ML20084A136

Expresses Concern Re 711104 Fire at Facility & Nuclear Power in General

ML20084A136
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	11/04/1971
From:	AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
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ML20084A137	List: ML20084A136
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NUDOCS 8304050107
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{{#Wiki_filter:. -= i ? s - s. ACHILLES' HEEL A. bout those Indian Foint Guerrillas... DAILY NEWS: "A multinillion-dollar fire that wrecked an auxiliary building at Consolidated Edison's nuclear generating complex on the Hudson River south of Feekskill Nov. 4 was determined yesterday to have been deliberately set... it was learned that a' prime suspec t ' has been id entified and an arres t is expected shor.tly. " They're bluffine. They don't have the slightest idea which guerrilLE did this! On yovember 4, 1971 a fire caused approximately $10 million of damage ~ to electrical equipment in connection with the construction of Consoli-dated Edison Company's new nuclear power plant No. 2 at Buchanan, N.Y. The cause of the fire was described as " suspicious" and "possible ar-son" by police and insurance officials. In the meantime, two conser-vation 6roups had petitioned the AEC to stop construction of nuclear plant.No. 3 contending that the Indian Point area cannot take the im-pset' of. three nuclear plants and two additional nuclear plants plannc2 .for the future. The arrogant criminals of the AEC and Consolidated Edi-son conspired to go ahead with construction although a full environment- ~ ' al review of the facility had not been completed. Such legal machinat-ions by lawyers representing environmental groups are naive and utterly ineffective. If the American people wish to save themselves and their children from murder planned by the AEC and the utility companies, in-cluding designers and constructors of nuclear. power plants, it will re-quire more positive methods such as sabotage or arson. Here is why. m Albert Speer, Hitler's Minister of Armaments, in a recent Playbov inter-view stated, "There is, unfortunately, no necessary correlation between in celligence and decency; the genius and the moron are equally suscep-tible to corruption." Capitalist America produces more than 50F, of the world 's goods and is literally trampling upon the Earth, polluting the air, water and earth with wastes from its industries. There may be on. ~S ly 30 years left to control " normal poll.ution,"but the pollution is re-versible and can be stopped, although we stand at a poin'c where the very s'urvival of man is being threatened. '/. However, there is one form of pollution that is not reve-sible or con-trollable and is the ultimate catastrophe awaiting life and the environ-ment. on this planet. And that is " radiation pollution!" Acide from a nudlear war, which would completely destroy.all life, the next most dangerous " radiation pollution" is that radioactivity resu.iag from the industrial use of atomic _ energy ~for electric power generators. These a atomic pc 'er reactors are so dangerous that insurance' companies will not cover them; Congress pays $500 -million of insurance on each plant in case of a nuclear accident. The dangers from the so-called peaceful uses of atomic energy stem from three sourcest.the possibility of 8304050107 711104 PDR ADOCK 05000247 P PDR .F Ch'.h Y 3.c...[;; % f a n.; M k. W.'

. i. s-a nuclear accident, the disposal of nuclear wastes and the dispersal. of radioactive gaseous wastes to the air at the site or discharge into' water including thermal pollution of nearby lakes and rivers. Government Frankenstein scientis't's-engineers of the Atomic Energy Com-mis i.on, inninding the criminal.s of tha Congrensional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, have been stifling any criticism of the atomic energy program and have purposely lied in order to underestimate the risks ^ from nuclear radiation. The AEC had arbitrarily set a radiation toler-ance of 0.17 Rads (Radiation Absorbed Dose) per. year as a permissible radiation dosage for human beings. John Gofman, a professor of medi-U cal physics at Berkeley and 'a research associate of the AEC's Lawrence - Radiaticn Laboratory, disagreed with this arbitray determination and stated, "The statement that there's some number that's safe is an ab-solute, unmitigated lie." Scientists such as Ernest J. Sternglass, professor of radiation physics, have contended that nuclear reactors at Indian Point and at Brookhaven National Laboratory have increased _, infant mortality in the surrounding areas. Accidents with serious re' lease cf radioactive material into the en-vironment have occurred in England and America. In 1969 the reactor core of the'Enrico Fermi breeder-test p'lant near Detroit melted down when a cool' ant line became clogged. On May ll, 1969 a' plant located in Rocky Flats near Denver, Colorado had a fir'e that burned $20 mil- .. ion worth of plutonium. This AEC plant fabricated plutonium into nuc-lear _ triggers for hydrogen bombs. -There is a long history of explos- . ions ~, fires and plutonium spills _ occurring at'this plant with many workers overexposed to plutonium._AEC-sanctioned nuclear e'nterprises have contaminated the Colorado River, Lake Mead, Gre'at'~ Sal.t Lake and _the Columbia River. It was the AEC criminals who permitted the removal .,of more than 300,000 tone'of. uranium mill tailings to be-used as con-struction fill in towns like; Grand Junc~ tion, Colorado. With a history of criminal negligence going back to the 1940's, can we accept the wod of the.AEC c,oncerning the safety of nuclear reactors when such reactom -have shut down due to'balfunctions"in. Michigan, New Jersey,New York and. Minnesota? Consider the subject of the burial of radioactive" wastes from nuclear l . reactors in special AEC storage caves,or in barrels dumped far out to sea. At the proposed atomic waste disposal' dump near Lyons, Kansa; of an abandoned salt mine, geologists found that water could seep into the atomle burial areas. Geologists centend that such areas must be sater free; if not, the salt may dissolve and allow' radioactivity from the _ nuclear waste to move to the surface. Some subterranean emissions may continue for hundreds of thousands of years.In the town of Lewiston, near Niagara Falls, federal radiation experts found radioactive " hot spots" in a field where contaminated radioactive equipment (tank drums, pipes, etc.) were stored. The level of radioactivity showed somo,1cv-els of 5 millirads an hour whereas the AEC considers 1 nillirad an hour the maximum permissible level. The magazine Ecologist has pointed out that of 183 atomic waste storage tanks in the states of Washington, South. Carolina and Idaho, nine have failed'so far! These fa.ilures oc- ->f"less than 20 years and s"inal Ior thousands of years.yet the co'ntents of the tanks are utterly o J.

..,mm b. D O The loss of the nuclear submarine. Thresher in 1963 contributed to the. The oceans are being polluted. radioactive pollution of the oceans. through leaks and discharges from atomic ships and power plants. Embryo . fishes with deformed backbones have been found in the Irish Sea due to theradioactive pollution caus'ed by the Windscale nuclear power station A Dr. Jcrcld M. Lowenstein of the Universi-ty of on the British coast. - California Medical Center at San Franc.isco stated, "Every living thing on and under the sea is being ppisoned with radioactive wastes." Con-tainers of high-level radioactive wastes mixed with concrete are being - dumped into international waters whose hazards are yet to be reckoned with by future generations. Lord Ritchie-Calder',' president of the Con-servation Society of England in an interview on Nov. 23, 1968 stated, ~ "When scientists and decision-mak'ers (read capitalists and AEC) act ' o.ut of ignorance and pretend it. is knoivledge, then they are putting the -2whole world.in hazard." There are 22 conventional nuclear-powered plants now in operation in These reactor. plants are,of the-boiling-water type where the the U.S. -heat of a reactor is used to convert water into steam, which then drives ~ turbine' generators to produce electricity. A new. type breeder ~ -reactor is being developed that also uses fission to make both st am In these breeder and more fissionable material such as plutonium 239 liquid sodium.would be used to carry the heat from the reactor

plants, to the plant's turbo-generators. However, extreme caution must be used to keep the sodium fr6m coming in contact with air or water, as it

. bursts violently into flame on contact.Another danger is that breeder plants tend to clog and cause melting of the core, as happened in the But the AEC decision makers are very optimistic ~ Enrico Fermi plant. that these reactors can be designed and built.to keep these catastro-phbs from happening. Boiling-water reactors'. depend on emergency coolart Recent tests waters to reach.the reactor core to prevent a melt down. -conducted in a mock-up reactor last November.ar,d December (1970) at . ~ Idaho Testing Site showed that in six straight tests, where..the planth ~ . primary'cobling loop was ruptured, the emergency coolant waters failed to.get through~to the reactor because of steam accumulations. Ralph E. Lapp, a nuclear' physicist, stated that futurg nuclear power l plants should be designed and constructed ~to insure that the coolant reaches the reactor core within' ten seconds'. Any longef', he contends., might me.an a violent chemical explosion that could spread radioactive mater-If'lthis'is.true of the boiling-water type r'eactor, ials for miles. imagine the extrems' danger that would result from liquid metal fast like water, can be used under any breeder reactors where no coolant, c.ircumstances.. Why has the AEC' spent more than $600 million on'the development of The reas'o'ns' are that by the end liquid metal fast breeder reactors?of the century the world's available supply of uraniu The fast breede'r reactor, which converts uranium 238 to plutonium 239, is expected to produce enough plutonium 239 not only.t'o replen.ish it-self but also produce eno' ugh for another reactor (boiling-water type) over a period of 20 years. In the U.S. the total electric. utility installed capacity as of Dec. 31,.1970 amounted to 335 million kilowatts. Of this total, 7 5 millim i" ~ % milliod kilowatts kilowatts.are operable nuclear plant capacity.. . l. ' g ={ ' ~ l I. ~' M t'

