ML20084G663

Snubber Rept Response to NRC Insp Repts 50-280/83-32 & 50-281/83-33

ML20084G663
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	01/25/1984
From:	Blount R, Kansler M VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20084G651	List: ML20084G649 ML20084G663
References
NUDOCS 8405070309
Download: ML20084G663 (34)

Text

1 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION ITNITS 1 AND 2 St>

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RESP 0:4SE TO USNRC INSPLCTION kFPORT NCS.50-280/83-$[and$0-201/83-33 9

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4 Dates January 25, 1984 1

Tre'ruei Ryt M. R. Kansler YO R. N. Blount 0

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f' TABLE OF CONTENTS i

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PACE l

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I.

INTRODUCTION 1

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II. PURPOSE 2

1 I

III. DISCUSSION I

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j A.

Program Evolution 3

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B.

Analysis of Historical Data i

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1.

Hydraulic Snubbers 7

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2.

Mechanical Snubbers 11 j

4 l

C.

Program Description and Planned Changes 15 l

1 i

IV.

CONCLUSIONS 18 l

J LIST 0F FICURE5 & TABLE 5 i

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PAGE I

1.

FIGURE 1 - Snubber Histogras i

j 2.

FIGURE 2 - Nueber of Bleed Failures vs. Range

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3.

FIGURE 3 - Number of Lockup Failures vs. Range i

j 4.

FIGURE 4 - Number of Failures vs. Mode 5.

TABLE 1 - Total Number Snubbers Tested and Failed 1-1 1

l 6.

TABLE 2 - Total Number Snubbers Tested and Failed 2-1 by Sise and Year j

7.

TABLE 3 - Total Number Bleed Failures by Range 3-1 i

l 8.

TABLE 4 - Total Number Lockup Failures by hange 4-1 l

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SNUBBER REPORT s

PAGE 1

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INTRODUCTION 4 4,' ' d

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(; v. 1 As a result of the' NRC inspection of the Surry Unit 1 and 2

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snubber program, conducted by J.- J. 'Lenaban en N'ovember 14 - 17, 1983 (refetcnce Report No. 's 5-280/83-32 and 50-281/83-33), the y

Commission requested clarification and explanation of Surry's I

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basis for snubbdr functional test select' ion _ criteria.

Subsequent

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discussion resdited in a Vepco commitmant'to provide a detailed report describing the snubber program by January,30, 1984.

This

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1 report pro'vides that inform 1 tion.

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This report is limitsd to describing the progtvms and history for

mechanical snubbers and small bore hydraulic snubbers'(6" bore and

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1ess). Large bore snubbers (including 6" pathon snubbers) are not s

a discussed because Technical Specifications provide special retest'

's exemption criteria for large bore snubbers (T:

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4.17.c.7)

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and Surry. has ' ompletely overhauled, refurbished and tested all c

large bore snubt rs during the Unit I and 2 SGR Project outages.

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SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 2 II.

PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to:

1.

Describe the evolution of the snubber test programs from 1978 through 1983.

2.

Correlate historical functional test data to the overall condition of the snubbers.

3.

Describe the existing snubber program and planned changes.

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SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 3

)

i III. DISCUSSION A.

Program Evolution NOTE: Changes described in the following report are displayed chronologically on Figure 1.

In 1978, snubber selection for functional testing was performed utilizing PT-39, Snubber Inspection.

The PT required that at refueling outages, a representative sample of 10 snubbers (not larger than five inch bore) be removed and functionally tested in accordance with the appropriate Mechanical Maintenance Procedures (MMP).

Selection of the snubbers was done by identifying every fif th snubber on the PT-39 listing.

If the snubber fell in the proper size category, it was removed and tested.

If a snubber failed the test, an additional 10 snubbers were pulled and tested. The acceptance criteria in effect was 6 to 30 in./ min. for lockup and 2 to 10 in./ min.

for bleed.

