ML20084P786
| ML20084P786 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1984 |
| From: | Bush M PHILADELPHIA, PA |
| To: | Brenner L, Cole R, Morris P Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8405180425 | |
| Download: ML20084P786 (18) | |
Text
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RELATED C0iiT:ESPONDENCE
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PNiegelptua. Pa 19102 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA BARBARA W.1%THER, City Solicitor May 16, 19 %
MARIHA W. BUSH, Deputy City Solicitor 215-686-5249 Honorable Lawrence Brenner Administrative Law Judge Atcmic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmrission Washington, D. C. 20555
- cd Honorable Peter A. Morris Administrative Law Judge g
g c ;!
d Atcmic Safety & Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission G
50 Washington, D. C. 20555
' 'O W
Honorable Richard f. Cole t ;,
Administrative Law Judge c3 Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear. Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D. C. 20555 RE:
IN THE MAITER OF PHI 1ADELPHIA ELECIRIC COMPANY (LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 & 2) DOCKET NOS. 50-352 & 50-353 o/_
Dear Board Members:
Enclosed herewith please find a copy of the study comissioned by the City of Philadelphia. This study was delivered to Mr. Wetterhahn on Tuesday, May 15,19%.
I am conveying it herewith by express delivery to the Board an1 the NRC Staff. Delivery to all other parties by regular mail.
Sincerely, MG.k 5
MARTHA W. BUSH, Deputy City Solicitor MWB:ddb Enclosure cc: ALL PARTIES
$$[ k!ab 0
3sO3
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POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS AT THE LIMERICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
l l
1 Fred C. FiMlayson May 14, 1984 F.C.
Finlayson and Associates 12844 E.
Cuesta Street Cerritos, California 90701 (213) 926-9773
4 POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS AT THE LIMERICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT I'
1.0 INTRODUCTION
j-If a severe accident involving a core meltdown and a
j substanti al release of radiation were to occur at the Limerick nuclear power plant,
- state, local, and regional planners might consider taking several protective action options in an effort to reduce the potential radiological hazards, to the public.
Recommendations for evacuation might be made to the people living within the ten mile i
- radius, Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
Even outside the Plume Exposure
- EPZ, people might voluntarily evacuate their homes if an order to evacuate f
were given.
Another important option for reducing the radiological hazards of a
core melt accident is the
+
concept of sheltering.
If sheltering were recommended as a protective measure, people would be encouraged to stay 4
4 inside their houses -- in their basements, if they were available -- until the radioactive cloud had passed by or had dissipated within the'i r neighborhoods.
This report analyzes the probable radioactive oxposures and resulting f
consequences associated wYth protective action recommendations for evacuation and for sheltering within the vicinity of the City of Philadelphia and the Limerick plant.
For comparison, the exposures associated with
+
conditions where no protective actions would be taken are also reviewed.
Site specific results are presented in this report for f
the geographical area about,the Limerick site and for the Philadelphia area in particular.
The results have been based upon radiological source term descriptions for severe accidents at the Limerick plant as they have been
{
derived by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in their Draft Environmental Statement (NUREG-0974) for the facility (Ref. 1).
The individual source term categories considered in the descriptions of the accidents are presented in Table 1
(Reproduced from Ref.
1).
The corresponding probabilities of the contributing source term categories are presented in Table 2
(Reproduced from Ref.
1).
Consequences have been cal cul ated using the
/
CRAC2 statistical analysis code a
state of the art computer code developed by the NRC for estimating the potential effects of postulated severe core melt accidents at nuclear power plants.
Meteorological conditions for the site were furnished by the Philadelphia Electric Company. (Ref. 2).
2.0 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS RESULTS
t
[
Calculational results are shown in Figure 1
for a
model of public response where the people are assumed to take no special protective actions for an entire day in response to the accident conditions.
The model characterizes the public as going about their daily lives as though conditions were normal for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period of exposure to the radioactive fission products released in the event.
The concept of the model is based upon the results originally presented by the NRC in their basic planning document, NUREG-0396 (Ref. 3).
