ML20083N574

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Forwards Remaining Final Draft Responses to Instrumentation & Control Sys Branch Questions Per 821005 Request.Responses Reflect Results of Info Exchange Meetings W/Nrc
ML20083N574
Person / Time
Site: 05000447
Issue date: 01/31/1983
From: Sherwood G
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To: Eisenhut D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JNF-005-83, JNF-5-83, MFN-017-83, MFN-17-83, NUDOCS 8302020023
Download: ML20083N574 (25)
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{{#Wiki_filter:. - _ - _ _ G E N E R A L h; E LE CTRIC NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY.175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CAUFORNIA 95125 MFN. 017-83 MC 682, (408) 925-5040 JNF =. 005-83 January 31, 1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Mr. D.G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

IN THE MATTER OF 238 NUCLEAR ISLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT (GESSAR II) DOCKET NO. STN 50-447 Attached please find the remaining final draft responses to the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB) questions in the Commission's October 5,1982 request for additional information. These responses reflect the NRC/GE information exchanga meetings held in Bethesda October 14 & 15, 1982; San Jose December 7-9, 1982; and again in Bethesda January 11-13, 1983. This transmittal contains the last three responses for the 421-series as promised in our previous submittal dated January 28, 1983. They are 421.16, 22 and 32. Sincerely, Glenn G. Sherwoo, Manager Nuclear Safety & Licensing Operation Attachments M.J. Virgilio, NRC cc: D.C. Scaletti, NRC _I L.S. Gifford, GE-Bethesda (Without Attachments) g F.J. Miraglia (Without Attachments) g;oO> C.0. Thomas (Without Attachments) U R.M. Ketchel (Without Attachments) 83C2020023 830131 PDR ADOCK 05000447 A PDR

I of [ 421.16 QUESTION ( Identify any "first-of-a-kind" instruments used in, or providing i inputs to, safety-related systems. Include any microprocessors, multiplexers or computer systems which are used in, or interface with, safety-related systems. l 421.16

RESPONSE

The GESSAR II design incorporates the Solid State Safety System which fundamentally replaces relays with solid-state devices. All hardware components for GESSAR II are identical with those used in the Clinton plant, and also with those planned for TVA, Skagit, Black Fox and Allen's Creek. Therefore GESSAR II, of itself, does not have any first-of-a-kind equipment. However, these solid-state plant designs employ three basic types of devices which are new compared with Grand Gulf, Perry, Riverbend and previous BWR's. These are listed and discussed as follows: 1. The logic itself is solid-state as mentioned above. Functionally, this logic performs the same (i.e. has the same Boolean expressions) as other BWR 6 relay plants .for all safety-related systems except the RPS. Solid-state i RPS utilizes "2-out-of-4" channels to scram as compared / with "1-out-of-2 twice" for relay plants. \\f The self-test feature is unique with the solid-state logic. 2. This feature is described in conjunction with protection 7.1.2.1.6 of system in-service testability in subsection GESSAR II. Analog trip modules (ATM's) replace the more conventional 3. Analog Comparitor Units (ACU's) for solid-state plants. Functionally, both types of trip units serve the same purpose, but ATM's are designed to interface with the self-test feature. The following information is added at the request of the NRC 7 9, 1982: after reviewing 421.16 at the GE/NRC meeting December The PRA fault trees assume a 2.4 hour repair time for instrument failures based on the self-test feature applied to solid state instruments. This is somewhat less than values used in previous PRA's (16 WASH 1400), but in no cases does it significantly affect the results. The PRA is a realistic assessment which accounts for all available systems regardless of design classiification. Availability of these systems within the context of various failure modes is accounted for in the analysis. [