This criteria was established by Stone and Webster Engineering.

N'.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 4 In late 1978, a new functional testing procedure, PT-39.2 was generated to provide better control of the functional testing program. This procedure added three key elements to the functional test program.

First, it utilized a computer generated random list of snubbers to be tested. This ensured a more representative sample was selected.

Second, it provided tables, to record all snubbers that were tested and test results achieved. Third, the MMP's required snubbers be reset to optimum design setpoints prior to reinstallation.

This provided for better tracking and analysis of the data.

The computer was also utilized to track snubber status, i.e.

when changed out, overhauled, etc.

Prior to functionally testing snubbers during the 1979 Unit 1 Showcause outage and the Unit 2 SGRP outage, the PT was changed to incorporate the actual testing procedure.

The next change in the program occurred in August of 1979.

As a result of an analysis performed by Stone and Webster Engineering, the acceptance criteria for both lockup and bleed was changed to 4.6 to 30 in./ min. and 1.8 to 20 in./ min. respectively.

Snubbers tested during the Unit 1 SGRP outage in 1980 - 1981 and the Unit 2 1981 refueling outage were subject to this new criteria.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 5 In 1983, an effort was made to upgrade the Surry Technical Specifications to conform to Standard Technical Specifications.

Guidance used for the update was the ASME draft standard, Examination and Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers) 0 & M - 4.

The change to Technical Specifications was issued as Amendments No. 79 and 80.

This change brought surveillance specifications in line with Standard Technical Specifications except for the post failure functional test selection methodology.

In lieu of the formula presented in Standard Technical Specifications and 0 & M - 4, Surry chose what was considered to be a more conservative approach.

This consisted of selecting an additional 10% to be tested for each failure experienced.

Included with the new Technical Specification was the requirement to functionally test mechanical snubbers.

The overall snubber program was then modified to conform to the new Technical Specification requirements.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 6 l

The latest change made to the snubber program modified the functional testing acceptance criteria to 4.0 to 30 in./ min. for lockup and 1.0 to 20 in./ min. for bleed.

This new criteria was developed utilizing manufacturer's recommended ranges and a Stone and Webster Engineering evaluation of temperature effects and site specific piping thermal growth rates. The functional testing done during the 1983 refueling outages was performed under this new criteria.

In addition to the items described above, the following program changes were initiated:

1.

Analysis of piping systems is performed whenever snubbers have been declared inoperable to determine the effect on the system design function or operability.

2.

Tracking of snubber service life.

More detailed information on the existing-program and scheduled changes are provided later in this report.

j SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 7 B.

Analysis of Historical Data 1.

Hydraulic Snubbers Test data was reviewed from functional testing performed in 1978 through the present.

The following categories were reviewed.

i a.

(Table 1) - Total Snubbers Tested and Failed.

b.

(Table 2) - Total Number Snubbers Tested by Size and Year Vs. Total Failures c.

(Table 3 and Figure 2) - Bleed Failures by Range l

d.

(Table 4 and Figure 3) - Lockup Failures by Range i

Total Number of Failures Under e.

(Figure 4)

Acceptance Criteria in Effect at Time of Test Vs.

t Total Number of Failures Under Existing Acceptance Criteria By Mode of Failure Note: A specific breakdown by manufacturer's type (i.e.

Miller vs.

Lynair vs.

Tompkins Johnson) was not performed. Records prior to 1983 did not always contain manufacture's

type, therefore reliable

number, percentage, etc. could not be prod'uced.

Testing data for Unit 2 in 1978 could not-be collated in the format necessary for this report (specific breakdown of range and mode of failures was not available) and is not included.

i

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 8 As shown in Table 1, the overall failure rate for the entire period is 30.3% (128 of 423).

Assuming present day acceptance criteria is applied to all functional testing the rate becomes 16.8%

(71 of 423).