Shielding factors for the calculations are presented in Table 3.
In analyzing the results of Figure 1,
a substantial f
i fraction of the population of Philadelphia is located at distances of between 20 and 30 miles from the Limerick plant.
The city boundaries are generally east-southeast I
(ESE) to southeast (SE) of the facility.
At this distance l
and direction,, assuming no protective actions are taken by the public, the mean doses projected are between 2.0 and
)
3.0 rems.
The mean doses presented in these results f
represent the probabilistically weighted arithmetic mean 4
(or " average")
values of over 1300 to 2600 individual calculations of the magnitudes of doses and/or health effects for each analytical case considered.
Peak doses and health' effects values have also been presented in the text below.
The peak values cited represent the largest
[
single values of the conditions calculated from the 1300 to 2600 individual results calculated for each case and l
location in the analyses.
l 2.1 Health Impacts of Ionizing Radiation Exposure to the ionizing radiation resulting from a
l severe nuclear power plant accident may cause health I
effects as a result of biological changes induced in the cellular structure of the body.
- However, the health i
i effects induced by radiation can only be projected on a
stantical basis.
That is, within a group of people that l
have all been exposed to the same average
- dose, individual members of the group will not necessarily experience the i
same symptoms -- especially at relatively low doses.
Thus not everyone exposed to radioactive doses sufficiently i
large to induce some early deaths or injuries may be victims of such effects.
- However, survivors of early effects may subsequently succumb to the delayed effects of latent cancers.
These delayed effects would also be probabilistically distributed among individual survivors and would ordinarily begin to appear after latency periods of ten years or more.
j In order to minimize the probability that the public
[
will be exposed to health threatening radiological
- doses, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established j
Protective Action Guidelines (PAG's).
The PAGs require responsible government agencies to initiate protective j
actions whenever proj ected doses to the public from an L
r 2
s
% 4 4
I accident are expected to. exceed 1 to 5 rems to the whole l
body and/or 5 to 25 rees to the thyroid.
The EPA did not propose that the PAGs represented acceptable doses to the public.
ThenPAGs simply represent triggering dose level s
[
at which protective actions n.ust be initiated, if
}
I.
projected doses exceed the established limits (Ref. 4).
j i
However, if PAG 1evel domos, were received by the public, the probability of health effects to individuals L
would be quite low.
The probability of early deaths or injuries - occurring within 30 to 60 days after exposure l
would be negligible.
Moreover, the probability of delayed cancer deaths (or incidence) would be less than 1/1000.
l l
I Threshold doses for. induction of early fatalities are commonly considered to be. aboutus2OO rems.
If doses of this magnitude,were recits ved, a
ten percent probability
[
i exists that early deaths would occur assuming that the
[
recipients received little of no insediate medical i
treatment for their radiological exposures._ If the people f
receiving 200 rom doses survived the-early fatality
[
l threat, there would be a 60 percent chance that they would experience early injuries prtmarily respiratory
[
s ailments, nausea, etc.
After recovery from the effects of '
the early injuries, there would still be a 3 to 8
percent j
4 probability that their exposure to such a large dose would
}
t ultimately result in death f rom latent cancers.
t 1
i comhonly accepted threshold doses for early The
[
injuries areqabout 30 rems.
At a 30 rem
- exposure, a
one percent probab111ty exists of incurqing early injuries.
l On,the other hand, the individual probability of latent l
cancer deaths < occurring as a result of receiving a dose of
- 30. rems is about
'O.5
.t o 1.2 percent.
In this
- study,
{
latent cancers have been assumed to be linearly related to the magnitudes.cf radioactive doses received with a
probabilistic frequency of about 150 cancer deaths per
[
million person-rems.
Recent evidence suggests that the i
.probabilistic; frequency of cancer deaths from radioactive exposure coulds be' as large as 400 deaths per million i
person-rems.