e ' * }{ O O l: '.E -4 Es representing 53 nuclear plants are presently being constructed. 35'mii ? e lion kilowatts representing 36 nuclear plants are planned (reactors or- [ dered). ms us Between 1970 and 1990 the utilitice are expceted to increacc their ca- [_ pacity from 335 million kilowatts to 1.1 billion kilowatts. In 1969 p the AEC estimated that this additional capacity will require at least L 255 new sites of 500,000 kilowatt plant capacity, of which 164 are ex- [ pected-to be nuclear plants. In the Northeast alone, about 100 nuclear { plants will have to be 'Juilt where fewer than ten are now operating. If these plans are carried out, every major body of water in the North-east will be rimmed with nuclear plants.The total estimated cost for 01 g new utility construction is somewhere between $300 million and $350 mn-lion. l [ j 2 Government investment in fission research for 1971 amounted to $103 E million whereas its investment in fusion research amounted to S28 mil-lon, which had to be reduced by $400,000 from the previous year. By = this determination the government had indicated its preference for " rad- [ iation pollution" in attempting to get a demonstra, tion breeder system by 1980 rather than invest in obtaining a positively " clean" reactor i which is only possible under the fusion process. E There are at least ten fusion reactions being considered for reactois. 2 i In one of the fusion rcactions, light atoms such as deuterium and tiit-ion, which are forms of hydrogen, are fused or combined to form heavier atoms such as helium and a single neutron which is ejected at 14.1 mil-lion electric volts. To gain energy from this process, the neutron penetrates and heats a lithiub blanket around the reacbr which is then circulated through a heat exchanger to produce steam for power generat-ion. Unlike the fission process whien is " dirty" and manufactures a var-iety of " radioactive" by-products dangerous to man, fusion is a " clean" precess and produces.no " radioactive" material at all. Fission involves 1 the splitting of atoms and is so incredibly complex that it requires nonstop monitoring by automatic instruments and nonstc? monitoring of e the instruments by men. At the end of the fission reaction the spent fuel is so dangerous that it must be stored in underground tanks for hundreds of years. Despite this, truckloads o# this waste are driven through towns. In fusion processes there is no danger whatsoever of a " runaway" or "ac-cident" as is possible in a fission plant where the core can melt and 7 release radioactive fumes. Fusion, on the other hand, is so dependent 9 on a difficult to achieve combination of factors that any accident would 9 shut down such a plant, not turn it loose in a rampage. There is another gain or asset fror fus.ca reactors in that they may " burn up" some of the radioactive wastes from fission reactors, and also there would be reduced thermal pollution because of improved efficiencies from use of high temperatures and direct conversion to electricity. There has been significant progresc made in controlled fusion research within the last few years in both the Soviet Union and the U.S. The best estimates are that a fusion demonstration reactor could be con-structed by 1985, sooner wit % a crash program, and with significant com-mercial impact by the year 2000. If the difference in achieving a breed-or reactor b 1980 and or a fusion reae qf y. ~. 4.q..y > f... e j w - %.4-j y(,,.f zr. z r, v c.. y ,g 7 3;,- . y 3 y. l 7.; f; -M,. 6 :l fM @W, ;s, g1 -V 8?.~. ... y,, r

~ 6 0 L years, then the emphasis placed by governnent and industry on the " rad- 'lation pollution" breeder plant is nothing less than murder. 1 Until such time as fusion reactors are developed on a commercial scale, all fission plant recearch, develcpment and construction must be stqped, and all existing fission plants must be dismantled or destreyed or sab-ctaged as occurred recently at the Indian Point plant.The murder must be stopped by any means since the arrogant merons and " genius"-hoodlum d scientist-enigineers vill not listen to any lcgical, scientific stud-ies or pleas showing that their activities are detrimental to mankind. Research cempanies such as General Electric, Ucs tinghous e, Babcock and Wilecx and Bechtel Corporatien must cease work on fission research or thev will be held acceuntable for their crimes. The scientist-engineers employed on such projects should seek other employment er transfer to ncn-nuclear research. Anarchistic science (!) coupled with anarchistic capitalisn(! ) will not be tolerated. The development of non-nuclear conventienal plants such as hydroelect-ric er steam plants using low sulphur content ceal will be permitted to be constructed. However, the control of pollution at these plants must be so rigid as to prevent arregant bastards from violating strong anti-pollution laws. Federal, state or local boards responsible for cleaning up the country's air and water pollution must not be permitted to con-tinue to cover up for the criminals. They, in fact, are the representa-tives of the corporations who have been destroying the environment. These corporations have planted their stooges on 35 state boards and have, in fact, increased pollution. Air pollution has increased within the last four years from 142 million tons of contaminants to well over 200 nillion tons. As the president of the Monsanto Enviro-Chems Systems recently stated, "We are all living in a fool's paradise if we think that industry will do anything until it is forced to." The time has ecme to force them. The effective guerrilla attack en Con Ed's Indian Point Nuclear Plant No. 2 indicates that some people agree with this. It also indicates that they knew the right time and place. (Pass this on.) Issued by Project: Achilles' Heel

I Willi;m J. C1 hill, Jr. O 3. %c2 Ptcsusent Consolidated Edison Cornpany of New York. Inc. 4 Irving Place, New York. N Y 10003 Telephone (212) 460-3819 ~. Re: Indian Point Station Unit No. 2 chet 50-247 % 5%.No. b;N g ll 0 ) Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director

• 4 Division of Reactor Licensing 1 01972 > C U.S. Atomic Energy Commission O'

Mg(HgTtI } Washington, D.C. 20545 nouxy Bli MM Dear Dr. Morris In our report of Decenber 6, 1971 we described the electrical splices to be used in the repair of cables affected by the fire of November 4, 1971. In Section C of that report we stated that the outside of each splice would be covered by a fire resistant heat shrinkable tube to provide fire protection equivalent to the cable outer jacket. We also stated that completed sample joints would be subjected to the same fire tests as the original cable. When these tests were made it was found that the fire resistance of the splice could be significantly improved by placing another fiberglass sleeve over the fire resistant heat shrinkable tubing. The reason for this is that in some cases when subject to very intense flame the original heat resistant tubing, although it did not burn, did tear after a short time and expose the splice materials beneath it to the flame. We have conducted extensive fire tests in accordance with our original report on the modified splice and conclude that the fire resistance of the splice in all cases is superior to the original design and indeed is superior to the unspliced cable with its Asbestos braid jacked uninterrupted. For this reason we plan to modify j[ the splicing and terminating instructions in our December 6, 1971 report by adding the following general note. 16. Ib All splices will be covered with Hygrade Thermoflex Flexible Fiberglass sleeving. This sleeving will overlap the cable asbestos 16 jacket by at least two inches and be tied at each end with fiberglass cord. Su / %, CGl/ ll'n v ' O. N uqw 1 we9%% d %./ %~ m._ s.-~h+a ~, n i

Dr. Morris 2-4 The addition of the fiberglass sleeving will not reduce the thermal rating of the cables nor will it produce congestion in the splice boxes because in spite of its excellent fire resistant characteristics it is very thin and does not significantly affect the diameter of the splice. The fiber-glass sleeving conforms to NEMA standard VSI-1962 and is closely woven to provide maximum abrasion resistance and high flexibility. Very truly yours t '}/ ,/ (' / './' h d (n.llll -t'lll/'As ~ e G 100 J

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c- ,.~ William E. Ctidwell, Jr. A-Vice Peasidect [ L,,ij; [. i q uf. m m w,.