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PR A F T~ 421.16 RESPONSE (centinued) The following additional information is provided at the NRC's request following the ICSB review meeting in Bethesda, January 11-13, 1983. Safety Grade Application of Microprocessors MN ntrol The Rod Pattern Contro11 era, )which is a subsystem of the Rod and Information System (RC&IS, is the only design based safety grade applica+. ion gf microprocessors and multipexers. RPC is two I divisional,*Montains safety related components with the logic hardwired. It is not site programmable. The programs can only be modified by engineering approved changes to and replacement of i electronic circuit cards. l The Rod Position Information Systems (RPIS), which is also a subset of RC&IS, while not required, is designed in a similar fashion to the RPC. It is also a 2 divisional system with safety-related components. the RPC and RPIS are separated from non-safety related portions of the RC&IS via isolators. Manual Scram of RPS The manual scram for GESSAR II shares the common logic with the auto scram at the trip logic level. There is a way to scram independent of the NSPS logic by manually tripping at the local panel the breakers protecting both A & B solenoids for a given group of rods. The scram methods for GESSAR II are basically consistent with those employed on the Clinton design. i The self test system has the following characteristics, capabilities, & design configurations with respect to specific questions from the January 11 & 22, 1983 meeting in Bethesda, MD. A general description is presented in GESSAR II, Section 7.1.2.1.6. Simulations Test of Two Divisions i The self test system, during the normal testing cycle, will send a test pattern to another division so that the inter-divisional communication path can be verified. This test is under a master / slave arrangement, with the division under test being the Master. During this test, the functional logic in one channel of two different divisions may be tested simultaneously. This test, however, will be under the same timing control (less than 1 msec.) as the other tes.ts and so cannot cause or prevent a trip. 7 l Pulse duration The maximum time a functional input can see a test pulse is controlled by three different and independent means. First, the software generates timing pulses, as shown on the timing sheets provided as handouts during the self-test presentation. The gating pulses are I __ =,.

91I Is A HP" "** f Uvpb QM FT 345 Pulse ' duration - (continued) about 1 msec maximum duration. There is a separate timing circuit in each self test division which is hard wired and is checked against a different crystal clock than the normal self test timing elements. The self test timing is checked against this hard wired timer and a difference would be reported as a self test internal test failure. The final pulse limiting circuitry exists on the functional logic cards. is treated as part of the functional logic, and consists of a capacitor / resistor circuit which only permits a test signal to appear on a functional input for approximately 1 msec. The unlikely failure of this highly reliable component could be detected during plant shutdown by special testing. However, the self test remains single failure

< oof with regard to pulse limiting even given the failure of these components.

Response Time Testing The self test system will report any deviation in the (,utput of a logic string from its expected state. Logic strings are tested end-to-end (NSPS input device to output device) with the same maximum timing constraints (less than 1 msec). Therefore, the maximum propagation delay (response time) through any logic channel in the NSPS will always be less than 1 msec or the self test system will report a logic fault. This constitutes a response time test of the logic components every hour. Responses of external elements such as - transmitters and motors would be testable as normally required. Fault Alarm The self test system will provide ar. alarm on a logic fault or an internal self test fault by means of a window annunciator on the main control panel. These alarms are independent of diagnostic failure information available through the process computer interface. Trip Setpoints The recommended frequency of the trip setpoint check of the ATMs is one month. This recomendation will be conveyed to the applicant through technical specification inputs. t -ww-g-,--ww-

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El.u gesrome (cdrad l=tgAL psAFr 't 4 5 Reliability & Qualification The self test s'ysten is comprized of highly reliable, consnercially proven components. Solid state logic elements and other components are purchased MIL 3rade to insure maximum reliability. All boards are fully test before being installed in the self test system. During NSPS panel qualification tt its, the self test system is exercised before and after the seismic tests to ensare operability. Latchina Circuits The NSPS latching circuits, composed of a resistor / capacitor network,are designed with an approximate minimum time delay of 20 ms. Since the maximum self test pulse duration.is 1 ms, there is no dangerof the test latching a circuit. The exact time de'.ay of the latching circuits is determined during the individual card tests prior to installation in the NSPS panels. Special testing during plant shutdown could reverify the timing of these latching circuits. Software Verification The self-test system to be provided on GES$AR plants will have its sof tware designed in accordance with G.E.'s Software Engineering Manual. This manual was submitted in draf t form for NRC staff review and will be formally submitted after receipt of NRC comments. Manual and Aur.omatic Mode Circuit Sharing The NSPS is designed as all previous G.E. BWR designs, to maintain independance I between automatic and manual functions as much as practical. .g I N e - ~ -.