Therefore, the latent cancer death estimates I
x.
presented-in this report are telieved to be conservatively low.'
s.,
s 3
2.2 Dose-Distance-Probability Results 1
i47 bus the mean calculated done levels of. 2 to 3
[
within the Philadelphia, city limits, for the sum total of l
i all probable accidents at the Limerick
- plant, fall within the PAG limits.
Peak values for the projected doses i
within t!.e city limits for the same set of accidents range between 194 and 424 ram.
The results of the calculations show that the probability of exceeding PAG 1evels within j
the city limits is about 40 to 45 percent at i
rem and i
i from 8 to 14 percent at 5 rems, if no protective actions I
'were to be taked by the public.
As indicated in Figure 1,
j I
i
.\\
3, i
the probability of receiving life threatening or injury inducing doses is quite low at distances as far away from the Limerick site as Philadelphia.
Though as noted
- above, the peak doses calculated for the city were quite
- high, the probability of exceeding doses as high as 200 rems was calculated to be about 1/10,000 (or 0.01%).
The probability of exceeding doses of 30 rems was calculated to be about the order of 1 percent at distances between 20 to 30 miles downwind from the plant.
In Figure 2, the results are shown of cal cul ati ons of the potential doses to individuals who were modeled as evacuating through the City of Philadelphia with an average velocity of one mile per hour.
For purposes of this
- study, it was assumed that the residents of Philadelphia were also evacuating, even though they may not have been included in the evacuation order.
The calculated meaq doses to much evacuees at distances of 20 to 30 miles from the plant range from 1.7 to 2.3 rems.
Under corresponding accident conditions, the peak l
calculated doses to evacuees within the city ranged between 110 and 151 rom.
consequently, the probability of
~
life threatening doses was calculated to be negligible.
l The probability of receiving doses in excess of 30 rems was calculated to be less than 1 percent (ranging from
.62 to.34 percent).
The probability of exce -di ng i
rem was calculated to be about 40 percent (ranging from 37 to 43 percent).
An estimate was made of the potential effects of overloading the traffic carrying capacity of the city streets.
To estimate these
- effects, calculations were made of the doses received by people who were caught in gridlock conditions in their automobiles while evacuating within the city.
Doses received under these conditions would, of course, be very time dependent relative to the
.hich gridlock conditions existed.
time during w
Calculations were performed for parametric gridlocked periods ranging from. 2 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
For the unlikely case where gridlock existed within the city limits for the longest times of twelve
- hours, the doses received under such conditions were calculated to be very similar to those for the no protective action case.
The calculated mean doses ranged from 2.2 to 3.4 rems.
Though the peak calculated doses ranged between 213 and 458
- rems, the probability of receiving life threatening doses even under these extreme gridlocked conditions was essentially negligible.
However, the probability of receiving doses in excess of 30 rems was of the order of 1 percent.
Doses in excess of 5 rems were calculated to have a
probability of from 8.9 to 16 percent.
The probability of exceeding 1
rem was estimated to range from 41 to 50 percent.
For gridlocked periods of about two hours, the probability of exceeding either 200 or 30 rems becomes negligible.
The probability of exceeding 5 rems is reduced to a
range of from about 2
to 6
percents and the probability of Y
o
~-
f
/
exceeding i rem is reduced to f rom 25 to 35 percent.
In Figure 3, the results are shown of calculations of the potential dosen that,might be received by individuals if they took shelter -in brick houses with basements like those that are typical of-the Philadelphia area.
The mean calculated doses f or people who take shelter in this fashion for a period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> range' from 1.0 to 1.6 rems at distances of from 20 to 30 miles from the Limerick plant.
The probability of life threatening doses was calculated to be negligible under these circumstances.
The probability of exceeding doses of 30 rems was of the order of 0.1 percent (ranging from..064 to
.261 percent depending upon distance from the plant within the city limits).
The probability of exceeding 5 sems ranged fron' 3.8 to 5.5 percent;g while the probability of exceeding 1
rem ranged from 28 to 35 percent.
2.3 Health Ef f ects Analyses were made of the heal th effects associ ated with the accident sequences and associ ated
- doses, of radioactivity incurred by exposed individuals as discussed above.