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%7 Consobdated Edison Company of New York, Inc. x \\/ 4 Irving Place New York, N Y 10003 y Telephone (212) 460-5181 Q i December 6, 1971 Re Indian Point Station Unit No. 2 Docket No. $0-247 Dr. Peter A. I! orris, Director Division of Reactor Licensing U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D.C. 20545 Dear Dr. Morris We submit for your review the enclosed Indian Point Unit No. 2 report entitled, " Restoration Plan for Primary Auxiliary Building and Equipment" which details the program being conducted by the Consolidated Edison Conpany to repair the damage sustained by the facility as a result of the November 4,1971 fire incident. This report is submitted as a supplement to the various correspondence and com-munciations between the Consolidated Edison Company and the Atomic Energy Commis-sion since November 4, 1971. P AsweadvisedinourletterofNovember23r:1971, it is our intention to restore the primary auxiliary building and its equipment to the conditions which preceded the fire and to meet in all respects the Unit No. 2 Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report. The enclosed report discusses the effects of the fire, the repair program in progress and the associated test progran to assure ourselves that the safety and reliability of the facility will be preserved in accordance with the approved desi n. 6 We are presently revising the Unit No. 2 schedule for suberitical testing taking into consideration the effects of the fire and the repair program setforth in the report. We will review the planned execution of these testa with the Divisions of Reactor Licensing and Compliance prior to their commencement. Con 311 son now estimates that it will take about three (3) sonths to complete repairs of the November 4,1971 fire damage in the Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB). 'Jork is scheduled for completion by March 1,1972 with criticality scheduled for April 1, 1972. Our Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee has maintained a continuing review of the activities that are being conducted at the Unit No. 2 facility with regard to the repair operations to assure itself as to the adequacy of the efforts undertaken. ' Die Committee has concurred with the restoration program described herein.- enc. Very truly yours f/ k l1 g a JIl n j\\ b Af\\L i I 72 5. g COPY SENT REGION

c-M 3 INDIAN POINT STATION UNIT NO. 2 9 RESTORATION PLAN FOR PRIMARY AUXILIARY BUILDING S EQUIPMENT s DECEMBER 6, 1971 Consolidated Edison Company, Inc. 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003-l N d ? [hb 200 t

0 0 \\ TABLE OF CONTE!!TS Section A Summary and General Description Section B Tire Effects Section C Repair of Electrical' Damage Section D Structitral' and tiechanical Effects and Investigation-of Potential Chemical Effects 1 l I' l l = .n, .r., ,-r,.e-r---., +e-g,

b O SECTION A Indian Point Unit No. 2 Fire Suanary and General I:ecerintion Previous correspondence with the Atomic Ehergy Connission described (1) the cir-cunstances leadins up to, and resulting from the occurrence as well as on evalua-tion of the safety inplications of the November 4,1971 fire in the Indian Point Unit No. 2 Prinary Auxiliary Building (PA3) and (2) the intention of the Consoli-dated Fdison Company to restore the PA3 and its equipment to the condition which preceded the fire and to coet in all respects, the Indian Point Unit No. 2 Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report. Also, at prior neetinr;c with the Connission, the restoration program, an detailed in this report, was discussed and reviewed. It is highly inprobable that an incident of the nature of the November 4, 1971 fire can occur during operation since fire hazards such as the wooden shed in which the fire occurred have been renoved. Flannable maintenance sheds will not be permitted in buildings having plant functions. Corpartments that are required in these buildings for storage of tools, spare parts or other naintenance items will be nado from steel plate, expanded actal lathe or other non-flammable material. Also, flanrable naterials will be stored in specially designated areas of the plant and a nininun inventory will be maintained. For example, a nininun quantity of hydrasine for use in Indian Point Unit No.1 and Unit No. 2 will be stored in the conventional plant area of Unit No. 1 at a location where a fire would not involve the nuclear plant equipnent of either unit. Frequent inspections by operating personnel, as well as audits by the Company's Safety Services Bureau and the Nuclear Facilities Safety Connittee, will assure compliance with this requirement. 'Ihus, we have taken steps to prevent a recurrence of a similar fire during opera-tion. In addition, the plent is designed for a safe shutdown in the event of a fire or similar incident. 'Ihn November 4,1971 incident showed that the electrical cable is flame resistance and does not propat; ate fire. We have reviewed the cir-cunstances during and after the fire and are convinced that the plant would shut down safely from po:ter if the fire cecurred durin.g operation. We have reviewed the *appropriateMess of' ' raking ' design changes 'td.attak,n greater 3 separation df electrical equipment and have concluded that such changes would re-quire virtual redesign of the plant's control and electrical systems, involving l impracticable rearrangements of equipment and structures while not contributin6 significantly to the safety of the plant. The Control Rod Scran System is designed to assure ability to scram even under contingencies such as a fire, and the inherent ruggedness of the basic plant desi n provides core cooling after scram by natural 6 circulation and permits manual execution of the simple steps needed for safe shut-down. Alternate means for injecting feedwater and borated makeup water, even if normal modes are out of service, assure long-term safe shutdown under abnormal contingencies. \\ .1 j s, ~ "

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U K sunmary and general description of the proceedin6 report sections follows: Section B - Fire Effects his section lists the equipment affected by the fire in the PAB. Se lists were complied as a result of a comprehensive program to ascertain those components that could have been dana 6cd by the fire. Visual inspections, calibrations checks, megger tests, local functional tests, etc., were utilized in l determining which components were effected. Sections C and D l of this report also discuss supplementary methods employed to } determine the fire effects sustained by the plant's structures and components. l Section 0 - R<mair of Electrical Danare his section discusses the repair procedure to be used for the electrical cabics and equipment canaged by the fire. Included are the splicing specifications, tools to be used, i test procedures and the proof test to be employed. Alternate repair methods are also discussed. Section D - Structural and l'echanical Effects and Investiration__of Potential Chenical Effects his section discusses the non-destructive investigative progran implemented to ascertain those structural and mechanical components affected by the fire environment and the associated repair program. Although the plans for non-destructive and laboratory testing have been developed, tests results have largely not been received to date. S e program to determine whether there were chemical effects to otherwise unaffected components is also discussed in this section. As the final step in the restoration progran we will perforn an operational retest] l on every system or conponent that was subjected to the fire environment. I his retest program will serve as a final chcek on the inspection and repair programs f I carried out to restore the plant to its completed state in full accordance.with. the original design criteria and the' rules a,nd:r0 ulations'of the"Conhission. 6 g p. r, ..w. ~'n n r. n. w -. ~ - ~

O t-V ~ ~ SECTION B Indian Point Unit No. 2 Fire Fire Effects The following local control panels on El. 80' and 98' apoear to have suffered only smoke and water exposure and are usable. These are to be checked out and cleaned as.necessary to be put in good condition: A. Charging Pump Local Controls B. Heat Tracing Distribution Panels C. Heat Tracing Annunciator Panels D.' Gas Strioner Panel E. Uaste Evaporator Panels F. Gas Analyzer Panels G. Waste Evaporator Main Control Board H. Drummine Reon Panel The following items have been identified as being effected to the extent they must be renovated or replaced. A. MCC 26A B. MCC 26B C. MCC-27 D. Lightine Distribution Panel 22 E. Lighting Distribution Panel 211 F. Lighting Distribution Panel 213 G. 480 Volt LightinF Distribution Panel 23 H. Boric Acid Tank Heaters (4) I. Lighting Switchgear and Transformers J. All Electrical Cable on EL. 80' - Reference Drawing 9321-F-30GO Retween Grid Marks 4 and 8 K. All Cable Tray and Conduit Associated With the Cable in Item J, in Area of Item J L. All LinhtinF Fixtures in the Area of Item J-M. 600 Volt Transfer Switch Inspections have been made of the instrumentation in the PAB with the following results: A. Instruments which require repairs or replacement: PI-1303 FC-106A PI-1304 FC-106B PI-1305 TIC-107 PI-1306 PI-138 FI-664 PT-139 LT-102. TI-667 LT-106 FI-666 PI-136 FCV-111A FC-102A FT-173A FC-102B TI-665 FI668 o Y_l L.

73 Dg G BA Evaporators - Tank Level 21 and 22 Gas analyzer Package Items AS-1067A and AT-1067B Limit Switches, Valves 876A and 876B B. Instruments which require further evaluation to determine renair recuirements: ~ TIC-103 LG-1078 TIC-107 LT-1078 LC-101 PT-1077 TIC-100 PI-600 CI-ll36 PC-600 FI-647 PC-1175S CE-1136 FIT-lll LT-931 FI-110 LT-932 PI-108 FT-930 PI-109 RE-18 FM-110 TI-665 LT-628 LT-S28A C. Instruments with accumulation of soot which will be cleaned and checked: LT-1012 LT-112 LT-1013 LT-112D PT-1025 PT-139 PC-1035 TT-164 PC-1028 LT-165 LT-1030 FT-134 LT-1032 PT-135 l FT-173A TIC-149 The following pumos on EL. 15' were submerged and must be replaced: A. Sume Tank Pump - Serial #769-A-524-1 l* (Gould' Mode'l 31961 B. Sump Tank Pump - Serial #769-A-524-2 (Gould !!odel - 3196) The following relief valves must be replaced: A. Isolation Valve Seal Water Tank B. Component Cooline Water Surga Tank C. Penetration S Weld Channel Press. System - Air Receiver Relief Valves The following motors must have end cover removed, motor inspected and meggered. A. Boric Acid Transfer Puen Motors (2) B. Containment Spray Pump !fotors (3) C. Charging Pump Motors #21, 22, 23 (3) D. Waste Evaporator Package #21 (1) e,

i p /~V, V E. Primary Water Pump Motors (2) F. Monitor Tank Pump Motors (3) G. Makeup Water Pump Motor (1) H. Refueling Water Pump Motor (1) Valve repairs are to be made as follows: A. Replace air operators, positioner and limit switches on valves: FCV-111A FCV-110A HCV-104 HCV-105 i B. Disassemble, inspect and replace dianhragms on diaphragm valves (Grinnel and Kerctest) at Boric Acid Mixing Station, EL. 98'. C. Remove limit switch compartment, check limit switches, reassemble operator so that the motor is horizontal and limit switch compartment is up: MOV-H333 D. Remove manual operator, clean, inspect, repack and replace: Manual valve 766A E. Replace following valves in Component Cooling Hx Line A-4 l A-5 F. Remove limit switch cover, inspect limit suitches per drawings. Clean limit switches and replace as required: MOV-866A _ .!!OV-86'6B ~ [ G. Inspect and repair as necessary - LCV 112A, LCV 112C, TCV 149 Heating and Ventilating A. Air Handling Unit Repair as' necessary. t [ B. Duct Work - Replace all damaged sections. C. Steam and Condensate Piping - Needs thorough visual inspection.. Repair insulation as necessary. 7-Boric Acid Piping - Con. Edison has flushed and confirmed clear piping. t PA System,Tighting Fixtures - Inspect and replace effected components as necessary. hl o

