-ray searches The gun is NOT for useln needng metal Ipmert With reaped to vehicle searcos, the gun should be in a reasonable on a vehicle to test the seerd) capab81 ties of the security . With resped to x ray equipment, the gun may be pieced in henocorted pedages and =W to x-rey seers, also, to test the seare capabsides of m securty force. The gun should NOT be secreted on pwoonnel to test portal metal % unas c pat < sown eserches cara <*=d by securty sorce membws. 18 i l iyri iiiri g

UNfTED STATIS \\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l wAsmestom, p. c. muse NRC INSPECTION MANUAL mss INSPEC110N PRDCLDURE 81921 150LAT10N ZONE PkDGRAM APPLICABILITY: 2681 81921-01 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE-The inspector should verify that isolation zones ere maintained adjacent to the outer and inner physical barrier at the perimeter of the PA. 81921-02 PERFORMANCE CAPAllLITIES The inspector should verify that each isolation zone is large enough to per-mit observation of the activities of people on either side of the PA barriers. 81921-03 ITTECTIVEMES$ VALIDATION The inspector should verify that: 03.01 The lighting in all isolation zones meets the 0.2 foot-candle required by the regulattor.s. 03.02 All isolatica zones widths meet the licensee's physical security plan comattment. 03.03 1 solation zones are maintained free of clutter. (seeprocedure81928 - Protected Area Housekeeping) 81921-04 DEMONSTRATION OF ADEQUACT The inspector should verify that: 04.01 The inner and PA isolation zones can be assessed by CCTV or from a guard tower. 04.02 All isolation zones meet the housekeeping requirements of procedure 81928. NRC INSPECTION PROCEDURE 81921 1: sue Cate: 02/19/91 19 I

81921-05 FREQUENCY This procedure should be egleted during each FY inspection cycle, EMD !ssue Dste: 02/19/91 20

MAR E 11991 LtGRADE CONSTRUCTION APPROYAL W MORANDUM FOR: William E. Cline Chief huclear Peterials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, Ril FROM: Theodore 5. $ herr, Chief Domestic Safeguards Branch Division of Safeguards and Transportation. W55 $UBJEC1: UPGRADE CON 5tRUC110N AFFROVAL i The Categury 1 Fuel facilities are in the final stages of their comparability upgrades. Upon ccepletion, it will be necessary for both inspection and licensing to agree that the licensee has met certain requirseents. Enclosed is a set of inspection criteria to be jointly used for this final approval. It is anticipated that the B&W inspection w111 be the week of March 25, 1991 with Dave Thompson of your office and Charles Gaskin of my office. The date fcr NFS completion is not certain, but a mid-April time frame is anticipated, anticipated. The inspection report for each f acility should specifically ,odress acceptance based upon the enclosed criteria. It you er yta.r staff have any questions, please contact k'. Floyd (FT5 492-04%). 04N 0$9d M gic, n 3.GM Theodore 5. $ herr, Chief Domestic Safeguarcs Branch Division uf Safeguards and Transportation, hM55

Enclosure:

As stater. cc C. Gaskin R. Castaneira MEMO DATED MARCH 21, 1991 FROM T. SHERR TO W. CLl!1E,

SUBJECT:

UPGRADE CONSTRUCTION APPROVAL 21

i i 1 i INSPfCTION CRITERA run COMPARAstLTTY UPsaADEs Vehicle Barriers

  • Complete perimeter coverage Protected by Intrusion Alarms Effective design for DOTV

-. Cable sire, number, s p ing. [191*dienster930 above grede, or 2 9 3/4" diameter 9 24' & 32' above gradej Bollard sire, height, depth, spacine. [8' diameter. 36' above grade.100 f t with cable. 5 ft on centers without cable. 4 f t in ground] joining, a Traffic control barriers site, le of tapact. [Not acceptable if used alone against a 90 attack) Moveable barriers performance specifications (Must withstand DgTV valess other barriers forte entering vehiclestoslowdown) Reduced barriers due to 'errein. [ Licensee to demonstrate effectiveness) l ' Effective installation j Support members embedded in concrete below frost line. Full strength cable clamp 1s and brackets. 6 ate barriers kept closed -(Mustfailinclosedposition) Follows design details. Dead men or equivalent used to anchor cables (or equivalent) Protected by intrusion alars at d points along perimeter. 1 I 22 l ~.. -, _,.. _

Pgsenel terriers Ceeplete coverage around pertaeter with M barriers.

  • Intrvston alars between barriers.

At least 20 f t between barriers for a clear tone [lf less than 20 f t cepensation required, such as razor ribbon, or a ht rinnerbarrier] ' Iso a on tones on esci, side of each barrier. 3.02 footcandles illumination in all toelation tones.

  • . Secured fence bottoms.

Outrigger modifications to prevent hand holds.

  • Posts embedded in concrete.

'

  • Absense of objects on structures that would assist breaching er overcitabs._

' Adequate alare essessment capability. i l 2 23

NR FORv 335 U 8. NUCLE AQ Q1GVL A10RY COMMilllON I ( 1 NL i I2E22E BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET (See instr xtnons on the rowse) s NUREG-1321

2. m Lt ANo susiitLt TESTING STANDARDS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS oat RtPoa Pusus+n o AT CATEGORY I FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES oom

,t., October 1991 4 FIN OR GRANI NUMBE R

b. AU1 HOR 45:

61)FL OF REPORT PRISCILLA A DWYER Technical

1. Vt R LOU Co v'k R L D etnesa,e pare <>

BP fOR ANIZ AT ION - N AME AND ADDRl55 nr sac Prow'* D*e4. Dane O' aWM U $ brF er #eewierwt CodWesma. dad m*sh'y addgss if watsacms. provuse DIVISION OF SAFEGUARDS AND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

9. SPONSORING ORG ant 2 ATION - N AME AND ADDR L SS tre A #C e,ce %+r a san =e ', <' cuar** w< e'eva8* h*C O'*adea. Oat o' 8***a. U 3 hwd**' **i+88'** L*'a*a**'a.

ces nwouw e***m e SAME AS AD0VE. 10, SUPPLEMENT ARY NOTES

11. C4851 H AC T (JrM nese er seast THIS NUREG IS A COMPILATION OF PHYSICAL SECURITY TESTING STANDARDS FOR USE AT FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES USING OR POSSESSING FORMULA QUANTITIES OF STRATEGIC SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

1 E tJ A v AsL A84 Lei V 6i AILMs M

12. % L Y WOR D5/DE SCRif iOH$ ft er more er anam4 gam =* ms,ss sween *m an sor4ecie ene separt i UNLIMITED PHYSICAL SECURITY

' m c ua' " "^ * ' " TESTING STANDARDS < r aa *-> SAFEGUARDS Unclassified CATEGORY I FACILITIES " a a-'" Unclassified Ib. NUMBLM Of PAGt 5 16 PHICL e*AC FORu 3M (181.1

r.. J i i a .. i i THIS DOCUMENT WAS PRINTED USING RECYCLED PAPER L. _.. _ ~, -,,...,.,. -. -... -.............

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