ML20085A907
| ML20085A907 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/21/1979 |
| From: | Amy Snyder SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES |
| To: | Roy D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-GB GPU-0464, GPU-464, NUDOCS 8307070391 | |
| Download: ML20085A907 (9) | |
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A.wm.snyder bOUd!Q !.dbCIE!CI!33
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4 September 21, 1979 g
Dr. Don H.
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- I Manager, Engineering Dept..
Nuclear Power Generation niv.
Babcock & Wilet x i
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O. Ecx 12fC Old Forrest Road Lynchburg, VA 24505 Dear Dr. Roy I wish to thank you for your acceptanca of the invitation to Present a paper cnd par *.icipate in a discussion at the AS.:E Winter Annuct Meeting.
Encloccd yc's will find the confir: nod final program for Session 86 of the :ncoting.
I a:=. enthuriin.stic about the session, given the timeliness of the talk and the i
quality of the speahors we have in the session.
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p, I will be contacted sometimo prior to the r.iceting ogarding that
- : ual aids wi11 he required for the snssion; therefo:c, pina: e
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, r.: vide r:c, as soon as possibic, any requircr.wnts you. have other i
than 35mm slide projection.
J At this time I a::: not aEarc of any drniro on the part of the Ms to publish abstracta, su.'.mario s, presentationo, etc.
If I a:'i subsequently contacted by AS!,"4 on the natter of publication, I
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will im:acdiately be in contcet with yeu.
I do. rant you to I.nor, however, that I accepted the responsibility for retting up the session on the condition that publicct.Jon trould rect bc :3 iarla to-ry.
Thus, I would prefer to awalt thrs outcomo of the cession and than
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jointly determine what publications, if any, vould be.decira.02c.
1 Sincerely,
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The A._- crican Society of Mechanical Engineers D-1979 Winter Annual Meeting
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Decembcr 2-7, 1979 Statler !!ilton New York, N.Y.
Session ! 6 - Tue
- .a y, 2:0C - 4:30 P.M.
Title:
AthEeving Safety in Nuclear Pcwer Plants:
The l Approach and Recent Experience Cha ir *. man :
- 1. i.'m. Snyder Director, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs Sandia Laboratories Albuquerque, NM, 67135 Vicer Cha irr.an :
D. A. Dahlgren Supvr., LUR Safety R*.D Sandia Laboratories Albuquerque, N!!, 87185 The!ce The rad?iological safety of conte.nporary cc:mercial nuclear
,q power reactc::s dopc. mis prir.cipally upon tha ruliabic contain=ent of the radiolisotopos produced by finsion of the uranium fuel.
The contair.c=nt function is performed by uultiple passive' barriers and by acti.c electrical and s.cchanical components in the control a:nd safet-systems of the plant.
The reliability of the safet': and safety-reinted systems is dependent upon the maintenance caf the cystems and the exercise of automatic r.nd canual contrc:1. The reliabic c):crcise of manual control depen s in turn upoit : human factors and aloments of the control cycten, jointly opti ized for performance in both nomal and emergency situations. Safety is conceptually based en defense in-depth derived from. good pla: : design, msintenance of quality, operational c o=pete: ce and the inclusion of cystems enginected and dedicated' specifienlly to safety. Recent experience with reactor accidients har forced a reexaminatier. of the safety of i
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O existing plants and of the basic prncepts, which have nonetheless been responsitic for a notabic safety rec.ord.
The recent experience competently analy:sd and applied to revised and future designs can further imprcve reactor safety.
(EN.ch paper 20 minutes; session concluded Topics and Speakers: with o'ne-hour joint discussion)
Defcuse-in-Depth: The Role of Dcsign, Operations, and Maintenance in ncactor Safety
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l Dyzon Lee, Vice recsident Commonwealth Edison P. O. Cox 767 1 First flational Plata l
Chicago. IL 60690 t
(312) 294-3103 4
Recent Leccons Learned on Acactor Safety Roger J. !!sttson
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Director, Division of Systers Safety Ituelcar nagulatory Co:-sission j
Washington, D.C.
l (301) 492-7517 The II:n-Machine Interface in t.cactor Safety
!!ouard L. Parris Electric Pcuer Reccarch Institute P. O. Do: 10412 Palo Alto, CA 94303 (415) C55-2000 Trends in Improved Ecactor Safety Design i
I Con !!. Roy Manager, Engineering Dept.
Ilucicar Pouce Generation Div.
Ecbcock & Wilcox' P. O. Box 12GO Old Forrect Road Lynchburg, VA 24505 (C04) 384-5111, Ext. 2375 s
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TRENDS IN D! PROVED REACTOR T.AFETY DESICN -
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) FROM A DESIGNER'S POINT OF VIEY, hHERE AR1:
WE HEADED? IfE MUST KCEP IN MIND THAT PLANTS ARE DESIGNED TO BE OPERATED.
I BELIEYF MORF D!PHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON Tile OPERATOR, ON PLANT OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS, WD ON OPERATING EXPERIENCES. THE DESIGN PROCESS SHOULD INTEdRATE ALL ASPECTS OF PLANT OPERATION MO THAN IN THE PAST.