,7 - - x) c SECTION C INDIAN POINT #2 FIRE REPAIR OF ELECTRICAL DAMAGE In order to repair the fire damage at Indian Point and return the plant to operation two basic criteria have been established. 1. The plant will be returned to a condition equivalent to that which would have existed had there been no fire. 2. Repair operations will be conducted'in such a manner. that the reliability'and safety of the plant will not be reduced because of the repairs. Based on these two principles,it has been decided that the repair procedure-should disturb only that wiring and equipment that was damaged or could have been damaged in the' fire. New cable will be spliced into the undamaged, sections of. cable to replace that which was damaged' in the fire.- The use of splices is based on the fact that a properly designed ~and installed joint' is. equivalent to the unspliced cable in both electrical conductivity ..i.., 4.. 4 and insulation. To demonstrate that the splices do not degrade electrical conductivity, sample joints of each type will be made-with the a actual tools to be used,and tested for electrical conductivity. IThe resistance of the connector must be equal to or 'less than 4. bt <p' that of an equal length of unspliced conductor. During the repair r

{'s \\ SECTION C _ work, sample splices will be removed and tested. After the repair is completed, another set of sample joints will be prepared and tested to assure that the tools and splicing technique have been maintained throughout the repair without changes that could affect the quality of the connection. To demonstrate that the joint insulation is properly _ applied, each cable will be tested at 2500 volts DC conductor to conductor and conductor to ground. This will prove that the cable and splice is electrically equivalent to new unspliced cable, Additional tests will be performed to demonstrate that the splices will remain watertight and pullout tests will be performed on sample splices to prove that the tools and technique used produce joints of adequate mechanical strength. These tests are described in the attached test procedure. An alternate course of action could be to replace all cable ... linvolved terminal. to - termiTial. This.procedurelwobid reduir'e'unf. S" "

• I g

loading many trays outside the fire area where the damaged cables are intermixed with undamaged cables and installing new cables to ~ replace those damaged. This would result in handling many cables that have in no way been affected by the fire and would increase the chance of damage to these cables. Because of space limitation it is not possible to leave the damaged cables in place and run new cables from terminal to terminal to replace them. To completely remove and replace all the cables throughout their-entire length - would take a minimum of. ten months.

( (. s) SECTION C Since the new cables would have to be terminated with compression connectors similar to those used in the splice, the same number of compression connections would have to be made. Instead of being made in one area, however, where no other connecti'n or equipment o could be affected, the terminations would have to be made in cabinets and cubicles throughout the plant with the consequent danger of affecting other circuits and the much more difficult job of quality control. Making all the new splices in one area will facilitate the implementation of an effective quality control program because inspectors can be assigned and splicing condition controlled better. Rather than making a large number of different type terminations. in widely separated locations and under varying conditions the splicing program permits most of the repairs to be carried out at one location under carefully controlled conditions using similar oper.atio,ns for.all,sg ices..,,This careful contr,ol Jogether,.with the,, testing program outlined above,will provide the ultimate assurance that the repaired facilities will be-equal or1 superior to the.- original installation. Another variation would be to provide terminal blocks rather than insulated splices to replace the damaged cable. Since many of the circuits. involved opefate at 480V, it has been concluded

o c n ~~ SECTION C that the use of open terminals would be less reliable than insulated splices. The problem of producing an absolutely watertight terminal box and the danger of failures spreading from one open terminal to another if failures developed at 480 volts have been the principal objections to the use of terminals rather than insulated splices. The addition of mechanical connections necessary with terminal blocks,and the possible, though improbable chance that they could introduce problems of electrical conductivity have also led to the conclusion that simple compression type splices would be superior. The separation of channels has of course been maintained in the repair and as an added measure of p' otection, metal boxes will r be provided around the splices. Again this provides protection superior to that in the original design and assures that the plant F .saf,ety, wil.1,in, no way,be. degraded.by,.the., repairs., cStudigs, arp. ,,.,,.3,..., being made to assure that no thermal problem will occur in the DOxes. f The attached specifications show the details of'the splices to be used. The tools and inspection procedures have been selected to insure that all splices will conform with the design specifications. The test program has been designed'so-that there1 1

0-o o f' SECTION C t i V is complete assurance that all damaged' cable has been replaced. r In all cases the conductors will be joined using compression connectors. The small connectors will be applied with ratchet type hand tools that assure complete compression before the tool i can be released. The larger connections will be made with power operated tools and will utilize dies. designed so that a number will be imprinted on the connector only if the proper compression has been applied. All insulation to be used will be heat shrinkable tubing. The primary insulation for individual conductors will be applied j first, than a separate heat shridkable tube to replace the cable jacket and finally a fire resistant heat shrinkable tube to f provide fire protection equivalent to the cable outer jacket. i Completed sample joints will be subjected to the same fire tests A as the original cable. These tests are described in.the attached specification EO-6068. As a final proof that all cable reused has not been affected in any way by the fire, samples of each type of cable' in each tray will be taken at the splice location and subjected to extensive electrical and mechanical tests by both' Con' Edison and the cable manufacturer. Any cable that shows degradation from new-condition will be completely replaced. The test procedure to be )- used is attached. I ). tu - a - -.. . me er:mca;m wm, u,mx --w_. m

]. SECTION C The detailed design of the splice boxes is now being completed. We will provide the following details as soon'as they are available: 1. Mechanical details showing cable entry into the ~ boxes. 2. Details of mechanical support of the cables within the boxes. 3. Details of the physical arrangements of cables and splices within the boxes. 4' - ~- ++w m

~T /"\\ (V V n TESTING PROCEDURE FOR SPLICES Samples of each splice shall be made up without insulation and tested for resistance of connection. Connectors shall be pressed in accordance with Splicing and Terminating Instructions. Joint resistance shall be measured by a Wheatstone Bridge and must be equivalent to, or less than, the conductor resistance. Refer to Table III for maximum resistance values for the various conductor sizes involved. A pullout test shall be made on the compressed connectors according to EEI-NEMA Standard TDJ-162 for full tension connectors. Samples of a' completely insulated joint shall be-made up with approximately two and one-half feet of cable extending on either side of the joint. This assembly shall be. suspended .. vertically and clamped so. that no horizontal movement-at the ends is pcssible. The center of the joint shall be flexed three inches to either side of. center for 5,000 cycles at a, rate of 80 cycles per minute. After flexing, the joint shall I be laid horizontally in a tank'and covered with six inches of. one-percent NACL salt water for 8 days. The insulation t 4

q .m Q-Asg. ] q 2-resistance from the base surface of the conductor.to ground when tested using a 1000 volt D.C. meggar shall.be 200+ megohms. Water penetration into the joint shall be determined by dissection and shall not exceed 1/8-inch from the end. Samples of a completely insulated joint shall be made up with approximately two' feet of cable extending on either I h-side of the joint. These samples shall:be submitted to a i bon-fire test as described in Cons'ol'idated Edsion Specifi-cation EO-6068. Samples of a completely insulated joint shall be made with approximately ten feet of cable' extending on either 4 - side of the joint. A test voltage shall be applied to th'e-I sample at an increasing rate of 100 volts per'second until breakdown occurs. .u....- ....s o 2.... j e e 's t V i p + f } y.= s =

i ) ] ' l 1 t' TABLE III RESISTANCE VALUES OF CRIMPED OR INDENTED CONNECTORS Micro-Ohm Cable Size Connector Conductor ( AWG or MCM) Length

• Resistance

1. 12 13/16" 110.0
2. 10 13/16" 69.2
3. 8 1-3/8" 73.5
4. 6 2-5/8" 87.2
5. 4 2-5/8" 55.4-
6. 2 2-7/8" 38.3
7. 2/0 3-3/8" 22.5
8. 4/0 3-5/8" 15.'2 350 4-3/8" 11.1

• 0ne-quarter (1/4) inch added to connector length.