y y.ta RES!!!CS (Cnfik*eN) ^ f jflA L l?R A FT' 5 '$ 5 Manual and Automatic Mode Circuit Sharing (Continued) Sharing of manual and automatic' functions through load drivers is done in some cases such as the RPS scram function. The justification for this is that no cammon mode failure can be postulated that would hot short these lhad drivers on more than one channel, since the design complies fully with RG 1.75 separation criteria. In addition, load driver circuits are designed to handle any known type of electrical disturbance on their output. Over-voltage pro-tection is provided to handle approximately an order of magnitude more that the expected voltage, and current capabilities are many times that which is required. O ~ e l =

QUESTION [g L in Section 7.2.1.1.F.2 cf our FSAR, ytu indicate that the reacter system mode switch is 421.22 used for protective functions, restrictive interlocks and refueling equipment movement.. (7.2.1). Discuss how this mode switch is incorporated into the overall design so that the single failure criterion and separation requirements are satisfied. Use detailed drawings and schematics as appropriate. t, T ^

RESPONSE

The Resctor Protection System (RPS) mode switch provides bypasses and interlocks associated with various plant operation modes: run,. start-up and hot standby, refuel and shutdown. The mode switch has four contact blocks, each physically separated within compart-mental barriers. 5 witch action for each contact block is provided by a non. metal shaft. p. ._ } e Tho' contacts within each block (Bank A,8,C,0) perform intertecking functions within ,C 3 .7...

  • U their associated division (1,2,3,4) respectively.The contact block designated to Div. h is located closest to the rotation stop (or front of switch) and the other blocks follow in'- f order (i.e., 2,3,4 away from switch front).

The operation of the switch is under strict procedural control; therefore, ths' ope when switching modes, is checking the plant's condition through indications provided* ~ . *.J. it display computer and performance monitoring computer);.' gy ,l M.gy..,., (status lites, annunc a ors,. Discrepenciesd between;these d p. ,?gOk 7g.M. ;} #8tl.fY.the operator th' t the inode has,not changed ;--- - a 8 ~. ~ ....,p. %.' *, a :.* : c t.- The display computer monitors each position of the mode switch. 5pecific annunciators Jf . ~.. .e provide Indication such as " modo sw in shutdown" within each division and " mode svr not in run" within each division. 5everal annunciators and status lights are interlocked i such that before a tripped condition from NMS,W, RPS channels are indicated, the mode switch has to be in 'run' position. %4. Because of the interlocking'd;visionallogics of the Reactor Protection System, failurs of contact blocks will not prevent normal protective action of the safety system (scram)y.3

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421.224 QUESTION Perfom a FMEA for a postulated break in the reactor mode switch. The break is to be postulated for a one position at a time switch movement upwards or downwards. Only functional inouts need be can91dared. Positions between noneal positions need not be con-sidered. e RESPON5E The attached Mode Switch Functional Matrix is fomatted to illus. trate which functions are normally perfomed in each of the four operating modes (switch positions). Each switch Bank corresponds to one logie channal. It should be noted that most functions re-4 quire four Bank channels but some require only two. The attached FMEA tables illustrata the postulated break locations and show which functions are imposed or bypassed for each break location when the Mode Switch is. moved upward or downward to a different mode position. The only break locations of concem are between Banks A and B (Banks B,C,D potentially malfunction) and between B and C (Banks A and B function normally but C and D potentially malfunction). A bretsk between C and D causes potential malfunctions in only one Bank channel and one channel alone cannot degrade safety or initiate any 4etion. As' shown on the FMEA a ffectsa description, there are no effects e which degrade plant safety. There are esses where an undesireable trip would occur or rod motion is prohibited. These events would only affect availsbility and not plant safety. l O Q a