,In particular, early ' fatalities, early
- injuries, l
and latent cancer f atalities were projected f or the. severe accident sequences analyzed.
In all the cases report ed on below, the health eff ects included the combined-summation of all the source. term elements defined for the NRC's Draft Environmental Statement (DES) as described in Tables 1
and 2.
The calculations were conducted for the population associated:with the two sectors ESE, and SE of the Limerick facility within which the city of Philadelphia i s l ocated.
The health ef f ects were analyzed parametricall y for three evacuation conditions and for three sheltering conditions.
The evacuation analyses' were conducted on the basis of the assumpti on that.
an evacuation had been recommended for.
the city of Philadelphia'and that evacuees were moving through the city at three dif f erent average velocities -
2.5, 1.0, and O.5 miles per houb (mph).
A two hour. delay period prior to initiation of evacuation was assumed for all cases in accordance with the DES assumpti ons (Ref.
1, p.5-22).
The sheltering calculations were performed under the assumption that the maj ori ty of, the pcpulation of Philadelphia took shelter. in brick houses with. basements.
The effects of exposure periods of 6,
12, and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />'s were investigated parametricallyy As expected, the highest velocity evacuation case was the most effective,. protective action analyzed.
For the 2.5 mile per hour average velocity
- case, there were l'05' mean early fatalities (relative to the peak value of 4860 fatalities for all calculated cases with this average velocity).
By comparison, there were mean and peak values of early fatalities of 4.15 (9120 peak) and 24.9 (54,900 peak) for the 1 mph and 0.5 mph cases respectively. ' In
/
F
6'
-~
~^
most cases, early ' fatalities occurred outside the city limits, within the close-in regions nearer the Limerick facility.
Early fnjuries were also found to be of limited significance to the city planners.
Only for the lowest velocity case (0.5 mph) was there any substantial likelihood of early injuries occurring within the city boundaries.
In this case, where a mean value of 449 early injuries was projected f or the population distributed over all distances from the reactor, 131 of the early injuries (or 29.2 percent) were calculated to occur within the city boundaries.
For all the other velocity cases i
investigated, the probability of early injuries occurring within the city boundaries was found to be essentially negligible.
Latent cancer fatalities were only calculated for the one mile per hour evacuation case.
A mean calculated value of 613 fatalities was projected for this case (compared
.to a
peak cal culated value of 62,000 fatalities).
Of the 613 mean total fatalities for the ESE and SE sectors and all distanceu from the
- facility, 320 j
(or 52.2 percent) were calculated.to occur within the city l
boundaries.
I For the sheltering cases examined, the overall early f
fatalities were smaller in number than they were for the 1
j mph evacuation case.
When all= distances from the plant j
were included, mean values ranged from 2.42 fatalities for i
the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> exposure period case to 3.98 for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />
(
exposure period conditions.
Peak values of early j
f atalities associated with these exposure conditions were j
L 7610 and 5560 respectively.
- However, like the evacuation l
cases examined, the impact of early fatalities on the city
{
was essentially negligible.
In only a f ew relatively rare i
cases were f atalities incurred as far from the plant as the city limits.
Even in these rare
- cases, it appears j
that few, if any, deaths would be expected to occur within
{
the city limits.
e
(
Early injuries were projected for the she.'? ring l
cases that were examined.
The results indican,J that l
l early injuries under these conditions have a
limited impact on the city.
The mean early injury values at all distances from the reactor were found to range from 27.8 l
to 36.3 for all the exposure periods investigated.
For
[
the mean values calculated, the city's contribution to the whole was found to be less than one-half of one percent (0.5%).
The peak values observed for all distances from the plant ranged from about'90,000 to 100,000.
For these cases, the city's contribution to the overall total is unknown.
However, it is likely to be larger than the i
fractional contribution calculated above.
In any
- case, however, the probability of
.the peak values of early l
injuries occurring in an accident is very remote ^
i I
6 l
~. -.
?