g. 1 mi ~ p

3 hsb h y@e.<l u m Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc. id w 4 frving Place, New York, N Y 10003 [%J Purchase and Test Page 1 All Districts EO-6068 8/20/71 Fire and Heat Resistance Tests on 600V Power and Control Cable and S;.itchboard Wires SCOPE 1. This specification covers the fire and heat resistance tests to be performed on 600V power.and control cable and (]) switchboard wires as a requirement for-Company acceptance. s-GENERAL 2. When performing any of the tests outlined in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this specification on a sample of wire or cable, an approved wire or cable shall be. submitted to-the same test (s) at the same time so that a performance level is established for the test sample under the same test conditions. 3. The Transmission and Distribution Engineer will revibw the results of all testing and determine the suitability of ' ({,} the sample construction for use. 4. The following flame tests shall be performed on all 600V power and control cables and switchboard wires, except where l specified:

a. A.S.T.M. Vertical Flame Test As a preliminary test, the A.S.T.M.

vertical flame test, designation D-470-64T, shall be performed only.on 600V con-trol cable and switchboard wires. All cables which'do not meet this test s. hall be considered to have; failed,and,shall ~ not-be. sQbmitted 'to any additional ~ testin'g ?- ~ %.s

b. Con Edison Vertical Flame Test With the cable in a vertical position, a burner-flame with the tip of the inner cone of the flame at. the outer surface -

of the cable covering, is held on the cable forf five. (5) minutes. The time to ignite the cable is noted and after l removing the flame, the time that the cable continued ~to flame and the extent of the' burning-are noted. l The-flame shall be supplied by a Fischer Burner No. 3-902,- l-40mm. diameter head, using natural. gas withLthe tip of-the-inner cone of the flame adjusted for' 1900 degrees F. () l

/ h -() Y ~ Page 2 .O EO-606S 8/20/71 GENERAL (Cont'd) All cables which do not meet this test shall be considered to have failed and are not to be submitted to any additional testing.

c. Con Edison Bon Fire Test This test shall be performed on 600V power and multiconductor t:able.

Several cables to be tested, the number depending on service V.n conditions, shall be three feet in length each. The cables to be tested shall be grouped in a bundle and exposed to an oil flame produced by igniting transformer oil in a 12 inch diameter pail. At the start of each test the oil level is adjusted to 2-3/4 inches below the rim of the pail. The grouped cables shall be placed horizontally over the center of the pail, with the lowest conductor 3 inches above the top of the pail. The flame is applied for five minutes. All cables shall be meggered at 1,000V before and after the test. ~ Throughout the test a voltage shall be applied to the cables as shown in the diagram below: 7 Op,en. l ~~ ' 7 a Circuit Test l l

n l

13 l --d-Io3V Cables ^ l g 5* ilov l n-l' 4 ' L. .._ I' Q The cables shall be grouped in such a way that each cable is' in contact with the others as shown below: !) IE 3. Should there be more than three cables, they shall be grouped as shown below: Q,_.,

p,. () v ~< \\' Page 3 EO-6068 S .8/20/71 __ HEAT TESTS 5. The following heat tests shall be performed on all 600V network power cables which pass the flz.me tests mentioned previously: a. Oven Test A sample of cable approximately one foot in length is placed in an oven and heated at 260 C for four hours. The sample is then examined for damage. There shall be no signs of ( S. blistering, cracking, etc. All cables which do not meet the 'il requirements of this test shall be considered to have failed and are not to be submitted to any additional testing. b. Roasting Test Several cables to'be tested, the number depending on service conditions, each approximately twenty (20) - feet in length are grouped in a bundle and placed in a four inch duct.

Current, as determined by the Transmission and Distribution Engineer, is applied to raise the temperature of the conductor to 260 C

in two hours. Inmediately after this temperature is reached, the cable is removea f rom the duct and the insulation is (C) examined for damage. There shall be no visible signs of blis-tering, cracking, etc. l / \\ 7 s.s / '0& ( j, - l:3v. d x i ./ Frank E. Fischer - Transmissi'an and' Distribution <. Engineer -' i' h ~. Electrical Engineerihg Department' Edward D. Ishaq:mp REVISION 0: FILE Purchase and Test Manual No. 6 i t \\h n n.,. _

.q (3 O v u TESTS REQUIRED' ON SAMPLES OF CABLE TAKEN FROM INDIAN POINT # 2 AFTER FIRE 1. Tests on-Conductor The. conductor shall meet all the requirements of annealed copper wire per ASTM B3. The direct current resistance of solid or Class B. stranded uncoated conductors at 20 C ori25 C shall not exceed by more than 2 percent the values in Tables 2-9 and 2-11 of IPCEA Publication No. S-61-402 (Second Edition - 1968). 2. Tests on Insulation The insulation shall meet the following physical requirements when tested in accordance with IPCEA Publication No. S-61-402 (Second Edition - 1968) paragraphs 6.4.11 and 6.4.12. Tensile strength, minimum 1500 psi Elongation at rupture, minimum 100 % After air oven test at 1210 Ci10 C for 168 hours. Tensile strength, minimum percent of unaged value 70 Elongation at rupture, minimum percentage of unaged value. 65 3. Tests on Jackets (PVC) PVC jackets shall meet the following physical _ requirements when tested in accordance with IPCEA Publication No. S-61-402 (Second Edition - 1968) paragraphs 6.4 and 6.9. Tens,1.le strength, minimum 1500 psi. ~. Elongation at rupture, minimum 100% ~ After air oven test at 100 Ci10 C for 5 days. Tensile strength,1 minimum percentage of unaged value. 85 Elongation at rupture, minimum percentage of unaged value 60-After oil immersion at 700 C i 10 C for 4 hours.

j Tensile strength, minimum percentage of 'naged value 8:0 u

Elongation at rupture,-minimum . percentage of unaged value 60 Heat distortion,-1210 C i 10~C' maximum' i percentage. 50 .A m u

I-g g o f (. : M Heat shock, 121 C-1 C no cracks g Cold bend, 350 C i 10 C no cracks r [ In addition to the above tests each sample shall be checked for eccentricity of the insulation around the conductor. Each sample shall have a representiative section~ submitted tio a h dielectric proof test voltage of 1.5 kV A.C. for 1 minute per-( ASTM D 1389-62. i All samples which pass the dielectric proof test shall be submitted to a dielectric breakdown test. per ASTM D149-64. s f Each sample shall have a representative section submitted to an L insulation resistance test per.-ASTM D-257-66. The-minimum insulation resistance shall be 50 megohms per 1000 feet. [ All results of.the previously described testing are-to b'e certified and submitted to the Transmission and Distribution Engineer.. Each i test sample shall be clearly identified as to the-type and tray P number. i I i i l. ... ~.. w. r ) 1 .i um =

4 SAMFLES TO BE TAKEN-ON INDIAN POINT #2 CABLES Tray-36 c One 2 foot. sample of each of the following:

1) 1/c #1

2) 1/c #10

3) 1/c #8

4) 1/c #2

5) 1/c #2/0

6) 1/c #4

7) 1/c #6 Tray 15c - 14c K1 + KlB

1) 3/c #12

2) 2/c

1. 12

3) 12/c #12

4) 5/c #12

5) 1/c #10 Tray 09H (D level)

1) 3/c #12

2) - 9/c #12

3) 5/c #12 s

4) 1/c #10

5) 7/c #12

6) 12/c #12

7) 2/c #12

8) 1/p #16

._,,gg 3g y. g g.

~ < ^* .e n.

1) 9/c #12

2) 12/c #12

~

3) 1/c #10

~

4) 3/c #12

5) 5/c #12 6)- 7/c #12 Tray 15c K2

1) 5/c #12

2) 12/c #12

3) 7/c #12

4) 1/c #10

'5) 9/c #12-

6) 3/c #12 -

-Q-h , Tray 14c K1b 11 7/c #12

2) 5/c #12

3) 12/c #12

4) 9/c #12

5) 3/c #12-

6) 1/c #10 Tray 14c K2B

1) 7/c #12

2) 9/c #12

3) 3/c #12

4) 12/c #12 i-Tray 13c (F level)

1) 1/c #10

2) 1/c #4

3) 7/c #12

4) 3/c #12 3

5) 9/c #12

6) 1/c 4/0

7) 1/c 2/0

8) -1/c #1

9) 1/c 350 V

10) 1/c #12

11) 5/c #12 Tray 86c (J level)

1) 3/p #22

2) 1/p #16

3) 2/p #16 Tray 06c (C level)

1) 1/c 350-

2) 1/c 750 Tray 34c (D, F, J level)

1) 3/c #12

2) 1/c #12

3) 7/c #12

4) 1/c #8-

5) 1/c #6 6)~2/cL#12

7) 1/p-#16

8) '1/c. # 4 -

1 -~Jul wa .s-. , _ _.;..m 1 -- - - ~ -

0 0 -'3 12" Tray 2JS1 2JS2 2JS3 2001

1) 1/c 750 (2JSl)

2) 1/c 750 (2JS2)

3) 1/c 750 (2JS3)

4) 1/c 750 (2001)

Conduit 20P1

1) 1/c 350 g.