By discounting bleed related failure - a valid assumption, considering bleed rate failures do not prevent a snubber from performing its intended function, the failure rate decreases to 5.9% (25 of 423).

This failure rate could be reduced further by discounting lockup failures between the range of 2 to 4 in./ min.

The basis for the existing acceptance criteria results from the worst case system thermal growth rate which is in the range of 3.7 to 4.0 in./ min.

Most system thermal growth rates are less than 2.0 in./ min.

As shown in Figure 3,

a significant number of failures fall in the 2 to 4 in./ min. range.

If the failures in this range are discounted, the overall rate would reduce to 2.8% (12 of-423).

1..

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 9 The conclusion drawn from the above discussion is that the overall failure rate, accounting only for failures l

where the intended function of the snubber is I

compromised, is low and indicates that the overall I

functional condition of the snubbers has been acceptable.

Further, Figure 4 shows that the failure mode is spread I

evenly between lockup and bleed, under both tension and i

compression.

This applies to failures under the acceptance criteria in effect at time of testing.

The application of presentday acceptance criteria serves to equalize the failure mode to an even greater degree.

Therefore, a

generic failure mode has not been determined to exist.

Figure 2 indicates that most bleed failures are due to rates less than 1.8 in./ min.

However, as stated previously, bleed failures do not prevent snubbers from performing their intended function.

Conversely, Figure 3 indicates most lockup failures occur in the higher range of 3 to 6 in./ min.

A number of failures in this range could be eliminated if specific acceptance criteria were generated for each snubber 1r.stallation.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 10.

The failure rate of snubbers tested in 1983 is 32.4%.

This is approximately the same failure rate of all snubbers when utilizing past acceptance criteria.

However, eliminating bleed failures and lockup failures in the 2 to 4 in./ min. range, the modified failure rate is 5.9% which is considered to be acceptable.

During the 1983 Unit 2 Refueling outage, all snubbers tested were disassembled, and overhauled regardless of i

test results.

All of the ITT Grinnell Lynair type snubbers exhibited cylinder and piston scoring of varying degrees. Of the 16 Lynair type snubbers tested 8 failed, 3 in bleed and 5 in lockup.

This, in conjunction with the actual values of bleed or lockup failure, indicate that the scoring was not. causing a generic type failure.

All Lynairs tested were replaced with ITT Grinnell Miller snubbers.

These snubbers are provided with a piston bearing device which should serve A

to reduce or eliminate the scoring.

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SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 11 2.

Mechanical Snubbers Prior to the 1983 refueling outages, no mechanical snubbers were functionally tested since the Technical Specifications in effect at the time did not require mechanical snubber functional testing.

Thus, a

historical data base dose not exist.

The discussions below will be limited to the data obtained in 1983.

A total of 32 mechanical snubbers were tested between Unit 1 and 2, with 16 failures.

The breakdown is as follows:

Size i Tested

1. Failed Cause of Failure k

5 4

High Drag is 9

3 1 High Drag, 1 Accel.,

1 Locked up 1

4 3

High Drag 3

12 6

4 High Drag, 2 Locked up 10 1

0 NA 35 1

0 NA 32 16 12 High Drag, 1 Accel.,

3 Locked up NOTE: All failed snubbers were replaced with stock spares.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 12 i

As a result of the Unit 1 failures, a representative sample of the failed snubbers (3 snubbers - 2 High drag and one Locked up), was sent to PSA for evaluation. PSA tested the snubbers and found no problems, i.e.

all passed the functional test.

For Unit 2, all 7 failed snubbers were sent to Wyle Labs for evaluation.

The snubbers were tested and only two (both PSA ls) of the seven failed the test. These snubbers were disassembled to determine cause of failure.

Both snubbers had a white gritty material (believed to be insulation paste) on the inside of the housing and the outside surface of the inertia mass.

The presence of the gritty material appears to have increased mechanism friction thus increasing the drag force.