I l
(approximately 1/10,000,000 -- assuming that a severe core melt accident has occurred).
f Latent ' cancer fatalities were cal cul ated for conditions where the population was sheltered for the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> exposure case.
A mean calculated value of 581 deaths
(
was proj ected for the entire area considered in the calculation (compared to the peak value of 59,300 deaths for the same area).
Of the total mean value of 581 deaths, 274 were projected to occur within the city limits (about 47.2 percent of the total).
3.0 CONCLUSION
S The results of the calculations performed for this report were dominated by the effects of only a
small j
number of the 27 listed Release Categories presented in l
Table 1.
The relative probability of a
severe coremelt accident is dominated by the release categories I-T/DW, the two I-T/WW
- cases, and the two I-T/LGT cases.
Together, these five cases represent over 92 percent of the relative probability of a
severe accident occurring.
i However, the projected doses for these release categories
[
(when considered in terms of their individual contributions) are quite low.
For example, the mean dose
[
associated with the I-T/WW series is about 0.5 rem at the j
city limits.
L I
t On the other hand, a few release categories with large fission product releases contribute most of the rest of the impact on doses and health effects.
For
- example, the
[
II-T/WW, III-T/WW and the IV-T/WW series ciaminate the impacts of the high dose categories.
Though these three categories contribute less than five percent to the overall relative probability of a
severe accident at i
l Limerick, they contribute 25 percent of the overall mean value of the dose for all integrated contributions of the release categories.
The calculated mean dose for the
. individual contribution of the IV-T/WW category at the city limits is about 37 rems -- a rather large mean
- dose, slightly in excess of the early injury threshold.
- Thus, these few, relatively
- large, release categories have a
I disproportionate influence on the consequences of severe accidents.
An accident in any of these categories, if it
[
l were to occur, could cause unfortunate consequences for j
the city.
A significant question to ask is whether the approximately five percent relative contribution to the j
probability of an accident associated with these combined I
categories is sufficiently small to be negligible for city f
emergency planning purposes.
As a result of the influence of the relatively high probability of the Limerick release categories associated with low doses, the proj ected mean doses were rather low
[
within the city limits f or all cases considered in this l
report.
Mean values ranged from about i
rem with
[
7
[
i
i t
e sheltering to about 3 rems for cases where no protective action was taken.
On the other hand, peak dose values for these same identical cases ranged from from about 100 rems to about 425 rems.
The peak values show the influence of j
the relatiyely high consequence rel ease categories combined with bad weather co. ti ti ons.
Peak doses are almost always associ ated with rainfall conditions occurring simultaneously with the arrival of the radioactive cloud from the accident over the city limits.
However, as noted above and as shown in Figures 1
to 3,
the meteorological condi ti ons leading to peak doses are relatively rare occurrences.
Though the calculated one to three rem mean dose
{
values are relatively
- low, the probability of incurring more substantial dose levels within the city limits is relatively high.
The probability of incurring doses in excess of 30 rems - the early injury threshold is about one percent assuming that a
core melt accident has occurred.
Moreover, the probability of incurring a 10 rem t
dose is about 5 percent.
Though doses of 10 to 30 rems have a negligible probability of being associated with i
early fatatities, they do increase the individuals incremental probability of incurring latent cancers by l
about one to two percent.
The' calculated consequence results indicate that early f atalities and early injuries will probably not have a major impact on the
- city, unless very low evacuation
(
velocities are expected to occur within the city.
For
}
most practical purposes, the effects of early deaths and
{
l injuries are confined to areas outside the city limits.
Except for those
[
cases where evacuation velocities were substantially less than 1
- mph, when early deaths and injuries occurred within the city limits the consequences were essentially negligible.
The effects of latent cancers are so pervasive however, that they are calculated i
to impact the city.
As
- noted, in the cases considered, l
about 50 percent of the overall mean latent cancers induced by the accidents occurred within the city limits.
