ML20084K752
| ML20084K752 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/1995 |
| From: | Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9506070004 | |
| Download: ML20084K752 (4) | |
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Southem Nuclear Operatino Comptny Post Offica Box 1295 Orminghtm. Alsb:ma 35201 Telephone (205) 868 5131
?;'f,alg, Southern Nudear Operating Company Farley Project May 31, 1995 the Southern electnc system Docket Numbers: 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk 9
Washington,DC 20555 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP)
Reply to the Notice of Violation (VIO)
NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/95-08 and 50-364/95-08 Ladies and Gentlemen:
As requested by your transmittal dated May 2,1995, this letter responds to VIO 50-364/95-08-04," Loss of Personnel and Material Controlin the Unit 2 SFP CRAB." The Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) response to VIO 50-364/95-08-04 is provided in the Attachment.
In addition, the subject inspection report included V10 50-364/95-08-03, " Inadequate Tagging Order Preparation and Execution." In order to facilitate a more thorough root cause evaluation of this event, SNC requested a one week extension for response submittal. This extension to June 8,1995, was granted by Mr. John Johnson of NRC Region II by telephone conference with Mr. B. L. Moore of SNC on May 26,1995.
Respectfully submitted, f hcvf I
Dave Morey EFB: mar 95-08-04. DOC SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME Attachment THIS 8/
DAY OF 7 d-4A
,1995 cc:
Mr. S. D. Ebneter 1[LCC O Mr. B. L. Siegel Notary Public Mr. T. M. Ross My Commission Expires: 'IfhMf I /997 9506070004 950531 PDR ADOCK 05000364 f
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ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO VIO 50-364/95-08-04 l
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RESPONSE TO VIO 50-364/95-08-04 a
VIO 50-36495-0844 states the following:
l Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that applicable written procedures recommended in f
Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,1978, shall be established, implemented and maintained. Appendix A, Section 2.k., recommends general plant operating procedures for
" Preparation for Refueling and Refueling Equipment Operation."
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Administrative Control Procedure 7.0, " Foreign Material Control In Fuel Handling Areas And Spent Fuel Pool Material Storage," Section 5.1 requires that all individuals entering a controlled refueling area boundary (CRAB) are responsible for securing their own loose articles.
Furthermore, each individual is also responsible for logging their entry and exit of the area, unless an access control point monitor is stationed.
Contrary to the above, on April 3,1995, two individuals entered the Unit 2 spent fuel pool (SFP) controlled refueling area boundary without logging themselves in. A number ofloose articles (e.g., rags, wire clippers) were identified on the spent fuel pool bridge crane that were not properly secured. Additionally, a number ofimproper/ incomplete log entries made in the Personnel and Material Accountability Log during the previous two weeks were identified. The licensee had not stationed an access control point monitor at the Unit 2 SFP.
Admission or Denial The violation occurred as described in the Notice of Violation.
Reason for Violation Personnel error in that individuals failed to follow procedural requirements to properly update the Personnel and Material Accountability Log when entering and exiting the SFP-CRAB.
Additionally, personnel failed to exercise good work practices in the handling ofloose articles while working in the area.
Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved 1.
Upon discovery of this condition, the Shift Supervisor and Engineering Support Supervisor were notified and an inspection and inventory of the SFP-CRAB was performed. Discrepancies in the Personnel and Material Accountability Log were reconciled.
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A continuous CRAB Access Control Point monitor was established in the SFP l
Room for the duration of the fuel inspection activities.
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Anachment Page 1 of 2
n RESPONSE TO VIO 50-364/95-08-04 An inspection of the SFP was performed utilizing underwater camera equipment to 3,
confirm that lost articles had not been introduced into the SFP.
l The SFP-CRAB control provisions of procedure FNP-0-ACP-7.0 were reviewed i
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with Westinghouse refueling / fuel inspection, Engineering Support Reactor Engineering, Health Physics and Chemistry personnelinvolved. These individuals 1
were re-instructed on the importance of adherence to procedure provisions.
Corrective Steos to Avoid Further Violation Personnel authorized security access to the spent fuel pool will be re-instructed on the SFP-CRAB Personnel and Material Accountability provisions of FNP-0-ACP-7.0, with particular 1.
emphasis placed on logging requirements and on the importance of foreign mater respect to the potential damage to fuel assemblies. Provisions will be established training and periodic retraining are conducted for individuals having access to the SFP.
FNP-0-ACP-7.0 will be revised to add provisions for assessment of the work scope by the responsible work group and, when deemed necessary, to establish a SFP-CRAB A 2.
Point Monitor. The duties of this monitor will be similar to and provide the positive controls o the Containment CRAB.
Date of Full Comoliance July 31,1995 Page 2 of 2 Attachment
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