Also a bent guide rod and bearing assembly contributed to one snubber failure.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 13 The combination of failures in both units and subsequent testing and acceptance by PSA and Wyle resulted in a review of the functional test procedure.

It was discovered that the manufacturer's (PSA) recommended i

test method included performing acceleration testing before drag tests are conducted.

The Vepco, Wyle and ITT Grinnell procedures require the drag test be performed first then the acceleration tests.

It appears that running the acceleration test first tends to free up the mechanism thus resulting in lower drag forces.

Vepco considers the manufacturer's test method to be less conservative and will continue to perform drag tests before acceleration tests.

The drag failures experienced were generally within 5%

of the acceptance criteria of 1% of rated load.

An evaluation will be conducted to determine if the acceptar.ce criteria can be expanded.

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SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 14 The identification of the testing discrepancies noted i

above provides some explanation for the high failure rate on Unit 1.

However, the Unit 2 failed snubbers sent to Wyle were tested on a Wyle machine and in accordance with a Wyle procedure.

As with the Vepco procedures, the test sequence was in reverse of the PSA procedure, yet 5 of the failed snubbers tested by Wyle during the outage, passed when retested at the Wyle facilities in Alabama on the same type test machine.

The only explanation is that the initial failures were due to drag valtes slightly off from the acceptable setpoint and the transportation and handling of the snubbers caused the values to drop when retested.

(Same could have applied to the drag failure snubbers sent to PSA for Unit 1).

Until such time that the mechanical snubbers can be f

replaced or more detailed failure ey.planations can be provided, Surry will continue to replace any failed mechanical snubber with a new or refurbished snubber.

In addition post-failure selection will be in accordance with an updated. program as discussed in the next section.

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 15 C.

Program Description and Planned Changes Present functional testing selection criteria is taken from a combination of 0 & M - 4 and Technical Specifications 4.17.C.

The following requirements were used as a basis for the selection of snubbers for functional testing:

1.

10% of each type of snubber tested.

2.

Various configuration, environments, and sizes selected.

3.

25% of the snubbers in the representative sample will include:

a.

First snu'ober away from each Reactor vessel nozzle.

b.

Snubbers within 5 feet of heavy equipment.

c.

Snubbers within 10 feet of discharge from a safety relief valve.

To comply with the above requirements, snubbers were divided into categories based on their sizes and locations.

There are 29 categories for Unit 1 and 24 cntegories for Unit 2.

Eleven of 29 categories for Unit 1 and 10 of 24 categories for Unit 2 are near heavy equipnent, pump discharge, safety _

relief valves, steam generators and reactor vessel nozzles.

Thus selecting any snubber from each of these categories will meet the minimum 25% requirements as stated above.

1 l

i

I SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 16 At the development of Surry's program, snubbers were divided into three groups:

1) mechanical, 2 ) large bore (including 6" pathon) and 3) small bore hydraulic snubbers prior to the categorization.

This would ensure 10% of each group of snubbers on the initial selection.

In the present program, if there is a snabber failure, an additional 10% of the snubbers in same category are tested.

Testing would continue until no more failures are found in the category. If a generic failure is found that would cause snubbers not to function properly, a large sample size by manufacturer or design deficiency is selected.

This additional selection over a 10% resample would be independent of the requirements for snubbers not meeting the functional test criteria, i

The intent of 0 & M - 4 and Standard Technical Specifications is to ensure snubbers are functionally operable and generic I

problems are identified and bounded 'such tbat corrective I

action can be implemented.

Although the Surry selection method, which used a literal interpretation of 0 & M - 4 and Technical Specifications, is -conservative and provides a large and representative initial sample, the use of the same categories for follow up testing could possibly produce a non-conservative retest sample. Historical testing data for snubbers at Surry has - proven that no. generic problems, relating to operability, exist. However, to ensure snubbers

SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 17 remain in an optimum condition, the following changes are planned and will be implemented prior to and during the next refueling outages.