"It should be noted, however, that the individual risks of incurring cancer as a
result of the radioactive doses i
received in an accident are relatively low within the city limits. On the basis of the potentially exposed population of about 1,767,000 included in the zones of the calculation for the
- city, the mean values of the i ndi vi dual risk of death from latent cancer induction from I
the accidents are about 1/10,000.
It should also be noted that the latent cancer deaths associated with such accidents would be distributed
[
over a
relatively long period of time.
No deaths are likely to l
occur in the first ten years after exposure to the ionizing radiation.
Thereafter, the probability of cancer induced death is distributed essenti al l y uniformly throughout the remainder of an individual's lifetime.
E l
Thus, the indicated mean values of latent cancer deaths projected f or the city in the calculations (approximately 300 in both the evacuation and sheltering cases consi dered) would probably be spread cut over many decades i
of time after the accident.
For comparative
- purposes, the cancer induced natural deaths over a
similar period of time for the population of a city the size of Phil adel phi a would be about 300,000.
If an accident with doses more severe than the mean values were to occur (e.g.,
10 to 30 rems as discussed above) then the number of latent cancer deaths might reach values of the order of 10,000 for the city.
Though these deaths would also be distributed over decades of time, their impact on the city would clearly be substantially greater than the impact of the mean value l
cases (300 latent cancer fatalities) as discussed above.
Since the n, umber of latent cancer deaths could be much larger than the mean values cited above in the event of an especially severe accident, it will be important for the city planners to consider the necessary protective action options that might be exercised to limit the potential i
hazards of nuclear power reactor accidents.
The results of the calculations suggest that sheltering can offer as much effectiveness as practically any other option considered.
In
- addition, sheltering probably offers an l
easier, planning option
.than preparing for complex evacuation procedures.
Thus, sheltering appears to be a
relatively effective protective action for the city of Philadelphia.
It should probably be given serious
(
considsration in the mix of protectiv,e options available i
to the city planners.
i i
+
i 5
I h
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REFERENCES 1.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
" Draft Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Limerick Generating
- Station, Units 1
and 2",
(Docket Nos.
50-352 and 50-353, Philadelphia Electric Company), NUREG-0974, Supplement No.
1, December 1983.
l 2.
Private Communications, Philadelphia Electric
- Company, 13 April 1984.
3.
- Collins, H.E.;
- Grimes, B.K.;
- Galpin, F.,
" Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016, December 1978.
4.
Environmental Protection Agency, "Manuhl of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents", EPA-520/1-75-OO1, September 1975.
l l
l l
l l
I I
i l
I l
nfb
l
'bL-2.
l.
lable 5.Ilc Summary of the almospheric release specifications used in consequence analysis for timerick Units 1 and 2" l
Warning Fractions of Core Inventory Released l
C.
Release Release tia.e for foergy Release M
Ne le.s:,e time' duration evacuation release height Inorgan-I
?..
category' (hr)
(hr)
(hr)
(los Stu/hr) (a) '
Me-Kr Organic l' ic I Cs-Ab Te-Sb Ba,-$r Nu ta" p
1-1/fAl(22)*
5.17 0.5 3.67 100 25 1.0 6.99(-3)**
1.78(-3) 1.88(-2) 8.41(-2) 9.94(-4) 4.95(-3) 9.85 i
i a
I-l /t,A!(25) 5.17 0.5 3.67 100 25 1.0 6.99(-3) 1.46(-4) 3.11(-4) 1.24(-3) 1.91(-5) 7.39(-5) 1.4E 1-1/W(24) 5.17 0.5 3.67 100 25 1.0 6.99(-3) 2.03(-4) 9.19(-4) 2.16(-3)
- 8. 22(- 5) 1.39(-4) 2.61 l
8 l-l/5f(14) 2.4 0.5 1.0 130 25 1.0 9.6(-2) 1.0(-1) 4.0(-1) 1.0(-2) 4.0(-1) 2.0(
1 - 1 /140 ( 2 0 )
2.4 6.5 1.0 100 25 1.0 2.0(-1) 6.0(-2) 1.0(-1) 7.0(-3) 8.0(-2) 1.0(
l 8
I-l/4Gl(26)**^ 1.5 3.4 0
- 1. 0 25 0.73 2.7(-3) 9.8(-5) 4.6(-4) 1.6(-5) 3.2(-5) 5.80 i-I-IttGl(IB) 1.5 3.4 0
1.0 25 0.7?