AND HOW WILL SAFETY BE THEREBY DtPROVED?
CLOSE THE LOOP - IN 'THE FUTURE KEY PARTICIPANTS !!UST COUPLED TOGETHER:
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SYSTEM DESIGNERS
].{Q SYSTEM ANALYSTS
{ Qsh TRAINERS
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PROCEDURE WRITERS OPERATORS HOW CAN THIS BE DONE?.
EMPHASIS MUST BE' SHIFTED TOWARD EVENTS THAT ARE HIGM e
AND A11AY FROM THOSE THAT ARE OF A VERY LOW PROBABILITY; AT LEAST FROM A?f OPERATIONS POINT OF VIEW.
THIS IS NOT TO SAY, AS TMI PROVED,'THAT THESE MORE LIKELY EVENTS CAN' OT LEAD TO N
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.
, EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON ANALYTICAL CODES AND ANALYTICAL e
RESULTS h*HICH ACCURATCLY PREDICT SYSTDI BEHAVIOR AS OPPOSED TO SHOWING THAT BEHAVIOR UNDER ACCIDENTS IS 9
BOUNDED.
IN HELPING THE TRAI.'ER OR PROCEDURE WRITER DO,A CCOD i'
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JOB FOR THE OPERATOP., THEY MUST HAVE A CCOD UNDERSTAND'iNC OF REALISTIC SY' STEM BEHAVIOR.
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2-BOi 11AS ASKED RECENTLY liHILE TESTIFYING BEFORS Tile PRESIDENT'S L
f' CCSDIISSION IYHY A'i ANSifER TO A SAFETY /O ALYSIS REPORT QUESTION ON A RECENT PLANT SH0tlED THAT 4 PSI liOULD BE REACllED IN THE CONTAINMENT IN"LESS TilAN 10 MINUTES FOR A STUCK OPEN PRESSUR1 '2R VALVE liHEN ON T>II-2 4 PSI liAS NOT REACHED FOR SEVERAL HOURS.
THERE liERE SEVERAL REASONS BUT THE MOSI SIGNIFICANT liAS THAT IN THE RECENT CALCULATIONS, A NUMBER OF VERY CONSERVATIVE AND UNREJ.LISTIC ASSU'4PTICNC liERE !. LADE IfMICH LED TO A, RATHER QUICK ISOLATION. THE POINT IS.AT LEAST FROM AN OPERATIONS POINT OF VIEt!,
REALISTIC BEHAVICR PREDICTIONS ARE IMPORTANT - CONSERVATISM IS NOT ENOUGH.
MORE FULLY EXPLOIT FIELD OPERATING EXPERIENCES AND FEED THEM BACK e
INTO THE DESIGN, ANALYSIS, TRAINING, AND OPERATING PROCEDURES --
AND THIS MUST BE AN ONGOING ACTIVITY. 700 MANY LER'S HAVE BEEN GLOSSED OVER OR END lYITH 110RDS LIKE, THE PLANT IS IN SAFE" i
CONDITION TO REUIRN, TO PCifER AND NO THREAT liAS POSED TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY, h' HEN *IN REALITY AN INDEPTH REVIE11 MAY HAVE PROVIDED IN MANY CASES SOME MORE VALUABLE INFORMATICN THAT CCULD PRODUCE HIGHER AVAILABILITY AND IMPROVED SAFETY -- I'LL COME BACK TO THAT IN A MO:.!ENT --THE RELATIONSHIP BET;iEEN AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY. BUT ifE MUST USE FIELD DATA /J D EXPERIENCES TO HELP TICHTEN DIE LOOP BET 11EEN THE XEY PARTICIPANTS ON AN ONGOING BASIS -
l TRANSIENT DATA REVIEli CAN PRODUCE BETTER UNDERSTANDING CF SYSTEM DESIGN FOR 'THE DESIGNER, BETTER (GNPUTER CODE BENCllMARKS FOR Ti!E l
BEHAVIOR ANALYST, USEFUL CHECKS ON TF VALIDITY OF TRAINING AND j
PRCCEDURES AND lie SHOULD 310RE FULLY EXPLOIT THIS VALUABLE INFORMAT IN THE FUTURE.
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-- e STILL MORE EMPi! ASIS NUST BE PLACED C ; PREVENTION RATilER THAN AN OUNCE OF PREVENTICN IS WORTH A POUND OF CURE.
p MITIGATION TROUBLE USUALLY SHOWS UP IN THE SMALL BEFCc5 IT APPEARS IN THE LARGE.
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EMPHASIZE PREVENTION VICE MITIGATION -- THE L TF REPORT TALNS ABOUT IMPROVING Tile RELI ABILITY OF EMERGENCY FEEDh'ATER SYSTEMS --
TilAT'S A flITIGATIVE SYSTEM. Tile INDUSTRY CAN 00 ITSELF A FAVOR BY IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY OF THE MAIN FEED AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, SO THAT THE ENERGENCY FEED SYSTEM ISN'T NEEDED -- THAT'S PREVENTION AND IT.WILL PAY AVAILABILITY BENEFITS, TOO.
e ANOTHER THING THAT CAN LEAD TO IMPROVED OPERATIONS IS TO FOCUS ON RELATIONSHIP OF AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY.
IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE INDUSTRY AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES CAN WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A MUTUALLY C0ho!ON COAL -- THAT QF INCREASED SAFETY -- IF MORE EMPHASIS IS GI,VEN TO PROMOTING A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN. AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY.
700 FREQUENTLY IN THE PAST THERE HAS BEEN A TENDENCY TO VIEW THESE MATTERS AS SEPARATE. THE INDUSTRY IS INTERESTED I'N IMPROVED AVAILABILITY hHICH FREQUENTLY INVOLVES EQUIPMENT hBICH HAS NOT TRADITIONALLY BEEN CONSIDERED TO HAVE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
THEY SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO FOCUS INORDINATE ATTENTION ON SAFETY-RELATED MATTERS g
TO Tile DETRIMENT OF NON-SAFETY EQUIPMENT.
AVAILABILITY IMPRCVEMENT f
PROGRAMS, EVEN IF Ti!EY INVOLVE AN INNOCENT VALVE IN THE CONDENSATE Y
SYSTEM, CAN HAVE BOTH AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE.
WE NEED TO PROMOTE A BALANCED FOCUS ON THE WHOLE PLANT AND RECOGNIZE THIS RELATIONSilIP.
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CLOSE Tile LOOP -- HAVE EACil KEY PARTICIPANT BE GIVEN AN OPPORTU.\\
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TO INTERACT WITil Tild OTHER PARTICIPANTS.
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I RECOGNIZE DIPORTANCE OF ACCURATE PREDICTION OF REALISTIC e
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EXPLOIT FIELD EXPERIENCES.
e-i D1PHASIZE PREVENTION VERSUS MITIGATION.
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DON'T BE SATISFIED WITH GOOD,BfMAVIOR IN A TRANSIENT -- ELDf!NATE THDI.
STAY FLEXIBLE BECAUSE TIIE CHARACTER OF TIIE INDUSTRY IS GOING e
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TO CHANGE -- I BELIEVE FOR THE BETTER.
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TFI.30T, 1:t itt.e):-MING HEAC7. 0R SAFETY DiSION OCTC3G 5.1979 E
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Thir im In cr.4;u2Ae to your October 1st te16 phone c.111 to peorida input to as upocaing I/r. Pay speech. Sos.e r.cucrayr.cd thoughts arv twlow:
i one haa Lanically two directions. to g J to i ; rore reactor safety, preven-3 tion or mitigatica of accidenta. bar,t c.uign ar.1 operation standpcist, g
prevent.inct la the pzsfartv l rodta. Tt,e cieser a plant comes to preventin;;
all accitieur.m. the gruter.. will be its' reliability.md availah111t7 I
Without outside influesce, it cocas obvion t.he te '-- f cal
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put. the re.secrees there. For an extrwc.e anspie, consider a ?.asien ispimve-l cast pro.iucin,; a fuel rod cladding tMr ntain.s all radicactivity under all conditiona. Iaqine the suas111.scy systeam that could be -!!= *nte1.
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However, because of outsid: 1sfluence, ret.ources have te. 1,e devoted to I
mitigatha cf.ac:1 dents. pttbably to the detripent of prwvention'esucws.
j TWo reasons fur this are:
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As lo:g as teschters cern ask "what if" questions, cczd without a safety g
aoal, <=se can al.ya postulate new sc.1:>.rios which requim mitigation j
systems.
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C%ims supporting this are:
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ACR3 41scussion about mscarr.h in solten care r.::tentiam <.p hi.11ty.
1:o.s can d..t re Le ch.anged to iscrease the time moltes core t,aterial e-A the grtr.e.dwater?
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heat reporting of the North A.na Jecident. Regxrdirq the nic.uc
- a of radioactivity, one mport stated, changes in.stituted since !?ti t
wen suppued to prevent thia.
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- c.' Ccat!zrba changes in the tMstwar of Class 9 cr d'-cc.
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44 Septed.er 24th C1".* order, the Conclesion has d1.recte1 the Staff to l:
revlev Clazz 9 policy, ami in the hteria tta Staff is to tri:y; to
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the cc:nission's attention ":ny L..dividust cases in which it believes i I the envircemental consegacace.1 ci Clar.s 9 accidents sicild be car.si?cred".
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C'rceber 5,1979 The c%11 cage to the etiga ces:asity la to fc ee a r.m nation cr? The mticn/
nieuco wsttoa to ensum n,sor===
-t m t pect.tve e auerin; national needs for pcwa. Tsim quentios hcwver. c.an t.ot even be apenacted with'ait a r-afety soal(u) (witch Joha isard has s.Titten a'oour vc:y well) fur.ac.rgy pn=ti=
t e ior.is.
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