1.

The snubber selection method will be modified to conform to the intent of 0 & M 4 and Standard Technical Specifications. The existing groupings will be modified to ensure a sample of all sizes in all categories are tested initially.

For additional testing, all small bore snubbers will be subject to selection and not just those in a particular grouping.

2.

The cause of failure, if it can be determined, will be required on the PT data sheets.

3.

The 1TT Grinnell Lynair snubbers will be replaced with the Miller type snubbers.

Note:

This will be subject to availability of replacement units.

4.

An evaluation will be performed on Mechanical snubber functional test acceptance criteria and the effects of high drag on piping systems.

5.

All small bore testing will be performed ' on the new computer controlled Wyle test machine.

In addition, the following long range modifications will be made as manpower and funding are available.

1.

All snubber installations will be reviewed to determine j

if the snubber can be removed.

2.

All PSA mechanical snubbers will be replaced with j

hydraulic snubbers or mechanical snubbers of a different

-l design.

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1 SNUBBER REPORT PAGE 18 IV.

CONCLUSIONS The following conclusions are drawn from this report:

1.

Based on an analysis of test data, no generic problems affecting operability exist with Surry snubbers.

2.

Since no generic problems exist and program upgrades will be made, additional testing prior to the next refueling outages is not required.

As shown in this report, a large number of snubbers have been tested at Surry Power Station with a resultant low failure rate in terms of failures affecting true snubber operability.

In addition, a large amount of manpower and funds have been expended in resolving problems as they arose and ensuring they do not reoccur.

The overall snubber program has evolved to a well documented, procedurally controlled program.

Surry is committed to continually improving this program with the intent of maintaining snubbers in a fully functional condition.

SNUBBER REPORT TABLE 1 PAGE 1-1 TABLE 1

TOTAL NUMBER SMUBBERS TESTED AND FAILED NO BLEED FAILURES NO BLEED WITII NEW CRITERIA.&

TOTAL ORIGINAL USING FAILURES NO LOCKUP FAILURES TESTED CRITERIA NEW CRITERIA NEW CRITERIA BETWEEN 2-4 IN./ MIN.

UNIT 1 FAILED

% FAILED FAILED

% FAILED FAILED

% FAILED FAILED

% FAILED 1978 78 6

7.7 2

2.6 0

0.0 0

0.0

- 1979 130 35 25.9 13 10.0 6

4.6 4

3.1 1980-81 10 0

0.0 0

0.0 0

0.0 0

0.0 1983 32 9

28.1 9

28.1 4

12.5 3

9.4 Michanical 21 9

42.9 Tctal Hydraulic 250 50 20.0 33 13.2 10 4

7 2.8 UNIT 2 1979 127 65 51.1 18 14.2 7

5.5-3 2.4 4

1981 10 0

0.0 0

0.0 0

0.0 0

0.0 1983 36 13 36.0 13 36.1 8

22.2 2

5.6 Mschanical 11 7

63.6 Tctal Hydraulle 173 78 45.1 38 22.0 15 8.6 5

2.9 T;tal Both Units 423 128 30.3 71 16.8 25 5.9 12 2.8

' Mechanical 31 16 51.'6 4

SNUBBER REPORT TABLE 2 PAGE 2-1 TABLE 2

TOTAL NUMBER SNUBBERS TESTED AND F AIL E D BY SIZE i

U NIT 1

SIZE 11 TESTED FAILED POST ON NEW CRITERIA 1978 33 2

1979 13 6

1980 1

0 1983 16 5

50 20 6

SIZE 21 1978 16 3

3 1979 5

3 1980 3

0 1983 7

1 26 9

6 SIZE 34 i

1978 5

0 1979 1

1 1980 0

0 1983 1

0 6

1 1

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I SNUBBER REPORT ~

TABLE 2 PAGE 2-2 SIZE 4 TESTED FAILED POST ON NEW CRITERIA 1978

'20 1

1 1979 8

8 1980 5

0 1983 3

0 28 9

9 SIZE 5 1978 4

0-1979 0

1980 1

0 1983 2

2 7

2 SIZE 6 1983 3

1 UNENOWN 130 8

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SNUBBER REPORT TABLE 2 PAGE 2-3 TABLE 2