1.9(-2) 9.8(-2) 4.6(-2) 1.6(-3) 3.2(-3) 5.80 l
II-)/tas(0) 24.92 3.91 5.32 1.0 25 0.98 6.86(-3) 6.73(-1) 3.36(-1) 2.31(-1) 4.1(-2) 4.0(-2) 3.20 a
l 11-1/5[(14) 27 0.5 7
130 25 1.0 9.6(-2) 1.0(-1) 4.0(-1) 1.0(-2) 4.0(-1)
- 2. 00 lit-1/w(10) 2.67 1.38 2.17 100 25 1.0 6.99(-3) 7.01(-2) 2.24(-1) 5.74(-1) 1.95(-2) 3.65(-2) 6.92
"
- I/5E(5) 2.0 0.5 1.0 130 25 1.0 4.0(-1) 5.0(-1) 5.0(-1) 5.0(-2) 5.0(-1) 3.03
. 4 - 1/lLB( 20) 2.0 0.5 1.0 100 25 1.0 2.0(-1) 6.0(-2) 1.0(-1) 7.0(-3) 8.0(-2) 1.03 Ill-l/tGl(26) 0.5 3.5 0
1.0 25 0.73 2.7(-3) 9.8(-5) 4.6(-4) 1.6(-5) 3.2(-5) 5.83 til-l/[Gl(18) 0.5 3.5 0
1.0 a 25 0.73 8
1.9(-2) 9.8(-2) 4.6(-2) 1.6(-3) 3.2(-3) 5.b3 IV-1/tr.J(2) 1.13 3.34 0.5 1.0 25
- 1. 0 6.99(-3) 9.39(-1) 8.61(-1) 8.62(-1) 9.39(-2) 1.49(-1) 1.15
'l' IV-1/W(4 )
1.13 3.34 0.5 1.0 25 1.0 -
6.99(-3) 9.39(-1) 7.72(-1) 6.88(-1) 9.0(-2) 1.19(-1) 9.30 y
IV-l/W(1) 1.13 3.34 0.5 1.0 25 1.0 6.99(-3) 8.74(-1) 8.04(-1) 5.82(-1) 9.55(-2) 1.38(-1) 7.89 IV-l/5f(5) 2.0 0.5 1.5 130 25 1.0 4.0(-1) 4.0(-1) 5.0(-1) 5.0(-2) 5.0(-1) 3.0(
l-S/inl(23) 5.11 0.5 3.76 100 25 9.99(-1) 6.99(-3) 3.31(-3) 4.09(-3) 2.00(-3) 6.,01(-4 ) 2.8F(-4) 4.01 IV-A/lh4(1) 1.17 3
0.5 1.0 25 9.99(-1) 6.99(-3) 9.65(-1) 8.7(-1) 8.74(-1) 9.9(-2) 1.51(-1) 1.2(
, 15-C rint(13) 0.37 3.16 0.31
- 1. 0 25 1.0 6.99(-3) 7.61(-2) 1.37(-1) 5.68(-1) 7.42(-3) 8.17(-2) 7.05 15-C/5E(14) 1.3 0.5 1.3 130 25 1.0 9.6(-2) 1.0(-1) 4.0(-1).