.g. .,.g. , =, e, 4 e i j L

-~~ ~ _,m. -r w % >? e i F e i, * . -Splicine and Terminating Instru_ctions } 3 A. Cencral Notes instruct!ons to the contrary are given. !?here spIIces arc, No srlices shall be made in cables, except where specific

1. unavoidable, they shall not be accomplished without prior notification and approval by UELC.,

using Splicing Instructions given in Table I nay be cccomplished 'without

2. Eplicing at penetration pigtails and Reactor 'leadProcedures other than those given in Table I n.ust be approved before cccomplishraent.

prior notification and approval.

3. Connections to penetrat ion built-in terminal lugs and assemblies shall be treated as tern.dnations.

type tools only.

4. Tool installed, compression type connectors shall be applied with the connector manufacturer's recommended rachet i

terminations shall be made with silicone bronze hardware.

5. Bolted connections at

6. Single and multi-conductor cables, rpted at 1,000 volts or below, shall have all tapes and braids, which are not conductor primary insulation, shields or outermost jackets, stripped back as follows:

Single Conductor Cable (Mylar Tape) a.

1) to the termination po, int of,thic asbestos braid or lead sheath at both splices and terminations.

Individual Conductors of Multi-conducter Cable (Mylar Tape and/or Class 3 raid) b.

1) for a minimum distance of thyee (3) inches beyond the termination of the primary insulation of thu individual conductors at splices.

(1) ir.ch beyond the termination of the primary insulation of the individual conductors. I

2) for a minimum distance of one:

at terminat ions.

ulti-conductor Cat,le (Mylar Tape, Fabric Tape, Asbestos Tape, Zinc Tape, Class Braid and/or "Kerite" braids and ; tapes).

c.

1) to the termination point of hhe outermost sheath (Lead) or jacket (PVC, Silicone Rubber or Asbestcs Braid) at both splices and tendnations.

stripped back, at r.311ce s

7. Unless otherwisc indic.-ted, cables described in Ceneral Note sb sh C i have cach sheath and/or jacket I

and terminations, to a point that will provide c minimum space of one (1) inch between the tertaination of the sheath and/or Inside cabinets, racks, and main control boards, outer jac'<et jacket and the terninat ion of the ncxt inner sheath and/or Jacket. and/or sheath shall be stripped back to the cable entrance. (Leave glars braid intact.) 1,000 volts and below, shall be staggered to minimize the

8. Spilces in individual' t onductors of multi-conductor cables rated atSplices of individual conductors at penetrations shall be staggered a total diameter of the completed splice.

to eliminate any extsro cable. shrinkable tubir.n and expanded molded parts shall be "Thermofit" brand heat shrinkable products, as manufactured by the

9. Heat Raychem Corporation of Henlo Park,Califo,rnia.

Page No. 1

9 Splicies; and lerminEt_ine inst rue t innt (C r n t.,' d) A. Genernt Not es (Cont'd) 9. (cont'd) n. C1.ms "A" heat shrinkahle product shall be Raychem type " sticky" SCL, selectively cross-linked polyvinyl-chloride tubinj with a moltable adhesive inner wall, classifed as Raychem compound RT-862. (For proper wall thickness, use only ranuf acturing numbers M022 and TB0(,). b. Class "B" heat shrink.thle product'shall be Raychem type TCS, irradiated, modified, ultra-violet resistant, polyethylene tubing with interior surfaces coated with Raychem mastic #394-A. c. Class "C" heat shrinkable product shall be Raychem type "Kynar" tubing, as described in Raychem Specification RT-850, d. Class "D1" heat shrinkable product. shall be Raychem type SFR silicone rubber tubing as described in Paychem Specification RI-1140 (see General 1:ote #12). c. Ci m: s "D2." h ea t shristable product; shall be Raychcm polyolcun expanded molded parts as described in naychen Specification M-301 (see General 1:ete #12). i

10. Clcss "Dl" and "D2" heat shrinkable products shall be used in conjunction with a silicone rubber adhesive, which is applied,to the s,oice or termination to produce 4 watertight seal.

Silicone rubber adhesives shall be room tenperature vulcanizing, type RTV, as u mof actured by t he D wral Electric Company of Waterford, New York. a. G.ss "X" adhesi ws r Mll be one-part adhesive /scalant, C.E. Co., type RTV-102, packaged in disposabic tubes. Cl a :;s "y." .csive shall he u: a with. Class'"D1" tubing only. The adhesive shall first be applied to the connector, af ter which the a:tu:.ing shall be slips.ed over and ' entered on the joint. Then apply the adhesive liberally under the ends of the tubing and c t shrink in place. (compound plus curing agent) ' adhesive / sealant, C.E. Co., type RTV-015, packsted in b. Class "Y" adhesive r. hall be a two-part fca7.cn cartridpa*.,si taining pre-weighted, pre-mixed and dcaerated compound. Class "Y" adhesive shall be used with Class "'.'" nolded pa r t : o nl y. The adhesive shall be injected into the boot, formed by the :,olded p trts, cemplet ?ly fillir;g it and climinating volu, AFTER the molded parts have been shrunk in place. (See Figurc.1).

1) Con. pound pact. aging and corrpound application guns shall be by Semco Sales and Service Inc., of Los Angelos, California.

^

11. Heat siirinkable tubing Aall be shrunk in place with'either an electrical"y heated air blower, or a gas fired catalytic hecter.

Ol'CN H.AMES SilALL IMT l K WED. Bloyer and heater shall be as manufactured.by the Raychri.. Corporation.

12. Splices and terminationr. of triaxial and coaxial cables shall be made with Amphenol, fif ty (50) ohm, splicing and terminating Illincis. Such splices and connectors 'for triasial and coaxial cabic, as manufactured by Bunk.r-Ramo Corporation of Oak 1: rook, terminations shall be inade strictly in accordance with the connector manufacturer's instructions.

13. Splices and terminations of all cables, other than triaxial and coaxial cablery shall be made in accor&nce. with Tables I, II, and 111 below.

r-. Page No. 2 s t

Splicing and Terminating InsEructions (Cont'd) -df !? f/ A. General Notes (Cont'd) f, 16. Each cable will be t' rung out" for identification and each cable will be tagged with an identification number at the splice box. 17. A two-foot sample of each type of cable in each tray will be removed for electrical examination of the insulation. Each sample is to be tagged with an identification number and sent to the Con Edison Technical Services Bureau, 708 First Ave. New York City for test. b 18. Hand tools will be used on all wires up to and including #4 AWG during splicing. a. The stripping tool shall be Ideal Industries #45-090C for conductor sizes #8 to

1. 12.

One tool shall be used for each different conductor size with only the one effective notch (all others ground out). The stop limit shall be adjusted on each tool to limit the length of insulation stripped. The tool shall be readily identifiable as to the size of connector it can be used on. b. The compression tool shall be Burndy Hytool MR-4.. (all others One tool shall be used for each dif ferent conductor size with only the one effective notch ground out). The tool shall be readily identifiable as to the size of connector it should be used on. 19. Power compression toolb shall be used on all wires above #4 AWG. a. Thomas & Betts. head UT15 and electric pump #15596 or equivalent Burndy tools with "circumferential" type dies shall be~ used to compress the connectors. The . dies shall imprint a clearly identifiable size number upon the compressed fitting. WED Co. quality control shall visually check each. connector after it is compressed to assure that the above number is imprinted and is clearly identifiable. b. An electricians.l knife shall be used to strip the insulation and jacketing materials from single and multiconductor cables. Care shall be taken not to nick conductors or insulations during these operations. 20. At the completion of the splicing each circuit shall be " rung out" for proper identi-fication. 21. A 500 volt DC insulation resistance test shall be made before splicing on the section of the cable to be reused. A 2500 V insulation resistance test will be made on each cable after the splice is completed. The tests shall be made both between conductors and from conductor o ground. Page No. 2A

m_ ~ Splicing and Terminating Instructions (Cont'd) A. General Notes (Cont'd) 14. Wherever field conditions prevent using the exact procedures specified in these nplicing and terminating instructions, a modified procedure, to suit the field ~ condition, shall be devised cmd submitted to UE&C for approval. 15. Splicing and terminating instructions for each type cable are given in numerical order from Tables II and III, which is not necessarily the order of installation. For this reason, it. is necessary to read all parts of the instruction before attempting any particular operation. h B. Table II TABLE I - SPLICING AND TERMINATING INSTRUCTIONS INSULATION FOLLOWING PROCEDURES LISTED SERVICE VOLTAGE CLASS (V) FOR SPLICING (see Table II) Power 600 SO2, SO5, SO6, S11, S11-A, S13, S21 and general notes 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. O Power 600 SO2, SO7, SO9, S11-B, S13, S15-A S18, S21 andgeneral notes 16,17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. Power & Control 600 S0 2, SO7, SO9, Sll-B, S16, S16-A S21 and general notes 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. O Page No. 3 1 e