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I ~ F p. h,f*? '" ~'d '77 Mf b ( I3:3 ' -/ QUESTION E 3P a. Based on our review, it appears the the proposed logi.c I (, 421.32 for manual initiation for several ESP systems is interlocked with permissive logic from vario,us sensors. In some cases, it appears that the permissive logic is dependenc on the same sensors as those used for auto-matic initiation of the system. Our position on this matter is 'that the capability to manually initiate 1 each safety system should be independent of the permissive logic, the sensors and the circuitry used for automatic initiation of that system. (Refer to Section 4.17 of IEEE Std. 279). Identify each safety system which is ' interlocked in a manner similar to that described above. Provide proposed modifications or justification for the present design. In this regard, manual control of actuated devices at the motor control center (MCC) h,as been typically Our review of drawings provided in previous designs. I-960 A through M indicates that this feature has not i Provide your been provided for your proposed design. rationale for not providing local control at the MCC's. b{SI 32 AESU"K ($ge atTacised 3 pasea) i t i ~ ~ ~ - a* --,,,m.

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RESPONSE

QUESTION 421.32 ESF Manual Initiseion The ESF systems meet IEEE 279, paragraph 4.17, since each individual system manual initiation. Two of the ESF systems and subsystem has provisions for (MS-JLCS and the shutdown cooling mode of RHR) are manually initiseed and have A third system, CRVICS, is initiated automatically no automatic initiation. as well as, manually; however, there are no interlocks involved in nianual 1 operation. ECCS subsystems (HPCS, LPCS, LPCI, and ADS) and the containment spray The four mode of RHR share cosmon interlocks between the automatic and manual initiatio modes. This arrangement is acceptable for several reasons. The individual subsystems of ECCS are not required to meet theThe EC 1. single failure criterion. of its subsystems inoperative. The two loops of the containment spray mode are completely separate 2. and no single failure could prevent operation of both loops. All cansors, transmitters, and trip units used in permissive logic for 3. systaa initiators are Class 1E and are completely qualified for their In addition, the testability features of the design application. permit frequent checks during normal operation to verify operability. I. ECCS LPCS and LPCI (Loop A) The LPCS and LPCI (Loop A) subsystendare initiated automatically by a LOCA signal (low reactor water level and/or high d,rywell pressure) or by a single system-level remote manual switch.* In either mode, two interlocks, apply: 1. Power availability on pump motor bus ** Reactor pressure below set point (applies to injection valves only: 2. 1 of 2 twice logic) *** The LPCS and LPCI (Loop A) subsystems can be initiated individually by use of In this mode, the individual remote manual switches for each valve and pump. injection valves cannot be opened unless either of two pressure permissives is present.- Reactor pressure below set point (same sensors as for system level 1. initiation: 1 of 2 twice logic)** ~ Pressure at each injection valve below set point (2 out of 2 log'ic; 5 2. No sensors are shared between LPCS and LPCI-A.) e . l e oe e -e e e-e .e. e.. e -- amun- -, _j

awn t(ee & b FIMA v QR A FT' ^ ~ n .y I. ECCS (Coot.)~ LPCS and LPCI (LOOP A) Ona initiation logic circuit is used for both LPCS and LPCI(A).

    • Separate " power available" sensor for each subsystem.
    • 4 One pressure permissive circuit applies to both subsystems l

LPCI Loops B and C No sensors are shared between Identical with LPCS and LPCI (Loep A) preceding. LPCI (B&C) and LPCS/LPCI(A). ADS The ADS function is initiated automatically by a LOCA signal (Iow reactor water level and/or high drywell pressure) or by system-levd remote manual switches. the LPCS In either case, the ADS valves are prevented from opening unless In addition, each individual pump, or one of the three LPCI pumps, is running. ADS valve can opened ranually without restrictions. HPCS The HPCS subsystem is initiated automatically by a LOCA signal (low reactor watsr level in a 1 out of 2 twice logic arrangement.o_r_ high drywell pressure in 1 out of In addition, the 2 twice logic)or manually by a system level armed pushbutton. subsystem can be placed in operation by use of an individual remote manual switch In all three initiation modes, the injection valve for each valve and the pump. is interlocked closed by high water level (level 8) in a 2 out of 2 logic If the valve is open, hgh water level (level 8) will cause it to arrangement. ,2l;, % g.-2 4 (47N})

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