1.0(-2) 4.0(-1) 2.02 15-[/Ih4(12) 1.47 2.9 1.41 1.0 25 1.0 6.99(-3) 8.22(-2) 1.43(-1) 6.06(-1) 7.78(-3) 1.07(-1) 7.35 15-C/SI(14) 2.3 0.5 2.3 130 25 1.0 9.6(-2) 1.0(-1) 4.0(-1) 1.0(-2) 4.0(-1) 2.08 I
5-H20/W(ll) 2.67 4.56 2.67 1.0 25 9.8F(-1) 6.99(-3) 1.09(-1) 1.62(-1)
- 2. 8's(-1) 1.23(-2) 4.9(-2) 3.6C l
5-il20/5E(5) 3.5 0.5 3.5 130 25 1.0 4(-1) 4(-1) 5(-1) 5(-2) 5(-1) 3.03 5-li25/W(9) 2.83 3.55 2.83 1.0 25 9.68(-1) 6.98(-3) 2.56(-1) 2.74(-1) 3.86(-1) 2.5J(-2) 6.18(-2) 4.99 See Section 5.9.4.5(7) for discussion of uncertainties, beeAppendixilfordesignationsanddescriptionsofthereleasecategories.
' Organic iodine is added to inorganic lodine for consesysence calculations because organic lodine is litely to be converted to inorganic or partic forms during environmental transport.
Includes Ro, Nh, Co, N, ic.
" loc ludes V, t a. 2r, Nb, Ce, Pr. Nd, NP, Pn, Am, Cm.
- lhamber in parentheses indicates relative ranking of the release category according to cesfini fraction.
a*6.59(-3) = 6.99 x 10 3 aaalhis release cateuery is combi'ned with III-1/tGl in consespeente analysis.
,--r
-r
'l4%_EE. 2.
Table 5.11d Summary of the calculated mean (point estimate) probabilities of atmospheric release categories Probability of the release category initiated by internal Probability of the release causes, fires, and low to category initiated by Release moderately severe earthquakes severe earthquakes category (per reactor year)
(per reactor year)
I-T/0W 2.41(-5)*
5.6(-7)
I-T/W 2.18(-5) 5.1(-7)
I-T/W 2.44(-6) 5.7(-8)
I-T/SE 9.77(-9) 2.3(-10)***
_I-T/HB 9.77(-7) 2.3(-8)
I-T/ LGT**
2.17(-5) 5.0(-7)
I-T/T 2.67(-5) 6.2(-7)
II-T/W 2.04(-6) 2.0(-8)
II-T/SE 4.0(-12)***
4.06(-10)***
, III-T/W 1.66(-6) 3.7(-7)
III-T/SE 3.4(-10)***
7.4(-11)*==
III-T/HB 3.4(-8) 7.4(-9)
III-T/LGT' 7.5(-7) 1.6(-7)
III-T/ M 9.2(-7) 2.0(-7)
__IV-T/DW 1.63(-7) 4.7(-8)
IV-T/W 1.46(-7) 4.27(-8)
IV-T/W 1.63(-8) 4.75(-9)
IV-T/SE 3.25(-11)***
9.5(-12)***
I-S/0W 3.76(-8)
- 0. 0
._.IV-A/DW 5.0(-9) 0.0 l
IS-C/DW 1.4(-8) 1.3(-7) l IS-C/SE 1.4(-12)***
1.3(-11)***
IS-C/0W 1.0(-7) 9.0(-7)
IS-C/SL
- 1. 0 (- 11) ***
9.0(-11)***
5-H20/W 1.35(-8) 4.1(-8)
S-H20/jE
- 1. 35 (- 12 ) ***
' 4.1(-12)***
S-H20/W 1.35(-8) 3.69(-7)
. Total prob-ability per reactor-
- i year 1.04(-4) 4.56(-6) 1!
"2.41(-5) = 2.41 x 10 3
""This release category is combined with III-T/LGT
""*Any release category with probacility less than 10 8 per reactor year l
is omitted from consequence analysis because of its low probability and l
. insignificant contribution to risks.
1 l
NOTE:
Please see Section 5.9.4.5(7) for discussion of uncertainties.
l l
l
_imericX DES Sucplement 5-18
Table 3 Shielding Factor Projections Shielding Factors Population Status clouc cerounc i
0.75 0.33 Preparingfgr/
Evacuation -
During Evacuation 2/
1.0 0.7 1!
- 0. 4 0.09 During Sheltering Normal Activity 0.75 0.33
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