TOTAL NUMBER SNUBBERS TESTED AND FAILED BY SIZ E U NIT 2

SIZE 14 TESTED FAILED POST ON NEW CRITERIA 1979 50 33 22 1981 1

0 1983 19 11 70 44 22 SIZE 21 1979 31 18 12 1981 3

0

'l983 5

0 39 18 12 SIZE 31 1979 7

0 1981 0

0 1983 3

1 10 1

SIZE 4 197-30 12 11 1981 4

0 1983 5

1 39 13 11

SNUBBER REPORT TABLE 2 PAGE 2-4 SIZE 5 TESTED FAILED POST ON NEW CRITERIA 1979 9

2 2

L 1981 2

0 1983 2

0 13 2

2 SIZE 6 1983 2

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SNUEBER REPORT TABLE 3

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_ TABLE 3

PAGE 3-1 TOTAL NUMBER BLEED FAILURES BY RANGE

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TENSION YEAR 0.-0.99 1-1.79 1.80-2.0 10.01-20.0

>20 UNIT 1 1978 8

5 3

1 1979 3

1980 1983 4

2 TOTAL 12 8

3 1

2 UNIT 2 1979 13 10 3

1 1981 1983 2

2 TOTAL 15 10 3

1 2

TOTAL BOTH UNITS 27 18 6

2 4

TOTAL BLEED TENSION 57 NEW CRITERIA 26

SNUBBER REPORT i

TABLE 3 TABLE 3

PAGE 3-2 TOTAL N U M Is E R. BLEED F AIL U R ES BY RANGE

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COMPRESSION YEAR 0.-0.99 -

1-1.79 1.80-2.00 10.01-20.00

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1979 6

4 1

1980 1983 3

1 1

TOTAL 11 5

1 1

UNIT 2 1979 8

14 6

1 1981 1-1983 3

TOTAL 11 14 6

1 1

TOTAL BOTH UNITS 22 19 7

1 1

TOTAL BLEED COMPRESSION - SC NEW CRITERIA-27

SNUBBER REPORT 5

TACLE 4 TABLE 4

PAGE 4-1 TOTAL NUMBER LOCKUP F AIL U R ES BY R'ANGE TENSION YEAR 0.99 1-1.99 2-2.93 3-3.99_

4-4.99 5-5.99 -

20.1-30.0

>30

'UNTT 1 1978 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

1 1979 1

0 0

2 0

3 0

0 1980 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

1983 1

0 0

1 0

0 0

2 TOTAL 2

0 0

3 0

3 0

3 UNrr 2 1979 1

1 3

3 6

13 0

0 1981 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 1983 0

0 0

2 0

0 0

0 TOTAL 1

1 3

5 6

13 0

0 TOTAL BOTII UNr13 3

1 3

8 6

16 0

3 LOCKUP TENSION TOTAL - 40 NCW CRITERIA - 15

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PAGE 4-2 TOTAL NUMBER LOCKUP FAILURES' BY RANGE COMPRESSION YEAR S.99 1-1.99 2-2.99 3-3.99 4-4.99 5-5.59 20.1-30.0

>30 l UNIT 1 1978 0~

0 0

0 1

1 0

0 i

1979 1

0 0

2 7

1 0

1 1980 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

1983 0

0 0

1 0

0 0

0 TOTAL 1

0 0

3 8

2 0

2 1

' UNfr 2 1979 2

2 2

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8 0

0 1981 0

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1 3

3 0

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7 9

10 0

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LOCKUP COMPRESSION TOTAL - 33 NEW CRITERIA - 18 i

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