O L d / / Y-i 1 g ,\\ e s i ,d C. Table TI TART.R T T - PROCFD1'RES FOR SPLICTNC i Pn00:9tr 1: NI *:3EiO DRSCRTPTIOT

~~~~

• 3 4-Sol

') Under no circumstances shall any splicing Le allowed wit tioot the prior notifiestion and, approval of procedure of UE&C Inc. 502 Similar to procedure nu:nber 501, except tiat splicing at penetration "rigtails" will be allowed without prior notification and approv.11. Page No. 4

.? ~ Splicing and Termin ting Instructirns (Cont'd) C,, Table 11' (Cont'd) _ TABLE II - PROCEDURES FOR SPLICING (Cont'd) } PROCEDURE NUMBER DESCRIPTION - See Splicing and Indoor Terminating Instructions UE6C Spec. No. 9321-05-113-4, l S03 for 8KV Crounded Neutral Cable '(Type 8 and Type C) dated July 2, 1970. SO4 In line splices of singic insulated conductors #6 AWC - #4/0, shall be insulated and scaled with Raychem, Clafs "D2" double diameter boo:s and Class "Y" silicons lf - ' rubber adhesive. S0$ Splices of insulated conductors, #6 AWC and larger, shall be made uit h turndy, long ba rrel, ":tydent," compression connectors. Primary insulation on each conductor chall be butted as close to the connector es possibic. S06 Splices between conductors of dif ferent size, in the range of #6 AIJG cnd largcra shall . be made in accordance with procedure r.cmber SOS, except that Barndy type Y-R reducing adaptors shall be used to accommodate the smaller conductor. 507 Splices of insulated conductors, #8 AWG and smaller, shall be nade with Burady, sheet barrel, "!!ydent " compression connectors. Primary insulation on cach conductur shall g be butted as close to the connector as possibic. SOS Shield tape drain wires shall be crimped using Burndy Hylink ce=pression coaneetors. Solid draio wires shall be crimped and soldered to insure a neod connection. Where no compression connector is available, drain wires shall be soldered. SO9 Splices between conductors of dif ferent s'ze, in the range of #10.Y.10 to #22 K.cc, shall (g be made with A-MP Inc. (Aircra f t Marine Products Inc., Harristurg, Pennsylvania) step-down ty'pe, pre-insulated, "Dia:ond Grip," ccmpression connectcrs, czewpt,that the connector insulation shall be removed before installation. Primary insulation.of each conductor shall be butted as cTose to the connector as possible. 510 In-line sp1!6es of single, insulated conductors, #8 AWG and sneller, shall he inselsted and scaled with Class "D1" heat shrinkable tubing (see General Note fil) and Class "X" silicone rubber adhesive (see General Note #12). a. Tubing and adhesive shall extend over the single cenductor prinary insulation for a mininum distance of two and one-half (25) inches f rom the terminati.on of the insulation on each side of the splice. r / 1 Page No. 5 e /

I Splic ing r nd Termin t i*n In't ruct i n' (C:nt'd), ~ C. Table 11 -(Cont 'd) s TA nf.E 'I T - PROCEDURES FOR SPLICINC (Cont'd) ?; PROCEDURE l _ NUMBER DESCRIPTION i. E S11 .In-line splices of single, insulated conductors, #6 AWC and larger, shall be insulated and sealed with Class "B" heat shrinkable tubing (see Cencral ?:ote #11). a. Tubing shall extend over the singic conductor primary insulation for a minimum distance of two (2) inches from the termination of the insulation, on each side of the splice. Sil-A ' Splices made in accordance with procedure number S11 shall be fire-proofed with Class ,"C" heat shrinkabic tubing (see General Note #8 and #9). Class "C" tubing shall , overlap the Class "B" tubing and/or the asbestos braid jacket by a minimum of 11, inches amt each end. S11-B Jn-line splices of single insulated conductors, #8 AWG and smaller, shall be insulated 'and sealed with Class "A" heat shrinkable tubing (see Cencral Note 'lll). a. Tuuing shall extend over the single conductor primary insulation for a minimum distance of two (2) inches from the termination of the insulation, on 4 each side of the splice. S12 Wye or tee splices shall be taped with " Scotch" brand electrical tape No. 70. Tape ~ .'shall be built up to 1.5 times the conductor primary insulation thickness. S13 Similar to procedure number S12, except tape shall be No. 33. 9 S14 ' Af ter stripping back the outer pVC jacket as required, a Icad sleeve shall be fore.sd over 'the spliced conductors and wiped to the cable's lead sheath, in accordance with standard ' utility practice, by splicers an,d Icad wipers proficient in such practice. Af ter. wiping is completed, the Icad sleeve shall be filled with a suitable insulatir.g compound, which !ts compatible to the materials with which it comes in contact. .l S15 ,;1n-line splices of silicone rubber insulated multi-conductor cables shall be con.pleted by cont inuing t he outermost silicone rubber jacket of the cable across the splice with a 5/8 inch Class "D1" heat shrinkable tubing and Class "A" silicone rubber adhocive. e a. Tubing shall extend over the outcrmost jacket fur a minimum distance of two (2) inches from the termination of the jacket on each side of the splice. Page No. 6 1

1 l ,Sylicing and Terminating Instructions (Con t,' d) C. Tahle II (Cont'd) 4 TABLE TT - PROCEDURES FOR SPLTCING (Cont'd) PROCEDURE NtHBER DESCPI' TION S15-A In-line splices, of insulated single conductor, multi-conductor, or multi-pair cable, shall be completed by continuing the outermost jacket of the conductor across the splice with Class "C" heat shrinkabic tubing (see Cencral Note #11). a. Tubing shall extend over the outermost jacket for a distance of tso (2) inches from the termination of the jacket on each side of the splice. S16 In-line splices of insulated multi-conductor cable shall be completed, by continuing the outermost jacket (not braid) of the cable across the splice, with Class "B" Seat shrinkable tubing (see Ceneral Note #11). a. Tubing shall extend over the outermost jacket (not braid) for a distance of two (2) inches, from the termination of the jacket, on each side of the splice. S16-A Splices completed in accordance with procedure number S16 shall be fire-proofed with r 2 Class "C" heat shrinkshic tubing (see General Notes 08 and #9). Class "C" tubing shall overlap Class "B" tubing and/or the asbestos braid jacket by a minimum of l'a inches at each end. S17 Wye or tee. splices shall be completed'by continuing the outernost jacket of the cable the splice with " Scotch" brand electrical tape No. 27. Tape shall be built up acress h to a thickness equal to that of the outermost jacket of the conductor. j { S18 6imilar to procedure number S17, except tape shall be No. 33. S19 Lead jacketed splices siiall be completed by contir.uf ng the PVC overall jacket across the splic'c with half-lapped " Scotch" brand electrical tape No. 33. Tzpe shall be ] built up to a thickness equal to that of the PVC. jacket. S20 Splice those single conductors which do not terminate on terminal blocks with "Scotchlok" brand insulated c1cctrical spring connectors. Splices outside of amplifier cabinets, terminal boxes and wireways will not be permitted. (This procedure does NOT apply at penetrations), j 1 e I e i . Pa ge No. 7 j h i

a Splicing nnd T rmin-ting Instructfrn, (CInt'd) e C. Table II.(Cont'd)

• TABI.E II - PROCEDl'RES FOR SPLICING - (Cont'd)

P R OCF D"' I' NINBER DESCRIPTiG .i S21 For special splices at penetrations, main control boirds, injunction boxes, and at reactor head, see Sketches SS1 - SS11 on UELC Drawing 9321-F-33363. 1 Sketch No Cable Type 2 SS1 G SS2 D SS3 Jork SS4 F 4 ~ SS5 N4 S$6 N3 SS7 D SSS D to E SS9 M4 to NS SS10 K SS11 N8 D. Tabl e TIT 9 TABLE III - PROCEDURES FOR TERMIh ATING PROCEDUi.E NtHEUt_ DESCRIPTION gl T01 See Splicing and Indoor Teminating Instructions UE6C Spec. No. 9321-05-113-4, fcr Three Conduc' tor 8':V Crounded Neutral Cable (Type B cnd Type C, dated July 2, 1970. T02 The outer PVC jacket shall be stripped back from the end (barrel end) of the terminal lug for a minimum distance of nine (9) inches and cle lead sheath shall be terminated without wiping, a minimum of seven (7) inches frem the tercaInat ion of the P'.'C jacket (see General Note #S). The PVC jacket and the lead sheath shall each be served with a section of Class "C" heat shrinkable tubing (see Ceneral No:e #11). Tubing serving the lead sheath shall extend for a uinir.um dir.tance of 'two (2) a. inches over the lead sheath on one end and one and one-half (15) inLhes over the conductor primary insulation on the other end, d Page No. 8

i N

O-SECTIO" D l

Indian Point Unit No. 2 Fire Structural and ?fechanical Ef fects and Investicati'n of' Potential Chemical Effects o A test program of the structural and mechanical components has been undertaken in the PAB since the fire. Although plans for testing are now fairly well developed, test results have largely not been received to date. Test results are excected in the,near future. The testing program includes the following items: Item 1 Samoles of insulation have been removed on a number of pipes in the PAB and tested for water soluble chloride. Test' ~ samples will be compared to the original engineering soecifi-cations for the insulation. These scecifications indicate the maximum chloride concentration permissible in the absence of inhibitor materials in the insulation. Testing is not complete at this time as further sampling is recommended in order to define specifically uhich areas require insulation removal and r'eplacen.ent and.,which areas have satisfactory insulation. Item 2 Structural Testing a) Structural steel has been measured for distortion. We have found one cross brace directly behind the area of the fire distorted and it recuired replacement. It is planned to box one column which shows slicht distortion, bu't is otherwise structurally acceptable. b) S'amples have been removed from'struct' ural steel in the building and tensile tests have been performed. Such testing indicates that the structural steel meets ori-ginally specified properti'es. c) Tensile tests have been conducted on structural bolts located in the structure above the fire. The test results have'not been received to-date. d) Visual examinations has been conducted on welds.in the structure. The results of the examinations have not been received to date. e) The concrete floor has been cored and core samoles are l being tested for stFencth and, in one area, for micro-i structure to determine whethen the fire caused any internal changes in the concrete. A visual examination of all concrete floor slabs has been conducted. One crack e e9e 9 4 e m.,-

--4 p 9 was found above the area of the fire on elevation 98'. Concrete in that area has been removed and will be replaced. f) Insulated wall panel exterior siding on the building has been examined by the siding manufacturer. All siding on the easterly end of the building will be replaced. g) The roofing has been examined by the roofing sub-contractor. Portions of the roof are now being repaired. Item 3 The PAB heating and ventilating unit in elevation 98' has'been tested. The motor is satisfactory based on megger testing of the insulation. The fan has been found satisfactory upon visual inspection. Galvanized parts' are being re-galvanized. Fan bearings will be serviced. Steam heating coils will be tested for leakage. Item 4 The weld channel-penetration pressurization air receiver tanks (4) will be inspected after consultation with the ASME code inspector to determine precisely what testing is reauired. It is planned to inspect and rework as necessary air _ pressure regulator valves on the air receivers and to replace the air receiver safety valves. Item 5 In general, motor operated valves are considered to be satis-factory although it is also planned to test.the motors by megger. In addition, limit switches on the motor operated valves will be tested in the areas in cuestion. Because there is some cuestion that the fire may have affected the diachrarms in some valve operators, plans have been nade-to have available spare diaphragas. Also, it will be determined if certain testing can be done on valve diaphrags operators in order to provide a basis for certi-fying that the operators are satisfactory. Item 6 I To identify the chemistry of the water applied to fighting the fire in the PAB, copies of past-water analyses made on the city water, on or about November 4, 1971, will be obtained. Item 7 By use of steam cleaning, sand blasting and repainting the smoke and heat affected areas are being restored to their original clean condition.

d I

,~ ,,3 ( ) v v Attachment No. 1 to this section is a report nrepared by the Chemical Bureau of the Consolidated Edison Company, which discusses the results of an investigation into the' fire effects sustained by the PAB as a result of the November 4, 1971 fire. 1 .MS' g O g e c. .m.,.. .a - . -mmm~r~~ - -W w--

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3:p i;.i n = ~ u ~^ ' SECTION D - ATTACHMENT NO. 1 Fire Effects in Primarv Auxiliary Building Indian Point Unit No. 2 There are four types of fire effects of concern - heat, smoke, water and chemical attack from the hydrochloric acid formed from the burned polyvinyl chloride cable covering. Heat has buckled a few structural steel members in the immediate vicinity of the site of the fire at the 80' elevation and these.will be repaired or replaced.- The corrugated steel' support for the concrete at the 98' elevation showed some fire effects, but this steel serves no structural function. Heat effects to the concrete may have resulted in differential expansion and possible cracking, but the reinforcement rods would have counteracted this. Some fine cracking was observed in the concrete floors, but this was probably-present prior to the fire and is of no major concern. Fire effects to the-tanks and pioing were probably limited to the areas where paint on the tanks had charred and flaked. Piping-joints were marked with plastic tape strips and many components were tagged. No fire effects were observed on the tags or ' tape. Tests in the laboratory-indicate that th'e tape chars below 400 F, suggesting tha.-the piping t had not exceeded this temperature. This would_ preclude any sensiti- ^ zation of the stainless steel piping or equipment as a result of the fire. Fire effects in the form of charred paint could be seen on the top-and bottom of the Pressurization Air Receiver No. 22, the top of' Pressurization Air Receiver No. 24 and the bottom of Boric Acid Tank. No. 21. Brinnel hardness measurements were made on the Pressurization Air Receiver No. 22 in areas showing the greatest effects. The~ measured hardness was in the range of 120 to 143 BHN. These values are satisfactorily low and preclude quenching and hardening as a result of the fire. No distortion was observed in any of the tanks.- Structural effects due to water would not be. expected, except on pipe lagging. Pipe lagging which has-been affected by water'will be ~ replaced. All other surfaces will be cleaned to their' original. specifications. Electrical equipment which has been affected by water or combustion products will' either be replaced cn? cleaned to restore ~them tx) original design specifications. It is probable that. hydrochloric acid vapors permeated the. building. since corrosion products removed from copper; piping. remote from the fire showed greenish deposits. In addition, paper equipment tags changed color from medium blue to a. light green.. -Similar color' changes were produced by exposing one of these new tags 1x) hydro- . chloric acid vapor. Water did not discolor the card. Li

f e o u Carbon steel components exposed to hydrochloric acid would uniforaly corrode until either the acid had all reacted or evaporated. This corrosion would not be extensive and even this attack is minimal since nost of the nininc and other components had been painted and the paint was unaffected. A small amount of corrosion could be observed on sote unoainted hangers and in scattered areas on galvanized conduit pipe but this is of no concern. Acid attack on non-sensitized stainless steel would produce uniform corrosion. This was not observed under high power magnification. Any effect, if present at all, would have been removed in the cleaning, leaving the material in an as new condition. Attack in areas sensi-tized by welding could produce intergranular corrosion. Since no surface cracking was observed, it is probable that no attack took place. The metallurgy laboratory will attempt to verify this conclusion by duolicating the exposure of sensitized stainless steel to hydrochloric acid. Here also, any surfaces which were painted were unaffected since they were not exposed. Similarly any painted concrete surfaces can be considered as not having been exposed to the acid. Core samples of concrete have been taken in an area near the fire where the paint had been abraded by constant traffic and another area where the floor had not been exposed to the acid and the paint covering was intact. Chloride determinations will be made in various areas of these samoles to determine whether any acid had permeated the surface. Sin'ce no rust spots indicative of reinforcing were observed on the c'oncrete-surfaces and all surfaces which were repainted are intact, it is probable no significant effect to concrete took place. Further tests to verify the integrity of all materials in contact with hcl. vapors include: 1. Deposit Analyses 2. Water Samole Analyses 3. Concrete Chemical and Mechanical Tests 4. Metallurgical Analyses Reports on the findings of these tests and any others' deemed necessary will be prepared. 9 mM wwrmmm em _ - _ x. . m _ ..u - m m r_ - -o-m _m

~-m [. F"- a 3..atedEdisonCompr[ofN.Y.,Inc. s; ~ $ CcnfAng Place, Naw York, J. 10003 fi 2elephone (212) 460-5181 4 jl c Movember 24, 1971 Re: Ind4== Deisk Station Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-247 Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director Division of asactor I.icensimy U. 5. Atomic Enargy ccanission i Washington, D. c. 20545

Dear Dr. marris:

'\\ w: L Our letter of November 14, 1971 submitted a 2 report describing the fire incident dich 'oce'arred on p November 14 and indicated that we would be in e ^r*et B with your office as soon as further discussions were appropriate. With regard to restoration of fire damage t 1 please ba :.dvised that vc plan to restore the building l 3 and its equipacnt' to the conditionn uhich preceded the i fire ar4 to umet in all respects the Unit 2 Final Facility ascription and Safaty Analyzio Report. 'this restoraties

T will be accouplished by thoroughly cimammir the baileias, i

l 1 testing its cessponents and repincirrf or respiring those j which are damaged. In particular the motor control centers and lighting switch gear which were damaged will be replaced with new equissaent and will be conamoted to l existing undamaged cables with splices, installed ame j tested in a manner to preserve the reliability of the ( approved design. on Wednesday, November 24, 1971 we met with I regresentatives of Region 1 of the Division of Complianoe. 1.. .[ our plans Apr the restoration were A4h at that ging { [ and we espect to be in fearther contact with aegian 1 as -!/ the week psegresses. Should you have any questians l regarding this west we are avai1=Ma to meet with your i staff and,to peevi_ seah inforumtion as you any require. i 4 Di

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